Abstract:
The authors argue in this article that some categories of amnesty
programmes, such as ‘blanket’ and ‘self-granted amnesties’ that bar the
prosecution of perpetrators, have not been very helpful in the protection of
the rights of victims in transitional justice. They contend, before
embarking on widespread abuses of human rights since the post-ICJ era,
that most perpetrators, especially dictators, often are aware of the legal
odds but feel confident that if their regimes collapse, they would press for
amnesty at least in return for a transitional process involving cooperation,
surrender, confession, reparation and reconciliation. The Chilean, Peruvian
and Sri Lankan cases have become citeable precedents. This reliance
presents these categories of amnesty as unjust instruments of transitional
justice. The article proposes a rule of law-based transitional justice that
will involve an adjustment in the international law as a viable alternative
to some amnesty programmes that appear to shield perpetrators from
justice.
