Abstract:
In his recent book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, John Pittard
challenges J.L. Schellenberg’s rejection of mystical experience as worthy of enjoying presumptive
doxastic trust for two main reasons. First, Pittard holds that Schellenberg wrongly focuses only on
avoiding error while placing no emphasis on gaining truth. I argue that, contra Pittard, Schellenberg’s account nicely balances the competing epistemic goals of gaining truth and avoiding error.
Second, Pittard thinks that Schellenberg’s criteria for presumptive trust in that of universality and
unavoidability are arbitrary. I counter that Schellenberg’s criteria are not arbitrary since they are the
best way of achieving these goals. I conclude that despite not enjoying presumptive doxastic trust,
this in itself does not entail that mystical experiences are never trustworthy.
