Choosing the agent's group identity in a trust game with delegated decision making

Zimper, Alexander; Nicholls, Nicky

dc.contributor.author	Zimper, Alexander
dc.contributor.author	Nicholls, Nicky
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-31T10:01:15Z
dc.date.issued	2020-02
dc.description.abstract	Members of a given social group often favor members of their own group identity over people with different group identities. We construct a trust game in which the principal delegates the decision about an investment into a receiver to an agent who either favors the principal's or the receiver's group identity. When choosing the agent's group identity the principal faces a trade‐off between a loyal agent and an agent who might increase the receiver's willingness to cooperate. We solve for the principal's decision in a subgame‐perfect nash equilibrium for the two scenarios of a risk‐neutral and risk‐averse agent, respectively.	en_ZA
dc.description.department	Economics	en_ZA
dc.description.embargo	2022-02-01
dc.description.librarian	hj2020	en_ZA
dc.description.uri	http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet	en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation	Zimper A, Nicholls N. Choosing the agent’s group identity in atrust game with delegated decision making. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020;22:220–244.https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12405.	en_ZA
dc.identifier.issn	1097-3923 (print)
dc.identifier.issn	1467-9779 (online)
dc.identifier.other	10.1111/jpet.12405
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2263/73050
dc.language.iso	en	en_ZA
dc.publisher	Wiley	en_ZA
dc.rights	© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article : Choosing the agent’s group identity in atrust game with delegated decision making. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020;22:220–244. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12405. The definite version is available at : http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet.	en_ZA
dc.subject	Fairness	en_ZA
dc.subject	Identity	en_ZA
dc.subject	In‐group bias	en_ZA
dc.subject	Trust game	en_ZA
dc.title	Choosing the agent's group identity in a trust game with delegated decision making	en_ZA
dc.type	Postprint Article	en_ZA