Kroesbergen, Hermen2015-05-292015-05-292015-04Kroesbergen, H 2015, 'Superstition' as a contemplative term : a Wittgensteinian perspective', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 105-122.0020-7047 (print)1572-8684 (online)10.1007/s11153-014-9496-8http://hdl.handle.net/2263/45347Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in which theWittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating ‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate the meaning that religious beliefs have in the lives of both the faithful and their critics. I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be called superstitious.en© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014. The original publication is available at http://www.springer.comseries/6102SuperstitionGenuine religionProsperity gospelContemplative conception of philosophyLudwig WittgensteinD.Z. PhillipsTheology articles SDG-04SDG-04: Quality educationPostprint Article