Kishore, Kaushal2017-06-272017-06Kishore, K. Dynamic inconsistency and preferential taxation of foreign capital. International Tax and Public Finance (2017) 24: 381-396. doi:10.1007/s10797-016-9423-21573-6970 (online)0927-5940 (print)10.1007/s10797-016-9423-2http://hdl.handle.net/2263/61110In a two-period dynamic model in which a single country attempts to attract two large investors endowed with capital with varying rate of returns, we show that the result of Kishore and Roy (Econ Lett 124:88–92, 2014) that a country has incentives to commit to a non-preferential regime to circumvent a dynamic inconsistency problem does not hold. The tax revenue of the government may be higher under a preferential regime compared to a non-preferential regime.English© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016The original publication is available at : http://link.springer.comjournal/10797.Tax competitionNon-preferential regimePreferential regimeDynamic inconsistencyPostprint Article