Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital
| dc.contributor.author | Kishore, Kaushal | |
| dc.contributor.email | kaushal.kishore@up.ac.za | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-27T07:40:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-06 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | In a two-period dynamic model in which a single country attempts to attract two large investors endowed with capital with varying rate of returns, we show that the result of Kishore and Roy (Econ Lett 124:88–92, 2014) that a country has incentives to commit to a non-preferential regime to circumvent a dynamic inconsistency problem does not hold. The tax revenue of the government may be higher under a preferential regime compared to a non-preferential regime. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.department | Economics | en |
| dc.description.embargo | 2018-06-30 | |
| dc.description.uri | http://link.springer.com/journal/10797 | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | Kishore, K. Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital. International Tax and Public Finance (2017) 24: 381-396. doi:10.1007/s10797-016-9423-2 | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1573-6970 (online) | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0927-5940 (print) | en |
| dc.identifier.other | 10.1007/s10797-016-9423-2 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2263/61110 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en |
| dc.publisher | Springer | en |
| dc.rights | © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016The original publication is available at : http://link.springer.comjournal/10797. | en |
| dc.subject | Tax competition | en |
| dc.subject | Non-preferential regime | en |
| dc.subject | Preferential regime | en |
| dc.subject | Dynamic inconsistency | en |
| dc.title | Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital | en |
| dc.type | Postprint Article | en |
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