The role of incentive structure in eliciting willingness to donate

dc.contributor.authorChisadza, Carolyn
dc.contributor.authorNicholls, Nicky
dc.contributor.authorYitbarek, Eleni
dc.contributor.emailnicky.nicholls@up.ac.zaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-03T08:04:06Z
dc.date.issued2023-03
dc.descriptionDATA AVAILABILITY : Data will be made available on request.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe monetary incentives provided to participants lie at the heart of controversies in experimental economics. In the literature, opinions differ about the required structure and importance of incentives. This study compares five incentive schemes for charity donation decisions in South Africa. We document similar findings to those in the literature when looking at mean decisions. Participants tend to donate more where endowments are hypothetical and have a lower payout probability. On the other hand, donations are lower where endowments are earned. We generate the earned endowment effect simply by framing part of the survey questionnaire as a “paid task”, suggesting an innovative way of framing earnings in experiments without the onerous requirement of earning tasks. Finally, we note material gender differences by incentive scheme, which might have an important implication for our knowledge of gender differences in charitable giving.en_US
dc.description.departmentEconomicsen_US
dc.description.embargo2025-02-02
dc.description.librarianhj2023en_US
dc.description.urihttp://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecoleten_US
dc.identifier.citationChisadza, C., Nicholls, N. & Yitbarek, E. 2023, 'The role of incentive structure in eliciting willingness to donate', Economics Letters, vol. 224, art. 111005, pp. 1-4, doi : 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111005.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765 (print)
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374 (online)
dc.identifier.other10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2263/91244
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rights© 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Notice : this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, Economics Letters, vol. 224, art. 111005, pp. 1-4, 2-23, doi : 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111005.en_US
dc.subjectIncentivesen_US
dc.subjectDictator gameen_US
dc.subjectCharitable givingen_US
dc.subjectSDG-01: No povertyen_US
dc.titleThe role of incentive structure in eliciting willingness to donateen_US
dc.typePostprint Articleen_US

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