No-fault unbelief defended : a reply to Roberto Di Ceglie

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Date

Authors

Lougheed, Kirk

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Springer

Abstract

In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that some might find the usual reasons for rejecting ‘no-fault unbelief’ (i.e. intellectual or moral failure) to be offensive. In light of this, he proposes an alternative rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ based on the consequences it entails for both non-believers and believers. I argue that Di Ceglie does not do nearly enough to establish these consequences. I conclude that his rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ is at best incomplete or at worst false.

Description

Keywords

No fault unbelief, Flawed unbelief, Divine hiddenness, Roberto Di Ceglie, Reasonable disagreement

Sustainable Development Goals

Citation

Lougheed, K. No-fault Unbelief Defended: a Reply to Roberto Di Ceglie. SOPHIA 60, 473–479 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1.