Kistner, Ulrike2015-12-032015-02Kistner, U 2015, '‘Common purpose’: the crowd and the public', Law and Critique, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 27-43.0957-8536 (print)1572-8617 (online)10.1007/s10978-014-9146-4http://hdl.handle.net/2263/51032The legal doctrine of ‘common purpose’ in South African criminal law considers all parties liable who have been in implicit or explicit agreement to commit an unlawful act, and associated with each other for that purpose, even if the consequential act has been carried out by one of them. It relieves the prosecution of proving the causal link between the conduct of an individual member of a group acting in common purpose, and the ultimate consequence caused by the action of the group as a whole. The National Prosecuting Authority’s controversial and vociferously challenged decision (initially upheld, then withdrawn at the beginning of September 2012) to charge 270 demonstrators at Lonmin Platinum Mine in Marikana with the murders of 34 colleagues under the ‘common purpose’ doctrine, implying liability by association or agreement, raises the question as to the constitution and characteristics of the crowd and of the public, respectively. This article outlines the history of the application of the common purpose rule in South Africa, to then examine ‘common purpose’ within the philosophical parameters of group psychology and collective intentionality. It argues for methodological individualism within a psychoanalytic theorisation of group dynamics, and a non-summative approach to collective intentionality, in addressing some problems in the conceptualisation of group formation.en© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014. The original publication is available at : http://link.springer.com/journal/10978.Collective actionCommon purposeComplicityGroup psychologyImplied mandateImputation of liabilityIndividual psychologyIntentionPostprint Article