Abstract:
It is generally recognised that election management bodies (EMBs) constitute one of the most
important institutions needed to sustain Africa‟s fledgling transition to democratic and
constitutional governance. They are needed to ensure that all political actors adhere to the
rules of the electoral contest and that the outcome of elections are not predetermined and are
based on free and fair processes that reflect the genuine will of the people. However, frequent
incidents of post-election violence in which citizens question the role played by the EMBs in
the last few years have raised many questions about their role which has not been
systematically and thoroughly investigated.
This paper aims to take a critical look at the legal framework relating to the setting up and
regulation of EMBs in a selected number of countries in the Eastern and Southern African
region to see whether there is any possible connection between the manner in which they are
structured and the effectiveness of their operations. Does the legal framework of an EMB
have anything to do with the acceptance or non-acceptance of the electoral results of elections
organised by the EMB? Are there any lessons that can be learnt by comparing the legal
framework of the EMBs of countries where election results are generally accepted with that
of countries where the announcement of election results have often provoked violence? The
establishment of an EMB is supposed to be a clear sign of a firm commitment by a country to
constitutionalism and constitutional democracy. This does not always turn out to be so. From
the comparative analysis of the experiences of the selected countries, this study will highlight
some of the major lessons that can be drawn in designing EMBs in order to enhance their
performance and credibility.
