dc.contributor.author |
Zimper, Alexander
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Nicholls, Nicky
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2020-01-31T10:01:15Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2020-02 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
Members of a given social group often favor members of their own group identity over people with different group identities. We construct a trust game in which the principal delegates the decision about an investment into a receiver to an agent who either favors the principal's or the receiver's group identity. When choosing the agent's group identity the principal faces a trade‐off between a loyal agent and an agent who might increase the receiver's willingness to cooperate. We solve for the principal's decision in a subgame‐perfect nash equilibrium for the two scenarios of a risk‐neutral and risk‐averse agent, respectively. |
en_ZA |
dc.description.department |
Economics |
en_ZA |
dc.description.embargo |
2022-02-01 |
|
dc.description.librarian |
hj2020 |
en_ZA |
dc.description.uri |
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet |
en_ZA |
dc.identifier.citation |
Zimper A, Nicholls N. Choosing the agent’s group identity in atrust game with delegated decision making. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020;22:220–244.https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12405. |
en_ZA |
dc.identifier.issn |
1097-3923 (print) |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
1467-9779 (online) |
|
dc.identifier.other |
10.1111/jpet.12405 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2263/73050 |
|
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_ZA |
dc.publisher |
Wiley |
en_ZA |
dc.rights |
© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article : Choosing the agent’s group identity in atrust game with delegated decision making. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020;22:220–244. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12405. The definite version is available at : http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet. |
en_ZA |
dc.subject |
Fairness |
en_ZA |
dc.subject |
Identity |
en_ZA |
dc.subject |
In‐group bias |
en_ZA |
dc.subject |
Trust game |
en_ZA |
dc.title |
Choosing the agent's group identity in a trust game with delegated decision making |
en_ZA |
dc.type |
Postprint Article |
en_ZA |