Zimper, AlexanderNicholls, Nicky2020-01-312020-02Zimper A, Nicholls N. Choosing the agent’s group identity in atrust game with delegated decision making. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020;22:220–244.https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12405.1097-3923 (print)1467-9779 (online)10.1111/jpet.12405http://hdl.handle.net/2263/73050Members of a given social group often favor members of their own group identity over people with different group identities. We construct a trust game in which the principal delegates the decision about an investment into a receiver to an agent who either favors the principal's or the receiver's group identity. When choosing the agent's group identity the principal faces a trade‐off between a loyal agent and an agent who might increase the receiver's willingness to cooperate. We solve for the principal's decision in a subgame‐perfect nash equilibrium for the two scenarios of a risk‐neutral and risk‐averse agent, respectively.en© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article : Choosing the agent’s group identity in atrust game with delegated decision making. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020;22:220–244. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12405. The definite version is available at : http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet.FairnessIdentityIn‐group biasTrust gamePostprint Article