Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital

Kishore, Kaushal

dc.contributor.author	Kishore, Kaushal
dc.date.accessioned	2017-06-27T07:40:57Z
dc.date.issued	2017-06	en
dc.description.abstract	In a two-period dynamic model in which a single country attempts to attract two large investors endowed with capital with varying rate of returns, we show that the result of Kishore and Roy (Econ Lett 124:88–92, 2014) that a country has incentives to commit to a non-preferential regime to circumvent a dynamic inconsistency problem does not hold. The tax revenue of the government may be higher under a preferential regime compared to a non-preferential regime.	en_ZA
dc.description.department	Economics	en
dc.description.embargo	2018-06-30
dc.description.uri	http://link.springer.com/journal/10797	en
dc.identifier.citation	Kishore, K. Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital. International Tax and Public Finance (2017) 24: 381-396. doi:10.1007/s10797-016-9423-2	en
dc.identifier.issn	1573-6970 (online)	en
dc.identifier.issn	0927-5940 (print)	en
dc.identifier.other	10.1007/s10797-016-9423-2	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2263/61110
dc.language.iso	English	en
dc.publisher	Springer	en
dc.rights	© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016The original publication is available at : http://link.springer.comjournal/10797.	en
dc.subject	Tax competition	en
dc.subject	Non-preferential regime	en
dc.subject	Preferential regime	en
dc.subject	Dynamic inconsistency	en
dc.title	Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital	en
dc.type	Postprint Article	en