The role of incentive structure in eliciting willingness to donate

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dc.contributor.author Chisadza, Carolyn
dc.contributor.author Nicholls, Nicky
dc.contributor.author Yitbarek, Eleni
dc.date.accessioned 2023-07-03T08:04:06Z
dc.date.issued 2023-03
dc.description DATA AVAILABILITY : Data will be made available on request. en_US
dc.description.abstract The monetary incentives provided to participants lie at the heart of controversies in experimental economics. In the literature, opinions differ about the required structure and importance of incentives. This study compares five incentive schemes for charity donation decisions in South Africa. We document similar findings to those in the literature when looking at mean decisions. Participants tend to donate more where endowments are hypothetical and have a lower payout probability. On the other hand, donations are lower where endowments are earned. We generate the earned endowment effect simply by framing part of the survey questionnaire as a “paid task”, suggesting an innovative way of framing earnings in experiments without the onerous requirement of earning tasks. Finally, we note material gender differences by incentive scheme, which might have an important implication for our knowledge of gender differences in charitable giving. en_US
dc.description.department Economics en_US
dc.description.embargo 2025-02-02
dc.description.librarian hj2023 en_US
dc.description.uri http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet en_US
dc.identifier.citation Chisadza, C., Nicholls, N. & Yitbarek, E. 2023, 'The role of incentive structure in eliciting willingness to donate', Economics Letters, vol. 224, art. 111005, pp. 1-4, doi : 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111005. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0165-1765 (print)
dc.identifier.issn 1873-7374 (online)
dc.identifier.other 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111005
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2263/91244
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.rights © 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Notice : this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, Economics Letters, vol. 224, art. 111005, pp. 1-4, 2-23, doi : 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111005. en_US
dc.subject Incentives en_US
dc.subject Dictator game en_US
dc.subject Charitable giving en_US
dc.subject SDG-01: No poverty en_US
dc.title The role of incentive structure in eliciting willingness to donate en_US
dc.type Postprint Article en_US


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