



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA  
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**POST-1992 MOZAMBIQUE: AN ANALYSIS OF FAILED PEACE AGREEMENTS  
AND THE RESULTANT CONFLICT IN CABO DELGADO**

**by**

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**A mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES**

**In the Department of Political Science**

**Faculty of Humanities**

**University of Pretoria**

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**September 2022**

## DECLARATION

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## **DEDICATION**

To my daughter, Beverly.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first and foremost thank God for this milestone. My deepest gratitude to my Supervisor Prof Victoria Graham. Prof, thank you for your patience and guidance through this journey, your support, encouragement, and constant reminder of my abilities pushed and challenged me to finish.

My gratitude to my family, your encouragement through phone calls and texts have sustained me. To my parents, my brothers Kopano Makamase and Thabiso Makamase, you have always supported me and for that I am grateful.

I would like to thank the African First Ladies Database (AFLD), for their contribution to my registration at the beginning of this journey. This Masters would not have been possible without various financial contributions, thank you all for seeing me.

I would like to thank Dr Chenai Matshaka for reading and commenting on my work. Dr Madalitso Zililo Phiri, thank you for the intellectually invigorating conversations, friendship, and motivation throughout this process. Mr Kafui Tsekpo, I owe a great deal of gratitude to you, thank you for your reassurance, support, and availability. I questioned myself a lot through this process and your support helped me push through.

Lastly, thank you to all my friends and family who have directly and indirectly supported me through this period. You have made this challenging and lonely journey a bearable one.

## ABSTRACT

This study critically analyses the three peace agreements in Mozambique and the ensuing socio-economic and political environment that contributed to the emergence of ISIS-affiliated Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jamaa (ASWJ) in the Cabo Delgado province. Despite three signed peace agreements, peace remains absent in Mozambique. The study's key findings demonstrate the limitations of the liberal peace paradigm and assumptions on peacebuilding in Mozambique as it facilitated elitist peace agreements that neglect victims and the broader population. Secondly, an interplay of longstanding symbiotic socio-economic and political factors that remain unaddressed are rooted in colonialism. Lastly, these exist and are compounded by the globalised system and its pressures.

To comprehend these findings, decoloniality and relative deprivation theories were used as analytical tools to comprehend colonial legacies that remain relevant in understanding Mozambique's contemporary challenges, including approaches applied in peace processes and agreements, the Cabo Delgado crisis, which relative deprivation further helped to explain how the frustrations and anger of the Cabo Delgado population can manifest into violence. Most Mozambicans remained afflicted by unaddressed colonial legacies, the impact of intrastate wars, weak governance, socio-economic marginalisation, and neglect against an increasingly corrupt government and elite. The 2014 and 2019 peace agreements similarly failed to deliver peace because 'national unity and reconciliation' as articulated in the agreements can only be achieved if they go beyond FRELIMO and RENAMO and prioritise and address the plight of all Mozambicans.

**Key Concepts:** Peace, peace agreements, governance, decoloniality, marginalisation

## Table of Contents

DECLARATION .....	i
DEDICATION .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACRONYMS.....	viii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	ix
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY .....	1
1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Research Problem .....	3
1.3. Research Questions.....	5
1.4. Significance of the Study .....	5
1.5. Literature review.....	6
1.5.1. Perspectives on Peace and Peace Agreements.....	6
1.5.2. Peace in Mozambique .....	8
1.5.2.1. Cabo Delgado Insurgency.....	10
1.6. Conceptual Framework.....	10
1.6.1. Peace .....	10
1.6.2. Peace agreements.....	11
1.6.3. Governance .....	11
1.7. Theoretical Framework.....	12
1.7.1. Decoloniality.....	12
1.8. Research Methodology .....	18
1.8.1. Research Approach and Design.....	18
1.8.2. Data Collection and Analysis.....	19
1.9. Ethical considerations .....	19
1.10. Limitations of the Study.....	19
1.11. Chapter Outline .....	20
CHAPTER TWO .....	22
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MOZAMBIQUE: FROM COLONIALISM TO POST- INDEPENDENCE (1480s – 1992).....	22
2.1. Introduction.....	22
2.2. The Colonial History of Mozambique: 1500s- 1975 .....	23
2.3. Independence in 1975 and the New FRELIMO in Government.....	30

2.3.1. Mozambique’s Political Economy between 1975- 1984 .....	33
2.4. The Civil War in Mozambique 1977- 1992 .....	35
2.5. Mozambique In The World: From 1500s to 1991 .....	36
2.6. Conclusion .....	37
CHAPTER THREE .....	40
MOZAMBIQUE’S PEACE AGREEMENTS 1992- 2019: IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND SECURITY .....	40
3.1. Introduction.....	40
3.2. Peace and Peace Agreements in Mozambique: 1992-2019 .....	41
3.2.1. The Consolidation of Peace in Mozambique .....	45
3.3. Conclusion .....	47
CHAPTER FOUR.....	49
UNDERSTANDING MOZAMBIQUE’S PEACE AGREEMENTS AND RECURRING CONFLICT IN CABO DELGADO .....	49
4.1. Introduction.....	49
4.2. Peace Agreements Limitations and Drivers of the Cabo Delgado Conflict.....	51
4.3. Political and Economic Grievances .....	54
4.3.1.1. Corruption, Poverty, and Inequality.....	57
4.3.1.2. Limited Governance vs Ungoverned Territories.....	58
4.3.2. Resource Induced Conflict in Cabo Delgado.....	60
4.3.3. Youth Radicalization .....	62
4.4. Elite Settlement, National Integration, and the case of Cabo Delgado .....	63
4.5. Conclusion .....	65
CHAPTER FIVE .....	66
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF PEACE IN POSTCOLONIAL MOZAMBIQUE .....	66
5.1. Introduction.....	66
5.2. Summary of Key Findings .....	66
5.3. Conclusion: Hindrances to Durable Peace in Mozambique.....	68
5.4. Recommendations for Further Research.....	70
6. Bibliography .....	72

## ACRONYMS

ACHPR	African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights
ANC	African National Congress
ASWL	Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah
CIO	Central Intelligence Office
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique/ Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FOMICRES	Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reinsertion
GPD	Gross Domestic Product
GPA	Rome General Peace Accord
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILPI	International Law and Policy Institute
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MANU	Mozambican African National Union
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PRE	Economic Rehabilitation Programme
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana/ Mozambique National Resistance
SERAC	Social and Economic Rights Action Center
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UDENAMO	National Democratic Union of Mozambique/ União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	National African Union of Independent Mozambique
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USD	United States Dollar
WNLA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1:	Map of Mozambique.....	3
Figure 4.1:	Population breakdown of Cabo Delgado.....	50
Figure 4.2:	Map of Cabo Delgado and attacks linked to ASWJ from 2017.....	51

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

#### 1.1. Introduction

This study critically analyses Mozambique's 1992, 2014, and 2019 peace agreements. It delves into the post-1992 socio-economic and political landscape in Mozambique to understand factors that have contributed to recurring conflicts, specifically the Cabo Delgado crisis despite three peace agreements aimed at establishing peace for all Mozambicans. See Figure 1.1 for a map of Mozambique, showing the Cabo Delgado province. Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. Since then, it has had three peace agreements – 1992, 2014, and 2019 – aimed at resolving intrastate conflict between Frente de Libertação de Moçambique/ Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana/ Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and building peace for all Mozambicans.

The Rome General Peace Accord (GPA), framed according to the UN Agenda for Peace and signed in 1992, was the first peace agreement signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The peace negotiations were chaired by Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo and mediators included Mario Raffaelli, Jaime Goncalves, Andrea Riccardi, and Matteo Zuppi. (Government of Mozambique, 1992). It ended over 15 years of civil war and aimed to build peace, democracy, national reconciliation, and unity for all Mozambicans. The perceived success of the GPA led to Mozambique being regarded as a successful post-conflict state by the international community, though this view was not without contestation (Vines, 2020). Between 2012 and 2013, the GPA collapsed when parties returned to conflict over allegations of political and economic marginalisation, among other grievances (Vines, 2020). Two more peace agreements in 2014 and 2019 were produced, yet peace remains elusive in Mozambique (Government of Mozambique 2014, 2019).

Through a decolonial lens, this study aims to understand the limitations in the liberal peace paradigm applied to addressing conflicts in Mozambique, primarily between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The liberal peace approach assumes the promotion of democracy, open markets

and “institutions associated with modern states are a driving force for building peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Zambakari, 2016). This parochial logic has dominated peacebuilding efforts in Mozambique, thus ostensibly producing elitist peace agreements serving FRELIMO and RENAMO interests, neglecting the potential of other elements and spoilers evolving into grave security threats (Newman and Richmond, 2006). These limitations, therefore, necessitate decolonial thinking to building peace in Mozambique as alternatives to the liberal peace paradigm, which has thus far failed to establish sustainable peace (Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2009b).

As noted above, these peace agreements were initially perceived to be successful by the international community (Phiri, 2012; Darch, 2018). However, the recurrence and emergence of new conflict dynamics demonstrate the failures of these peace agreements, which can be arguably attributed to economic and political challenges (Darch, 2018). Druckman and Wagner (2019) state that justice variables are significant in peace and reconciliation, and when neglected, the prospects of durable peace are fewer hence numerous peace agreements eventually fail, such as witnessed in Mozambique. According to Peace Agreements data set by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), over 40% of the 216 intrastate peace agreements between 1975-2011 saw renewed conflicts within five years, especially in cases of delayed political and military reforms and lack of economic growth (Willcoxon, 2017; Druckman and Wagner, 2019). For Murithi (2009, p. 5), peace agreements are confronted with:

“[T]he of lack political willingness at the implementation phase, the neglect of socio-economic issues, political justice, human rights, and reconciliation for the broader population which are secondary and often neglected in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building”.

The 2019 peace agreement in Mozambique was signed amid escalating security threats in Cabo Delgado – northern Mozambique – that began in 2017. This raised acute questions on how the peace agreement that sought to establish peace and national reconciliation failed to account for the challenges faced in and by the Cabo Delgado region.

**Figure 1.1: Map of Mozambique**



Source: ACCORD. Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/ignoring-the-roots-of-mozambiques-war-in-a-push-for-military-victory/>.

## 1.2. Research Problem

Mozambique gained its independence through a decade of nationalist-liberation war that ended in 1975. This struggle for independence was led by a nationalist movement of Mozambicans under FRELIMO. However, at the dawn of independence fractions within the nationalist movements led to the formation of RENAMO, a counter nationalist opposition to FRELIMO (Vines, 1991). Post-independence Mozambique has grappled with persistent intrastate conflicts, primarily between FRELIMO and RENAMO (Vines, 2019). In 1977, a civil war that would last 15 years broke out because of disagreements about the nature of independence that carried over into concerns regarding the political and socio-economic trajectory of post-independent Mozambique. This war ended with the signing of the GPA in 1992.

The GPA, being the first peace agreement, was framed based on assumptions of liberal peace, promoted by the United Nations (UN) (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The UN-backed peace agenda sought to end the root causes of conflicts by promoting liberal democratic ideals such as electoral democracy, creation of criminal and justice institutions and liberalisation of economies (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2009b). The liberal peace model applied to resolve the conflict in Mozambique prioritised electoral democracy (which introduced a multi-party-political system enabling the population to elect its government) and marketization (with the objective of promoting economic growth and thereby reducing tensions), without addressing the root causes of the conflict (Paris, 2004). The eventual collapse of the GPA in 2012-2013 is symptomatic of the limitations of the liberal paradigm in addressing the root causes of conflicts and establishing effective peace, such as in the case of Timor-Leste and Rwanda where UN backed peace agreements failed after a few years (Newman and Richmond, 2006; Richmond, 2009b; Mac Ginty, 2015). This necessitated academic scrutiny, especially in African contexts where it has upheld international norms whilst neglecting local populations and conflict dynamics on the ground (Chandler, 2006; Newman and Richmond, 2006; Richmond, 2010; Murithi, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2015).

Vines (2021) has argued that the GPA and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) – mandated to oversee the implementation of the GPA such as monitoring the country’s first democratic elections and the demobilisation of RENAMO – were deeply flawed and a missed opportunity for establishing durable peace in Mozambique. ONUMOZ’s mandate of completely disarming RENAMO failed, thus leaving a vast number of weapons unaccounted for (Vines, 2021). Moreover, genuine institutional power-sharing had little success due to being used as a tool to protect the political survival of the elite with little regard for transitional justice initiatives for reparation and restorative justice (Koko, 2019), and accumulative socio-economic and political tensions led to the GPA’s collapse (Darch, 2019, p. 201). Mozambique’s elusive peace was further demonstrated through the return of FRELIMO-RENAMO violence in 2012-2013.

In 2014, another peace agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO was signed to end the renewed conflict that had begun in 2013. However, this agreement also failed. In 2019, another round of peace negotiations produced the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation, a peace agreement signed amid an intensifying security threat in the Cabo Delgado province (Government of Mozambique, 1992).

The recurring conflicts demonstrate the inability of these peace agreements to establish durable peace in Mozambique, thus requiring an examination of why the peace agreements in Mozambique have failed to consolidate peace. This study uses a decolonial lens to explain the limitations of the general approach to peace in Mozambique. The study aims to try to understand the hindrances to effective peace in Mozambique.

### **1.3. Research Questions**

To achieve the aim of the study, the main research question is: Why have peace agreements in Mozambique since 1992 failed to establish durable peace and possibly resulted in the conflict in Cabo Delgado?

Secondly, the research seeks to address the following sub-questions:

- What are the root causes of continuing conflicts in Cabo Delgado?
- How may the failed peace agreements have contributed towards the current conflict in Cabo Delgado?

### **1.4. Significance of the Study**

It has been argued that most civil wars and conflicts in Africa not only reflect the multifaceted challenges produced by economic marginalisation and poverty, but also weak governance and institutions (Field, 2004; Aall and Crocker, 2017). This ultimately raises questions about the political leadership occupying the state and their role in responding to these challenges. The uneven distribution of power and economic resources has led to inexplicable levels of inequality globally and contributed to violent conflicts as well as the emergence of new conflict dynamics at national level, with more complex features and implications. (Paris, 2004, p. 145; Reid-Henry, 2015, p. 4). This study seeks to explore peace agreements in Mozambique since 1992 to understand the socio-economic and political landscape that followed post the GPA, where two more peace agreements were produced yet failed to establish peace in the country. Amongst other issues, this demonstrates the limitations of the liberal peace model in addressing African conflicts, thereby necessitating an alternative approach in peace processes, especially how the Mozambican political leadership and government perceive the conflict and their

potential role in its emergence. This study is interested in why the peace agreements were not inclusive and people-centred, with impactful transitional justice initiatives for lasting peace, thus offering another perspective on factors that led to the Cabo Delgado crisis.

## **1.5. Literature review**

The following thematic literature overview is divided into two sections. The first section briefly deals with debates on peace and peace agreements in resolving conflicts. The second section focuses on existing literature on peace in Mozambique, mainly the post-1992 period and the current conflict in Cabo Delgado.

### **1.5.1. Perspectives on Peace and Peace Agreements**

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the liberal peace model has been dominant in conflict resolution and peace processes. Liberal peacebuilding missions launched from 1989- 1999 by the United Nations, sought to transform conflict shattered countries into liberal market democracies (Paris, 2004, p. 5). The aspiration was that democratisation would reduce conflicts by introducing electoral politics and that liberal marketization would stimulate economic growth, thereby reducing tensions and building sustainable peace. Over time, this model in cases such as – in South Sudan, Kosovo amongst others – has been inadequate in addressing the root causes of conflict, leaving grievances unresolved, increasing inequalities and reproducing conditions for continued violence. In Africa's experience, socio-economic inequalities exacerbated by the adverse effects of power and economic globalisation have contributed to most civil conflicts (Reid-Henry, 2015, p. 4; Aall and Crocker, 2017, p. 17) add that, while the specifics may vary, common contentions also include the nature and control of the state.

Africa accounts for over 42% of the peace agreements on the UN Peace Agreement Database (Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke, 2018, p. 3). Some have successfully ended conflicts, while others have failed to establish durable peace (Wallensteen, 2011, p. 3; Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke, 2018). Peace processes in Africa often have had to contend with the interests of foreign actors, which has led to the temporary cessation of violence and failed

agreements. In cases such as in Mozambique, liberal peace approaches have neglected unresolved complex conflict dynamics on the ground, negated widely held values, and prioritised the interests of foreign actors at the expense of the locals (Murithi, 2014, p. 94). Religious and ethnic nuances are common in African conflicts. However, these have often been overlooked. The inadequacies of liberal peace in conflict resolution and peacebuilding highlight the imperative for contextually relevant and pragmatic approaches to each conflict.

Scholars such as Murithi and Hudson (2006); Mutisi and Sansculotte-Greenidge (2012); and Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke (2018) have proposed that indigenous systems and approaches especially in Africa can potentially contribute to the durability and effectiveness of peace agreements, especially when they have local support. They propose that African concepts and values such as *Ujamaa* in Swahili, *Ubuntu* in IsiZulu, *Kparakpor* in Yoruba, and *Botho* in Sesotho, which are challenging to render in English, but articulate humanness, humanity, equality, caring and reciprocity amongst other values (Murithi and Hudson, 2006; Velthuizen, 2016) can be used to support conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies.

According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2007, pp. 17–19; DeRouen Jr *et al.*, 2010, p. 335), the post-conflict political landscape makes sustainable peace and democratic development difficult to achieve. Some of the challenges include the lack of trust and political equilibrium amongst warring parties, failure in power sharing institutions due to credibility challenges, and sometimes representatives rarely reflecting the full spectrum of the interests and powers in the conflict. Furthermore, non-state actors are often under-represented, while those regarded as ‘too radical’ are rarely invited to peace talks (Schulenburg, 2017, p. 141). Over time, the credibility and legitimacy of peace processes and agreements may be challenged thus increasing the potential for renewed conflict. It is therefore vital for the representatives to have a credible constituency (Murithi and Hudson, 2006, p. 21), and agency to ensure inclusiveness and to address root causes of discontent.

Addison and Brück (2008, p. 4) attest that civil society organisations that represent the interests of the broader population are vital in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Peace agreements and institutions emerging from these processes lay the foundation for the post conflict landscape. They therefore need to be inclusive and address deep tensions to safeguard durable peace. They also state that there is a clearer correlation between peace and prosperity compared to that of participation, because elections – which are a form of public participation – may be an inferno for conflict in instances of electoral irregularities that lead to election-based violence. Aall and Crocker (2017) mention that the modern African state is the most

lucrative source of material wealth in post-independence, one eclipsing all other economic opportunities. Ajulu (2004) also argues that natural resources are a key driver in some of the greatest conflicts and that the inadequate understanding of the nature and root causes of most African conflicts has led to inappropriate recommendations for dealing with the conflicts. For Ajulu (2004, p. 267) “conflicts are rooted in the scarcity of resources on the continent and the absence or failure of crafting institutions that could guarantee the equitable distribution. Therefore, it seems as if the politics of resource distribution lie at the heart of contemporary conflict in Africa”.

### **1.5.2. Peace in Mozambique**

Mozambique regained its independence from Portugal after 10 years of a liberation/anti-colonisation war (1964- 1975) led by FRELIMO, which was then installed as the government of Mozambique under President Joaquim Chissano. Two years later, a newly formed rebel movement, RENAMO, led then by Afonso Dhlakama waged a civil war to destabilize the FRELIMO government (Hume, 1994; Chachua and Malan, 1998). In 1992, after more than 15 years of civil war, the government of Mozambique and RENAMO signed the GPA in Italy, Rome (McGowan, Cornelissen and Nel, 2007, p. 309), the agreement was mediated by the Italian government, the Catholic Church under Community of Sant'Egidio based in Italy and former Archbishop of Beira Jaime Pedro Gonçalves. The GPA simultaneously facilitated the transformation of RENAMO from a rebel movement into a political party and paved the way for the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994 (Macamo, 2016). There have been six general elections since then, all won by FRELIMO. RENAMO has challenged all election outcomes since, threatening retaliation and violence over electoral fraud and manipulation (Hanlon, 2015; Vhumbunu, 2017).

The GPA was regarded by the international community as a success based on the cessation of violence, however, the agreement’s mandate was not fully realised, including that of ONUMOZ established under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 797 to oversee the implementation of the GPA. Scholars like (Phiri, 2012) and (Vines, 2019) have argued that Mozambique was inaccurately regarded as a successful post-conflict state due to the positive economic indicators recommended by the neo-liberal World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) which focused on political and economic reforms (Phiri, 2012; Hanlon, 2015; Darch, 2018). The GPA brought an end to overt violence but failed to

establish conditions for sustainable peace which include social and economic peace. Transitional justice and restorative justice initiatives were neglected, especially for the broader population.

Marginalisation and high socio-economic exclusion in post-1992 Mozambique risked jeopardising the progress achieved in the country (Azevedo-Harman, 2015). Sentiments of a return to war were expressed by former RENAMO soldiers living under dire socio-economic conditions, as a means to improve their circumstances. The discovery of vast natural gas and rubies between 2009- 2010 (Faleg, 2019), attracted more investment. FRELIMO leaders became wealthier, and the rest of the population demanded the distribution of the wealth. Political tensions and grievances of economic marginalization increased for RENAMO. Inflated costs of living led to riots in Maputo and Nampula, where doctors went on strike demanding higher salaries, former soldiers demanded increased pensions and rural Mozambique remained most affected by the socio-economic disparities (Hanlon, 2015).

By 2013, gas explorations in the Rovuma (or Ruvuma) region were contributing over 4% to the gross domestic product (GPD) (Azevedo-Harman, 2015). Mozambique became one of the countries with extreme poverty while the promise of wealth loomed before them. Hanlon (2015) contends that governance and corruption issues, against the backdrop of growing inequality and poverty, led to increased public discontent and a decline in FRELIMO votes. The high economic growth experienced by the country failed to translate into poverty reduction. Neo-liberalism turned Mozambique into a country that acts in the interest of foreign lenders, donors, and corporations.

Mozambique was ostensibly peaceful until RENAMO and FRELIMO's return to war in 2012-2013, which demonstrated the fragility of peace in the country (Vines, 2019). The two parties purported that the vital terms of the GPA had been violated (Macamo, 2016). In 2014, RENAMO Secretary General sparked such concerns after threatening regional separation would occur if the party's demands were not met (Vines, 2019). A corruption scandal of US\$2.2 billion in secret loans – used to fund weapons and fishing boats – discovered in 2016, fuelled more violence and political tensions (Hanlon, 2017). Azevedo-Harman (2015) adds that mistrust is a major challenge between Mozambican political parties, and for RENAMO, it has learned and relearned that violence is a vital bargaining tool with which it gets the government to negotiate.

### **1.5.2.1. Cabo Delgado Insurgency**

According to Bonate (2018), the Cabo Delgado crisis caught the public and the government by surprise because “Mozambique had never had any visible Islamist radical political movement before”. In October 2017, a group of armed men – later known as the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – attacked police stations and other government administration buildings (Devermont, and Columbo, 2019). Between October 2017 to December 2018, there had been eighteen reported attacks in Momcimboa da Praia, Macomia, Nangade, Palma and in Quissanga (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019), on civilian populations, houses and churches. However, Matsinhe and Valoi further contend that the extent and intensity of the attacks may be unknown due to the government’s secrecy and imposed a blockade on journalists, researchers, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Bonate (2018), Vines (2019) and Faleg (2019) acknowledge that the boom in the extractive-mineral industry prompted the insurgency.

While literature on Mozambique is widely available, the Cabo Delgado conflict is a fairly recent development but is increasingly gaining scholarly attention (Bonate, 2018; Faleg, 2019; Vines, 2019). Those that focus on the country’s peace agreements and their relations – governance issues and socio-economic disparities – to recurring conflicts or new conflict dynamics such as in the case of Cabo Delgado are limited (see, for instance, Devermont and Columbo (2019); Faleg (2019); and Vines (2019)). This, albeit brief, study thus aims to add to this body of knowledge.

## **1.6. Conceptual Framework**

### **1.6.1. Peace**

Peace is considered a normative concept, and like ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘harmony’, it is often recognized through its absence. Over time with a deeper and broadened understanding of the concept, it has been divided into two categories; negative peace – associated with the absence of war – and positive peace – which not only includes the absence of war but also the presence of harmony, justice, equity (Webel and Galtung, 2007, p. 6). Scholars contend that peace ought to establish life affirming and life enhancing values and structures to be sustainable (MacGinty, 2006; Webel and Galtung, 2007; Barash, 2013) the study, therefore, adopts this understanding of peace to guide the study. Considering the conceptualisation of peace above, the study uses

peace to encompass the necessary socio-cultural, economic and political conditions of positive peace.

### **1.6.2. Peace agreements**

A formal definition of a peace agreement remains largely complex to define. However, the concept is understood to entail a signed mutual agreement(s) from negotiations between conflicting parties, aimed at ending conflict and how (Bell and O'Rourke, 2010). Mediators and third-party stakeholders commonly facilitate the negotiation processes. Peace agreements also outline the objectives and priorities for protagonists to settle conflict and provide a level of stability, these can address institutional reform, power-sharing and transitional justice issues (Bell and O'Rourke, 2010, p. 948; Druckman and Albin, 2011; Fazal, 2013; Lanz, Nathan and Raffoul, 2019). Power-sharing institutions are expected to provide the foundation, rules and domestic order on how conflicts and other issues will be addressed in the post conflict period (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007, p. 19). Power-sharing consists of four dimensions; security, territory, politics and the economy (Sriram, 2008, p. 30), which are crucial in determining the probability of success. In the context of this conceptualisation, the term peace agreement(s) in the study is used to refer to a signed document(s) between warring parties – being FRELIMO and RENAMO in this study.

### **1.6.3. Governance**

Governance can be understood as the interaction and relations between the government and citizenry, it is the nexus of state-society relations that includes the processes, rules and institutions. It includes public administration, policy formulation and implementation, state organs, the quality and exercise of power in politics (Nye and Donahue, 2000; Fukuyama, 2013). Quality governance further has economic, social and political implications. Weak governance characterizes failed and fragile states, and these commonly descend to conflict and civil unrest (Brinkerhoff, 2007, p. 2). Nye and Donahue (2000, p. 12) further state that governance can also include state and non-state actors, such as nongovernmental organizations and private firms in association with governmental bodies. The study uses the term governance in context of state-society relations mentioned and the quality of political, economic, and social relations between the two.

## **1.7. Theoretical Framework**

### **1.7.1. Decoloniality**

The period referred to as the decolonisation of Africa occurred mainly between the 1960s and 1970s, when most African countries gained independence from colonial rule; however, the aftermath of colonialism led to continuity and new forms of domination and exploitation (Young, 2016). As concepts, decoloniality and post-coloniality constitute a critical response to the conditions of the post-colonial epoch, they do not have fixed definitions, scope, or methods (Lawson, 2015). The study adopts decoloniality as it critiques the ‘coloniality of power’ informing modernity, the state, the foundation of the current international capitalist system, institutions, economies, and norms in relation to Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Certain arguments from postcolonial theory are borrowed to also understand the post-colonial era, but the study is fundamentally a decolonial study as it questions power and the current asymmetric global capitalist system amongst other dynamics influencing contemporary relations in Africa, peacebuilding and peace agreements.

Decoloniality enables an understanding of Mozambique not only from the current socioeconomic challenges but also in the context of its roots which are mainly the country’s colonial history and colonial legacies that continue to impact lives. The socio-economic hardships and frustrations born out of these issues, against government corruption and neglect have led to some of the biggest revolts, protests, and susceptibility to radical extremist recruitment. This way, the feeling of relative deprivation: deep frustration and anguish can trigger revolutions against governments such as the Arab Spring, which was sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old man from Tunisia (Safi, 2020). Relating this to instances of conflict or terrorism, the feeling of deprivation has been used to comprehend Boko Haram in West Africa (Tayimlong, 2021).

African countries, including Mozambique, remain disproportionately affected by the adverse effects of globalization, global capitalism and the legacies of colonialism. Therefore, the critical thinking and analysis that decoloniality enables are imperative as it locates Mozambique’s positionality in its socio-historical context. It considers the history of Mozambique to understand what has informed its current landscape. This is important to the study as it answers questions guiding the research: understanding the factors that have led to failed peace agreements in Mozambique and, thereby, recurring conflicts. Decolonial thinking

constitutes an alternative to the lopsided exclusionary traditional discourse and offers a different lens to understand and look at the past and future (Mishra and Hodge, 2005, p. 379). Decoloniality also questions the economic, material, and cultural conditions that govern the global system in which the post-colonial nation is required to survive, one heavily prejudiced toward the interests of international capital such as the G7 powers (Young, 2016, pp. 57–59)<sup>1</sup>. Conditions in post-colonial Africa demonstrate the lack of transformation, imperialist norms, and values that policy actors in the international system exports to non-western countries. Independence led to new forms of post-colonial domination, and the third world/ developing countries/ global south and Africa remain at the periphery. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and others are essential governance organizations. Still, their reform remains a foreign policy agenda that most countries in the global south continue to grapple with, because of their lack of representation and accountability (Lopes and Casarões, 2019). The power asymmetries in these groupings demonstrate an ontological dilemma that ultimately undermines their legitimacy as Young (2016, p. 59) has argued that “today post-colonial struggles for autonomy, real independence and self-determination have had to contend with the complex adversary whose power is dispersed through a wide range of globalized institutions and practices.”

The study locates Mozambique within the larger discourse of post-colonial Africa in a globalized world. It aims to understand the root causes of recurring conflicts in Mozambique, hindrances to sustainable peace agreements, and the resultant conflict in Cabo Delgado. The study delves into the contextual history of Mozambique to understand nuances informing the current political landscape, the sources of conflict, and the country’s positionality in the international system. The global system in its current form has maintained colonial underpinnings and remains “the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa” (Rodney, 1983). The post-colonial African state for instance is today broadly characterized by underdevelopment, weak governance, corruption, illiteracy, and fragile economies, which as are rooted in the colonial history of the continent (Edebor, 2014). In this context, Mozambique has suffered from decades of colonialism<sup>2</sup>, neo-colonialism<sup>3</sup>, imperialism and neo-

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<sup>1</sup>Group of 7 (G7) is an intergovernmental organization of the most developed countries in the world: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Colonialism refers to the “political domination, social control and economic exploitation of a territory and its people by a foreign power” (Mansbach and Taylor 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Neo-colonialism “a policy whereby developed countries use economic and political means to perpetuate or extend its influence over less developed countries” (Mansbach and Taylor 2012).

imperialism<sup>4</sup>, and globalization<sup>5</sup>, processes accompanied by violence, slavery, oppression, subjugation, and exploitation, for capitalist expansion (Achankeng I, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Colonialism and its pervasive legacies remain relevant in understanding and analysing Mozambique's contemporary socio-economic and political environment. Mozambique still grapples with the adverse legacies of Portuguese colonialism, such as systemic inequalities, poverty, illiteracy, weak infrastructure, and violence against an exploitative capitalist system called globalization. Mozambique remains one of the world's poorest countries despite its natural resources and over three decades of foreign aid and development finance from the international community (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019; Vines, 2019).

In the book 'Orientalism', Edward Said (2003) provided a perspective on understanding power and dominion relations between the 'orient'/'The Other' and the western world/ occident. According to Said, the West has continuously fragmented and orientalised the orient to control and possess it, with no concern for the people, experiences, languages, and cultures (Said, 2003, p. 5). He questions whether neo-imperialism ever ended and brings attention to understanding the complexities and injustices within the context of history, culture, social and economic reality. Said has contended that "ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied outside of their force or more precisely their configurations of power, the Orient was created or 'Orientalized' by the Occident.

The relationship between the Orient and Occident is that of power, dominion, to varying degrees of complex hegemony, and western dominance" (Said, 2003, p. 5). In a similar vein, scholars like Gandhi (1998); Chakrabarty (2000); Mignolo (2011); Lawson (2015); Young (2016), have further argued for decoloniality as a response and resistance against colonialism, imperialism, legacies of colonization and Eurocentrism. Despite the desire for altruism, the UN, World Bank, IMF, and WTO remain contentious organisations (Lopes and Casarões, 2019). They advance western liberal democracy and exploitative free market policies in favour of Washington and to the detriment of African states (Amin, 2004). Samir Amin termed this condition as the 'liberal virus,' which produces nothing but intensified inequalities, exploitation, poverty, and thereby conflicts (2004).

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<sup>4</sup> Imperialism is the "the practice of foreign conquest and rule in the contest of global relations of hierarchy and subordination. It can lead to the establishment of empire (Baylis et al 2011). A policy of extending a state's authority by territorial acquisition or by the establishment of economic and political hegemony (Mansbach and Taylor 2012). Neo imperialism refers to the extension and reimposition of imperialism

<sup>5</sup> A process that increasingly knits people everywhere together, producing worldwide interconnectedness and interdependence featuring the elimination of borders and rapid large scale movement ad person, things, ideas across sovereign borders (Mansbach and Taylor 2012).

According to Wallensteen (2011), capitalism and the global economic system are “obverse sides of the same coin. One does not cause the other” and peripheral countries/ developing countries are at a permanent disadvantage because of the capitalist global system, which is characterized by ceaseless unequal relations (Sterling-Folker, 2006; Wallensteen, 2011; Jackson and Sorensen, 2013). The tensions and frustrations born out of these inequalities and their impact on countries and the lives of ordinary people manifest in various forms including protests, military coups, and intrastate violence.

According to Baylis (2020, p. 161), the discipline of international relations seldomly addressed issues of race and racial discrimination/ racism, compared to gender and class, despite issues of race being a prominent factor that continues to shape the “contemporary theory and practice of world politics in far-reaching ways.” As previously stated, post-coloniality/ decoloniality emphasizes the persistence and continuity of colonial forms of power in contemporary world relations. The authors further argue that:

“By bringing questions of empire, colonialism, and race into the study of world politics, post colonialism and decolonial approaches present alternative account of many of the thematic issues in international relations presented such as globalization, sovereignty, trade, international law, weapons control, gender, security, environmental crisis, development and labour. These alternative accounts trace the ways in which imperial hierarchies continue to Orient identities, policies and actions in these fields, it examines the kinds of resistance that they encounter and imagine alternative ways of thinking about these issues” (Baylis, 2020, p. 161).

In response to this observation, decoloniality has emerged as a critical lens among some International Relations and Security Studies scholars that challenges the ontology and epistemology of Euro-American/ Western thought and its homogeneous approaches and assumptions on global issues (Duffield, 1998, 1998; Richmond, 2009a, 2010). For these scholars, liberal peace, for instance, assumes that peace is an outcome of liberal democracy, market-based economic reforms, and the formation of institutions associated with modern states (Paris, 1997; Zambakari, 2016), but unable to provide a robust framework for building effective peace (Richmond, 2010).

Decoloniality is critical of the knowledge and parochial logic of liberal peace because of its positionality – being Western – and its deliberate efforts to ‘silence the Other’ (Zondi, 2018). Decolonial scholars like Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013); Mignolo and Walsh (2018); Zondi (2018) have lamented the imperative of unmasking this parochial lens to enable diversification, including that of African endogenous and indigenous knowledge and ontology. The validity of

alternative logics and approaches to social realities is being neglected by dominant methods of inquiry, which reflect imperialist reason, power asymmetries, ideological agendas, and other ethical challenges greatly informed by colonial history (Mignolo, 2011; Mignolo and Walsh, 2018; Zondi, 2018). Zondi contends that at its core, international relations discipline is a conversation of men from a small region of the world, a region that acquired its privileged imperial position in world affairs through processes that include imperialism, slavery, and colonialism (Zondi, 2018). Beyond critiquing the discipline, decoloniality brings into question the broader issues linked to the social struggles, especially poverty, inequality, development, and the impact of neoliberalism on the African continent.

For scholars like Achenkeng I (2013), the colonial factor remains the root cause of African conflicts, one outweighing issues of weak governance and failure of governments in Africa. Achenkeng I (2013) further contends that malgovernance, poverty, and fragile economies are only symptomatic of problems rooted in the past, specifically in Africa's colonization and decolonization processes (Achenkeng I, 2013). Achenkeng I adds that conflict resolution cannot be perceived as conflict resolution as it has maintained and protected the interests of external actors and former colonizers and their perceptions of Africa and the world. It is therefore essential to question how far a progressive and just future can be structured in a colonial past, especially when the core powers have done nothing to invalidate or reform the unequal order (Rodney, 1983; Mignolo, 2011; Mignolo and Walsh, 2018). Relatedly, Shizha and Diallo (2015) have argued that despite its political and economic potential, Africa has had to survive and function in a rule-based system with microscopic influence through policy diffusing institutions such as the UN, WTO, World Bank and IMF. This lack of reform in the international system has maintained structures and norms informed by colonial logic and perceptions of the global south from the Western gaze (Lopes and Casarões, 2019).

Consequently, the effects of colonial and neo-colonial policy interventions explain the abject marginalization of parts of Mozambique and the lack of effective integration into the Mozambican state (Hanlon and Smart, 2008; Hanlon, 2015; Vines, 2020). This accounts for the intuitive social behaviour of citizens of these parts of Mozambique who feel deprived of the public goods from the state to enable their well-being and self-actualization in comparisons to their counterparts in other parts of the country. The idea that an individual or a group is worse off in comparison to “other people or groups, or even themselves at different points in time” which creates a feeling of anger, frustration, or resentment if they do not get what they perceive they are entitled to (Smith *et al.*, 2012; Tayimlong, 2021). In understanding political

violence, scholars invoke relative deprivation to explain phenomena and events that lead to participation in protests, the “susceptibility to terrorist recruitment” (Smith *et al.*, 2012), and violence that manifests out of grievances and relative deprivation to seek justice (Aaron 2015). In *Why Men Rebel*, Gurr defines this condition in the following words:

“As actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping”. “The greater the discrepancy we perceive between expectation and capabilities, the greater is our discontent. The greater the importance we attach to the values affected, and the fewer the other satisfactions we have to fall back on, the greater is our discontent. If we have many alternative ways of trying to satisfy our expectations, we are likely to defer discontent over our failures; if we have few alternatives, we are likely to feel the anger of desperation.” (Gurr, 2015, pp. 24 & 59).

In sum, Gurr (2015) argues that rebellions/ violence occurs out of frustration and perceived deprivation. The more value attached to the discrepancy, the greater the discontent, which can manifest in rebellion. This also compounds if there are no alternatives, thus intensifying the anger of desperation. Gurr further states that time is an important determinant, a denied expression of anger increases before it subsides, and the greater the intensity, the longer it persists. In understanding the emergence and drivers of insurgent activities in the Niger Delta for instance, Aaron (2015) applies relative deprivation as a rational justification for injustices such as protracted marginalization of a region in government policies, environmental degradation induced by extractive oil industries, structural inequalities, and exploitation, a development crisis, and poverty when the oil revenue sustains the rest of the country. These factors are similar to those relevant to understanding the Cabo Delgado crisis in northern Mozambique. According to Tayimlong (2021), socio-economic grievances such as illiteracy, high unemployment rates, and the lack of public service delivery increase the susceptibility to recruitment by terror groups.

This logic has influenced and shaped policies and responses to peace and security issues in Mozambique, Africa, and beyond. The limitations of liberal peace in African contexts have been studied by scholars such as Murithi (2009); Richmond (2010); Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke, (2018), point to the diversity of relevant practices available outside the liberal framework. Richmond (2010, p. 41) further argues that liberal peace's undergird is transforming and redesigning other parts of the world into liberal societies. Decolonial approaches in fields of Security Studies enable this study to address the research questions in the context of Mozambique's positionality in the globalized capitalist system, characterized by

hegemonic power asymmetries. The peace agreements demonstrate that power and influence have shaped contemporary landscapes, and relative deprivation, which further enables understanding of how frustration and grievance led to violence and recruitment ease of ideological extremist groups.

## **1.8. Research Methodology**

The following section presents the research methodology that is employed for this study. It outlines the research design and approach, the paradigm, methods of data collection and analysis as well as the limitations of the research.

### **1.8.1. Research Approach and Design**

This is a single-case study that uses qualitative research methods for gathering and analysing secondary information relevant to the objective of this study. Qualitative research uses both primary and secondary data to analyse and interpretate social phenomenon to provide a deeper understanding of the social reality, economic circumstances, experiences, and history of individuals, community and countries (Newman, 2014, p. 8; Babbie, 2020). The study herein is concerned about peace in Mozambique post 1992, with a specific focus on Cabo Delgado as a case study. In a case study, information is gathered from available sources in order to understand the entirety of an event(s) or individual(s). Contextual details surrounding the case including the historical, physical, economic and social environments that influence the situation (Leedy and Ormrod, 2019) are considered. Mozambique has had three signed peace agreements, yet they have failed in establishing an inclusive and sustainable peace for the country. The units of analysis for the case study includes the socio-economic and political landscape in Mozambique post-1992 and how these have impacted or hindered successful peace agreements. The qualitative and interpretivist approach to the case study, will contribute to the theoretical discourse on the peace agreement limitations and recurring conflict.

### **1.8.2. Data Collection and Analysis**

As desktop research, this study primarily depended on secondary sources of information: books, working papers, research papers from recognised academic journals and institutions, online newspapers and news websites (Babbie, 2020). Primary sources in the form of archival materials, information was sourced from the various peace agreements. With regards to the peace agreements, the 1992 GPA is available in English, the 2014 and 2019 peace agreements were acquired written in Portuguese, these were then translated using a translation tool ‘DeepL Translator’ (available at <https://www.deepl.com/translator>). The information gathered from both the primary and secondary sources formed the basis upon which the discussion(s) in this study is carried out. The data analysis strategy mainly depends on inductive reasoning (Leedy and Johnson, 2019). Thus, the study explores research “questions that have not been previously addressed or have not been well addressed by existing scholarship” (Barakso, Sabet and Schaffner, 2013, p. 29), such as a critical analysis perspective on the peace agreement in Mozambique and their relation to the Cabo Delgado crises and recurring conflicts.

### **1.9. Ethical considerations**

No human participants are involved in this study. There are no unusual or special ethical considerations to consider in this mini-dissertation other than the fact that I am aware that plagiarism is an offence against the laws of the Republic of South Africa and the regulations of the University of Pretoria and I declare that this proposal and the pending dissertation, will be my own work and that all information sources used have been, and will be acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

### **1.10. Limitations of the Study**

The research case study being Mozambique, which is a Portuguese speaking country, some documents were in Portuguese including those from thinktanks in Mozambique that may have had great impact on the study and provided further insight into understanding Mozambique. The peace agreements were mainly in Portuguese, except for the GPA which was readily available from various websites including the United Nations peace agreement database. The agreements in Portuguese were translated using an online software, it is therefore important to acknowledge that based on the translation using a software, there is potential that meaning, and

effect of text may have been lost in translation, however unbeknownst to the researcher who is not Portuguese or fluent in Portuguese. The Cabo Delgado crisis is ongoing and perhaps the various factors that contributed to the emergence of the conflict may be understood after the conflict has elapsed which is that is beyond the scope of the current study.

The use of secondary data in addressing peace issues in Mozambique is a limitation as well for the study as most literature available is also subject to the authors and organization's objective and bias in understanding the Mozambican conflict or Mozambique in its entirety. Primary data may have enriched the research in providing clarity, nuances and lived experiences of Mozambicans especially those in the northern and rural province of Cabo Delgado. Another unanticipated obstacle that confronted during the research process was time, time in evaluating and understanding in deeper detail issues and challenges in Mozambique. However, the available sources of data consulted addressed the research question and objective of the study in understanding and establishing the root causes that led to the Cabo Delgado problem as well as the connection and linkage that this current crisis may have with peace being centred on RENAMO and FRELIMO as per their peace agreements. The study similarly contributes to the rapidly growing body of knowledge and debate on the crisis of insurgency and extremism in Mozambique.

## **1.11. Chapter Outline**

### *Chapter 1: Introduction, Background and Methodology*

This chapter introduces the topic and provides an overview of the research focus and problem. It aims to contextualise peace agreements and their challenges in providing peace in Mozambique.

### *Chapter 2: A Historical Overview of Mozambique: From Colonialism to Post-Independence (1480s-1992)*

This chapter provides a background of Mozambique, to understand the root causes of violent conflicts in the country.

### *Chapter 3: Mozambique's Peace Agreements 1992-2019: In Search of Peace and Security*

This chapter explores literature on peace agreements and peace in Mozambique.

*Chapter 4: Understanding Mozambique's Peace Agreements and Recurring Conflict in Cabo Delgado*

The chapter analyses and discusses findings on the challenges to peace in Mozambique and provides an account of understanding the crisis in Cabo Delgado. It delves into the socio-economic and political factors contributing to the crises.

*Chapter 5: Conclusion: The Politics of Peace in Postcolonial Mozambique*

This chapter provides concluding remarks, key findings, and recommendations for further study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MOZAMBIQUE: FROM COLONIALISM TO POST-INDEPENDENCE (1480s – 1992)

#### 2.1. Introduction

As previously established in Chapter One, the study seeks to understand why peace agreements in Mozambique have failed to establish durable peace, therefore a contextual history of key events and issues, relevant in understanding contemporary drivers and root causes of conflict in Mozambique are paramount. The African continent, like other parts of the world, did not evolve in isolation. Africa had to acclimate to invasions and colonization, whose adverse effects remain in the social, cultural, economic and political fabric of the continent. Africa's interaction with Europe prior to the advent of colonization was facilitated by trade, missionaries and explorers. In the 15<sup>th</sup> century the Portuguese established a trading post in the West Coast (Tordoff, 2002, p. 24), making profit in gold and ivory. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the main export commodity was slaves. Numerous aspects of the slave trade remain uncertain – for instance, the precise number of people abducted from the continent remains unknown, estimates vary “from a few millions to over one hundred million” (Rodney, 1983, pp. 95–96) – however its catastrophic implications are crystalline and laid the foundation of the exploitation and racial discrimination of mainly black people of African descent, which remains a challenge today. This chapter provides an overview of Mozambique's history from its initial encounter with the Portuguese, through to the advent of colonialism in the 1500s, the struggle for independence, the post-independence years and the civil war that ended in 1992. These periods in history have been pivotal in shaping the contemporary socio-economic and political landscape in Mozambique.

Mozambique is located along the Indian Ocean in the east of Southern Africa, its size can be equated to that of Britain and France combined. It shares borders with Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, eSwatini, Zimbabwe and Zambia, all but two countries are landlocked, thus strategically providing Mozambique with a market for its ports (Andersson, 1992, p. 2). Its mineral resources include: columbo-tantalite reserves – used in building nuclear reactors, aircrafts and missile parts – located in the Zambezia province, other strategic minerals include beryl and coal (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, p. 1). It is home to one of the largest dams

Africa; the Cahora Bassa Dam, which has the potential for being a strategic energy resource for central and southern Africa. It possesses large natural gas deposits, which can also increase Mozambique's role as an energy producer. The country was the second largest Portuguese colonial territory after Angola and together, they constituted the largest territory in sub-Saharan Africa under one colonial authority. The demographic makeup consists of mainly black Bantus populations and a white minority, mostly Portuguese settlers (Humbaraci and Muchnik, 1974, p. 77). The two main groups in the north and Zambezi valley are the Maravi-Yao cluster and the Islamised Yao/ Ajava cluster. The extreme northern seaboard are East African Swahili and a distinct Makonde related to those in southern Tanzania by the Rovuma River and the primary economic activity is agriculture. Industrial development, if any, in the northern part of Mozambique was minimal. The only industrialized centre to process agricultural produce was in Lourenco Marques, which was significantly distant from northern Mozambique (Samuels and Abshire, 1969; Humbaraci and Muchnik, 1974, p. 79). Underdevelopment is therefore one of the major legacies of colonialism that have had a lasting effect on Mozambique, especially the rural population in the North and in Cabo Delgado.

## **2.2. The Colonial History of Mozambique: 1500s- 1975**

The first Portuguese vessels to reach the shores of west African are traced back between the 1470s and 1480s (Humbaraci and Muchnik, 1974, p. 85; Isichei, 1997, p. 30; Shillington, 2012, p. 177). The Portuguese first established trading posts in Africa with an objective of making profit from voyagers on the way to the Indies. The continent's strategic importance increased as a source of great fortune, especially in the 16<sup>th</sup> century when slaves became a major export commodity. In 1503, the Portuguese establishment a fortified settlement in Sofala, thus marked the advent of Mozambique's colonialization. In 1511, the Portuguese attacked an Arab-Swahili trading base in Angoche and began to move into the mainland. In 1522, they carried out attacks in Cabo Delgado and conquered the Quirimbas islands (Darch, 2019). Their trade commodities were ivory and gold. In the 1520s this escalated to include slaves, due to the growing demand of slave labour for sugar plantation economies, which further consolidated the integration of Mozambique into a capitalist global economy. The Portuguese islands of Sao Tome and Príncipe were the first destination for slave labour and later Europe. Over time, slave trade eclipsed other Portuguese African exports. In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Portuguese trade monopoly

in the region was disrupted by the arrival of the more powerful French, Dutch and English (Isichei, 1997, p. 390).

Before colonization, Mozambican communities, similar to other parts of the African continent, were organized in autonomous chieftaincies and kingdoms, “a chief was assisted by a council of elders, comprised of village headman and often cult priests” on various issues such as the use of land in farming and hunting (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, p. 12). Tribute was periodically paid to the chief, which symbolically demonstrated the ultimate authority on land tenure. In due course, their political authority, rights over land and mining were ceded to the Portuguese, either through military conquest or converting to Christianity. In 1607 for instance, the Monomotapa King conceded his mining authority to the Portuguese, he converted to Christianity in 1629 and further relinquished his political, military and mining authority to the Portuguese (Darch, 2019). Eventually, military conquests, religion, alliances and payments in kind contributed to the decline of kingdoms, the alienation and disenfranchisement of Africans by the settler populations. Large feudal estates of land referred to as *prazos*, were allocated to Portuguese settler families in Mozambique from the 17<sup>th</sup> century (Mittelman, 1981, p. 24), plainly entrenching a classist hierarchy between master, vassal and slave. “The prazero governed through the local land chief, who acted as his agent in the forced sale of agricultural products for which much less than the market prize was paid” (Mittelman, 1981, p. 25).

The industrial revolution in Europe was accompanied by profound alterations for the global economy, despite being far from Africa and the Indian Ocean, its impact was felt “like a series of shockwaves” from a direct explosion”, altering the social, economic and political life of east Africa and Mozambique (Newitt, 1995, pp. 244–245). Under Portuguese colonial rule, Cabo Delgado was a peripheral area, due to the lack of governance, people of diverse ethnicities and cultures survived through developing local institutions of cooperation and commerce. It was through Cabo Delgado that the French, through illegally dealing with Afro-Portuguese traders and Portuguese officials, gained virtually full access trading coin and foodstuff for slaves on the east African coast. By the 1770s, an estimated 1500 slaves were exported annually by the French from Mozambique (Newitt, 1995, p. 247). Over time the Portuguese government legalized slaves trade with French on condition that Mozambican ports were the only ones supplying the trade. Slaves, together with sugar and gold became the primary commodities exported from Portuguese Africa. Scholars such as (Newitt, 2010, p. 21) have estimated that a third of slave exported in the Atlantic slave trade were shipped from Africa by the Portuguese to their colonies, and mainly to Brazil.

Slave trade was not firmly established in Mozambique until the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the emergence of the industrial revolution in Europe as mentioned above (Humberaci and Muchnik, 1974, p. 89). The 1834 abolishment of slavery in Portugal did not extend to Portuguese colonies, trade in slaves peaked between 1800 to 1850 with approximately 25 000 slaves exported annually (Marcum, 2017, p. 17), and served as the most lucrative source of revenue for Lisbon. Slavery in 1850, “was replaced by a system of conscript labour for European farms and mines that persisted into the 1960s” (Ibid). Later, in the 1930s, this system was embellished with an official assimilation policy, however conditions for the black Mozambicans remained unchanged, abuse and forced labour remained. Portugal remained impoverished, the colonies were economically primitive with minimal education and medical amenities.

The classist system and the capitalist mode of production in Mozambique facilitated racist prejudice. Rodney (1983, p. 88) has contended that, capitalism similar to other modes of productions is informed by ideological components. In its encounter with Africa, capitalism’s most prominent feature is the rise of racism, which came to be deeply ingrained in European thought (Rodney, 1983). Slavery became instrumental in promoting racist prejudice and ideology – the notion of racial superiority of one race over another, based on skin colour and difference in physical features – especially in Africa’s experience similar to the United States of America (US) (Rodney, 1983). It is therefore arguable that white racial supremacy was an integral part of capitalism’s mode of production and European expansion was depended on the exploitation of African labour (Rodney, 1983).

The 1884- 1885 Conference of Berlin which later came to be known as the Scramble for Africa, stronger powers did not fully regard Portugal’s claim and authority in Mozambique and Angola (Collins and Burns, 2013). Post the Berlin Conference, Portugal was forced to retake control of its colonies at the risk of losing them to the more powerful European counterparts. Portugal's reoccupation of its colonies was met with resistance, resulting in battles at Magul in September 1895 and Coolela in November 1895. Portugal lacked the capabilities both technical and monetary to firmly re-establish itself in the colonies and therefore turned to foreign investment to boost its economic power. In 1891, the Niassa Company introduced leasing agricultural schemes in northern Mozambique, however not much success was attained in the project (Pitcher, 2002). Mozambique’s economic potential was increasingly located in its ports which provided the landlocked countries outlets. This role became even more vital in the expansion of the railway system in southern Africa (MacQueen, Macqueen and MacQueen, 1997, p. 7).

The company successfully constructed a railway connecting the Transvaal to Lourenco Marques began in 1887 (Alden, 2001).

In 1894, forced labour for black Mozambicans was introduced. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) adopted in 1901 introduced the migrant about system, through the supply of labour to mining companies in South Africa (Newitt, 2010). This increasingly became a lucrative source of revenue for Lisbon, affecting the south and central parts of Mozambique. As part of the agreement, the Mozambican government received half of each miner's remuneration in gold at a fixed rate, which was then sold to the global market for further profit, therefore, the miners' salaries were paid only upon their return to the colony in Portuguese *escudos* which was the local currency (MacQueen, Macqueen and MacQueen, 1997, p. 7; Alden, 2001). In 1913, the Portuguese entered into another labour agreement with Southern Rhodesia. Port fees and mining revenue quickly became the colony's primary source of foreign currency, more lucrative than the Zambezia Company. Consequently, Mozambique was effectively under other foreign powers until 1926 (Alden, 2001, pp. 3–4). The First World War in 1914- 1918 resulted in the mobilization for 12 000 African soldiers and 90 000 laborers extracted from Africa (Collins and Burns, 2013). This period gradually experienced sporadic peasant uprisings.

A 1926 military *coup* in Portugal accompanied significant adjustments for Portuguese Africa colonies. (MacQueen, et al 1997, p. 9) has stated that “the 1926 changes were merely the beginning of a thorough going process of constitutional definition and consolidation of the empire” the economic and political changes in Portuguese Africa were to remain fundamentally unchanged until the 1960s. The Portuguese military dictatorship, which was in power from 1926 to 1933, understood its inexperience and limitations in governance (MacQueen, et al, 1997), and therefore appointed civilians sympathetic to its ethos for governance issues. One of these was Antonio de Oliverira Salazar, a former law lecturer and parliamentarian elected in 1921. Salazar was appointed as finance minister in 1928 and in 1930 became the acting colonial minister. Under Salazar's leadership, the ‘colonial act’ which became the key legislative statement of Portuguese 20th century colonial policy was published. The new government also sought to reduce the presence and infiltration of foreign powers within its colonies (MacQueen, et al, 1997). The colonial act was included the Estado Novo (New State) constitution of 1933, which further disadvantaged the black natives under Portuguese rule, until the 1960s (Ibid).

From 1926- 1950, Salaza pursued nationalist economic policies where colonies were further systematically exploited, reinforcing oppressive labour policies adopted again in 1950- 1960.

A divide and rule strategy was further demonstrated in its 1950 policy that physically separated different racial groups and social groups (Marcum, 2017, p. 18). Portuguese settler population in the 1960s had more than doubled in the years immediately after World War II (Alden, 2001, pp. 3–4). Portugal’s reopening to foreign investment and industrial production improved however, it was dependent on cheap labour.

The national struggle for liberation in Mozambique ensued between 1960 to 1974. Throughout the colonial period black Mozambicans were denied all forms of political expression (Tordoff, 2002, p. 32). However, the revolutionary spirit of liberation and insurgency had long existed despite being inundated with force and brutality from the Portuguese regime (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, pp. 61–62). It was often demonstrated through acts of defiance such a protest by peasant labourers in the rural areas, and through “forms of tax evasion, work slowdowns, desertions and sabotage”, and through anticolonial writings by black Mozambican intellectuals. Terror, tyranny and racism were prominent tools in lusophone Africa, characterising relations between the Africans and their Portuguese colonizers. In 1960, 500 Makonde cotton labourer protesters in Mueda in the northern part of Mozambique were killed by the Portuguese police and military. Similar incidents in 1961 unfolded when cotton labourer protesters were met with violent suppression from the Portuguese. Having occupied African territory for five centuries, the Portuguese being the first to colonize Africa fought desperately to keep its colonies.

On 25 June 1962, Mozambican anti-colonial movements; the National Democratic Union of Mozambique/ União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) and the Mozambican African National Union (MANU) convened in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and together forged a united front in the form of FRELIMO (Alden, 2001; Tordoff, 2002). They elected Dr Eduardo Mondlane as president and Samora Machel as his deputy. The formation of FRELIMO was to become the pillar of Mozambican independence, For the first time the organization united diverse nationalist groups in a common front against Portuguese colonial domination. The diverse ideological differences continued in FRELIMO, mediation and continuous dialogue for the unification of the movement was mandatory from the onset. Differences often manifested in threats of separation, internal battles and ethnic hostilities (Emerson, 2014).

Alden (2001) and Tordoff (2002) have contended FRELIMO’s unity was fragile, especially between 1967 and 1970. The conceptualization and understanding what of the liberation struggle meant was deeply contested. One faction led by Marcelino dos Santos advocated for socialist ideals and sort the transformation of liberated areas, they argued that “they were not

fighting for whites so much as the exploitative system upon which Portuguese domination rested, and that women youth and the elders should all participate in the liberation struggle” (Tordoff, 2002, p. 61). Another faction led by Lazaro Nkavandame, “saw the struggle primarily in terms of securing the expulsion of the Portuguese” (Alden, 2001, p. 5), they perceived independence as “a means of accomplishing a social revolution but of establishing themselves in power within what would necessarily be in neo-colonial framework led by black Mozambicans (Tordoff, 2002, p. 61). Despite the rifts, the liberation movement succeeded in its mandate of liberating Mozambique. On 25 September 1964, FRELIMO launched its guerrilla war against the oppressive Portuguese government, starting in Chai in Cabo Delgado (Shillington, 2012, p. 422). In February 1969, FRELIMO president Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated by a bomb. The struggle for Mozambique’s liberation continued under Samora Machel and for over 10 years, FRELIMO led the war against Portuguese colonial domination. The war would cost Lisbon approximately 10 000 Portuguese fatalities with an additional 30 000 more injured (Emerson, 2014).

The beginning of 1974 witnessed an intensification in guerrilla campaigns and by 25 April, FRELIMO had intensified its campaign in areas of Tete, Maniza and Sofala, as well as its stronghold in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. The war was successfully contained in the north, its expansion southward to central Mozambique was however closer to European settlements (MacQueen, Macqueen and MacQueen, 1997, p. 124; Collins and Burns, 2013). Prior to this, the white Portuguese population which were geographically separated from the north regarded FRELIMO’s liberation struggle as disorganized, thus a non-factor or threat to them (MacQueen, Macqueen and MacQueen, 1997; Collins and Burns, 2013). In Lisbon the perception was that FRELIMO was unsuccessful and close to defeat until the *coup*. Upon the *coup* in Lisbon FRELIMO issued a statement of congratulations to the Portuguese democratic forces which had for years courageously opposed the colonial wars in Africa. In the statement FRELIMO expressed that Portuguese colonies also had the right to independence, had the same rights as the Portuguese people and demanded their independence as well.

According to European standards, Portugal was impoverished, its colonies were therefore imperative to its economic policy and development, hence Lisbon went to great lengths repudiating demands of independence (Minter, 1972, p. 13; Thompson, 2010, p. 35). Any form of political expression by the black Mozambicans, through protests and other forms of resistance, were met with violent brutality from the Portuguese government. This oppressive existence under the Portuguese led FRELIMO to increasingly perceive a socialist

transformation as the appropriate model for the country, a model radically distinct from that of its oppressor. Eduardo Mondlane in his writings had argued that “we are not replacing a foreign ruling class with a Mozambican one” and that peace is the base of their revolutionary movement, as witnessed in Guinea Bissau under PAIGC (Shillington, 2012, p. 425). Darch (2019, p. 10) adds that FRELIMO was liberation movement strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology by the time Mozambique gained its independence, and FRELIMO therefore had legitimate basis for its disdain as it had suffered under the racist subjugation by the Portuguese.

The ten-year liberation struggle that eventually toppled colonial rule was mainly carried out from the northern regions of country, like Cabo Delgado, while the central and southern parts of Mozambique experienced economic growth and development (Minter, 1972; Newitt, 1995; Shillington, 2012). The Portuguese hoped that its relations with apartheid South Africa through the Cahora Bassa hydro project<sup>6</sup> would prompt South African intervention, however this hope did not materialize. Increased impatience in Lisbon especially from the Movimento dos Forças Armadas (MFA) led by General Spínola precipitated a military *coup* on 25 April 1974 (Emerson 2014, Alden 2001). In June 1974 independence negotiations between Lisbon and FRELIMO commenced in Zambia, these talks produced the Lusaka Accord which brought an end to the ten-year struggle for liberation in Mozambique and facilitated the transition to independence, gained on 25 June 1975. The FRELIMO liberation movement under Samora Machel, subsequently became the government and the only political party. FRELIMO was ostensibly uncontested as the political authority in the newly liberated Mozambique. Some scholars like Bertelsen (2016, p. 27) have argued that Mozambique’s independence was only possible because of the *coup d’état* in Lisbon that overthrew Salazar’s authoritarian regime, and the massive economic strain that the colonial wars had on Portugal.

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<sup>6</sup> The Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric plant is in the Tete province of Mozambique, the largest hydropower plant in Southern Africa.

### **2.3. Independence in 1975 and the New FRELIMO in Government**

Upon gaining independence in June 1975, FRELIMO assumed government in Mozambique – under the leadership of Samora Machel, who was elected in 1970 and deputized by Marcelino dos Santos – it inherited economic, political, and socio-cultural difficulties from centuries of Portuguese colonialism and oppression (Machel, 1975; Alden, 2001). The government therefore sought to protect and consolidate their socialist victory through transformation and unification of Mozambique. Poverty, illiteracy, disease, and various socio-economic difficulties had subjected Mozambicans to subhuman existence, especially for rural populations (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983; Darch, 2019). The FRELIMO government as articulated by Samora Machel’s speech “FRELIMO’s Tasks in the Struggle Ahead” in Mozambique: Revolution or Reaction (Machel, 1980), sought to empower the masses of its people through socialist policies. “Socialism with a Mozambican face” expressed the accumulated lessons of the liberation struggle – experimentations, self-criticism, self-reliance, peasant mobilization and the development of popularly based political institutions– and the contemporary Mozambican reality with the broad organizing principles of Marxism-Leninism” (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, p. 3).

FRELIMO decisively fought against tribalism and racism in its efforts to achieve national unity. In 1980 Mozambique’s population was estimated at 12 million consisting of a diverse number of ethnic groups and religions, while historical experiences and cultures were similar, each had their own language, material conditions, identity and heritage. Rivalry between various groups had also been fuelled by the Portuguese as part of their colonial strategy, patriotism and social cohesion were therefore not an easy task. Samora Machel also sought to create a non-racial society where approximately 20 000 non-black Mozambicans – European and Asian – would enjoy full Mozambican citizenship rights. This move was perceived by some critics as a naïve attempt to ‘jump over history’ (Alden, 2001). FRELIMO embarked on a one-party state policy, banned protests, nationalized certain economic and social service sectors, and restricted religious activities. The settler populations which were the sole repository for skilled labour, declined from approximately 200 000 to under 30 000 in 1977, and a further impediment in capital flights and looming threats of aggressive socialism seemed to signal future investment constraints (Alden, 2001, pp. 5–6).

The FRELIMO government immediately assumed measures to nationalise key economic sectors, restricted religious activities, rearranged communal villages and the rural population for the distribution of health and other social services, it passed stringent national laws and bolstered its support for the liberation struggles in neighbouring South Africa, and Rhodesia (Tordoff, 2002, p. 61). In 1976, Mozambique moved to sanction Ian Smith's white minority regime in Rhodesia (McNamee and Muyangwa 2021, p. 325), in support of the country's nationalist struggle. Economically, the decision cost Mozambique potentially lucrative revenue from its ports. On its relations in the region, the sanctions marked the beginning of hostile relations with apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia (McNamee and Muyangwa 2021, p. 325).

In retaliation, the Rhodesian government's Central Intelligence Office (CIO) capitalized on Mozambique's internal disgruntled population – mainly rural – to deter FRELIMO's consolidation of its post-independence power. The regimes facilitated the formation of RENAMO, which became an armed opposition against the FRELIMO government (Darch 2019, p. 10). RENAMO started its operations under the Rhodesian commando units prior breaking away, it carried out attacks on key economic targets in Mozambique. This marked the beginning of a brutal decade-long civil war that would eventually spilled over into Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe borders at its peak. RENAMO attacked economic and social targets, while evading all contact with government military forces. The government in turn located and destroyed RENAMO bases, while seeking to safeguard the civilian population. In 1976, the South African apartheid government cut the number of Mozambican labourers from 115 000 to less than 40 000 (Andersson 1992). “Two years later Mozambique suffered another devastating blow to its foreign currency earnings when South Africa decided to stop linking the payment for migrant mining labour from Mozambique to current gold prices” (Andersson 1992, p. 8).

By the 1990s, Mozambique had become a warzone, displacing millions and threatening the daily security of individuals (Andersson, 1992; Shillington, 2012; Marcum, 2017). RENAMO raided civilian suburbs and rendered roads and railway travel virtually impossible in most parts of the country. RENAMO not only targeted and destroyed health care facilities, schools in the rural areas and FRELIMO offices but also started to mutilate civilians (Young, 1990). The Mozambican government signed the Nkomati Accord which was a non-aggression pact with South African in 1984. Which was as a result of the enormous effects the conflict had on the country both in human and economic cost. As part of the agreement the Mozambican government would cease harbouring and providing protection to the ANC within its borders,

the South African government would in turn cease providing financial support to RENAMO. However, the South African government continued its clandestine support for RENAMO, according to documents seized at a RENAMO base in Gorongosa in 1985 (Darch, 2019, p. 11). RENAMO operations in 1985 had spread to northward to Cabo Delgado and to southern province of Mozambique. The insurgency movement's support also increased; right wing groups in Europe and North America extended their support RENAMO to intensify its attacks against the FRELIMO government. The civil war's death toll in 1989 reached 15 000, with further devastations to the economy and social fabric (Ibid).

Another important aspect to note in the history of Mozambique is the role of Christianity and Catholic church. The Church and Christianity more broadly in Mozambique is marred with controversy. On one hand, it was an important tool in the colonial project, it aided colonial policies and oppression of black Mozambicans and on the other hand, it contributed to educating a generation of Mozambicans including Eduardo Mondlane, who obtained a PhD from the United States and ultimately became the president of FRELIMO. While under Salazar in the 1940s, Mozambican Catholic churches were tasked with preparing Africans with a restrictive system of elementary education to prepare them for serving the colonial society. Individuals such as Dom Sebastiao Soares de Resende, the Bishop of Beira from 1943 to 1967, condemned oppression and forced labour practices and equated them to slavery. It was only in the post-independence period that black Mozambicans could form part of the church hierarchy. The Mozambican government's first attempt at establishing with RENAMO were in 1983 to 1985 with the Nkomati non-aggression pact processes with the South African government. RENAMO was however pressurized by the government to end the negotiations (Armon, Hendrickson and Vines, 1998). In September 1988, Pope John Paul II's efforts from his visit to Mozambique during the civil war accumulated into another round peace negotiations that led to the Rome GPA of 1992, thus ending years of civil war.

The northern regions of Mozambique including Cabo Delgado are predominantly Islam, which remains the second largest religion in Mozambique. Islam was introduced in this part of Mozambique through trade in gold and ivory with Arab-Swahili communities. Most northern Mozambicans are Sunni Muslims with a small minority that follow Ismaili Shi'a (Bonate, 2010). The Islamic northern regions were without interference from Portuguese colonial rule from intimal encounters in the 16<sup>th</sup> century until the concluding decade of colonial occupation, the northern regions of Mozambique maintained a certain level of independence from the Portuguese and remained under the rulership of Sharazi clans with closer kinship, political,

economic, and religious linkages to the Swahili (Bonate, 2010). A significant number of Africans however maintained their African belief systems alongside formal memberships to Islam and Christian churches and denominations.

### **2.3.1. Mozambique's Political Economy between 1975- 1984**

In its efforts to redress and transform the legacies of underdevelopment, FRELIMO pursued Marxist-Leninist socialism policies domestically and in its foreign policy, a path vastly different from that followed under Portuguese rule. The state introduced resettlement projects which facilitated the relocated of several Mozambican populations to rural areas, to ease the administration of resources and facilitate the politicization of the peasantry. These programmes soon became mandatory thus sparking criticism as they were perceived to be forced reallocations, which were ultimately met with resistance. In the agricultural sector, the state implemented state-run production and collectivization measures, the state further lowered produce prices thus negatively affecting the peasant farmers. Consequently, peasant farmers resorted to the black market to sell their produce and reduce output, due to the state led agricultural production, collectivization and low pricing policy by the government. The government further introduced a policy that curtailed imports regarded as non-essentials to development and process, thus resulting in a decline of consumer goods at a time of increasing consumption (Alden, 2001, p. 6).

A clear vision of a socialist Mozambican state existed, this was however challenged by staunch domestic, regional and global factors. Domestic challenges were mainly centred around issues of underdevelopment, differences in political ideology as well as influence from external forces. Groups in opposition to the FRELIMO government worked with pariah states of Rhodesia and South Africa to form an insurgency for the sole purpose of destabilizing the FRELIMO government. This threat increased in scale and intensity, thus, leading to the devastating civil war that became significantly challenging to resolve and spilled into neighbouring countries (Shillington, 2012; Emerson, 2014; Vines, 2019). The civil war in Mozambique became a classic case of an insurgency where enemies of the state pitted competing ideologies, personalities and ethnic cleavages against one another. According to Emerson (2014), the conflict was probably a foregone conclusion by 1977 when the country grappled with the redefining the new Mozambique.

Gradually, Marxist-Leninist principles and socialist policies grew unsustainable against the demands and challenges emanating domestically and externally. The regional and international geopolitical shifts of the Cold War and decline of the Soviet Union impacted Mozambique's economy and standing in the civil war. In 1985 the government joined the arguably neo-imperialist IMF, in its effort to evade complete economic failure and to attract foreign investment (Dinerman, 2006, p. 61). Within three years the IMF began introducing policies and structural adjustment programs which instantaneously improved the country's GDP. Mozambique's GDP increased by over 4.5% in the years between 1987 to 1989 as a result of the structural adjustment programmes (Dinerman, 2006, p. 153). The Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE) a Structural adjustment programs sponsored by the IMF; proceeds were also seen increased revenue in agricultural production which experienced a 79% increase in 1987. In 1989 at its 5th party Congress FRELIMO abandoned Marxist-Leninist ideology. In 1990, the following year, a new constitution was paved way for a multiparty representation, thus expanding political representation in the country (Dinerman, 2006, p.152- 153). This subsequently paved the way to peace negotiations with the armed insurgency of RENAMO which had been used to destabilize Mozambique (Dinerman, 2006, p. 61). A multiparty constitution was unveiled in 1990. Mozambique went through a series of critical defining transitions between 1987 and 1994, which would have implications on the social, economic, and political developments of the country.

While positive economic indicators suggested progress, this economic growth failed to have a tangible impact on the majority of Mozambican people, their living conditions remained unchanged, as approximately 90% of the population were impoverished. Although the civil war and hereditary underdevelopment were major contributing factors, the PRE structural adjustment programs heightened the condition. "Successive devaluations, price liberalization, cuts in government spending and the removal of government subsidies brought high rates of inflation, declines in the purchasing power of most citizens and, consequently falling livelihoods" and having of the highest infant mortality rates (Dinerman, 2006, p.153).

Mozambique's independence similar to other parts of the continent was gained during the Cold War, a period of heightened power struggles between the US and the Soviet Union. While dozens of African countries attained their independence, a rivalry between the two powers produced proxy wars in which fuelled conflict against competing groups (Emerson, 2014). The newly independent Mozambique thus became a platform for this contestation of power and ideology. The civil war in Mozambique evolved into a protracted conflict, a source of

instability and an extension of Cold War dynamics, the aftermath of which would continue for years.

#### **2.4. The Civil War in Mozambique 1977- 1992**

As previously noted, in June 1976 a new group armed group referring to itself as RENAMO emerged and embarked on an anti-Communist propaganda campaign using a Rhodesian based radio station the “Voz De Africa Livre/ Voice of Free Africa” (Chan and Venancio, 1998, p. 3). In September, Rhodesian Intelligence aided RENAMO in setting up military bases in Mutare and Bindura. Through these, RENAMO was able to recruit “disgruntled Portuguese and black Mozambicans, dissidents from FRELIMO, veterans of the colonial war both black and white who fled to Rhodesia upon Mozambican independence), some intellectuals middle class businessmen and traditional chiefs” (Chan and Venancio, 1998, p. 3). RENAMO’s attacks began in 1976 and early 1977. The first RENAMO leader was Andre Matsangaissa, who was succeeded by Afonso Dhlakama in 1970 after being killed in a FRELIMO attack on one of their bases. In 1980 upon the independence of Zimbabwe, South Africa then engaged RENAMO to expand its operations and establish a base in Phalaborwa in the Northern Transvaal.

The presence of external forces in the Mozambican civil conflict, often pursuing their own interests and agendas, contributed to the difficulty in reaching a resolution and peace for country. Mozambique’s peace negotiations and settlement coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The changing political landscape in the 1990s simultaneously facilitated an environment where a RENAMO and FRELIMO settlement could be reached (Emerson, 2014). Like in most conflicts, the Mozambican civil war was resolved through negotiations and political settlements that accommodated the insurgents. Over 2 million Mozambicans displaced both internally and externally, and over 800 00 people were killed. In 1992, the GPA brought an end to the civil war.

In engaging Frantz Fanon’s work on decolonization and independence in Africa, Mittelman (1981, p. 23) argues that political independence was more than the struggle for liberation against oppressors. That independence was an agreement between the dominant classes in former colonies and the interests of the metropolitan born from negotiations in conferences and missions. Economic structures were not dismantled which maintained structural economic

dependence. Political power and autonomy were further not completely attained because they did not have control over their own relations and affairs. In the case of Mozambique similar to most countries on the continent, independence was achieved through guerrilla warfare rather than through negotiated settlements alone.

## **2.5. Mozambique In The World: From 1500s to 1991**

Mozambique's integration into the global economic system coincided with its contact with Arab and Indian traders, and later with colonization. Relations with Arab and Indian traders is estimated to have begun as early as 15<sup>th</sup> century. The presence of Islamic and Indian communities in Mozambique is indicative of the early relations the country had with these groups. The 500 years of Portuguese presence and influence in Mozambique, linked Mozambique to Europe and more broadly the West. Labour migration to neighbouring mines and farms of South African and Rhodesian, especially in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, together with the movement of people facilitated by the porous borders integrated Mozambique regionally and globally (Pitcher, 2002, p. 12). As aforementioned, Mozambique together with other southern African countries played a significant role in the liberation movements, through hosting black liberation movements such as the African National Congress, which ultimately became the governing party in South Africa upon the country's first democratic elections. Mozambique's political economy under the Portuguese was highly dependent on foreign investment, thus by extension, dependent on its European counterparts as it lacked the authority they wielded. Later, ideology, power constellations and contestation of the global system witnessed during the Cold War would contribute to further violence and proxy wars in Africa.

Upon independence, FRELIMO's foreign policy upheld revolutionary ideals and demonstrated its disdain towards capitalist exploitation. It sought closer ties and alignment with the Soviet bloc. Firstly "FRELIMO held the view that total liberation and real development would only be possible once the country reduced the fetters capitalist influence" (Chan and Venancio, M, 1998, p. 2). Secondly, the Mozambican government's commitment to the support of liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia became an important component of its foreign policy. As a regional player, the newly independent country posed sanctions on neighbouring white minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa, this not only marked the beginning of complex regional relations in Southern Africa but the future of Mozambique as well. A consequence was the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)'s efforts of training and arming RENAMO as an insurgency, effectively leading to civil war (Vines, 2021).

FRELIMO was a close ally to African liberation movements, during a time when apartheid South Africa and Smith's Rhodesia sought the suppression any black liberation movements. Chan and Venancio (1998) further contend that the FRELIMO government's "failure to assume a more moderated realistic stance directly threatened not only the building of FRELIMO's internal socialist vision but also the very existence of a sovereign independent Mozambican nation state" (Vines, 2021). The devastating years of civil war further entrenched the state into economic crisis and destitute caused by Portuguese colonization in Mozambique. Peace negotiations to end the civil war began in 1982, but the role South Africa in civil war through RENAMO impeded progress until the later 1980s (Vines, 2021). The end of the Cold War in 1991 made the prospect of successful peace talks possible, with declined external influence. On The dependency of Mozambique on the IMF and World had certain scholars regarding Mozambique a "state of structural adjustment" (Bertelsen, 2016, p. 4).

## **2.6. Conclusion**

What came to be known as Mozambique in early 1948 (Emerson, 2014), has experienced unrestrained European colonialism, imperialism, capitalist exploitation and superpower rivalry. These historical events fashioned factors significantly complex to address for the Mozambican leadership and its people, designating that even in its post-independence, Mozambique's authority is limited in determining its trajectory and fate. Mozambique grappled with 500 years of Portuguese colonialism, a decade long war for independence. Upon independence, oppressive minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia orchestrated an insurgency that plunged the country into civil war, for the sole purpose of destabilizing and undermining the FRELIMO government. This chapter provided a chronological account of Mozambique's history with the objective of demonstrating various events that contributed to Mozambique's contemporary predicament and challenges. Legacies of Mozambique' colonial history has contributed to the deep structural and systematic inequalities entrenched in Mozambican socio-political and economic issues. These predominantly affect the black Mozambican population due to the racist prejudice of the colonial era, black Mozambicans were suppressed and denied political expression and effective economic participation for 500 hundred years.

This chapter has argued that centuries of underdevelopment, the brutality of the Portuguese colonial rule and oppression of black Mozambicans have created the deeply entrenched conditions of underdevelopment and inequality in Mozambique. The agonizing subhuman existence the black population were subjected contributed to the radicalization of the Mozambican population and resistance movements. FRELIMO sought an ideal socialist Mozambique, where the impoverished peasants would be granted access to basic social services such as education, health care and economic opportunities that they had been denied for centuries. A capitalist economic system had contributed to the exploitation, enslavement and oppression of Mozambicans, and therefore could justifiably not been the trajectory assumed by the liberation movement. The clear classist system that discriminated against race and social status had conspicuously created a master and subject system of oppression.

FRELIMO's efforts of national unity and transformation were rooted in the aspiration for an equal and just Mozambique, attainable through Marxist-Leninist socialism. The emancipation of the black Mozambicans depended on completed social transformation, thus informing the resettlement policies adopted under Samora Machel. Occurring within the confines of the global economic system of competing interests, FRELIMO's socialist revolution and domestic policy faced opposition internally and externally. The FRELIMO government was confronted with anti-liberation and anti-socialist regional forces from oppressive minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, which sought to suppress black liberation movements as they posed an intensifying threat, they fought to immobilize (Dinerman, 2006; Emerson, 2014). Although direct global implications are ambiguous, the Cold War's implications contributed to sponsoring conflicts and proxy wars in Africa. FRELIMO sought non-alignment in its foreign policy, however the Soviet bloc represented the ideals it upheld. Support for black liberation movements thus the independence of the African continent through arms and training, while the US and European powers supported the South African apartheid regime and Rhodesia in sponsoring RENAMO. These factors created a fragile environment for sustainable peace and remain relevant in understanding the plight of contemporary Mozambique.

The study has thus far provided a contextual history of Mozambique, with regards to the socio-economic and political dynamics that have shaped the landscape and challenges thereof. The colonial legacies inherited by the FRELIMO government upon independence have not easy to have undone and remain relevant in understanding certain aspects of Mozambican challenges. Violence specifically to drive political agendas became a tool Mozambicans were forced to use against their colonizers and it became a tool used against Mozambicans in the post-

independence period. The next chapter delves into literature on peace and peace agreements in Mozambique, and the FRELIMO and RENAMO rivalry in shaping the contemporary political landscape.

## CHAPTER THREE

### MOZAMBIQUE'S PEACE AGREEMENTS 1992- 2019: IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND SECURITY

#### 3.1. Introduction

Mozambique's post-independence political landscape has grappled with considerable (in)security challenges, primarily armed conflicts, which have had devastating multifaceted implications for the country. Violent relations between the primary actors in the conflict FRELIMO and RENAMO have had a significant impact on the country's political configuration, accompanied by costly material and moral implications (Alden, 2001; Cabrita, 2001; Emerson, 2014; Bertelsen, 2016; Vines, 2020). Peace processes directed at resolving FRELIMO-RENAMO conflict have produced three peace agreements, in 1992, 2014 and 2019, yet national unity and reconciliation remain unattained (Armon, Hendrickson and Vines, 1998; Azevedo-Harman, 2015; Vhumbunu, 2017). This observation, as argued by scholars such as Matt Duffield, Roland Paris and Oliver Richmond among others as ostensibly a case of the inability of the liberal peace framework to peacebuilding, being unable to comprehend the issues that are germane to effective peace in conflict affected states (see Richmond, 2015, 2009; Duffield 2012,2014; Paris, 2012). In essence, liberal peace is fraught with implementations difficulties among other issues (Duffield, 2014). As such the peace agreements primarily between FRELIMO and RENAMO, although have articulated the imperative for national unity and reconciliation as necessary conditions inclusive socio-economic advancement for all Mozambicans (see Government of Mozambique, 1992, 2019, 2019), this has largely been elusive due to the logic underpinning its framing.

The previous peace agreements have somewhat been regarded as a success by donor organisations and the international community at large (Darch, 2018). However, the ambiguities around how this acclaimed peace was achieved resurfaced when the current crises erupted in 2017, leading to the collapsed of the previous peace agreements. The signing of the last peace agreement in 2019 was similarly met with pessimism due to the aforementioned crisis in Cabo Delgado (Vines, 2021, p. 321). This has revived the conversation on Mozambique's search for durable peace among critical scholars that argue that the liberal peace

approaches in African conflicts are unable to achieve the desired outcomes (Richmond, 2014; Azevedo-Harman, 2015; Vines, 2020).

This chapter reviews the extant literature relevant to peace agreements and peace in Mozambique post 1992 era. In doing this, the study seeks to understand the challenges peace agreements have encountered in consolidating peace in Mozambique. Conversely, what accounts for the resulting failures of the peace agreements, hindering effective peace and national development. The first section delves into the three peace agreements the extent to which their key objective articulated a ‘victim-centred’ peace that would guide the formulation and implementation of policies in the interest of the broader population. The second section explores the socio-economic and political aftermath of FRELIMO-RENAMO violence and its impact of the country: primarily the segment of society primarily affected by the recurring conflict. The third section explores the Cabo Delgado crisis, and its dynamics to expand our understanding of the conflict. The last section provides a conclusion and summary of the chapter.

### **3.2. Peace and Peace Agreements in Mozambique: 1992-2019**

A formal definition of a peace agreement remains largely complex to define. However, the concept is understood to entail a signed mutual agreement(s) from negotiations between conflicting parties, aimed at ending conflict (Bell, 2006; Druckman and Albin, 2011). The negotiation processes are commonly facilitated by mediators and third-party stakeholders. Peace agreements also outline the objectives and priorities for protagonists in order to settle conflict and provide a level of stability, these can address institutional reform, power-sharing and transitional justice issues (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010, p. 948; Druckman and Albin, 2011; Fazal, 2013; Lanz, Nathan and Raffoul, 2019).

The signing of the first General Peace Accord (GPA) on 4 October 1992 by the Mozambican government led by FRELIMO, under President Joaquim Alberto Chissano and RENAMO under then leader Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama ended over 15 years of civil war (UN 2001). The agreement was reached after 12 rounds of negotiations (Vines, 2021). The war displaced over 5 million people and killed over 1 million people between 1977- 1992 (Faleg, 2019). The peace agreement consisted of seven protocols including security sector reform, institutional reform, and transitional justice mechanisms for the social reintegration and rehabilitation of victims. Parties agreed to the assistance of the UN in implementing the GPA

(Vines, 2019). A UN peace mission ONUMOZ was instituted under UNSC Resolution 797 to oversee the implementation of vital provisions of the agreement, which included the protection of transport corridors, withdrawal of foreign troops – Zimbabwe and Malawi – the reform of the security sector, the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of RENAMO militia (United Nations, 2001). ONUMOZ was further mandated to monitor the country's first multi-party democratic elections in 1994 and provide support to humanitarian operations. In the search for peace, FRELIMO and RENAMO committed “to do everything within their power for the achievement of genuine national reconciliation” and to achieve national unity for all Mozambicans (Government of Mozambique, 1992).

The question of how the GPA precisely gained its success is regarded to have been unclear (Vines, 2021), but scholarship on the issue revolves around five key points (Sumich and Honwana, 2007; Vines, 2021). First, parties had reached a stalemate, with no decisive victor. Secondly, financial, and technical support from external actors declined for both FRELIMO and RENAMO, the Cold War ended and so did the Soviet Union's support for FRELIMO, and South Africa's changing domestic landscape and the end of the apartheid system affected RENAMO (Hume, 1994; Emerson, 2014). Thirdly, worsening environmental conditions threatened Mozambique with starvation thus reducing its ability to feed its constituencies. Fourthly, incentives and payoffs played a role in brokering peace. Lastly, some scholars point to the role of external intervention and attribute it to the liberal peace model, arguing that peace was possible because there was international pressure (Hume, 1994; Vines, 2021).

For Chachiua and Malan (1998), the people's long-suffering was a strong determinant of the GPA's peace. While Bueno (2019) states that amnesty was granted at national level, at local level communities had to rely on rituals and traditional healing practices, which played a significant role in transitioning from the war. Some scholars are also of the view that reconciliation did not take root in Mozambique, even when the violence stopped. They argue that after three decades of bloodshed, the absence of violence would seemingly be mistaken for peace (Sumich and Honwana, 2007; Dzinesa and Motsamai, 2013; Wache, 2013; Bueno, 2019), these overlooked conflict dynamics will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. FRELIMO has also dominated the political landscape since 1994, and RENAMO has contested all national and parliamentary elections since 1994, and equally challenged all election outcomes. Post electoral violence has also resulted in numerous deaths, thus demonstrating the fragility of the peace in Mozambique (Macamo, 2016).

According to Vines (2019), Mozambique's security is historically linked to its complex regional politics, and that the divisions in the country stem from the colonial period that introduced separate administrative zones, effectively dividing the centre and periphery. The rural parts of the country remain marginalised due to the concentration of resources and economic activity being located in the southern part of the country, close to South Africa (Bornstein, 2008; Devermont and Columbo, 2019). Despite the positive economic growth experienced between 2003- 2013, with an average of 7% GDP growth, it did not translate into a positive impact on the poor (Vines, 2019; Tayimlong, 2021). An influx of aid and investment created a new centre of power, a narrow FRELIMO elite that increasingly tightened its hold to power no matter the cost (Macamo, 2016; Faleg, 2019; Vines, 2019). RENAMO's return to armed conflict in 2013 included reasons of economic exclusion and GPA violations (Tayimlong, 2021).

Through the politicization of electoral commissions, FRELIMO has also ensured its political dominance. FRELIMO amended several electoral laws and purportedly rigged elections to facilitate its stay in power (International Law and Policy Institute, 2013), thus resulting in violent retaliation from RENAMO. Hanlon (2010); Dzinesa and Motsamai (2013); International Law and Policy Institute (2013); Vines (2013) share a similar observation that RENAMO has minimal prospects of acquiring political power through the ballot, as witnessed in the 2009 general elections and FRELIMO's debilitating efforts. In 2009, FRELIMO won the elections by nearly three million votes, while RENAMO secured less than one million votes. FRELIMO secured 191 out of 250 parliamentary seats, the highest number in 4 elections (Hanlon, 2010). Hanlon further notes that the voter turnout was 45% like the 2004 elections, but lower than the 1992 and 1999, thus questioning the legitimacy of the elections. Hanlon further argues that the Mozambican population has not adequately exhibited or protested in support of RENAMO's dissatisfaction. In a similar vein, scholars like Macamo (2016); Darch (2018) have argued that RENAMO has also failed to transform itself from a rebel movement to a legitimate political party, the official opposition to the governing FRELIMO.

In December 2012, RENAMO discovered the government's amendment of electoral laws without RENAMO's approval. In 2013, the GPA collapsed after more than twenty years of peace, when RENAMO returned to targeted violence. RENAMO then embarked on a campaign of sporadic attacks in June 2013 after collapsed negotiations with FRELIMO, in response the government attacked a RENAMO base of Afonso Dhlakama in Satungira. The incomplete DDR of the GPA meant that RENAMO had access to weapons. The Mozambican Force for

Crime Investigation and Social Reinsertion (FOMICRES) disclosed that over three to four million weapons had been in circulation since 1992 (Vines, 2021, p. 327). Weapons that were confiscated were not destroyed, thus adding 200 000 more weapons undestroyed for the war (Vines, 2013). Increased investment in the country gas and coal industries intensified tensions between FRELIMO's elite over access to economic spoils and pushed RENAMO motivation for armed conflict.

RENAMO's return to conflict in 2013 produced another round of peace talks in Mozambique, the 'Declaration on the Cessation of Military Hostilities' signed in September 2014 in Maputo. Present observers and mediators included Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Cape Verde, Portugal, Italy, Ghana, United Kingdom and the United States. This second peace agreement similarly expressed the need for reconciliation an "immediate cessation of all hostile manifestation, especially the military manifestation, including in the social communication" (Government of Mozambique, 2014), it acknowledged the need to complete implementing the DDR process under the GPA. The integration of RENAMO's residual forces into the Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, to reintegrate economically and socially to become productive. The agreement expressed the need for national unity, reconciliation, political stability, democracy, and lasting peace. The agreement, however, does not specifically mention issues of transitional justice and victims of violence. It reiterated the imperative of RENAMO's integration into the security structure as a unifying measure for national reconciliation. The 2014 agreement experienced limited success as violence returned in 2015-2016 "focused primarily on commercial links and public services", it led to the 150 deaths and 500 injured (Vines, 2021).

In August 2019 the 'Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation' was signed between the Mozambican government under President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade called for an effective and lasting end to conflict and establish peace. The agreement expressed similar aspirations of reconciliation and national unity to that of the two preceding peace agreements (Vines, 2021). According to Weimer (2020), reconciliation was not a priority in the 2019 peace agreement, similar to the 2014 and 1992 agreements. Reconciliation mechanisms were minimally incorporated into government policies and budget, thus leaving reconciliation efforts to religious organisations, communities, NGO, and ordinary people. Weimer further argues that the agreements' main objective, thus the objective of FRELIMO, is the disarmament of RENAMO. For RENAMO, the constitutional amendments

of April 2018 strategically granted it access to resources at the provincial level. Weimer further notes the external financing of the agreement, by actors including Switzerland.

### **3.2.1. The Consolidation of Peace in Mozambique**

According to Adedokun (2017), post conflict reconstruction and development are considered as big challenges today, due to the high probability of relapsing into conflict, creating a phenomenon scholar have described as the ‘conflict trap’ (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Adedokun, 2017b). Intra-state conflict research has also increased our understanding of these conflicts, their root causes and driving factors driving as well as ways to address them. In Mozambique, independence was earned through a decade long struggle and bloodshed against the Portuguese colonial power (Alden, 2001; Bertelsen, 2016). The civil war followed two years after the country’s independence and fuelled for over 15 years, due to both exogenous and endogenous influences. The prospect of peace in Mozambique was made possible by geopolitical shifts at the global level, the demise of the Soviet Union that brought an end to the Cold War and the changing domestic politics in apartheid South Africa. The Rome peace talks were preceded by two peace talks that sought to end the civil war but collapse without resolution, the Nkomati Peace negotiations in 1984 and the Nairobi Peace talks in 1989 (Isaacman, 1985; Armon, Hendrickson and Vines, 1998)

Policy legacies of colonialism, carried over by post-independence political actors in relation to the unequal development and marginalisation of parts of Mozambique heavily contributes to the recurring conflict. For Phiri and Macheve Jr, (2014), conflict in Mozambique “bequeathed a legacy of blight, neglect and poverty as a result of direct and structural violence by the perpetrators”, mainly the political class to whom the responsibility to address the causes of the violence rests. After the GPA, conflict returned to Mozambique on various scales including in post electoral violence and regarding economic and political exclusion. The country’s vulnerability to internal conflict has exhibited intractable conflict features. According to Mitchell (2014, pp. 32–33), intractable conflicts are caused by multiple factors even though they may be perceived to concern a singular issue, for instance, scarcity. Most intractable conflicts emerge due to incommensurable goals of conflicting parties, identity and diverging political goals. Natural resources, economic cleavages, poverty, and inequalities further show a link to creating conflicts. In Mozambique, these factors and the government’s exclusionary policies have contributed to RENAMO waging conflict. The GPA transformed RENAMO a

former rebel movement into a political party, to contest the power to govern the country through elections (Adedokun, 2017a). In sum, the elite competition over power and resource dominance over the quest to direct public resources for effective development has been a bane of the ongoing conflict.

Scholars acknowledge the importance of meaningful inclusion/ participation for durable peace, processes that include more political parties, civil society, and non-political actors (Murithi, 2009; Jamar, 2018). For Selim and Murithi (2011), the failure to address underdevelopment and distributive injustice in post-political violence and transitions countries is equivalent to enabling violence and injustice to persist, which has implications for the stability of a community or country. Distributive justice in this sense relates to the how political actors deploy public resources to address social, political, and economic problems. Therefore, in countries such as Mozambique where violence conflict is shaped by unequal power relations and socioeconomic justice, there is the need for political actors to address the root causes of conflict, namely, the perceived or real injustices in the distribution of power, resources, and opportunities, underlying social, economic, politic and cultural injustices through the just distribution of public resources. These components to effective peace are symbiotic and mutually reinforcing. Accordingly, it can be understood from this set of literature that the focus of peace agreements on elite on political and civil rights violations, neglecting the economic, social and cultural injustices of the conflict hinders the usefulness of such agreements.

A core issues in ending conflicts in transitional justice seen as measures for punishing and compensating perpetrators and victims and ensuring a just system for harmonious co-existence. This component is essential, partly, in remedying conflict by ensuring reconciliation and efforts of consolidating peace. According to (Pillay and Scanlon (2008); Igreja (2015); Bueno (2019), in Mozambique legislative amnesty was extended to combatants at state level in the interest of peace and transitional justice issues were neglected. At community level, survivors and perpetrators had to rely on their own justice and healing mechanisms as witnessed in Gorongosa where ‘spirits’ enabled survivors and perpetrators to heal and live in communities devastated by conflict. For instance, the *magamba* ceremony where “magamba spirits are thought to return and, in general, enter the bodies of women whose relatives were allegedly involved in some crimes against the soldiers” (Pillay and Scanlon, 2008). The belief was that the spirits manifested for justice and post-war denialism, as a way of addressing war atrocities and to enable the healing to process (Pillay and Scanlon, 2008; Thompson, 2010). Bueno (2019) contents that despite these attempts, reconciliation never took root, even from former

President Chissano's administration (1992-2005), as was experienced in other non-violence methods. During former President Guebuza's tenure (2005-2015, reconciliation advances were reversed as the country witnessed a relapse into violence in 2012. Barriers that divided FRELIMO and RENAMO were left intact and can be identified in "the socio-economic, political and military spheres of Mozambican society".

Linked to ensuring durable peace in the issue of governance. In the case of Mozambique, effective governance is critical as it provides core functions and facilitates interaction between the state and its population, protection of territory, property and livelihoods from internal and external security threats, and vital for the rule of law (Brinkerhoff, 2007, p. 4). In this regard, economic governance and administration also contribute to public service delivery, economic opportunities, and transparency in policy formulation. From a political view, it promotes government accountability and efficient public policy that is protective of the citizenry. In ungoverned spaces, organized crime, terrorist activities nest and thrive due to the state's incapacity to counter threats that undermine national security (Raineri and Strazzari, 2017). The limitations of state control in certain zones enables the creation of alternative power structures and authorities. Neethling (2021b) has argued that Cabo Delgado is a space of limited statehood, where the state lacks capacity to maintain a legitimate monopoly on the use of force or enforce political order and laws. According to the author there are numerous governance challenges in Cabo Delgado, stemming from weak government institutions in Mozambique, due to the institutional capacity, gaps in legitimacy, and effective governance. "Cabo Delgado is an area that the central government in Maputo in the south is unable to control or govern effectively" (Neethling 2021b). In a similar vein, (Faria, 2021) also notes "the government's powerlessness to tackle internal threats" by the militia group in Cabo Delgado.

### **3.3. Conclusion**

The independence decade ushered optimism as African countries regained their independence from colonial powers. However, the global system has maintained power asymmetries similar to the colonial period. Euro-American hegemony remains dominant in the international arena, and as established from Richmond (2009a), liberal thought informs the international community's logic, understanding and approaches to African conflicts. The international community played a momentous role in supporting peace efforts between FRELIMO and

RENAMO in 1992, and ONUMOZ peacekeeping mission assisted in the implementation of vital provisions of the GPA. Mozambique transitioned into a democratic state and FRELIMO won the first elections in 1994 and has since then dominated the country political landscape, though through questionable means. Mozambique became a donor and investment destination due to the promising stability, which produced an elite and political leadership that facilitated its stay in power through corrupting democratic governance institutions which eroded their legitimacy. The country economic potential consequently limited to their myopic interests. RENAMO's violence became an important tool to negotiate with the government as its attempts through democratic processes and elections had not yielded positive results.

Closer attention to the post 1992 landscape demonstrates a country grappling with the 'liberal virus' as Amin (2004) elucidated. Economic growth and positive GDP indicators accompanied by increasing inequalities, poverty and the state's dependence on aid continues to threaten its sovereignty and ability to use state-power to distribute resources, to enable equitable development and address the root cause of the recurring conflict. Applying the ideas of decoloniality to the case of Mozambique speaks to liberalism's crippling effects on postcolonial states. Aid conditionality despite the hope for good, and financing of peace building initiatives have not addressed societal challenges which reproduced conflict dynamics. The next chapter builds on the reviewed literature and provides an analysis of the Cabo Delgado crisis as consequence of FRELIMO-RENAMO dynamics.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### UNDERSTANDING MOZAMBIQUE'S PEACE AGREEMENTS AND RECURRING CONFLICT IN CABO DELGADO

#### 4.1. Introduction

Peace agreements in Mozambique have since 1992 facilitated the formation of a consumerist state, with political elites solely concerned about the use of state power for partisan parochial interests or material and other considerations. Mozambique's peace agreements are thus built on quicksand, and their continued focus on belligerent forces only serve to delay durable peace in the country (Zambakari, 2016; Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke, 2018; Bussotti, 2021). In 2019, the current peace agreement – the *Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation* was agreed upon by the primary warring factions and brokered by the Swiss (Vines, 2019). A careful read of the document underscores a political elite more concerned about their interests and power than concrete measures to address the underlying causes of the conflict in a manner that connects with the aspirations of a cross-section of Mozambicans, especially the people of Cabo Delgado. The 2019 peace agreement which constituted a third attempt at establishing peace in the country offers little difference from its predecessors. Yet, it was antithetically signed amid telling divisions within RENAMO and escalating violence in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado.

Again, as was the case with previous agreements, the international community, including the UN, Germany, Italy, and Norway played key roles in the adoption of the agreement. The participation of these actors must be understood in the context of the current global governance architecture where powerful institutions and nations in Europe and North America lead the way in securing the peace of developing countries within the framework of liberal peacebuilding (Richmond, 2009; Duffield, 2010; Richmond, 2014). Thus, euphoria that followed the celebration of the current peace agreement between the political elite, even when the country is not at peace still, fits the liberal peace agenda of governmentality – getting the settings right for liberal institutions and norms to function to enable states function in the international arena (Richmond, 2006; Duffield, 2014).

The main objective of the current peace agreements has been to establish peace, democracy, national reconciliation, and unity for all Mozambicans. However, following the liberal peace logic the salience of national reconciliation is largely absent in the implementation of the agreement. In a way, this can be discernible from the fact that civil society organizations and other local actors needed in the broader processes of forming national reconciliation have been minute due to the focus on liberal peace processes that prioritises high-level political settlements and mediation (Newman and Richmond, 2006; Richmond, 2014). This remains a cardinal constrain to achieving effective peace in Mozambique.

All peace agreements in Mozambique (1992, 2014, and 2019) have aimed to achieve national unity, reconciliation, peace, and democracy for all Mozambicans (Government of Mozambique, 1992, 2014, and 2019). Yet, they have ostensibly served the partisan interests of FRELIMO and RENAMO actors and assigns to the detriment of ordinary Mozambicans. This focus on elite interest has been identified as central to the contributory conditions that have enabled the emergence of the Cabo Delgado crisis, with its attendant Islamic extremism (Alden and Chichava, 2020). Similarly, scholars like Vines (2019) questioned whether the 2019 peace agreement would last against the domestic challenges and increasing uncertainty. Understandably, the conflict in Mozambique is confronted mainly by the unequal development that has led to socio-economic deprivation of the inhabitants in that region (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2018; Devermont, and Columbo, 2019). In this regard, Vines further calls for a durable settlement of the FRELIMO and RENAMO conflict that is anchored on the country's national development agenda (Vines, 2019), as this enables political actors to overcome the hinderance to national reconciliation and durable peace.

Drawing on the counter literature of liberal peace approaches, especially in the African contexts and Mozambique, one can adduce the failure to address core grievances and build inclusive and sustainable peace, which includes all sectors of society to the lack of attention to the socio-economic inequality in the country to which the political elites flame to sustain their relevance. Scholars and practitioners have thusly advocated for inclusive and bottom-up approaches, encouraging victim-centred processes and decisions (Murithi, 2009; Igreja, 2013). Hence, GPA signed in Rome and Maputo neglected peace efforts at the grassroots level (Juergensen, 2000). From a careful read of the GPA, peace and post-conflict reconstruction were driven by pressure from the international community. Bueno (2019) has argued that the absence of government at grassroots levels meant that ordinary Mozambicans relied on their tools and processes to build peace, including traditional healing approaches and rituals, for trauma, healing, and

reconciliation, because the GPA and its provisions did not trickle down to them, especially in the case of amnesty that was passed at the national level, which pardoned all crimes committed during the war. At the community level, various indigenous approaches, such as rituals and other practices, were performed (Sumich and Honwana, 2007; Igreja, 2013). This demonstrated that decisions taken at the national may not always resonate with what exists on the ground to build peace.

Thus, this chapter attempts to answer the central research question in this study: why the peace agreements in Mozambique have (1992, 2014, 2019) have failed to build and consolidate peace, thus resulting in recurring conflicts between FRELIMO and RENAMO and the emergence of new conflict dynamics, such as in Cabo Delgado. The chapter begins by providing explanations of some of the considered factors that have ostensibly contributed to failed peace agreements in Mozambique and the resultant Cabo Delgado crisis. To corroborate this argument, focus is paid to the unequal socio-economic and political environment in post-1992 Mozambique, which has also enabled the emergence of an Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Through a decolonial and relative deprivation lens, the first section delves into the peace agreements and their limitations in establishing durable peace. The second section analyses the emergence of Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ) in Cabo Delgado as a ramification of the broader political leadership crisis and links it to peace agreements and their aftermath. The third section interprets the findings and establishes meaning, and the final section concludes with a summary and links the chapter to the research objectives.

## **4.2. Peace Agreements Limitations and Drivers of the Cabo Delgado Conflict**

The study's central focus is to understand why the three peace agreements between the governing party, FRELIMO, and RENAMO have failed to establish durable peace for all Mozambicans, thus potentially contributing to the emergence of the Cabo Delgado crisis. The literature review in Chapter Three indicates an interplay of multidimensional factors (Richmond, 2014; Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2018; Devermont, and Columbo, 2019; Tayimlong, 2021). Some factors are domestic but are also linked and influenced by external actors. These include failed and incomplete implementation of agreements and policies, e.g., ONUMOZ and the incomplete DDR, which was a significant determining factor in how an opposition party (RENAMO) retained a military wing (see Dzinesa, 2022). The literature also

pointed to weak governance, corruption, protracted socio-economic and political marginalisation, and structural inequalities rooted in colonial legacies (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995; Addison and Brück, 2008; Hanlon, 2015).

The Cabo Delgado province is geographically located in northern Mozambique (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter One); according to United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF, 2022) the total population is estimated at 2 670 078 (See the breakdown in Figure 2 below). The province is one of the most impoverished in Mozambique; the illiteracy rate is 52.4%, which is higher than the national average of 12.5%, with women being twice as likely to be illiterate as men. About 21.90% of people in Cabo Delgado do not have access to health facilities, and those that do (65.8%) live more than 30 minutes away from facilities, and 56.10% do not have access to safe drinking water (UNICEF, 2022). Cabo Delgado is predominantly inhabited by Sunni Muslims and a smaller group of Ismaili Shi'a (Bonate, 2010). As mentioned in Chapter Two, Islam was introduced in the area through trade with the Swahili. Under Portuguese colonialism, the region maintained a level of self-governance under the control of Shirazi clans, with closer political, economic, and religious kinship to the Swahili in Tanzania (Bonate, 2010). This demographic overview captures in part, the hindrances to the effective peace in Mozambique.

**Figure 4.1: The population breakdown of Cabo Delgado**


Total Resident Population	2,670,078
Total Adults	1,268,444
Adult Women	671,294
Adult Men	597,150
Total Children (0-17 years old)	1,401,634
Girls	699,526
Boys	702,108

Source: UNICEF (2022).

In 2017, a group of 30 young men later known as ASWJ, known locally as “Al Shabaab” attacked government offices and police stations, marking the beginning of the country’s battle against Islamic insurgency and extremism (Weimer, 2020; Faria, 2021). In April 2018, the group swore its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Neethling, 2021a), exponentially increasing the security threat that the government had underplayed. According to the International Crisis Group (2021), the insurgency had been looming since 2007, when

reports of frustrated youth activists in Cabo Delgado preaching strange Islam surfaced. They started denouncing local authorities and religious leaders, especially those with closer ties to the Muslim council in Maputo, condemning their association with the corrupt FRELIMO government. They began by denouncing the rights of women to work, and the enrolment of children in public schools in the province. The group of young men comprised largely of the poor and unemployed, fishermen traders, farmers, and a few leaders from Tanzania (International Crisis Group, 2021). From 2017 to March 2022, attacks linked to ASWJ as Figure 3 presents, had contributed to the displacement of over 735 000 people including over 350 000 children (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022), and over 3 000 fatalities and halted LNG operations (Amnesty International, 2021).

**Figure 4.2: Map of Cabo Delgado and attacks linked to ASWJ from 2017.**



Source: Pirio, Pittelli and Adam (2021): <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/cries-from-the-community-listening-to-the-people-of-cabo-delgado/>.

### 4.3. Political and Economic Grievances

Mozambique is one of the world's poorest countries. According to the United Nations Development Programme (2020) Human Development Index (HDI), out of 189 countries, Mozambique is positioned at 181, demonstrating low levels of human development, inequalities, poverty, education, and gender inequality. A significant amount of the country's economic and infrastructure deficit is attributed to devastating colonial legacies, the 1977-1992 civil war, the government's incapacity, and neglect after independence (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2018; Devermont and Columbo, 2019), as well as the country's vulnerability to natural disasters (Cambaza et al., 2019). In recent times, grievance arising out of political decisions relating the resource use of the country has contributed to the ongoing crises. This is reflected in the oil exploration activities in the Cabe Delgado region. In 2005, Mozambique's National Petroleum Institute (INP) announced the competitive bidding licensing round for exploration focused on the Rovuma Basin, approximately 40km offshore of Cabo Delgado (Macuane and Muianga, 2020). Exploration licenses were awarded to Anadarko (US energy company), ENI (Italy), Artumas (Canada), Petronas (Malaysia), and Norsk Hydro (Norway) (Energy Intelligence, 2006). The large natural gas reserves found mainly in the Rovuma Basin mandated the construction of LNG facilities. To achieve this, local populations in Cabo Delgado were evicted from their land and homes and resettled inland; this was an estimated population of 10 000 locals (Regalia, 2017). Anadarko reported that over 550 families were evicted and resettled, including approximately 1 000 people who lost cultivated land, and more than 3 000 people, who lost access to fishing (Neethling, 2021b).

The resettlement of the local population meant the loss of livelihoods and food insecurity for most of the people as they depended on fishing and agriculture for sustenance. An account by Rawoot (2020) adds that after the resettlement, the people also faced compensation corruption from the government which increased their frustrations, anger, and sentiments of marginalization. Those who were not compensated or had grievances were threatened by the authorities to remain silent. Concerns about the project's impact on society were voiced by civil society organizations and within government (Gqada, 2013), raising that the gas projects should also address some of the socio-economic problems in the region. The eviction of local people from their homes and land in Cabo Delgado, depriving them of their livelihoods to displace and resettle them in a worse-off habitat constituted a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Understood from the perspective of political decisions and its attendant grievances, it is safe to assume that political elites would enact public policies to address the

consequences of their actions on the local people. However, the government has not produced a plan to address the destitute conditions of Mozambicans and remote regions like Cabo Delgado are worst affected by these gaps.

Likewise, the country's development priorities have had to compete with the demands and interests of Western donors, and a corrupt government failing to deliver basic public services. The role of the international community in Mozambique is complex, despite decades of development finance and aid, development for the country remains unattained. Mozambique's international relations, particularly with the West are mired in complexity and contradiction and are demonstrative of the hegemonic power asymmetries of the international system and its impact on Africa (Hanlon and Smart, 2008; Hanlon, 2017). In this regard Western countries remain financially, militarily, and politically dominant in the peace process in Mozambique, this ostensibly is to protect capital investment and other valuable interests (Hanlon and Smart, 2008; Regalia, 2017; Rawoot, 2020).

As part of the World Bank Structural Adjustment policy blueprint for African countries, Mozambique joined the World Bank in 1984 (World Bank, 2022), to liberalise its economy. This decision as noted by de Renzio and Hanlon (2007) was as a result of the Soviet Union's decline in the mid-1980s. Further, the country accepted US NGOs to operate in the country and effectively accepted capitalism. Foreign aid became a lifeline for Mozambique's economy and consequently led to the country's high dependence on foreign aid (Hanlon, 2004; de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007; Hanlon and Smart, 2008). Attesting to the argument put forward by Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah that the post-independence era is a neo-colonial era, where African policies, economies, and politics are still controlled by core countries and western powers (Nkrumah, 1965). Though Mozambique won its independence and liberation, its political, social, and economic reality exists within the confines of capitalism, which benefits the West to the detriment of the local population. FRELIMO was a liberation movement, a vehicle for self-determination, freedom, and ultimately decolonization. Colonialism bequeathed a legacy of violence which became a tool to advance progress and equally destruction. Interference in the form of divisions orchestrated by the Western nations and corporation, and the US in particular propagated the civil war, whose legacies remain in Mozambique's contemporary political and security landscape (Hanlon, 2004; Mignolo, 2011; Duffield, 2014).

A significant defect to the peace agreements signed is the lack of provisions for transitional justice plans and implementation. An effect of the conflict in the country is the loss of lives, displacement, torture, destroyed livelihoods. Therefore, to achieve national reconciliation and build peace, it is the expectation, for citizens, that appropriate mechanisms for forgiveness and means of overcome the effects of the conflict would be provided (Thompson, 2016). This when well thought-out and implemented holds the possibility of making previously aggrieved segments of society remain silent. Looked at differently, for RENAMO, violence and the fight against the government provided relief, a tool ordinary citizenry had not explored. This led to the collapse of the GPA in 2013, and the peace agreement in 2014 provided amnesty once again for crimes committed during the conflict, which were signposts of a political crisis (Macamo, 2017).

In 2014, presidential and parliamentary elections were held, and FRELIMO won the majority votes, but with allegations of electoral fraud. RENAMO rejected the elections and threatened to divide the country into two. Afonso Dhlakama then called his party to a meeting that took a resolution called the “Autonomous Republic of the North and Centre of Mozambique” (Macamo, 2017) and insisted that he would only accept the election outcomes if he himself appointed governors in provinces that had been won by RENAMO. This points to the lack of a transitional justice mechanism that builds trust and assists with national reconciliation and development.

Also, the absence of a transitional justice mechanism in the peace agreements have therefore facilitated a democratic political system, which has revolved around the interests of mainly the two political parties and actors in the conflict who resort to the use of power and the country’s resources for parochial interests (Brooks, 2018; Vines, 2019). These events also coincide with the intensifying frustrations in Cabo Delgado, which were overlooked until it was impossible to do so (Devermont and Columbo, 2019). The emphasis of the Mozambique’s peace agreements on armed belligerents, a legacy of foreign interference though the liberal peace framework without appreciating the local socio-economic issues have led the recurring conflict in the country (Bekoe, 2008; Zambakari, 2016).

#### 4.3.1.1. Corruption, Poverty, and Inequality

Transparency International (2021) notes that the cost of grand corruption in Mozambique between “2004 and 2014 was up to US\$ 4.9 billion, equivalent to 60% of the country’s 2015 budget”. According to Transparency International grand corruption entails three main features: a corruption scheme, involvement of a high-level public official and serious harm caused which may include misappropriation of government funds and a gross violation of human rights (Transparency International, 2021). Also, the UN Convention Against Corruption report, decries the destructive effects of corruption and threats it poses to democracy and the rule of law, violations to human rights, and contributions to human insecurity, which leads to violence and terrorism (United Nations, 2004). Countries, therefore, have legal anti-corruption obligations and mandate to criminalise and prosecute corruption offenses.

In 2016, one of the biggest corruption scandals in Mozambique involving two banks based in London; Credit Suisse and Russian VTB were discovered. The hidden loans amounting to \$2.2 billion (US) were brokered by Mozambican senior public servants and politicians, European bankers, and Middle Eastern entrepreneurs, which added to the country’s debt deficit (Transparency International, 2019; Cortez *et al.*, 2021). According to these reports, the funds ended up in personal accounts, and 19 people were implicated including Ndambi Guebuza – who is currently in prison for the crime – the son of former Mozambican President Amando Guebuza. According to Toulemonde (2021), the current president of Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi who was Minister of Defence then is also implicated, though these allegations are denied, and refuses to appear in court. In its ruling, a judgment by the Mozambique Constitutional Council, in Case No:05/CC/2019, ruled that the loans are null and void due to their unconstitutional and illicit nature (Bradlow, 2020). Mozambique’s weak economy was plunged into further crisis visiting more hardship on the poor. The net effect of corruption in the country is that over 2 million people have been plunged into poverty (Krippahl, 2021; Transparency International, 2021).

The corruption and public debt crisis in Mozambique have negative implications for the country’s development imperatives, as it deprives critical social services such as health, education, safety, and water supply, thus increasing poverty and human insecurity because vulnerable groups such as the poor, women, child, and people with disabilities are the main beneficiaries of public services. In the current international system, loans and debt relief conditionalities from international financial institutions limit a country’s ability to meet its

development and human rights obligations, as they compel countries to reduce spending or investment in basic public services among other things (Lumina and Tamale, 2021). The reality for most developing countries like Mozambique is that they are forced to accept IMF and donor conditionalities to avert complete collapse and pressure from the capitalist global system. Liberalization subdued the competitiveness of local economies, and their development remains subject to the harsh impact of capitalism, as such socio-economic grievances increase from food insecurity, unemployment, poverty, and widening inequalities.

Moreover, climate change has also had a negative effect on the continent. In the Southern Africa region Mozambique is the worst affected by extreme climatic events, adding to the country's development challenges and issues the northern provinces including Cabo Delgado grapple with. In 2000, Mozambique experienced floods due to cyclones (Mondlane, 2004). The northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Sofala experienced severe drought between 2015-2016, and in 2019 Cyclones Idai and Kenneth added to the humanitarian crises confronting the Cabo Delgado population and surrounding provinces (Mugabe *et al.*, 2021). The impact of the 2019 cyclones contributed to the deaths, displacement of populations, food insecurity and starvation, damage and loss of infrastructure as well as communicable diseases such as cholera (Cambaza *et al.*, 2019; Mugabe *et al.*, 2021). As mentioned above, frustration and anger intensified by these factors increase the probability of violence and susceptibility of individuals to ideological extremists.

#### **4.3.1.2. Limited Governance vs Ungoverned Territories**

The recurring insurgency also exposes Mozambique's inability to secure and protect its population and territorial integrity, which is characteristic of ungoverned territory. The Cabo Delgado province, as well as neighbouring Nampula and Niassa provinces, are noted for organized crime and lawlessness, which could be attributed to the lack of the state's presence in those regions. This is understandably so when one considers the situation in these regions from a liberal perspective. However, the conditions favourable to the exploitation of terrorist networks in these regions are merely not the result of limited central governments presence, but the region's socio-economic disparity that leaves the population vulnerable to terrorist recruitment (Hanlon, 2018).

Cabo Delgado has a long history of illicit drug trafficking – mainly heroin – and established contraband networks linked to Afghanistan via Southern and East Africa routes (Hanlon, 2018). The destination of heroin is primarily for markets in the West, South Africa, and some in Mozambique (Alden and Chichava, 2020). The Mozambican Navy also lacks the capacity to curb criminality in the region. There are more inland personnel compared to the sea with a significant number of them lacking motivation to work (Alden and Chichava, 2020). The extent of the crisis within Mozambique’s state security apparatus is a cause for concern, as some reports note that some disgruntled soldiers sold intelligence and weapons to AWSJ in Cabo Delgado (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022). This could perhaps inform the delayed security response from government. For Neethling, AWSJ also emerged because of “issues related to limited statehood, specifically in relation to the domestic factors of marginalization, neglect, exploitation, and government corruption” (Neethling, 2021). The socio-economic disparity between the north and the south in Mozambique is a colonial legacy, which remained unaddressed under the FRELIMO government. The north, which is historically linked to the Swahili in Tanzania, depended on agriculture, while the south of the country enjoyed an economy based on gold, and being close to industrialized South Africa (Neethling, 2021a). However, government policy through the GPA has failed to address this root cause of the conflict. By 2022, what started as a group of disgruntled young men, attacking a police station and government buildings in 2017, had escalated into an Islamic insurgency affiliated to ISIS, inciting chaos, killing, decapitating civilians, increasingly capturing territory, and was challenging to defeat (Morier-Genoud, 2020; Neethling, 2021a; Felix, 2022).

The government’s incapacity to protect its people and stop the insurgents led to foreign security companies being contracted for assistance in fighting the insurgency. The energy companies also contracted their own security companies to protect the gas plants. From the government, contractors included the Wagner Group, a private Russian security company. This intensified the conflict, resulting in eleven Russian soldiers being killed. The Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), a South African private security company owned by retired Colonel Lionel Dyck, who served in the Zimbabwe Defence Force and Rhodesian Army was then contracted. DAG’s involvement with the Mozambican government was providing military training and air support. In Cabo Delgado, it deployed five helicopters, which faced operational problems, including shooting at civilian thus resulting in fourteen deaths, and sinking a fisherman boat in Ibo island. Efforts of private military contractors and government forces failed to defeat the insurgents, which resulted in military intervention first from Rwanda and the SADC at the request of the Mozambican government. While the government’s decision for military intervention can be

appreciated, the fundamental cause of the conflict is rooted in the government's failure to address the marginality of the northern region.

#### **4.3.2. Resource Induced Conflict in Cabo Delgado**

The Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique is endowed with natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. However, the Mozambican government has failed to transfer the dividends of this minerals into investments in Cabo Delgado as part of its overall national development goals, to positively impact and transform the living conditions of the Cabo Delgado populations. This lack of development despite its resource richness is a key trigger of the conflict in the region. For instance, the displacements and loss of livelihoods associated with investments into the extractive industry in the region has led to grievances and feeling of neglect by the central government (Regalia, 2017; Bonate, 2018). According to the International Law and Policy Institute ILPI (2013)'s petroleum sector report, investment and presence of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the region began in the 1960s with Sasol, more discoveries were made in 1998 with a lifespan of 25 years. Production of natural gas exports began in 2004, with an estimated annual production capacity of 120 million gigajoules (GJ) of gas. This coincides with the period INP exploration licenses were issued to international companies in the industry to explore the region, as previously mentioned. Despite increased investments in Cabo Delgado, the local people remained marginalized, neglected, and impoverished. Successively, all FRELIMO administrations failed to improve the living conditions in the region (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2018).

Invariably, the discovery of large deposits of natural gas and rubies and the development of LNG facilities were expected to transform Mozambique's aid-dependent economy into a natural resources-driven economy. The increased revenue from investments in the energy sector failed to translate into job creation thereby poverty reduction and enhanced living standards against the backdrop of endemic corruption (Bradlow, 2020). Scholars including Bonate (2018), Faleg (2019), Macuane, Buur and Monjane (2017) and Vines (2019) link the Cabo Delgado insurgency to the extractive industry boom, *vis-a-vis* frustration over the destitute socio-economic realities which Cabo Delgado population are subjected. Furthermore, Macuane et al (2017) note that the tussle for power within and outside FRELIMO regarding

the natural resources and who are the actual beneficiaries compounded the anger among citizens of the region and facilitate the conflict.

The study, therefore, argues that the re-emergence of the Cabo Delgado crisis around 2007 can be linked to the lack of increased investments in public goods in the region to enhance the well-being of inhabitants. Thus, income for LNG development has not driven socio-economic development in the Cabo Delgado, rather, deprivation, and despair of local the population is the everyday picture one is confronted with (Morier-Genoud, 2020). As previously mentioned, the development of LNG fields and ancillary development in Cabo Delgado led to the displacement of approximately 10 000 people (Regalia, 2017), who lost their livelihoods, lands and but are yet to be adequately compensated by government for their displacement. For instance, fishermen lost access to fishing sites due to extraction processes, yet their hope for employment in the Petro-chemical industry did not materialize as most Multi-National Companies (MNCs) brought in expatriates or ‘their own labour’ and neglected the local populace. Consequently, the neglect of the state to adequately compensate the people of Cabo Delgado for the loss of livelihoods and displacements, constitute a violation of their rights and fundamental freedoms according to the African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).

States are the primary duty bearers of protecting the human rights of citizens. MNCs are driven by profit maximization, proven by extant research to have adverse environmental and societal impact (Theisen, 2008; Schilling, Saulich and Engwicht, 2018; Devermont and Columbo, 2019). However, the government of Mozambique has failed to prevent these violations and often has become complicit in the activities of foreign companies in these activities (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2018). Similar cases demonstrating this instance are found elsewhere in Nigeria, Kenya among others. For instance, the Endorois community in Kenya where approximately 60 000 people were displaced from their ancestral land in Lake Bogoria for the development of the Kenyan Wildlife Services in 1970. In this case, the Government of Kenya failed to adequately compensate them and was therefore in contravention of the ACHPR Article 8, 14, 17, 21 and 22 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2013). The ACHPR ruled in favour of the Endorois community for their land to be restored and compensated (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Relatedly in Nigeria, the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights vs the government of Nigeria concerning the adverse impact of oil extraction on Ogoniland and people was found to have been in violation of the ACHPR Article 2, 4, 14, 16, 18, 21 and 24, as well the right to shelter

and food of the Ogoni people. The ACHPR's judgment on the case emphasized the duty of states to protect their citizens against the negative impact of business and extractive industries (ESCR-Net, 2002).

### **4.3.3. Youth Radicalization**

According to the International Crisis Group (2021), the Cabo Delgado crisis had been looming since 2007, but the Mozambican authorities ostensibly underestimated the national security threat the early signs of radicalisation posed. Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) note that the government ignored signs of youth Islamic radicalisation – mainly among the Makua ethnic group in the southern districts of Cabo Delgado – whom out of frustration, began to denounce the authorities and local religious leaders, especially those with close ties to the Muslim council in Maputo (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019). The Mwani ethnic group from Mocímboa da Praia joined them in the mid-2010s. Increased activity from the discovery of rubies and natural gas intensified their mobilization. They criticized the parochial interests of the 'liberation-era' generals in the province, who were President Filipe Nyusi's Makonde ethnic group. In 2017, the expulsion of artisanal miners from commercial mining concessions increased resentment and further local discontent (International Crisis Group, 2021). Admittedly, these actions by the state exacerbate the socioeconomic circumstances of the people in Cabo Delgado, hence, their resort to violence as means of bargaining for their due.

The abject deprivation in the region has exposed it to the influence of extremist. Extremist Muslim preachers identified in radicalising the youth in Cabo Delgado include Sheikh Hassan, from Tanzania, and others in Mocimboa da Praia, who exploited the desperate conditions affecting the youth and instilled ideas of a Sharia political order: considered an alternative to the corrupt FRELIMO government in Maputo (Faria, 2021). The Organization for World Peace (2019) similarly notes that youth expelled from mosques in the community formed their mosques, following radical Islam beliefs and practices from Muslim clerics like Aboud Rogo Mohammed from Kenya. According to the United Nations Security Council (2018), Aboud Rogo Mohammed is implicated financing al-Shabaab terrorists to sore instability in Somalia and Eritrea. The UNSC further notes that Aboud Rogo Mohammed embarked on a campaign to spread violence and terror throughout East Africa. Other accounts including (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2018; Faria, 2021; International Crisis Group, 2021) have argued that the youth

in Cabo Delgado joined the extremist networks for the hope of material gain, more than reasons of natural resource discoveries. In effect, the poor material condition of the people in the region due to decades of impoverishment flame the conflict in Mozambique.

#### **4.4. Elite Settlement, National Integration, and the case of Cabo Delgado**

Mozambique's stability, peace, and future have effectively been negotiated between the political leadership –particularly FRELIMO and RENAMO agents – and external actors, to the exclusion of the people. Hence, GPA has been a product of elite bargain and not one that connects with the needs of the people. This factor can be equated to the liberal approach to peacebuilding that shapes thinking around the signing of peace agreements in general and that of Mozambique. In this regard, this chapter has demonstrated that the various peace agreements and processes Mozambique have not sought to establish peace for Mozambicans but to serve the elite interests of FRELIMO and RENAMO activists. Equally, the role of external partners as drivers and enablers of this crisis has also been emphasised in this study. Therefore, for the population mostly affected by the crises, access to social justice and reparation has been secondary in peace processes and agreements, despite being the victims of violence and war (Thompson, 2016). Vines (2021) argues that violence as a tool and means to get the governing party to negotiate is an art and tactic RENAMO has learned and used to meet its demands. As such these demands have little in connection with the aspirations of the people. Despite being the official opposition of the governing party, RENAMO has effectively used violence against ordinary civilians and public infrastructure to bring FRELIMO to a negotiating table (Hultman, 2009; Dzinesa and Motsamai, 2013). Considering the liberal peace approaches to resolving conflicts that has been deployed in the Mozambican context, priority and significance are given to the armed belligerents, and the process is driven by external actors and interests, leaving out the core issues of socio-economic disparities (Zambakari, 2016).

The feeling of neglect due to the failure of political actors to effectively integrate the Cabo Delgado region into the social and economic system of Mozambique is part of the drivers of the conflict. For scholars like Hanlon (2021), the Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado can be equated to the liberation struggle fought against the Portuguese. Hanlon argues that the insurgent activities in Cabo Delgado against the government are like the liberation struggle, where the oppressed locals fought against exploitation and oppression by the Portuguese

colonial authorities in Maputo. The emergence of an Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado can therefore be viewed as the new civil war due to the commonalities in grievances, dispossession, neglect, and marginalisation experienced under the FRELIMO government. FRELIMO and other elites are perceived by the inhabitants of Cabo Delgado as “siphoning off the wealth, as the Portuguese had done before” (Hanlon, 2021).

Meanwhile, as RENAMO is yet to secure a majority vote from the people it claims to be representing, it continues to pursue its interest through the barrel of the guns as it has strategically done since the civil war (Hultman, 2009). In turn, the government has been consistent in addressing RENAMO’s demands on purely grounds of common elite interest. In concurrence with the above, the study finds the recurring insurgency in Mozambique as interest play between FRELIMO and RENAMO dynamics, as they have dominated the country’s political leadership and landscape since independence. Reading from the peace agreements to illustrate this argument, the study argues that the Cabo Delgado crisis ought to be understood as a warning signal to the leadership in Mozambique, the SADC region of the consequences of constant elite win-win situation as detrimental to finding sustainable peace with the possibility of spreading to other parts of the region. Especially as issues of marginalisation, malgovernance, economic deprivation, and increasing inequalities are contributing to the emerging dynamics of the conflicts for which other conflicts on the continent are conditioned upon.

Africa is perceived by the rest of the world as a region afflicted by numerous conflicts, failed and fragile states, malgovernance, corruption and poverty (Ajulu, 2004; Achankeng I, 2013). The effects of economic globalisation on Africa have not been without their continued adversity on African economies and people; hence despite numerous attempts at advancing Africa’s developmental imperatives, it is confronted with more challenges than success. The influence and existence of external and foreign actors in African conflicts manoeuvring and facilitating their continued advantage and interests add another layer of complexity to conflicts and post-conflict recovery. To buttress this observation Richmond and colleagues have argued that:

“It is not coincidental that much peacebuilding activity is targeted at post-colonial societies. Some might argue that persistent conflict and fragmentation, the failure of governance, ongoing violations of human rights, and the failure of economic development render inevitable the imperative to intervene in order to put things right. It is in this account or narrative of failure that runs through and informs interventionist practices, the remit of which is primarily governance. This is also a developmentalist account that assumes target societies to be in process of catching up, conforming to models drawn up in international organisations, national

governmental agencies and non-governmental sectors that they sustain. The machinery of peacebuilding is hence vast, it is institutional strongly embedded in the bureaucratic order of the international” (Richmond, Pogodda and Ramovic, 2016, p. 154).

#### **4.5. Conclusion**

This chapter sought to understand factors that have hindered successes peace agreements in Mozambique given the emergence of the Cabo Delgado Crisis. The decline of Soviet influence and end of the Cold War ushered in a singular approach to international peace and security issues – the Liberal Agenda. Liberal models of peace and governance by the core countries and international organisations have influenced and continue to lead the peace process in Mozambique. However, the limitations to the peace agreements are rooted in the linear logic undergirding these approaches leading to recurring of conflicts. The failure of peace agreements and the emergence of new conflict dynamics is therefore an issue of poor socio-economic development and lack of effective integration of the Cabe Delgado region into the Mozambican state. Based on the above analysis, protracted and unaddressed socio-economic grievances including poverty, unemployment, and inequality in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province contributes to the country’s instability. As such, the study argued that the failure to consolidate peace in Mozambique is because the peace agreements are exclusionary and elitist. While demonstrating a broader political crisis of a political leadership what use electoral power to marginalise constituencies and use violence to advance parochial interests.

Also, in light the evidence adduced in this chapter, I conclude by arguing that the incomplete task of fighting for marginalised individuals which informed the liberation struggle remains, and successive FRELIMO administrations have done little to correct this legacy of historical anomaly. Instead, it has evolved into a government that has resorted to the use of public policy to effectively marginalises a section of its people. This adjudication of responsibility by the political leadership has led to peace agreements that exploit rhetoric of national unity and reconciliation, which have ostensibly been used for nothing more than adding words to agreements from which little has materialised in terms of transforming and addressing conditions of deprivation that lead to violence.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF PEACE IN POSTCOLONIAL MOZAMBIQUE

#### 5.1. Introduction

This final chapter of the study provides concluding remarks on the research, an overview of the key findings and recommendations for further research. The study was guided by the central aim of understanding the factors that have led to the failure of peace agreements in Mozambique, the recurring conflicts, and the emergence of the Cabo Delgado Islamic insurgency. Applying a decolonial framework of analysis, the study critically analysed the various peace agreements as formulated within liberal peace approach to conflicts in the global south, and their failure to establish lasting peace. This chapter is divided into three sections. The next section sums up the key findings of the study. This is followed by the general conclusion of the study and finally recommendations for further research.

#### 5.2. Summary of Key Findings

In locating Mozambique in the context of the globalised world, the study sought to understand the root causes of recurring conflicts in Mozambique and consequently why the peace agreements have failed. The study aimed to provide an alternative lens of comprehending the Cabo Delgado crisis using decoloniality, and thus contribute to the growing body of knowledge dedicated to this subject.

The first key finding on peace agreements in Mozambique is the role played by FRELIMO and RENAMO as prominent actors in Mozambican politics, as well as the role of external actors. FRELIMO and RENAMO dynamics have influenced and shaped Mozambique's post-independence epoch, and peace agreements are signed for the benefit of the political elites of the factions involved in the conflict and other external actors who seek to profit from it. As such, parties to the peace agreements and the production of these various agreements overlook the unaddressed socioeconomic underpinnings of the conflict and the emerging dynamics. This demonstrates the fact that the agreements are signed by specific parties for reasons articulated in the content of the agreement or otherwise. This denotes an interplay of interests, power, and

pressure from mediation processes and the international community, which renders the agreements elitist and removed from the realities on the ground. For instance, the UN is in part responsible for the incomplete implementation of the GPA and ONUMOZ, which resulted in RENAMO retaining its military wing. Therefore, the international community regarding ONUMOZ, and the GPA as post-conflict successes fits the narrative of elite interest, that is, the failure to address the real long-term challenges that will aid durable agreements.

Secondly, the lack of proper representation from other concerned actors in the country including the broader population, civil society and interest groups insinuates that peace in Mozambique is assumed to be almost solely represented by the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. This limitation of the liberal paradigm has facilitated a political leadership in Mozambique that uses elections to secure power and violence to pursue its interests.

Thirdly, the study found that the sovereignty of post-independence Mozambique had been in question due to the country's dependence on aid and donors. The devastating impact of the civil war and post-Cold War landscape played a significant role in positing the country at the mercy of the World Bank and IMF. Colonial legacies remain a contributing factor to contemporary socio-economic and political construct and challenges in Mozambique, and the capitalist global system continues to entrench power asymmetries between core countries and peripheral countries. These socio-economic disparities were argued to contribute to violence and what is now an Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado.

The study also found that despite decades of aid and development finance, and positive economic indicators, most Mozambicans remain impoverished. The Cabo Delgado population remained neglected even when the hope for better livelihoods from increased investments in the region presented itself. The government further failed to protect its people from the harsh impact of extractive industries, it failed to adequately compensate the displaced populations, which further impoverished them, thus providing a source of motivation for resorting to violence.

Finally, corruption is ostensibly one of the most significant problems affecting ordinary people in Mozambique. Despite positive economic growth, it fails to translate into the transformation of peoples' lives. This has led to RENAMO waging war and is one of the factors that the youth activists, later AWSJ in Cabo Delgado, were critical of. This has contributed to a growing distrust of government and undermines effective governance.

### **5.3. Conclusion: Hindrances to Durable Peace in Mozambique**

The study's primary research question was as follows: Why have peace agreements in Mozambique since 1992 failed to establish durable peace and possibly resulted in the conflict in Cabo Delgado? Secondly, the research seeks to address the following sub-questions: What are the root causes of continuing conflicts in Cabo Delgado? How may the failed peace agreements have contributed towards the current conflict in Cabo Delgado? The study used decoloniality and relative deprivation as frameworks to analyse conflict dynamics not only from the contemporary landscape but from continuities and colonial legacies that remain factors in understanding the plight of Mozambique today.

To address the main research questions of this research, Chapter One of the study began with a historical overview of Mozambique, to comprehend factors that have contributed to the contemporary fragile situation in the country. This chapter proceeded to discuss the protracted socio-economic and political disparities that drive the conflicts in Mozambique, the study noted that the UN liberal peace agenda underpins the framework of peace agreements in Mozambique, denoting a top-down approach where the UN and its institutions introduce peacebuilding measures and institutions aimed at guaranteeing stability post-conflict. This includes the introduction of democratic election systems and institutions and the liberalisation of economies among others. This transition in Mozambique took place in 1992 but has failed to yield expected results, as with similar countries that remain affected by conflicts despite the signing of peace agreements and UN-led peacebuilding processes. The discussion above provided the challenges hindering genuine peace in Mozambique, linking it to the Cabo Delgado conflict. The hindrances amongst other factors include unaddressed root causes of conflict which cut across social, economic, and political lines.

While the agreements claimed to seek peace, democracy, national unity, and reconciliation, the study found that the peace agreements predominantly served FRELIMO and RENAMO interests. In the post-1994 period, FRELIMO has remained dominant in all elections, albeit with increasing allegations of electoral manipulation. RENAMO has remained strategic with its use of violence to get the governing party to the negotiation table. Aid dependence and corruption were found to have impeded development, with devastating consequences, especially for human security in rural provinces such as Cabo Delgado. The high reliance on foreign aid positioned Mozambique in an asymmetric position which may have had implications on the country's sovereignty. The study found that Mozambique's development

priorities competed with the interests of external actors, including donors and MNCs. The failure of the Mozambican government to use socioeconomic policies to transform the development of the entire country, including the peripheral areas such as the northern provinces, entrenched inequalities, underdevelopment, poverty, and weak governance, which had existed since colonial times and continue to be a challenge after independence. The large numbers of youth in the Cabo Delgado region facing unemployment and severe hardships have rendered them vulnerable to manipulation.

Again, the study also sought to understand Mozambique through a postcolonial lens. Therefore, the analysis in this study was carried out with a decolonial gaze to provide an alternative understanding of the legacies and entrenched structural challenges that the current Mozambican government seem unable to address. Violent conflicts have characteristics of the better part of Mozambican society; colonialism disturbed and reshaped Mozambique indefinitely, especially for those who find themselves in the Cabo Delgado region. The legacy of colonialism has distorted the social, political, and cultural fabric, making violence a necessary tool and condition that the resistance movement must rely on, from the advent of colonialism to the present. In the post-independence era, this has been the plight of the Cabo Delgado region in particular.

The challenge of violence and violent societies is that they become susceptible to recurring violence; it creates the notion and conditioning that violence is a necessary process for change and transformation. The inherited legacies of colonialism could have been addressed with policy measures. However, issues of corruption compounded by the factors and reality of the global capitalist system within which Mozambique operates has rendered the socio-economic emancipation of poor Mozambicans largely impossible. The emergence of conflict in the northern province of Cabo Delgado with new actors outside of the dominant parties further questions whether Mozambique's economic growth and promise benefit most of its population. The dire circumstances of the rural northern provinces lead to the brutality of poverty being acted upon. The despondent youth, susceptible to influence of any nature, have been radicalised by agents affiliated with extremist organizations.

In October 2020, at the 28th commemoration of the GPA signing, President Filipe Nyusi's response also shifted blame for the insurgency to external forces seeking to destabilize the peace and development that remained fundamental to all Mozambicans (AllAfrica, 2020). He further noted that the population of Cabo Delgado was collaborating with authorities to fight the militias (AllAfrica, 2020). One could argue that there are 'convenient' gaps in President

Nyusi's response, especially on a public platform and on the commemoration of the signing of the GPA. It lacked accountability not only for the violation of human rights and incapacity to protect civilians but for the lengthy period it took to respond to the crisis. Secondly, shifting blame to external forces instead of the pervasive marginalization exacerbated by the government's neglect to deliver basic public services and infrastructure.

Finally, the agenda for peace by the UN and other global governance institutions has dominated peace-building approaches and policies. Lessons drawn from Mozambique demonstrate the limitations of liberal peace in addressing the root causes of conflicts and the mandatory relevance in post-conflict liberal peacebuilding. The UN and partner organisations recognise and assume peace to be determined by FRELIMO and RENAMO elite, while recourse to grassroots factors is neglected. This speaks to a particular knowledge and understanding of the world and peace, which is geographically located in the global north. The headquarters of the UN, IMF and World Bank, and other international governmental organisations responsible for global peace and security are located in the global north (Richmond, 2014). This reflects the power asymmetries and top-down logic of who possesses power and thereby the capacity to address global issues (Newman and Richmond, 2006; Richmond, Pogodda and Ramovic, 2016). Through a decolonial lens, one is easily confronted with this positionality rooted in ideas of colonialism and remains relevant in understanding how global institutions function as the perceived role models of what a state should be, and the mechanism for achieving same, irrespective of the many failures associated with the logic of liberal internationalism (Paris, 1997; Richmond, 2014).

#### **5.4. Recommendations for Further Research**

The study sought to understand the causes of conflict and failed peace agreements in Mozambique. Based on the findings discussed above, the following recommendations are made for further research on issues that were outside of the scope of this study but are useful to gaining in-depth knowledge of the situation in Mozambique.

Socio-economic and political issues constitute the main drivers of conflict in Mozambique, particularly in Cabo Delgado. To enable policy makers, have an effective grasp of the issue, there is a need for multidisciplinary research on the drivers of instability in Mozambique and its regional neighbours, as these occurrences are intertwined.

The issue of maritime insecurity on the Cabo Delgado coast was found to have contributed to the prevalence of organised crime, drug and human trafficking and lawlessness in the Cabo Delgado province and neighbouring provinces. Therefore, further research on this question may aid advances towards understanding the extent to which Mozambique's maritime vulnerability poses security threats or instability in the Southern and Eastern African regions.

Similarly, challenges posed by migration and porous borders plays a part in youth radicalisation. For instance, in the Mozambican case, the poor nature of its borders facilitated the recruitment of unemployed youth by forces outside of the Mozambican state – in Cabo Delgado. This indicates the need for regional responses to extremism on the continent, as no country is exonerated from these threats. Hence, the need for further research, particularly guided by decolonial imperatives to help understand the exacerbation of the problems from a non-military perspective.

The study also recommends further research to understand the role and interests of international actors and the donor community or development partners in Mozambique's peace processes and development. It remains to be understood from the perspective of research how the involvement of these international organisations has influenced the peace process in Mozambique.

Relatedly, the role of the Mozambican political leadership needs scholarly attention. This study finds that political leadership is implicit in directing the policy and institutions aimed at addressing development and peacebuilding in Mozambique. Considering this, there is the need to understand how political leadership in the postcolonial African state such as Mozambique are responding to needs of its people from policy and research perspectives. Partly, this would also enhance the understanding of how colonial legacies flame acts of insurgencies in Africa.

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