Post-1992 Mozambique : an analysis of failed peace agreements and the resultant conflict in Cabo Delgado

Abstract

This study critically analyses the three peace agreements in Mozambique and the ensuing socio-economic and political environment that contributed to the emergence of ISIS-affiliated Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jamaa (ASWJ) in the Cabo Delgado province. Despite three signed peace agreements, peace remains absent in Mozambique. The study’s key findings demonstrate the limitations of the liberal peace paradigm and assumptions on peacebuilding in Mozambique as it facilitated elitist peace agreements that neglect victims and the broader population. Secondly, an interplay of longstanding symbiotic socio-economic and political factors that remain unaddressed are rooted in colonialism. Lastly, these exist and are compounded by the globalised system and its pressures.

To comprehend these findings, decoloniality and relative deprivation theories were used as analytical tools to comprehend colonial legacies that remain relevant in understanding Mozambique’s contemporary challenges, including approaches applied in peace processes and agreements, the Cabo Delgado crisis, which relative deprivation further helped to explain how the frustrations and anger of the Cabo Delgado population can manifest into violence. Most Mozambicans remained afflicted by unaddressed colonial legacies, the impact of intrastate wars, weak governance, socio-economic marginalisation, and neglect against an increasingly corrupt government and elite. The 2014 and 2019 peace agreements similarly failed to deliver peace because ‘national unity and reconciliation’ as articulated in the agreements can only be achieved if they go beyond FRELIMO and RENAMO and prioritise and address the plight of all Mozambicans.