Lougheed, Kirk2022-11-092022-11-092021Lougheed, K. No-fault Unbelief Defended: a Reply to Roberto Di Ceglie. SOPHIA 60, 473–479 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1.1619-1366 (print)1619-1374 (online)10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/88211In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that some might find the usual reasons for rejecting ‘no-fault unbelief’ (i.e. intellectual or moral failure) to be offensive. In light of this, he proposes an alternative rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ based on the consequences it entails for both non-believers and believers. I argue that Di Ceglie does not do nearly enough to establish these consequences. I conclude that his rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ is at best incomplete or at worst false.en© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021. The original publication is available at : https://www.springer.com/journal/11841.No fault unbeliefFlawed unbeliefDivine hiddennessRoberto Di CeglieReasonable disagreementPostprint Article