

# **AN ANALYSIS OF THE AFRICAN UNION'S HUMAN SECURITY INITIATIVES IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI FROM 1994 – 2005**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This research explores the capacity of the African Union (AU) to meet the challenges of building and sustaining good governance structures to promote and sustain human security mechanisms in Africa. The impact of effective human security policies in war torn African states should not be underestimated as a step towards development. The study uses a case study approach, and the information was gathered from authoritative sources. Set against the background of ethnic conflict, Rwanda and Burundi are the case studies that will be analysed in terms of the success or failures of the AU in implementing its human security initiatives in those countries. The main conclusion of the research indicates that funding and capacity constraints are still issues that hinder the implementation of the AU's human security policy initiatives.

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## ACRONYMS

ACDS	African Chiefs of Defense Staff
AEC	African Economic Community
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AU	African Union
ALF	Africa Leadership Forum
ASF	African Standby Force
CA	Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CIDO	African Citizens' Directorate
CSSDCA	Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EU	European Union
FRODEBU	<i>Front Pour la Democratie au Burundi</i>
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IfS	Institut für Sozialforschung
IR	International Relations
JPMC	Joint Political and Military Commission
KPD	German Communist Party
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group in Rwanda
NPM	New Public Management
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PALIPEHUTU	<i>Parti Pour la Liberation du People Hutu</i>
PDC	Parti Democrate Chretien
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations

RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RM	Regional Mechanism
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SPD	German Social Democrat Party
UN	United Nations
UPRONA	Union pour le Progres National (Unity for National Progress, Burundi)

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The introductory chapter provides a general historical background of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the AU. A historical background of Rwanda and Burundi will be summarised in order to assist the reader in understanding the complexities involved in addressing peace and security related activities in those countries. This study will focus on the OAU's efforts in addressing the genocides experienced in Rwanda and Burundi in 1994, and further analyse the AU's interventions from its formation in July 2002 until 2005 to ensure that human security is prioritised and implemented in those countries.

#### HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE ORGANISATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

Attempts were made from the first Pan-African gathering in Manchester (United Kingdom) in 1960, in order to channel African aspirations towards freedom, equality, justice and progress. These efforts eventually found their expression in the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963, with its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the Conference of Independent African States. At that same conference, the OAU Charter was signed by the Heads of State and Government of 30 of the 32 independent African States. The remaining two which were Morocco and Togo, signed the Charter before the end of 1963. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1985, and is now the only African state that does not belong to the OAU (now AU).

The first elected president of independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah initiated various efforts from 1958 with the view of forming a federal United States of Africa. However it became apparent in 1961 that a majority of newly independent states, particularly former French colonies were in opposition to Nkrumah's vision as there was a climate of self-determination (Dokken, 2008:120). In 1980, the OAU Extraordinary Summit adopted the Lagos Plan of Action as a major step towards the goal of integration. The commitments of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos were concretised in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1991 when the OAU Heads of State and Government signed the Treaty establishing

the African Economic Community (AEC) during the 27<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Since 1994, the OAU had been operating on the basis of the OAU Charter and the AEC Treaty, and the organisation was then referred to as the OAU/AEC.

Since the signature of the AEC Treaty, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government directed the Committee on the Review of the OAU's Charter to meet and review the OAU Charter with a view of aligning it to the AEC Treaty. Despite numerous attempts to do this since 1979, OAU Member States could not agree on amendments to the 1963 OAU Charter. At the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held on 9 September 1999 in Sirté, Libya, the OAU called for the establishment of the an African Union, which would conform to the requirements of the OAU Charter and the AEC Treaty. This is known as the Sirté Declaration (ISS, no date:2).

Following the Sirté Declaration, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000. The Lusaka Summit held in July 2001, agreed on a transition period (from OAU to AU) of one year, with the option to extend the period if necessary. The Lomé Summit acknowledged the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDSA) as creating synergy between the various activities undertaken by the OAU/AEC that would assist in the consolidation of the work in the areas of peace, security, stability, development and cooperation. The CSSDSA provides a policy development forum for the elaboration and advancement of common values within the main policy organs of the OAU/AEC.

During the Lusaka Summit held in July 2001, African leaders adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD provides a comprehensive, integrated development plan that addresses key social, economic and political principles for the continent. It entails a commitment by African leaders to African people and the international community to place Africa on a path of sustainable growth, accelerated by the integration of the continent into the global economy. NEPAD determines that peace, security, democracy and good economic and corporate governance are pre-conditions for sustainable development and proposes a system of voluntary peer review and adherence to codes of conduct (ISS, no date:3).

## OBJECTIVES OF THE OAU CHARTER

The objectives as outlined in Article 2 of the OAU Charter are:

- i) To promote the unity and solidarity of African states;
- ii) To co-ordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa;
- iii) To defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
- iv) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa;
- v) To promote international cooperation, giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- vi) To coordinate and harmonise members' political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defence policies.

## STRUCTURE OF THE OAU

According to Article 7 of the OAU Charter, the organisation shall accomplish its purposes through the following principle institutions:

- i) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government (The Assembly);
- ii) The Council of Ministers;
- iii) The General Secretariat; and
- iv) The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

As mentioned in this section, the OAU called for the establishment of an African Union, which would conform to the requirements of the OAU Charter and the AEC Treaty known as the Sirté Declaration. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000, and the organs and functions of the AU are discussed in the section following.

## MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

Set against the background of the intense and destructive conflict that Africa began to experience as the aftermath of the Cold War, the 26<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly held in June 1990 expressed its determination to work towards the speedy and peaceful

resolution of all the conflicts in Africa. Three years later the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution during the 29<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly held in Cairo in June 1993. From the time of the establishment of the Mechanism, the General Secretariat of the OAU, particularly the Centre for Conflict Management was engaged in the placement of the infrastructure and human resources necessary to facilitate the mandate of the Mechanism (., 2005:3).

## OBJECTIVES OF THE MECHANISM

The primary objective of the Mechanism was to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full blown conflicts. The Assembly were of the opinion that in the event that situations of conflict evolved into full blown conflicts, that it was the responsibility of the Mechanism to undertake peace making and peace building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of those conflicts. The Mechanism was also expected to undertake peace making and peace building activities in post-conflict situations, in order to prevent the re-emergence of unresolved conflict (ISS, no date:7).

## STRUCTURE OF THE MECHANISM

The Mechanism was built around a Central Organ, and the Secretary General and the Secretariat constituted the operational arm of the Mechanism. A Special Peace Fund was also established within the framework of the Mechanism.

The Central Organ was required to assume the overall strategic direction and coordinating activities of the Mechanism in between Sessions of the Assembly. The Central Organ functioned at the level of the Heads of State, Ministers and Ambassadors accredited to the OAU. Where necessary the participation of other OAU Member States, particularly the neighbouring states of an affected region was sought. The Central Organ could also seek military, legal and other forms of expertise to assist with the execution of its functions, from within the Continent.

The Secretary General and the Secretariat, under the authority of the Central Organ, and in consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deployed efforts, and took all initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The Secretary General relied on the

human and material resources available at the General Secretariat. The Secretary General made use of relevant expertise, and sent Special Envoys and dispatched fact-finding missions to conflict areas.

A Special Fund known as the OAU Peace Fund was established by the Declaration that established the Mechanism, in order to provide financial resources exclusively for the support of OAU activities relating to conflict management and resolution. The Peace Fund consisted of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the OAU, voluntary contributions from OAU Member States, as well as from other sources in and outside Africa (ISS, no date:8).

## EARLY WARNING

The development strategy of the Conflict Management Centre regarding the collection and management of an information network entailed the development of various focal points as sources of information within the various sub-regions of the continent. These focal points were situated within the sub-regional structures such as the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

In June 1995 the OAU Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, endorsed the establishment of an Early Warning Network which was based on a coordinating facility located in the Conflict Management Centre.

Cooperation with African Regional and Sub-regional Organisations and Neighbouring Countries.

The Declaration establishing the Mechanism provides that the OAU shall also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations (UN) in the areas of peace making and peace keeping. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the OAU's activities in conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the

UN Charter on the regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 52 of Chapter VIII states that:

- i) Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations;
- ii) The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council;
- iii) The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council (United Nations, 1945).

## THE AFRICAN UNION (AU)

The AU's principles as laid out in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU are in general different and more comprehensive than those of the OAU. The AU's principles can be broadly categorised into four groups, namely:

- i) Maintenance of sovereign equality for every member state;
- ii) Good governance and social justice;
- iii) Peace and security; and
- iv) Socio-economic development.

This research seeks to analyse the human security initiatives of the AU. It will also elaborate on the peace and security objectives of the AU.

## PEACE AND SECURITY

The Commission for Human Security which was launched after the UN Millennium Summit by the Government of Japan, and chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen observed that:

*“The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people”* (Slaughter, 2004:16).

Human security has started to take centre stage in the domestic policies of democratic states in Africa, particularly with the establishment of the AU in July 2002. Human security aims to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment (Slaughter, 2004:16). Human security first entered the agenda of Pan-Africanism in the early 1990's, and was initiated by the Kampala Movement which was an initiative of civil society groups that met in Kampala, Uganda to develop principles including security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa. At the heart of these principles CSSDCA was an effort to redefine security and sovereignty in every African government.

The movement demanded that African leaders redefine their states' security to include economic, political and social aspect of civil society, going beyond military considerations (Tieku 2007:30). The challenge today is to adapt these institutions and possibly create new ones to address the threats of a changing world (Slaughter, 2004:12). There are numerous diverse ethnicities and religions in Africa, and to implement the mentioned principles against the various colonial backgrounds will prove to be a challenge for the AU.

The peace and security principles of the AU relate to the establishment of a common defence policy, peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states, and the prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states. When the AU was formed to replace the OAU, African leaders were conscious of the fact that the conflicts in Africa constituted a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent, and that peace, security and stability were prerequisites for Africa's development and integration agenda. Relating the security agenda to socio-economic development

suggests that security was not conceived in traditionalist terms, but with due recognition of its importance as a necessary condition for development. It is not clear if the AU has the means and commitment to implement this broad approach to security. The AU has focused its resources and efforts mainly to conflict management rather than on conflict prevention and post-conflict building (Makinda & Wafula Okumu, 2008:39).

## ORGANS OF THE AFRICAN UNION

The AU has 18 organs that perform important governance tasks, but this study will focus on three organs that have an influence on peace and security will be examined, namely:

- i) The Assembly;
- ii) The Pan-African Parliament (PAP); and
- iii) The Peace and Security Council (PSC).

## THE ASSEMBLY

The Assembly is the supreme organ of the AU and comprises of heads of state or their representatives. The Assembly's Chair who is elected by heads of state and government, serves a term of one year, which is renewable in certain cases. The Assembly has its basis in the Constitutive Act, and wields a lot of power. It determines the AU's policies, admits new members, adopts the budget, appoints the Chairperson of the Commission and their deputy, and decides on intervention in other states. The Assembly can give directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and other emergency situations, and the restoration of peace. The Assembly has the potential to become dictatorial (Makinda *et al*, 2008:41-42).

The Executive Council comprises of Foreign Ministers or any other minister designated by the member states, and its composition is similar to the OAU's Council of Ministers. The Executive Council is filled with appointees of the Assembly and is accountable to the Assembly. Its mandate is to make decisions on foreign trade, science and technology, transport and communications, environmental protection, humanitarian action, education, culture, food, water resources, energy and mineral resources (Makinda *et al*, 2008:43).

The Constitutive Act invests the Assembly with enormous power, it provides no checks on this power, and has no means of reviewing the appropriateness of its actions. Under Article 9(2) of the Constitutive Act, the Assembly may delegate any of its powers and functions to any organ of the AU. The Assembly's rules of procedure stipulate the kinds of decisions it may take. If a decision is issued as a regulation or a directive, then it will be binding to the member states, and all measures will be taken to ensure it is implemented within 30 days. However, if a decision is taken as a recommendation, resolution or opinion, it will not be binding, as the intention will be to guide and harmonise the viewpoints of member states (Makinda *et al*, 2008:42).

## THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is one of the AU's key institutions, and was inaugurated on 18 March 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The PAP and its composition, functions, powers and organisation are governed by the Protocol on the Pan-African Parliament. Its objective is to serve as a deliberative continental body that will act as a common platform for all the people of Africa, and their grassroots organisations to become more involved in decision making regarding the problems in Africa. The PAP only has a consultative and advisory role in relation to the other organs of the AU. It is expected to evolve into an organ with full legislative powers and play the role of implementing the objectives and principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU, particularly with regard to the protection of human rights, consolidation of democratic institutions, promotion of good governance, as well as transparency, peace, security and stability in Africa (Makinda *et al*, 2008:45).

The PAP currently has limited powers, and lacks important legislative and supervisory powers to participate in important decision making pertaining to the budget of the organisation. Within these limitations, it is impossible for the PAP to play the oversight role in the AU. The PAP's powers are limited to examining, discussing or expressing opinions on a matter, such as the respect for human rights, the consolidation of democracy and the promotion of peace, stability and good governance, and the rule of law in Africa (Makinda *et al*, 2008:45).

The PAP's annual budget constitutes an integral part of the AU's budget and is drawn up according to the financial rules of the AU and is approved by the Assembly. This will continue to take place until the PAP starts to exercise legislative powers. The PAP is limited to giving opinions and making recommendations regarding its budget proposals, and is also unable to prepare an independent work plan according to its own priorities (Makinda *et al*, 2008:45).

The composition of the PAP poses certain problems. One of these is the issue of representation by an equal number of legislators from each member state irrespective of its population size. Some countries have larger populations than others and are forced to have the same number of legislators representing their countries as smaller nations. The PAP is also facing the problem of ensuring the representation from various political opinions in the continental legislative body. There are currently no common rules of procedure that are being applied by the national parliaments in the appointment of their legislators to the PAP. Members serving on the PAP do so in their personal capacity and not as national delegates. The fear is that PAP members would most likely promote national interests and enter into regional groupings and alliances, then their decision making would probably not be based on a common political platform. If PAP members could unite regarding commonly defined political programs that reflect the prevailing diversity among the African political cultures there could be some hope of promoting pan-African ideals and tackling continent wide problems (Makinda *et al*, 2008:46).

The Protocol on the PAP does not mention how the PAP relates to the other AU organs especially those tasked to tackle good governance, the rule of law, human rights, peace and security. The Protocols establishing the Peace and Security Council and the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights recognise the role of the PAP in promoting human rights and peace in Africa. The PAP like other AU organs was established despite financial constraints and the continent's weak capacity and both national and continental levels (Makinda *et al*, 2008:46).

Article 10 of the Protocol on the PAP provides that allowances shall be paid to PAP members in order to meet expenses in the discharge of their duties, but is silent on the sources of finance for the allowance (African Union, 2004). It would appear that some

parliamentarians were not aware that each member state is expected to cover the full costs including allowances and transport for the attendance of the PAP meetings. This arrangement has not worked well as a rich country such as Libya pays a daily allowance of US\$600, while a poorer country such as Guinea pays US\$150. Legislators from poorer countries find it difficult to attend PAP meetings (Makinda *et al*, 2008:46).

## THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act. The PSC is the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC is charged with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability and is seen as the vehicle for promoting overall security in Africa. The PSC is composed of 15 members elected on the basis of equal rights; 10 for two years terms and five for three year terms. One of the criteria for PSC membership is a country's contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The Protocol that established the PSC was ratified in December 2003 and the first meeting took place in March 2004 and the AU Assembly formally launched the Council two months later (Makinda *et al*, 2008:48).

Article 6 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union describes the PSC's functions as summarised below:

- Promoting peace, security and stability in Africa;
- Early warning and undertaking preventive diplomacy; and
- Making peace through the use of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian action and disaster management (AU, 2002:8).

Article 7 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union describes the PSC's powers. These powers include the anticipation and prevention of disputes, conflicts and policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity. The PSC has the power to undertake peace making and peace building functions to resolve conflicts, as well as approve the deployment of peace support missions, and lay down the guidelines for the conduct of such missions. The PSC has the

power to institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration. The PSC is further mandated to implement the common defence policy of the AU, and promote close harmonisation, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the AU in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. The PSC has the power to develop policies required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent occur within the framework of the AU's objectives and priorities. The PSC within its conflict prevention responsibilities also follows up on the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights within member states (AU, 2002:10). The PSC also has the mandate to promote and implement the international conventions on arms control and disarmament. The PSC may take the appropriate measures to defend the national independence and sovereignty of a member state that is threatened by acts of aggression, such as mercenaries (Makinda *et al*, 2008:48).

In order to support the efforts of the PSC in the areas of conflict anticipation and prevention, and the deployment of peace support missions and intervention, a Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund were established, pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, and they are discussed below.

## THE PANEL OF THE WISE

The Panel of the Wise was established in order to support the PSC in the area of conflict prevention. The panel is comprised of five highly respected Africans that have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. This panel is designed to support the PSC and the Chairperson of the PSC to ensure the promotion of peace, security and development on the continent (Makinda *et al*, 2008:88). The Panel of the Wise reports to the PSC and through the PSC to the Assembly, and undertake actions in support of the PSC in the maintenance of peace and stability (AU, 2002:16).

## THE CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

Early Warning Systems are rooted in the new human security thinking about the responsibility of leaders to protect ordinary people, and have traditionally been located within technical agencies that's forecast food shortages and within the non-governmental sector where they are widely applied among humanitarian relief agencies. By definition early warning systems use open source material and aim to serve human security, not national or state interests (Cilliers, 2005:1).

Member states mandated the PSC to fulfil a robust role in the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts than was the case with the OAU. One of the instruments through which the AU Commission is to operationalise this mandate is through the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which was established in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. CEWS will link the AU Commission in Addis Ababa with the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, as well as with research institutes and civil society organisations (Cilliers, 2005:1).

CEWS consists of an observation and monitoring centre, which is responsible for collection and analysis of data, and the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The Early Warning System anticipates and makes recommendations that will prevent conflicts (AU, 2002:17). This system will collaborate with the UN, its agencies, relevant international organisations and NGOs in collecting information to be fed into an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted indicators and methodologies. The information will be transmitted to the Chairperson of the Commission who will use it to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa, and they will in turn recommend the best course of action. The PSC will then inform the Panel of the Wise, take initiatives and use special envoys to respond, as well as oversee the deployment of the African Standby Force and ensure the implementation of the decisions taken by the Assembly (Makinda *et al*, 2008:88).

## THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Standby Force (ASF) was established under Article 13 of the PSC Protocol in order to assist in the deployment of peace support missions and intervention. AU member states committed themselves to take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the PSC (AU, 2002:18). The ASF engages in preventive deployment, humanitarian assistance, and intervention in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. The ASF shall be composed of regional brigades ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice on missions decided by the PSC or interventions authorised by the Assembly (Makinda *et al*, 2008:88).

## THE PEACE FUND

The Peace Fund was established in order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriation from the regular AU budget, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from member states and other sources from within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through fund raising activities (AU, 2002:27).

The implementation of the AU's peace and security agenda will be carried out by the CEWS, ASF, Peace Fund and Panel of the Wise, within a governance structure that comprises the PAP, the African Commission of Human and People's Rights, RMs for conflict prevention, management and resolution, international organisations such as the UN and civil society organisations (Makinda *et al*, 2008:89).

The AU has formulated a broad approach to security that incorporates military and non-military factors. Africa continues to experience wars and conflicts because the AU's mechanisms for dealing with these issues are inadequate. The AU's PSC is poorly run and Africa's capacity to deploy PSO is weak. The AU's security structure is dependent on outside funding, which allows outsiders to shape Africa's peace agenda. The AU and the PSC need to re-evaluate their objectives, modalities and resources, and involve civil society organisations more in its security and peace building activities (Makinda *et al*,

2008:93). It is important to note that wars and conflicts are not a result of the inadequacy of the AU. Their sources include colonial borders recognised by the OAU, poverty within member states, lack of democracy and poor governance amongst member states.

Article 3 (b), (f) and (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU (CA) states:

(b) Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;

(f) Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

(h) Promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments (2000:4).

The above principles enshrine the beliefs of the AU, and the CSSDCA, which later became known as the African Citizens' Directorate (CIDO). CIDO was established to facilitate civil society engagement with the African Union, as well as to promote CSSDCA and the AU human security agenda. CIDO's role is to create awareness about the AU's work and persuade civil society groups to promote the AU's human security agenda in their states (Tieku 2007:33).

CIDO faces many challenges, including being severely understaffed and under equipped, as it only has two full time staff (Tieku 2007:35). Other challenges include its human security efforts to meet civil society being undermined by anti-human security governments in Africa, such as Sudan and Libya (Tieku 2007:33).

## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI**

This section will delve into the historical backgrounds of both Rwanda and Burundi. The two countries' historical backgrounds will be looked at simultaneously, because of their close proximity, similarities in geographical size and topographical features, social structures and colonial heritage (Lemarchand, 1970:2). Rwanda and Burundi are located in the Central African rift valley and are bounded on the east and west by Tanzania and

the Democratic Republic of Congo respectively, and in the north by Uganda. The pre-colonial histories of Rwanda and Burundi will be described, followed by descriptions of the effects of colonialism on both countries and the various ethnic clashes and the reasons behind them. This section will conclude by describing the events that led up to the 1994 genocides.

## PRE-COLONIAL RWANDA AND BURUNDI

The kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi developed their present territorial base partially through conquest and peaceful assimilation. The pattern of expansion is similar throughout the interlacustrine region, which encompasses the area between Lakes Victoria, Albert, Edward and Tanganyika. The patterns of expansion in the interlacustrine region usually had the following characteristics: were under the leadership of a royal clan, successive waves of nomadic pastoralists spread their domination over the indigenous Bantu societies, whose customs and values were gradually assimilated into their own culture (Lemarchand, 1970:18).

There is reason to believe that the emergence of centralised state structures in both countries must have because of the stimuli or conditioning influences of pre-existing primary kingdoms of Bantu origins. However, the expansion in the territorial scale of each kingdom took place under the rule of an 'alien' minority. In both kingdoms the invading tribes were Tutsi or Hima pastoralists. Their origins are not firmly established; however their physical features suggest ethnic affinities with the Galla tribes of southern Ethiopia. Dr Richard Kandt, the first German resident in Rwanda was impressed with the Tutsi's 'gigantic stature, the sublimity of their speech, the tasteful and unobtrusive way of their dress, their noble traits and their quiet, penetrating, often even witty and irritating eyes' (Lemarchand, 1970:18-19). It is evident from this statement that the German colonialists favoured the Tutsi. As the Tutsi drifted southward into the plateau area they came into contact with the indigenous Hutu peasant populations. The Hutu are generally short and stocky, and share similar physical characteristics with other Bantu tribes of Central Africa.

Rwanda's pre-colonial past holds that its three ethnic groups, the Twa (0.5 percent of the population), Hutu (87 percent of the population) and Tutsi (12.5 percent of the population) arrived in Rwanda at different historical periods. It would appear that the Twa arrived first, followed by the Hutu, who cleared large areas of forests, and confined the Twa to whatever forest remained. The Tutsi pastoralists followed later (Pottier, 2002:12).

These incoming Tutsi wanderers under strong chiefs developed new patterns of authority, and gradually formulated a hierarchical structure of society whereby the ruling Tutsi clan was supported and supplied by subject clans, that is, the Twa and Hutu. The southwardly migrating Tutsi adopted the Hutu language and culture before installing their own hegemony through the *nyiginya* dynasty to which Mwami (king) Rwabugiri belonged. The Tutsi minority of cattle rich noblemen ruled over the Hutu majority who were mainly peasants. The structure of this kingdom as it developed after 1500 was reminiscent of the feudal system of vassalage in Western Europe. A similar situation was taking place in southern Ugandan kingdom of Ankole, whereby the Hima ruled and were rich in cattle, while the Iru farmers fed the cattle of the Hima, worked for them and were without any political rights. Tutsi rulers were linked to their subjects by links of vassalage or 'clientage' that were defined, named and understood (Davidson, 1966:150-151).

Several theories exist as to how the Tutsi extended their hegemony over the mass Hutu peasants. One theory according to Hans Meyer is that the secret of Tutsi domination lay in their superior intelligence, calmness, racial pride, solidarity and political talent. A more widely accepted theory suggests that the Tutsi used their cattle clientship or cattle contract, in order to acquire sovereign political rights over their Hutu clients. Historically, the situation is much more complex than the mentioned widely accepted theories suggest. Wandering bands of Tutsi and Hima pastoralists infiltrated amongst the indigenous tribes and established a symbiotic relationship with them. In some places these intruders set themselves up as minor chiefs controlling a few hills; whilst in other areas, the relations between the two communities were of a commercial nature, involving the exchange of cattle for agricultural products (Lemarchand, 1970:19).

The transition of the Tutsi from statelessness to kingship was achieved through the amalgamation of a few autonomous chieftaincies into a small nuclear kingdom and under

the leadership of a royal clan. In Rwanda this step took place in the Bwanacambwe region (near Kigali), in the fifteenth century under the reign of a Tutsi king named Ruganza Bwimba. In Burundi the creation of the nuclear cell took place towards the middle of the seventeenth century under the guidance of a Hima king who came from the neighbouring kingdom of Buha. A final stage of development saw the gradual incorporation of the outlying areas into an expanding territorial unit. In Rwanda this process began in the sixteenth century, with the absorption of what is today the central region of Rwanda, Nduga-Marangara into the nuclear kingdom. Ruganza Ndori ascended to power in the seventeenth century, and with that a series of invasions were launched against formerly independent Hutu communities, resulting in the expansion of Rwanda's boundaries. The final stage of these territorial invasions were not completed until the latter half of the nineteenth century under the reign of Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri, who is one of Rwanda's most prestigious historical figures (Lemarchand, 1970:19-20).

Burundi's quest for 'lebensraum' or habitation is similar to that of Rwanda. From a small core area situated in the central region Nkoma, King Ntare Rushatsi extended his rule over the BuTutsi, Kilimaro and Bunyezi regions. His successors saw their territorial ambitions temporarily halted by the expansion of the neighbouring kingdoms of Bugesera in the east, the Buha in the south-east and Rwanda in the north. In the first half of the nineteenth century, a new wave of conquests brought most of the peripheral areas into the fold of the central kingdom, and this was accomplished under the reign of Mwami Ntare Rugaamba, who played for Burundi a similar role to that played by Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri for Rwanda. Ntare Rugaamba expanded the original boundaries of his kingdom through his conquest of approximately half of Buha, the Buyogoma, Ruyigi and Bugesera regions. Sizeable portions of present day Rwanda and Tanzania were also incorporated into Ntare Rugaamba's kingdom (Lemarchand, 1970:21).

By 1900, the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi had spawned different types of political organisation. Rwanda had achieved a degree of centralisation, as all major administrative offices at the local level came under the direct control of the Mwami, except for the northern region which was still awaiting incorporation. The Mwami consolidated his rule by suppressing the autonomy of the local hereditary chiefs and replacing them with loyal Tutsis. The authority of the army chiefs in the traditional political structure of Rwanda

bears testimony to the crucial role they must have played in bringing about national unification (Lemarchand, 1970:22).

On the other hand, the military structure in Burundi was weak and the contest between the monarchy and corporate descent groups resulted in greater political decentralisation. Burundi did not have the centralised hierarchical pattern of authority in comparison to Rwanda. Power was fragmented among the autonomous political units, which were each under the authority of a prince. This authority was directly related to the rules of royal succession, as the strength of the prince's claims depended on the genealogical proximity of the dynasty from which he claimed descent. The dynastic names of the Burundi kings were fixed by tradition as Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga and Mwambutsa, in that order, and their immediate descendants were known as Batare, Bezi, Bataga and Bambutsa respectively.

According to tradition introduced under the reign of Mwami Ntare II Rugaamba, the descendants of Ntare would hold office as ganwa or royal class until the reign of the second Ntare, when a new generation of ganwa would come into power; likewise, the offspring of Mwezi became king, and so it continued. These rules were never firmly institutionalised and the accession of a new king brought with it opportunities for conflict, as the incumbents were reluctant to surrender their power to new kings. Mwami Ntare II Rugaamba established his reputation as one of Burundi's most illustrious kings due to his successful territorial invasions during the first half of the nineteenth century. The spoils of victory went to his sons, particularly Rwashwa and Twarereye, who after taking over the administration of the new provinces, asserted their independence from the crown. This act of rebellion resulted in bitter conflicts between Ntare's sons and his successor on the throne, Mwami Mwezi Kisabo. These conflicts resulted in the death of Twarereye at the battle of Nkoondo, which was fought near the traditional capital of Muramvya around 1860. The dynastic feuds between the king and princes continued for many years and by 1900 Mwezi Kisabo could only claim effective control over half his kingdom, while the other half remained in the hands of Ntare's rebellious sons, known from then on as the Batare. By appointing his sons to rule as his deputies over conquered territories, Ntare sowed the seeds of opposition among princes of the ganwa.

From the brief description of Rwanda and Burundi's pre-colonial pasts, significant differences in the processes of cultural amalgamation that took place in each kingdom can be identified.

An important concern is the prominent status achieved by the princes of the ganwa in the political system of Burundi. Due to the series of events that granted them dominance, they became identified as a separate ethnic group, whose prestige in society ranked far above that of the ordinary Tutsi. During pre-colonial times in Burundi, two classes of Tutsi existed, namely the low-caste Tutsi-Hima and the upper caste Tutsi-Banyaruguru. It is important to note that a totally different picture existed in Rwanda. The greater variety of status groups ranging from prince to commoner is a major reason why the Burundian society was relatively free of racial tensions. Another factor of social cohesion associated with ganwa rule lies in the nature of the competitive relations that developed among them. These rivalries caused the contestants, including the Mwami to seek the support of both Hutu and Tutsi, and this could not have taken place unless there was a situation of unadulterated harmony among the ruling elites of both clans. Seeing as neither the Mwami nor the ganwa could exercise a monopoly of power, and since their security depended on their ability to generate support from below, they had to adopt a more accommodating attitude towards the lower orders (Lemarchand, 1970:23-24).

In Rwanda, by contrast, the chiefs had no need for the chiefs to pander to the masses because the army was not only powerful, but entirely loyal to the Tutsi cause. While in Rwanda the monarchical absolutism was a major determinant of the rigidity of the structure, in Burundi the institutionalisation of rebellion gave the social system a greater measure of internal cohesion at the local level.

Finally, the differences in the patterns of Tutsi immigration are noteworthy, as they affected the geographical distribution of ethnic groups in different ways. In Burundi, the bulk of Tutsi are found in the BuTutsi region, where they make up between 80% - 85% of the local population. About one third of the country is inhabited by a mixture of Hutu and Hima populations. In Rwanda, Tutsi elements were spread almost evenly throughout the country. The only notable exception was the northern region (Ndorwa, Mutara, and Mulera) where the Tutsi hardly accounted for more than a tiny fraction of the total

population. Practically, this meant that the caste structure of Rwanda was more rigid throughout the country, while in Burundi local variations dictated flexibility in the application of the caste system. In Rwanda the uniformity of the caste structure invited a similar uniformity of political organisation, whereas in Burundi, regional differences in the patterns of social stratification called for a greater political diversification (Lemarchand, 1970:23-25).

In conclusion, seldom have the threads of migrations, history and cultural evolution produced such striking differences and similarities of social structure as between Rwanda and Burundi, and from this perspective both countries' colonial influences and the results of these influences will be analysed in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the genocides that took place in post-colonial Rwanda and Burundi.

#### COLONISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON POWER STRUCTURES IN RWANDA

The Berlin conference of 1884 – 1885 assigned the two kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi as part of Germany's sphere of influence in Africa. Military posts were only established later at Usumbura (now Bujumbura) in 1896 and at Kigali in 1907. The military district of Ruanda-Urundi which comprised of both kingdoms was administered from German East Africa, later known as Tanganyika. After the defeat of the Germans in World War I by the Belgians in 1916, the Germans' rule over Rwanda ended. Belgian forces occupied Ruanda-Urundi in 1916, and it became a mandated territory of the League of Nations, administered by Belgium from 1923. The Belgians, like the Germans, administered the kingdoms of Rwanda and Urundi as separate sub-regions, ruling through the two monarchies.

Burundi and Rwanda are different from other African states, in that before the German empire absorbed them at the end of the nineteenth century, both were long established kingdoms with a developed sense of territorial sovereignty. Their origins lie amongst the Eastern Bantu people, whose ancestors had migrated from central Africa to the northern fringes of the equatorial forest of what is now Congo, bringing their cattle, sheep and goats with them and establishing themselves in dispersed homesteads. Their earliest settlements in eastern Africa was in the region around Lake Albert, Victoria and

Tanganyika, and from here, during the first millennium AD, they spread eastwards towards the Indian Ocean coast, and south into central and southern Africa (Bentley & Southall, 2005:32).

Rwanda became a German colony in 1899, and the Germans adopted the indirect rule principle allowing the local leaders who were the elite Tutsi and in the minority, to continue to rule over the Hutu, who were in the majority and were farming peasants, as well as the Batwa, who were in the minority and were used as servants for the Tutsi elite. The attractions of this policy were both practical and psychological. The Germans found that the centralised political systems of the indigenous societies were suited to indirect rule, and any attempt to displace the traditional rulers would have most likely been met with resistance from the local populations (Lemarchand, 1970:48-49). After the defeat of the Germans in World War I by the Belgians in 1916, the Germans' rule over Rwanda ended. The Belgians retained indirect rule and favoured the Tutsi dynasty.

The significance of Rwanda's north-south divide in the genocide and the aftermath relates to the north-western inhabitants' (Hutu) historical opposition to rule by south-central (Hutu) Rwanda. This opposition is rooted in conquest, for it was not until the Belgian colonists lent the ruling Tutsi dynasty a helping hand in the 1920s, that the Tutsi monarch extended his direct rule over the entire country. Ever since, northern Hutu have viewed southern Hutu as "other" (Tutsi), and many despise them for sharing a common culture and kinship (Pottier, 2002:35).

## INDEPENDENCE EVE-1959 AND THE FIRST ETHNIC CLASHES

The tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi spiralled into ethnic based party politics that fuelled animosity between the Tutsi and the Hutu such that a civil war ensued in 1959, resulting in mass displacement of the Tutsi's to neighbouring countries. In 1960 the Belgians organized elections which were won by the PARMEHUTU party, which was led by Hutu Gregoire Kayibanda, and on 1 July 1962 the Belgians granted political independence to Rwanda.

President Kayibanda was from the south of Rwanda, and favoured the Gitarama region where he was born. Kayibanda's rule was largely based on favouring the Hutu who were marginalised during the Tutsi regime. His policies included extreme measures where the Tutsi were only granted 10% of civil service positions and education, with the rest going to the Hutu. Growing unrest with the status quo resulted in the expulsion of the Tutsi's from schools and jobs, and eventually being exiled. During this unrest, the UN Commission of Inquiry had reported that the ideals of the Kayibanda government, which was the first Hutu government, were disappearing, as the 1960s were marred by terror and discord. This terror was further exacerbated by southern public officials were too preoccupied with their own personal gain than with their official duties (Pottier, 2002:35).

#### THE HABYARIMANA MILITARY COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH

A coup was staged by Kayibanda's minister of defence General Juvenal Habyarimana in the wake of the instability. Upon seizing power, he outlawed all political parties, and established a one party state, which all citizens had to be members of. President Habyarimana reversed the process of favour from the south to the north-west, where he was from (Pottier, 2002:35). This failure of the government demonstrated how little had changed in Rwanda since the civil war in 1959. The civil war had removed one oppressive government and replaced it with another (Pottier, 2002:35).

The Rwandan refugees who were in exile established the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in Nairobi, Kenya, in order to find a solution to the Rwandan refugees in Uganda. This party later became known as the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), and they launched an armed attack on Rwanda on 1 October 1990 which lasted until 1994. The government retaliated by massacring thousands of Tutsis. In 1993, the Rwandan government under national and international pressure signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the RPF, which was known as the Arusha Peace Accords. The agreements were meant to pave a way for power sharing as well as solve the refugee problem.

#### THE 1994 GENOCIDE

On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing the president and President Ntaryamira, the Burundian president. The military and organised bands of militia known as the Interahamwe executed what was known as the Rwandan genocide of 1994 on Tutsi's and Hutu's killing over a million people between April and July 1994. The RPF intensified its military attacks during this period, leading to the capture of Kigali on 4 July 1994 (ISS: no date).

Against this history of violence and ethnic politics, the current government under President Paul Kagame, who is one of the founder members of the RPF, were to establish a new constitution that is based on democratic principles, reconciliation and the eradication of ethnic divisions.

## COLONISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON POWER STRUCTURES IN BURUNDI

The period of foreign rule in Burundi was brief, although its impact had far reaching consequences that led to one of the bloodiest racial conflicts of our time. The first white fathers set foot in Burundi in 1881, and they were massacred at Rumonge. In 1891, the Austrian explorer Oskar Baumann ventured into what was known as Ruanda-Urundi. In 1892, he crossed the Kagera into northern Burundi. Baumann's exploration of the two countries was one of the first of a series to be made by German officers.

The first encounter of Captain von Goetzen with Mwami Mwezi Kisabo of Burundi took place in 1899. By this time, Captain von Goetzen was employed at the Governor-General of the East African Protectorate based in Dar Es Salaam. It is important to note that of all colonial administrations in Africa at the time, Germany's was the most understaffed. As late as 1913, the whole of German East Africa, which was a territory larger than Nigeria, was administered by seventy European officials.

One of the earliest German policies in Burundi is found in a report written in November 1905 by Captain von Grawert, the Resident of Burundi, which stated:

*"The ideal is: unqualified recognition of the authority of the sultans from us, whether through taxes or other means, in a way that will seem to them as little a burden as*

*possible; this will link their interests with ours. This ideal will probably be realised more easily and earlier in Ruanda, which is more tightly organised, than in Urundi, where we must first re-establish the old authority of the sultan, which has generally been weakened by wars with Europeans and other circumstances”.*

In Rwanda the implementation of indirect rule reflected von Grawert's assumptions, although in Burundi German policies showed from the beginning improvisation on the part of the Germans (Lemarchand, 1970:49).

When the Germans arrived in Burundi they found power struggles between the aging king, Mwami Mwezi Kisabo and the rebellious chiefs. Power was divided among a host of princely factions, with the king limited in his powers. Mwami Kisabo adopted an accommodating attitude towards the Germans, although his promise to cooperate was nothing more than a façade in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the German colonial troops.

#### 1959 ONWARDS

In response to international pressure in November 1959, Belgium committed itself to a programme of reform. This would involve devolving legislative authority to an indirectly elected council, with the Mwami (king) acting as a constitutional monarch. These arrangements were to be backed by armed forces which were initially formed as a territorial guard in 1960. Initially, the recruitment of these forces represented both Hutu and Tutsi adequately. At the attainment of independence in 1962, the guard became the national army, which in 1963 spawned a special elite unit of commandos which were placed under the control of a Tutsi officer, Captain Michel Micombero. These armed forces were to become deeply divided along ethnic lines (Bentley *et al*, 2005:41).

Political parties began to form, of note UPRONA, which Prince Louis Rwagasore; the Mwami's eldest son was associated with. The party was dedicated to upholding traditional institutions and the Bezi lineage. Due to the political developments in Rwanda and the exile of many Tutsis, Rwagasore took UPRONA in a nationalist direction, and lost favour with the Belgian administration, which saw the party as pro-communist (Bentley *et al*, 2005:42).

Esterhuysen (as quoted by Bentley *et al*, 2005:42) states that the Parti Democratique Chretien (PDC) established by the Batware lineage as a counter to UPRONA earned the support of the Belgians and formed the first provisional government in 1961. The PDC's closeness to the colonial power undermined its credentials and promoted that of its rivals, resulting in its defeat in the country's first elections in 1961. UPRONA won 58 out of 64 seats and Rwagasore became Prime Minister. He was later assassinated on 13 October by agents of the PDC, and his death split UPRONA, and destroyed the national cohesion he had fought to achieve also because of the Hutu revolution that was taking place in Rwanda.

In this environment, the monarch was the remaining source of power at the time of independence on 1 July 1962. In order to seek a way to quell the ethnic tensions the Mwami, Mwambutsa, tried to balance the portion of Hutu and Tutsi in four successive governments between 1963 and 1965. In the process he alienated both sides, that is Hutu and Tutsi. In January 1965, Mwambutsa replaced a Tutsi Prime Minister, with a Hutu, Pierre Ngendendumwe. Ngendendumwe was assassinated three days after his appointment, by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee. The Mwami sought to further quell the tensions by holding new elections but this only served to ensure that Hutu candidates took 23 out of 33 seats. The monarch despite this clear win, appointed Leopold Biha, a prominent Tutsi as Prime Minister. This provoked an attempted coup by the Hutu army which was suppressed by loyal troops led by Micombero. In the chaos that followed, the Mwami fled to Congo, and the Tutsis took their revenge. The army was cleansed of Hutus, and the Hutu political party was almost wiped out, as well as their rural supporters, some who had risen in support of the Mwami. This period marked the end of Hutu political participation for many years (Bentley *et al*, 2005:42)

Mwambutsa sought to preserve the monarchy, and sent his son, Charles Ndzizeye back to Burundi to serve as Regent. In July 1966, Charles revoked the constitution, deposed his father and declared himself Mwami as Ntare V. He also appointed Captain Micombero as Prime Minister. This alliance was unstable and Ntare was soon overthrown by Micombero who in November 1966, declared Burundi a republic, and appointed himself as President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and leader of UPRONA. Another attempted Hutu coup in 1969 provided a platform for a purge of those Hutu officers who remained and

further entrenched Tutsi power. Following the outbreak of a Hutu insurrection in 1972 in which 2000 – 3000 Tutsis were eliminated, the first Burundi mass killings took place and Ntare was executed to prevent him from becoming a focus for Hutu support. After these incidents, between 100 000 – 200 000 Hutu were massacred, and 150 000 fled to neighbouring countries (Bentley *et al*, 2005:43).

The 1972 massacres provoke memories of fear for both Hutus and Tutsis. For the Hutu it confirms the genocidal intentions of the Tutsi and their desire to maintain the Hutu as an underclass. For the Tutsi in generates images of the majority Hutu rising up and exacting a bloody revenge were the Tutsi to relax their hold on power (Bentley *et al*, 2005:43).

Micombero was overthrown in November 1976 by his cousin Colonel Jean Baptise Bagaza, who sought to bring order to the state and firmly entrench Tutsi hegemony. Bagaza appeared to be liberalising reforms, as explicit reference to ethnic groups was banned, land reforms were declared, and a new constitution was adopted by referendum in November 1981. This commitment by Bagaza to a meaningful reform was exposed as a false. Elections were held for a new national assembly in October 1982, and Bagaza returned as head of state, after winning 99% of the vote, in a contest in which he was the only candidate (Bentley *et al*, 2005:44).

Thereafter, the period between 1984 and 1987 was seen as one of gross human rights abuse. Tutsis were favoured in the education system, and Hutu were excluded from the government, army, police and the judiciary. A campaign against the church was launched by the government, as it was accused of supporting the Hutu resistance with humanitarian aid. The government resorted to brutal suppression and torture of numerous Hutu political prisoners. This alarmed the donor nations, particularly Belgium and France, who pressurised Bagaza by withholding development aid. Whilst Bagaza was out of the country in September 1987, he was deposed by Major Pierre Buyoya, who was also a Tutsi (Bentley *et al*, 2005:44).

Buyoya formed a Military Committee for National Salvation of 31 army officer and suspended the constitution. In October 1987, Buyoya became the President of a 20 member government, four of whom were army officers. He relaxed the constraints on

religious freedom and released hundreds of political prisoners. This encouraged hope among the Hutu and alarmed Tutsis. In August 1988 a number of Tutsi were killed in the north of the country and 20 000 Hutu civilians died at the hands of the army, with many more fleeing to Rwanda. International response was swift and helped prevent the violence into a mass genocide. Buyoya, who was under pressure, launched a series of reforms in the form of a national commission to study the question of national unity. This commission was comprised of 12 Hutu and 12 Tutsi members, and a Hutu Prime Minister, Adrien Sibomana was appointed as head of cabinet, which was composed equally of Hutu and Tutsi. The report of the National Commission published in 1989 led to a Charter of National Unity, which was approved by referendum in 1991. Tutsi extremists were not happy with these developments and made various coup attempts between 1989 and 1992. In 1991, Amnesty International singled out the security forces for their human rights violations. The transition to a multi-party democracy and Buyoya's efforts to bring about change was rejected by elements within the military.

#### THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1993

The Constitutional Commission placed a great deal of emphasis on national unity in the run up to the election scheduled for 1993, as it was clear that the worsening ethnic divide would pose a threat to a peaceful outcome of the votes of the majority Hutu electorate were to prevail. The Commission sought to build provisions into the constitution that aimed at protecting the diversity of Burundi's ethnic population. This was an effort by the Tutsi which aimed to reserve a minimum number of seats for the Tutsi minority.

The run up to the election was dominated by two parties, the prevailing UPRONA, and the emerging *Front Pour la Democratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU) which was mainly Hutu. FRODEBU's leader was Melchior Ndadaye, and he was able to mobilise all elements of the Hutu population including followers of the outlawed radical *Parti Pour la Liberation du People Hutu* (PALIPEHUTU).

Despite efforts from the Constitutional Commission, the 1993 elections were conducted along ethnic lines. UPRONA put forward Buyoya as their presidential candidate, while

Ndadaye represented FRODEBU, *Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais*, *Parti du Peuple* and *Parti Liberal*. The third candidate was a royalist Pierre-Claver Sendegeya.

The elections were held on 1 June 1993, and were conducted in a peaceful and calm environment. There were 100 foreign and 1000 national observers and the prevailing opinion was that the election was fair and transparent. Ndadaye was returned as President with 65% of the vote, in which 97% of the electorate participated. Buyoya received 32% and Sendegeya 1,4%.

In the elections for legislative assembly, FRODEBU took 80% and UPRONA 20% of the vote, winning 65 and 16 seats out of 81 respectively. Ndadaye honoured his promise of appointing a female Prime Minister Sylvie Kinigi, and seven other Tutsi ministers. The cabinet was made up of 23 members in a government of national unity. The scale of UPRONA's defeat was to have severe consequences for Burundi, even though FRODEBU had attracted the support of some moderate Tutsis opposed to Buyoya, and that UPRONA had always retained a degree of support amongst those Hutu who favoured close co-ordination between the two groups.

This promising new start was to fall prey to two factors typical to Burundi which continue to play a stumbling block to peace and democracy. The first factor is that the Tutsi officers felt that their dominance in the government was necessary, and that in the absence of their dominance in the armed forces, genocide against the Tutsi minority would ensue. The second factor is the exclusion of the civilian population (both Hutu and Tutsi) at every level in the running of the state, despite the formal commitment to democracy. This climate of distrust that currently exists between the participants to the Arusha Accord cannot be overlooked in the short-term, and will have to be contended by a new Burundian dispensation (Bentley *et al*, 2005:45-46).

## **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Problem setting and formulation require the exact formulation of questions that need answers, which would be arrived at through investigation. Research questions guide and encourage the researcher to find solutions and to uncover the truth or reality of the

phenomenon or a case under discussion. Research is basically conducted to resolve identified problems (Makgalancheche, 2007:95). The problem in this research is to investigate: **“the extent to which the African Union can exert more influence on member states in maintaining its peace and human security objectives”**.

The research question of this study is: **“what has the African Union put in place in order to influence its Member States in maintaining peace and human security objectives?”**

The study will aim to analyse the African Union’s human security agenda, and how far these objectives have been implemented in both Rwanda and Burundi. The PSC is the standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and is charged with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability. It is seen as the vehicle for promoting overall security in Africa. In order to support the efforts of the PSC in the areas of conflict anticipation and prevention, and the deployment of peace support missions and intervention, a Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund were established by the PSC. The study will also aim to analyse the extent of the PSC’s efforts to promote human security in Rwanda and Burundi.

## **OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH**

The purpose of this study is:

- To identify areas where the AU’s human security initiatives through the PSC have assisted Rwanda and Burundi in resolving conflicts;
- To identify how the AU can exert more influence on Member States to implement human security initiatives;
- To investigate whether countries with histories of violence can implement human security initiatives;

- To identify gaps in the PSC's system of implementing its human security policies.

From the above overview, the problem statement which galvanizes this study leads the researcher to surmise and investigate the issues that constitute a cluster for a research question.

## **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The current field of study is Public Administration and Management, and the research is focused on the policy implementation of the African Union's (AU) human security and peace initiatives by AU member states.

A relationship exists between the studies conducted by Tim Murithi (2008) regarding the AU's evolving role in peace operations. Murithi's study gives a background of the human security agenda inherited by the AU from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). His study also examines the innovations proposed by the AU to affect a shift from the limited achievements of the OAU.

The research will also assess the innovations brought about by the AU in terms of its human security and peace agenda. The research will also look into the AU's human security and peace agenda against the backdrop of the Rwandan and Burundian experience, and look into how the AU's human security policies are to be implemented by those member states, as well as alternative suggestions for implementation. It is hoped that this research will make a significant impact and contribute to the existing field of knowledge regarding the promotion of peace and human security initiatives of the African Union.

## **SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The research undertaken is a desk study, and does not entail fieldwork to solicit the views of diplomats and other key figures familiar with African diplomacy and the Great Lakes regions. Exclusive focus on the two countries might overshadow other areas of African intervention and success. The timeframe of the study is between 1994 and 2005, and any interventions that took place before or after the stated timeframe have not been

considered. The research is not an attack on the African Union, Rwanda and Burundi, but merely an analysis to determine the African Union's successes and shortcomings between 1994 and 2005. Consequently the conclusions of the study will be limited and cautious.

## **STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a historical background to the study. The chapter also provides an overview and history of the OAU and its successor the AU in its efforts to maintain human security in Rwanda and Burundi. The chapter will also highlight the differences between the two organisations, and summarise the challenges faced by the AU in addressing the human security initiatives of war torn member states. It provides an overview of Rwanda and Burundi's pre-colonial and colonial history. The chapter discusses the institutional mechanism of the AU, which is the case analysis for this study. The chapter then proceeds to define the research problem, determine the objectives for the study, and the rationale for undertaking the study. The chapter provides the limitations of the study, and ends by providing the overall structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 is an outline of the methodology and research design for the study. It describes the major research methods in social science research and provides the reasoning behind the selection of a case study approach to analyse the topic. The chapter describes the methods and instruments that were used to collect data and how the information collected was analysed. In conclusion, the chapter discusses the issues of ethics, validity and reliability for the research.

Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on human security within the field of international relations and politics. It also forms a theoretical framework of the study. It discusses the topic in the field of Public Administration, through a survey of the major theoretical paradigms in Public Administration. The theoretical review will also focus on the principles of the AU, namely, governance, human security and peace building.

Chapter 4 is a case analysis of the AU's, with a focus on how the PSC's human security initiatives were implemented in Rwanda and Burundi. The chapter analyses the PSC in relation to its design, function and operation.

The study concludes with Chapter 5 which presents the findings and answers to the research questions and recommends areas of improvement for the AU in policy implementation. The results of the study will be presented. The study does not seek to be exhaustive but suggests how the AU can better implement the human security initiatives in Africa.

## CHAPTER II

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### INTRODUCTION

The importance of research is closely related to the search for knowledge and the understanding of phenomena. The validity of this knowledge largely depends on the manner in which data is collected, which is the research methodology. Scientific knowledge is obtained through rigorous methods and techniques that correspond to the social world being described (Mukamunana, 2006:40).

There are many kinds of research designs that can be followed, some are qualitative, and others are quantitative (Mouton, Auriacombe and Lutabingwa, 2006:9). The selection of methods and their application depends on the aims and objectives of the study, the nature of the phenomena being investigated and the underlying theories or expectations of the research.

A qualitative research approach is used to analyse the AU's human security initiatives, by making use of the case study approach, with a focus on the human security initiatives undertaken in Rwanda and Burundi. It is important to note that case studies are used when investigators have little control over events, especially when the focus is on contemporary phenomena within a real life context, particularly where the boundaries between the phenomena and context are not clearly evident (Webb and Auriacombe, 2006:30). The African Union is an instrument whose function is to foster and maintain good governance, peace and security and socio-economic development on the continent, and as such, the case study approach is appropriate to this research.

This chapter will review various types of research and policy evaluation approaches applicable to this research. The selected research method, research design and data collection methods used to gather and interpret the data in the study will be discussed.

The chapter concludes by considering the validity, reliability and ethics of the research process.

## **COMPARING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACHES**

Quantitative research is used to answer questions about relationships among measurable variables with the purpose of explaining, predicting, and influencing outcomes. This approach is sometimes called the traditional, experimental or positivist approach. A quantitative study usually starts with the specific hypothesis to be tested. The researcher usually isolates the variables to be studied, control for extraneous variables, use a standardized procedure to collect some form of numerical data, and use statistical procedures to analyse and draw conclusions from the data collected. The quantitative study ends with confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypothesis tested (Leedy and Ormond, 2005:94).

Qualitative research involves detailed description, understanding and insight, rather than measurement. It seeks to discover why certain behaviours are, and can provide highly relevant data. It is also suitable in exploratory and descriptive research (McGivern, 2003:34-35). Qualitative research describes a set of non-statistical techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena (McNabb, 2002:267). Researchers applying the qualitative research approach believe that the object of study in the social sciences exhibit fundamental differences compared to the object of study in the natural sciences. Qualitative research displays a number of characteristics.

Firstly, qualitative research is committed to viewing events, norms and values from the perspective of the people who are being studied. The events studied in this research are the histories, cultures and lead up to the genocides in both Rwanda and Burundi.

Secondly, such researchers provide detailed descriptions of the social settings they investigate. This enables them to understand the subject's interpretation of what is going on. The pre- and post-colonial backgrounds of Rwanda and Burundi were briefly described in Chapter 1 which gives the reader a primer to the events leading up to the

genocides in Rwanda and Burundi. A brief background of the OAU's security mechanism as well as the newly formulated AU's human security objectives were also briefly described in Chapter 1.

Thirdly, the scholar attempts to understand events and behaviour in the context in which they occur, following a holistic approach (Webb and Auriacombe, 2006:27). When a social scientist decides to follow a qualitative approach, he/she is most likely to make use of methods and techniques associated with it, including ethnographic studies, grounded theory and case studies. The most common and relevant to this research qualitative field research approaches are discussed below.

## **QUALITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACHES**

Different types of research approaches are employed in qualitative research, and the main research approaches most commonly used in public administration are case studies, grounded theory, action science and ethnography (McNabb, 2002:276). A research design consists of a plan that allows the researcher to test the validity of his/her hypothesis or answers to his/her questions, taking into account the factors that he/she believes might affect the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Webb and Auriacombe, 2006:19). The various data collection approaches, namely, ethnographic, grounded theory, case study and phenomenology are discussed below.

## **ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES**

Ethnography is the direct observation of the activities of members of a social group, with a view to providing an accurate description of those activities. There are two forms of ethnography, namely participant and non-participant observations. Under participant observation, the researcher is part of the situation being observed; and with non-participant observation, the researcher is detached from the situation being observed (Hinds, 2000:50).

The purpose of ethnographic studies is to describe different cultures and further understanding of human species. The researcher not only observes behaviour, customs, objects and emotions of a foreign cultural grouping, but also seeks to inquire about the meaning of these phenomena to its society (Webb and Auriacombe, 2006:28). Anthropologists developed the ethnographic approach as a method for studying different cultures and how members of societies develop coping mechanisms for social phenomena. The main differentiating characteristic of the ethnographic approach is its emphasis on specific ways to prepare field notes and rules for writing about cultural events. The primary data-collections method is participant observation, as ethnographers often live and work with the members of groups they are studying for extended periods of time, with the aim of being absorbed into the group (McNabb, 2002:276).

In Public Administration, ethnographic research can be used to answer questions on service delivery to communities (Mukamunana, 2006:46). The ethnographic approach was not considered as suitable an approach for the research as the case study approach.

## GROUNDED THEORY

The grounded theory approach to research in public administration has its roots in sociology and social psychology. Grounded theory uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively grounded theory about a phenomenon. Grounded theory researchers approach their study by gathering all possible facts pertaining to the problem through personal interviews and participant observation. Once all the data has been collected, it is analysed and interpreted by the investigator who develops a theory from the analysis. Only after data concerning a particular phenomenon has been collected and analysed does a theory emerge. The grounded theory in this research will be that Burundi and Rwanda are countries characterised by violent coups and a massive genocide. The aim of grounded theory is to build a theory that is faithful to and illuminates the area under study. Grounded theory should accurately represent the everyday reality of a particular substantive area, be understood by those who were subjected to the study and those who practiced it, be abstract enough to be applicable to a variety of different contexts related to that phenomenon, and provide individuals a measure of guidance. Grounded theory

does not have a clearly defined demarcated ending point (Webb & Auriacombe, 2006:29; McNabb, 2002:280), and as such is not suitable for this research.

## CASE STUDIES

Case studies are used to gain an understanding of a process or an event, especially when the research question deals with how an organisation functions, in this instance, the AU's PSC. Case studies are relevant to public administration where the intention is to understand a situation in order to make or adjust policy. Case studies are used by public administrators to inform decision making and enhance understanding, and can consist of one or more cases, which are known as multi-case comparative research designs (Johnson, 2002:51).

Case studies emphasise detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships. Case studies are used when investigators have little control over events, when the focus is on contemporary phenomena within a real life context, and especially when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident. Case studies use documents, artefacts, interviews and observation as sources of evidence and seek to present empirical evidence fairly and rigorously (Webb & Auriacombe, 2006:30).

The main use of a case study design is to obtain an in depth understanding as well as a detailed description of behaviours, and a sequence of events. Case studies can also be used to understand which explanation fits a hypothesis or theory. Should the findings be used to make a generalisation about a group or population to which the case belongs, the researcher must be careful to ensure that the case is representative of the wider population of cases, and in some cases generalisations may not be the aim of the research, but to understand the case in full, as is the case in this research (McGivern, 2003:86).

The case study approach will be used in this study and documents and observations of the AU's PSC ability to intervene in the human security crises in the Burundian and Rwandan situations will form the basis of the study.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

Research design refers to the approached to qualitative research, such as experiments, case studies and ethnography. The process of research design refers to working through a particular focus of the research, as well as the generation of the research plan and design for the topic in mind. Designing research involves specifying what kind of data that is required to explore an interest or topic, and as such, can also be seen as rough templates that provide a broad structure for working through the research project. In each case, the approach will contain variations on how the approach can be taken forward. For example, a case study will involve a detailed exploration of single or multiple cases (Gibson & Brown, 2009: 47-48).

The purpose of research design is to assist the researcher to provide answers to assumptions, research questions and hypotheses, as well as to control variances. The research design is constructed in order to enable the researcher to make inferences from the data collected. The research design assists the researcher to choose the type of research to employ, that is, either qualitative or quantitative, in this instance, the qualitative approach was employed. In essence, the research design is a systematic plan for investigating a problem using qualitative research methods (Taylor, 2000:168).

The format to be used in this research is adopted from Creswell (1998), and thus follows the traditional research approach of presenting a problem, asking a question, collecting data to answer the question, data analysis, and answering the research question (Creswell, 1998:18).

This study attempts to respond to the question: "What has the AU put in place in order to influence its Member States in maintaining peace and human security initiatives?" This research can be best answered through an in-depth analysis of the PSC, and as such due to the uniqueness of the case, the study is an intrinsic case study (Creswell,

1998:62). As the AU PSC is a relatively new mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, its intrinsic value led the researcher to focus on this particular instrument in the management of the Rwandan and Burundian human security challenges between 1994 and 2005. The criteria for the interpretation of the findings are explained in the following section, which outlines data collection and analysis (Mukamunana, 2006:51)

## **DATA COLLECTION PROCESS**

According to Creswell (1998:110), data collection is a series of interrelated activities aimed at gathering information that will answer research questions that may arise. Data collection involves locating a site or individual to study, and to gain access and build relationships in order for the participants to provide relevant data. Once the sites or people have been established, the researcher needs to decide on the most appropriate data collection approaches and finally, how the data will be stored for easy retrieval.

Data collection involves setting the boundaries of the study, collecting information through unstructured or semi-structured observation and interviews, documents and visual material (Creswell, 2009:178). This study seeks to analyse the PSC's human security initiatives in Rwanda and Burundi from 1994 to 2005, and as such the analysis of the case study drew on multiple sources of information such as observations, archival records and documents to ensure validity, and this process is called triangulation of data (Creswell, 1994:167). Triangulation of data is a common practice in qualitative research, and is useful for checking the trustworthiness of various sources of data (Gibson *et al*, 2009:58-59). Qualitative researchers often use multiple sources of data in any single study. It is essential that data collection methods are consistent with the ethical considerations discussed later in the chapter (Leedy & Ormond, 2005:144).

Case study research is based on six sources of evidence, namely:

- Documentations;
- Archival records;
- Interviews;
- Direct observation;

- Participant observation, and;
- Physical artefacts (Yin, 1989:84).

In order to analyse the PSC and prepare an appropriate response to the research question, this study made use of documentation and archival records, which are elaborated below.

## DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

In case study research, documents are used to validate and amplify evidence obtained from other sources, and are thus important in case study data collection plan (Yin, 1989:87).

Documentary research is the process of using documents to investigate social phenomena and involves analysing records produced by individuals and organisations. Documentation provides researchers with a means to gain detailed insights into people's lives as well as how organisations function. Documentation used by qualitative researchers usually predate the researcher. An important consideration in documentary research is the use of primary or secondary data. Primary data refers to data that is generated by the researcher or by someone relevant to the research question, and is first hand in nature as it is a product of the researcher. In this study, primary data was not used. Secondary data refers to research conducted by other researchers, and usually take the form of newspaper articles and other academic work, which is more applicable; and was the approach used in this study (Gibson *et al*, 2009:65-67).

The internet can provide a wealth of information for researchers as it offers access to commentaries, published and unpublished reports and access to libraries and archives (Gibson *et al*, 2009:75). Various internet articles, publications and reference materials from libraries and published articles were used to obtain information about the PSC and Rwanda and Burundi. Official AU documents about the AU and the PSC were also consulted to compile the research report.

## ARCHIVAL RECORDS

Archival records are relevant to many case studies, and can include service, records, organisational records, maps and charts, survey data and personal records. These and the documentary searches can make a case study research report more meaningful. Information pertaining to the functioning of the PSC have been used in analysing this organ of the AU.

## DATA ANALYSIS

According to Yin (1989:105), data analysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating and combining the evidence collected, in order to address the research question. Data analysis requires that the researcher develop categories and make comparisons and contrasts, and be open to contrary or alternative explanations of the findings (Creswell, 1994:153).

Creswell (2009:184) proposes a six step approach to data analysis in qualitative research, and highlights the interactive nature of the approach as the various stages are interrelated.

Step 1: Organise and prepare the data for analysis.

Step 2: Read through all the data.

Step 3: Code the data.

Step 4: Generate a description of the setting, categories and themes for analysis.

Step 5: Advance how the description and theme will be represented in the qualitative narrative.

Step 6: Interpret the data.

The study uses the above approach, and the research question constitutes the major themes against which the data will be analysed and reported on the PSC.

## **CLASSES OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH STRATEGIES**

Qualitative research strategies can be grouped into three broad classes, namely: exploratory research studies, interpretive research studies and critical research strategies, and will be discussed further (McNabb, 2002:269-274).

### **EXPLANATORY RESEARCH**

Explanatory research is conducted in order to develop a causal explanation of social phenomenon, where the researcher identifies a specific social event such as the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 that is to be investigated. The researcher then identifies the social, economic and political variables in the social environment that can be explained as a cause of the consequence. A major objective of explanatory research is to build theories that researchers can use to explain a phenomenon and then predict future similar events, and this gives researchers a measure of control over events. Explanatory research is seen as the fastest way to produce a cumulative stream of knowledge in a field or discipline, and is very commonly used in public administration. To a certain extent, the research undertaken is explanatory, in that the variables involved in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi are explained, and may be used by researchers to predict similar future events.

### **INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH**

Critics of explanatory research argue that human action cannot be explained in this way, as it can only be understood by studies that use interpretive research. The researcher using interpretive research arrives at an interpretation of a phenomenon by developing subjective meanings of social events. Research may be classified as interpretive when it is developed on the premise that humans learn about reality from meanings they assign to social phenomena such as language, shared experiences and publications. The fundamental aspect of interpretive theory is that social phenomena are constantly changing, as well as the fact that interpretive research is context-laden.

## CRITICAL RESEARCH

Critical qualitative research is the third approach to investigations of social phenomena, and its main purpose is to emancipate members of society from harmful conditions. Members of society are not told how to change their conditions, but are helped to identify on their own alternative ways of defining their society and of achieving human potential. The main objective of critical research is to assist people to change their beliefs and actions in order to help them become aware of their unconscious bases for their beliefs and actions.

Critical public administration research begins with the assumption that a crisis exists in some aspect of society, and the researcher's recognition of a crisis by the researcher is a key concept of the approach. The critical research strategy was used in this study and the reasons behind this choice are outlined in the objectives of the research in Chapter 1.

## APPROACHES TO POLICY EVALUATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A model is a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world. The models used in policy analysis are conceptual models that try to:

- Simplify thoughts on politics and public policy;
- Identify problems with public policies;
- Assist in the understanding of public policy by highlighting what is relevant and irrelevant; and
- Suggest explanations for public policy and predict its consequences.

Public policy within this study will be examined from the perspective of the following models:

- Institutional model;
- Process model;
- Rational model;
- Incremental model;

- Group model;
- Elite model;
- Public choice model; and
- Game theory model.

The above-mentioned models were not derived specifically to study public policy, although each model offers a different way of thinking about policy and even suggests some of the general causes and consequences of public policy. These models are not competitive and none of them can be considered as the best model. Most public policies are a combination of rational planning, incrementalism, interest group activity, elite preferences, game playing, public choice, political processes and institutional influences. The following section will briefly describe each model and pay attention to the various ways that public policy can be viewed (Dye 2005:12).

In order to gain a clear understanding of public policy, it is best to divide it into two broad branches. The first branch is known as the incrementalist paradigm of policy making and implementation, and is concerned with the study of how government policies are made and implemented, and attempts to describe that process objectively. The incrementalist paradigm is substantive, descriptive and objective, and is dominated by political scientists. The models that fall under the incrementalist paradigm are: elite, group, systems, institutionalist and organised anarchy models (Henry, 2007:283).

The second branch is known as the rationalist paradigm of policy making and implementation. This branch is theoretical, effectual, prescriptive and normative. It is mainly concerned with the development of theories in public policy making, and the outputs and effects of those theories in practice, and focuses on prescribing better ways of making and implementing better policies, and is thus applicable to this study. This paradigm is dominated by public administrators and relates to the application of available knowledge to government policies in order to improve their formulation and implementation. The models that fall under the rationalist paradigm are: rational and exclusion/consumption models (Henry, 2007:284).

Lastly, this section will be concluded by addressing strategic planning as a practical paradigm of policy making, which reconciles the differing perspectives of the incrementalist and rationalist paradigms of policy making and implementation. The application of strategic planning in the public and non-profit sectors will also be described (Henry, 2007:284).

## **INCREMENTALIST PARADIGM**

The incrementalist paradigm views new public policies as being variations of old ones. Charles E. Lindblom made the incrementalist paradigm more academically legitimate by dubbing it “muddling through”. This was also known as disjointed incrementalism, meaning that the analysis of conditions is uncoordinated and that only limited selections of policy alternatives are available to policy makers. Incrementalist policies are more politically expedient than those that necessitate basic redistributions of social values. In order to understand the incrementalist paradigm, six models, namely, elite, groups, systems, institutionalist and organised anarchy will be described (Henry, 2007:284).

### **THE ELITE/MASS MODEL**

Elite theory suggests that public policy is viewed as the preferences and values of a governing elite. The theory also holds that people are apathetic and ill-informed about public policy, and that the elites shape the masses’ opinions on policy questions, more than masses shape elite opinion. Public policy then becomes the product of the elite’s preferences, and public servants carry out these policies. Policies flow down from the elite to the masses, and do not arise from mass demands (Dye, 2005:22).

The implications of elite theory for policy analysts will be discussed further. Elitism implies that public policy does not reflect the demands of the people as it does the interests, values of the elite, and changes in policy are therefore driven by the elite. Change in public policy in elitism is incremental rather than revolutionary, as public policies are seldom changed, but rather modified. It is important to note that elitism is not necessarily hostile towards mass welfare, and that the responsibility for mass welfare rests on the

shoulders of elites and not the masses. Since elitism views the masses as apathetic and ill informed, mass sentiments are more often influenced by elites, and communication between elites and the masses flows downwards. Popular elections and party competition do not enable the masses to govern, and democratic institutions exist for symbolic value. Elitism asserts that elites agree in the continuation of their social system, as the stability of the system rests on elite consensus on the fundamental values of the system, and only policies that fall within the shared consensus will be given serious consideration. Elitism implies that competition amongst elites is around very few issues, and that elites agree more than they disagree (Dye, 2005:24).

## THE GROUP MODEL

Group theory asserts that the interaction among groups is the central fact of politics. Individuals with common interests join together formally or informally to impress their demands on the government, and the group becomes the bridge between the individual and the government. The influence of groups is determined by their numbers, influence, wealth, access to decision makers and leadership. Policy makers are constantly responding to group demands through negotiations and bargaining. Politicians also attempt to form a majority of coalition groups, and can therefore decide which groups are included in the coalition (Dye, 2005:21-22). Another name for the group model is the hydraulic thesis, whereby the polity is conceived as a series of forces and pressures acting against one another in the formulation of public policy. The group model is usually associated with the legislature rather than the bureaucracy (Henry, 2007:285).

## SYSTEMS MODEL

The systems model relies on concepts of information theory, that is, inputs, outputs and feedback, and this process is cyclical in that policy is formulated, implemented, adjusted, re-implemented and so forth (Henry, 2007:285). Systems analysis is a way of looking at problems at the policy level, and organising the information gained in order to aid the decision maker to make a more informed decision (College of Europe, 1971:135). The value of the systems model is found in the continuous feedback received by using policy

results as additional inputs to the system, therefore determining the success of the intended effect of the policy (Hanekom, 2001:32).

## **INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL**

The institutionalist model focuses on the organisation chart of government, and describes the arrangements and official duties of departments (Henry, 2007:286). The importance of the institutional model is found in the formulation of uniform policies which are given legitimacy by the legislator (Hanekom, 2001:32).

## **ORGANISED ANARCHY MODEL**

The organised anarchy model has three basic streams that flow independently of each other, and are important to the process of policy making. These are the problems, political and policy streams (Henry, 2007:283-84).

The problems stream involves focusing the public's and the policy maker's attention on a particular social problem, defining the problem, and either applying a new public policy to the resolution of the problem, or letting the problem fade from sight. Problems are defined in terms of values, comparisons and categories.

The political stream establishes the government's agenda, and the primary participants of this stream are the visible political actors, who are mainly seen at the forefront of the political stage, such as top level ministers, the president and the press.

The policy stream formulates the decision agenda, which is a list of alternatives from which a public policy may be selected by policy makers to resolve a problem. The forces are intellectual and personal, and the ideas of the policy entrepreneur or leader are paramount, and the major players in the formulation of the decision agenda are called the hidden cluster of policy actors such as administrators and interest groups.

## **RATIONALIST PARADIGM**

According to Henry (2007:290), rationalism attempts to be the opposite of incrementalism. Rationalism attempts to learn all the values of a society, assign each value a weight, discover all the policy alternatives possible and learn the consequences of each alternative, calculate how choose any one of the policies will affect the remaining alternatives, and then ultimately choose the policy alternative which is most efficient in terms of the costs and benefits of social values. Therefore, the rationalist paradigm deals with the construction of public policies that ensures better policies, and is concerned with the nature of public goods and services, the relationships between decision making structures, the requirements of a constitutional government and the corresponding patterns of collective action. The subsets of the rationalist paradigm are the rational choice model and the exclusion/consumption model.

### RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL

According to Dye (2005:15-16), a rational policy is one that achieves maximum social gain, meaning that governments should not adopt policies where the costs exceed the benefits. Therefore, a policy is rational when the difference between the values it achieves and the values it sacrifices is positive and greater than any other policy alternative. Rationalism involves calculating all social, political and economic values sacrificed or achieved by a public policy. In order to select a rational policy, policy makers must:

- i. Know all the society's value preferences and their weights.
- ii. Know all the policy alternatives available.
- iii. Know all the consequences of each policy alternative.
- iv. Calculate the ratio of benefits to costs for each policy alternative.
- v. Select the most efficient policy alternative.

Rational policies are based on the assumption that the society's value preferences are known and can be weighted, and this can be seen as a contentious view as there must be a complete understanding of the society's values, however, theory and practice are not always congruous.

## EXCLUSION/CONSUMPTION MODEL

Henry (2007:292-94) describes the exclusion/consumption model as one that deals with what kind of goods and services should be delivered by the government and what should be delivered by other sectors. In order to determine what policies government is responsible for two concepts are used namely exclusion and consumption. Exclusion refers to the degree of control that both buyer and seller have over a product, and consumption refers to the use or consumption of goods.

It is important to note that rationalist and incrementalist paradigms differ from each other. Rational policies are aimed at improving already existing policies, while incrementalist policies aim to understand policies and how they are formulated.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design consists of a plan or map, that allows the researcher to test the validity of his/her hypothesis, taking into account the factors that the researcher believes might affect the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. A research design is the way that the researcher plans to go about testing the hypothesis, or answering the research question (Webb & Auriacombe, 2006:19).

## ETHICS AND VALIDITY

### ETHICS

The study of ethics is the study of standards of conduct and the right and wrong behaviour of a person or group. Ethical principles are used to set standards of conduct for groups and professions in how they deal with people and information. In research, ethical standards apply to all people involved in the research process, including the researchers, research participants, clients and other users of research (McGivern, 2003:353-355). The ethical principles that are the basis of most standards of conduct when dealing with research participants are;

- **Voluntary participation:** requires that no one should be forced into participating in the research, and that the researcher should obtain an individual's or an organisation's consent, based on a clear understanding of what the research involves and how the data will be collected, and the purpose of the research, prior to the research taking place.
- **Informed consent:** means that the research should not proceed without the participants' informed consent.
- **Confidentiality:** means that any information disclosed will be treated with the highest of confidence, and will not be done publicly so as to publicly expose the informant.
- **Transparency:** means that the researcher should explain the purpose of the research, the end use of the data and in the event that anonymity and confidentiality may not be guaranteed, explain and obtain consent.

Most ethical issues of social responsibility in research fall into one of three categories, and the literature identifies them as, *analysis and reporting, objectivity and ideology and use of research.*

The analysis and reporting principle means that if there are any technical shortcomings and failures of study, that the researcher has an obligation to make these shortcomings known to his/her readers. Negative findings should be reported if they are relevant to the researcher's analysis. The researcher can serve his/her fellow researchers by telling the truth about all the pitfalls and problems he/she experienced.

The objectivity and ideology principle requires that social scientists be value-free. According to this view, methods of science are designed to eliminate personal preferences and values, and researchers are required to be neutral and objective. The value-free ideology maintains that social researchers can remain neutral in accumulating facts about social lives that are of equal use to all.

It is important to note that personal values and political beliefs sometimes affect how researchers select and conceptualise problems and how they interpret their findings. Many non-scientific factors such as personal interests, ideologies and climate of opinion

in society may affect the problem selection. The nature of the problem selected by the researcher and the motivation to study them are value laden. Researchers must be aware if not only the influences of their personal values and political preferences on their work, but also the implications of their findings for constructive use for others.

The use of research principle is very important for policy and public administration research. The product of research is likely to be used by policy makers and managers of public programmes to change policy as well as develop new policies and programmes (Lutabingwa and Nethonzhe, 2006:131).

## VALIDITY

The validity of the study needs to be addressed at the beginning of the study, as the researcher may end up conducting a study that has little apparent validity. Qualitative researchers frequently use triangulation, which is comparing multiple data sources in search of common themes in order to support the validity of their findings. This study makes use of the sources of information involving documentation, archival records and interviews (Leedy and Ormond, 2005:100).

## CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed the various methods and techniques applicable for qualitative research. A case study approach was used in order to gain an understanding of the AU's human security initiatives. The analysis of the AU's human security initiatives was conducted against the backdrop of Rwanda and Burundi which have histories of ethnic conflict. Multiple sources of information, particularly documentation and archival records were used to produce reliable research data. The methodology used was appropriate to answer the research questions and make scientifically relevant recommendations, which aim to analyse the effectiveness of the AU's human security initiatives.

## CHAPTER III

### PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE AU: LITERATURE REVIEW

#### INTRODUCTION

Public administration refers to two distinguishable activities; a professional practice and an academic field which seeks to understand, develop and improve the professional practice as well as train individuals for that practice. Public administration refers on the one hand to the administration or management of matters which have to do with the society, polity and its sub-parts, and on the other hand with the disciplined study of such matters. Public administration has to do with the management of the realm of governmental and other public activities.

It is important to note that firstly, the professional management of the public's affairs involves the planning, formulating and promotion of goals and purposes of the public. Public administration is involved in the substance of policy formulation and policy implementation, and this is alluded to in terms of the demise of the politics-administration dichotomy, the impossibility of value-free public administration, and the need for proactivity by public administrators. These terms reflect the widespread belief that it is no longer defensible to interpret public administration as solely involved in technically objective solutions. This understanding has led to attention to policy and the policy process. In conclusion, public administration is an umbrella term throughout the world, and it must be realised that the term implies a broader range of activities than the meanings of management and administration.

Secondly, it must be recognised that some matters of public administration do not always occur through governmental organisations. This had led to a deeper meaning of public administration. There are devices such as public corporations, public-private cooperation entities and governmental contractual agreements with non-governmental organisations to provide benefits and perform certain functions. When these considerations are taken into account, public administration is best defined as the practice and study of the

professional formulation and influence of public policy and the implementation of such policy on a regular and organised basis on behalf of the public interest of a society (Shafritz, 2000:5). The reality is that today we are living in an interdependent world in which domestic affairs are affected by many international cooperation agreements (Mukamunana, 2006:63). The AU's PSC and its support functions in the areas of conflict anticipation and prevention, and the deployment of peace support missions and intervention are examples of such international agreements.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background wherein the research case, the AU's human security initiatives will be analysed. The chapter is comprised of two major sections. The first section will be a survey of the major historical developments in the field of Public Administration from the managerial approach to the current governance approach. The second section will review the literature on the AU and human security. The AU is an organisation with the objectives and principles aimed at integrating Africa, and its inception was a reaction to global challenges aimed at the promotion of peace, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Therefore, concepts of governance, human security and globalisation are central to the review.

## **THEORETICAL PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Public administration is unique and differs significantly from political science and management (Henry, 2007:26). It has developed as an academic field through three main theoretical approaches, namely the political, legal and managerial approaches. Public administration is best defined as the practice and study of the professional formulation and influence of public policy and the implementation of such policy on a regular and organised basis on behalf of the public interest of a society (Shafritz, 2000:5). Public administration is also defined as the totality of the working day activities of all the people who work for governments (Shafritz, 2000:vii). Public administration refers to two distinguishable but closely related activities, namely, a professional practice dealing with the society, polity and its sub-parts; and an academic field which seeks to understand, develop, criticise and improve that professional practice and train individuals for that practice (Shafritz, 2000:3).

The groups of processes which constitute administration consist of six functions, namely: policy-making, financing, organising, staffing, determining and the determination of work procedures and controlling (Cloete, 1981:43).

An account of the evolution of public administration is provided below, which will be helpful in understanding the field, and the direction in which it is advancing.

## THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH

Woodrow Wilson set the tone for the early study of public administration in an essay entitled, "The Study of Public Administration," published in the *Political Science Quarterly* in 1887. Wilson's article left a lasting impression on the field, that Public administration was worth studying, and political scientists would later create the first identifiable paradigm of public administration around Wilson's contention (Henry, 2007:27).

During the early phase of public administration, focus was placed on the dichotomy between politics and administration. Politics was considered the making of policies, and administration the execution of the policies. During this phase, emphasis was placed on the separation between politics and administration (Khan, 2008:10). There is the view that public administration is made distinctive by its relationship to the governmental process and this relationship requires special attention to be paid to normative concerns such as justice, freedom and responsibility. There is also the view that after decisions are made in a democratic manner, their implementation requires the same managerial techniques used in the private sector. The latter viewpoint is represents the politics-administration dichotomy (Denhardt, 1993:52). The politics/administration dichotomy provided with it, and clear distinction of public administrators' function completely separately from elected officeholders' functions (Henry, 2007:28).

The early classical theories of public administration emphasised stable clearly defined structures and processes, as if organisational goals were always clear, and managers' main challenge was to design the most efficient, repetitive procedures for the attainment of the organisation's goals (Rainey, 2003:24).

Frederick Taylor (1856-1915) is cited as one of the pioneers of the managerial analysis. He was the main figure in the scientific management school, which involved a division of labour that was relatively new. For centuries work processes had been left to the discretion of skilled craftspeople and artisans, scientific management recognised a division of responsibility between management and workers. The role of management was to gather information on work processes, analyse it, and derive guidelines for the most efficient way to perform the required tasks. Workers were then trained in these procedures in order to maximise their output, quality of work and wages. Taylor conducted time-motion studies, which involved the measurement and analysis of physical characteristics of the workplace, such as the placement of tools and machinery in relation to the worker, and these practices are still in use today. Though the value of his contribution in the field of organisational analysis is undeniably significant, scientific management oversimplified the complexity of the needs of people in the workplace (Rainey, 2003:25-26).

Organisational theorists often treat Max Weber (1864-1920) as the founder of the analysis of complex organisations. Weber undertook to specify the defining characteristics of the bureaucratic form of an organisation, and saw the spread of such organisations as part of a movement toward more legal and rational forms of authority, and away from authority based on tradition. The bureaucratic form was distinct from the administrative systems regarded as similar to modern systems. The bureaucratic form was distinct in its legalistic specification of the authorities and obligations of office. Weber wrote that the fully developed version of bureaucracy had the following characteristics:

- i) Fixed, jurisdictional areas are established by means of rules;
- ii) There is a hierarchy of authority, involving supervision of lower offices by higher ones;
- iii) Administrative positions in the bureaucracy usually require expert training and the full working capacity of the official;
- iv) Management of sub-units follow exhaustive rules and the knowledge of these rules is the expertise of the official;
- v) The management position serves as a full-time career for the official.

In Weber's view, the existence of qualified career officials, a structured hierarchy and clear rule based specifications of duties and procedures made for precision, speed, clarity, consistency and reduction of costs. Weber did express concern that bureaucratic routines could stifle individual freedom and that problems could arise from placing bureaucratic experts in control of major societal functions. Weber is grouped with other classic figures of what is characterised the closed-system view of organisations (Rainey, 2003:26-28).

Henri Fayol (1841-1925) was a management theorist who developed the "14 principles of management", which he considered to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of organisations([http://www.12manage.com/methods\\_fayol\\_14\\_principles\\_of\\_management.html](http://www.12manage.com/methods_fayol_14_principles_of_management.html)). The 14 principles are: division of work, authority, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of individual interest, remuneration, centralisation, scalar chain (line of authority), order, equity, stability of tenure of personnel, initiative, and *esprit de corps*.

Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick's publication of 1937 entitled *Papers on the Science of Administration* marked a highlight in the field of public administration. Gulick identified two functions of management, division and coordination of work. Gulick and Urwick sought to define the job of management and administration through what became one of the most widely cited acronyms on general management and public administration: POSDCORB, which stands for planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting (Rainey, 2003:27).

Developments in the field of industrial psychology led to a reaction against Taylor's ideas about scientific management, and these developments led to a dramatic change in the way organisational and managerial analysts viewed the workers in organisations. Researchers studying behaviour and psychology in the workplace developed more insight into psychological factors in the workplace. Relationships, fatigue, monotony, remuneration, job satisfaction and productivity were analysed (Rainey, 2003:32). The human relations and behavioural scientists such as Kurt Lewin, Abraham Maslow, Douglas McGregor, Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon emerged and held that regularities in human behaviour could be determined by the careful and objective

observation of exhibited behaviour and that scientific theories could be logically derived from such observations (Denhardt, 1993:81). The managerial approach existed until World War II, and after the war, this approach was challenged, which gave rise to the political approach (Mukamunana, 2006:67).

## THE POLITICAL APPROACH

Early theorists of public organisations were critical of the politics-administration dichotomy, as they saw it as failing to recognise the influence of the bureaucracy on the formation of public policy. By the end of World War II it emerged that public organisations played an important role in defining public policy (Denhardt, 1993:139). In the 1940s, a shift from mainstream public administration took place in two directions. The first was that politics and administration could never be separated, and the second was that the principles of public administration were not the final expression of managerial rationality. The final abandonment of the politics-administration dichotomy took place in the 1950s when a leading scholar wrote in public administration's leading journal that, "A theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics also". The demise of the politics-administration dichotomy gave rise to a renewed definition, the governmental bureaucracy, which was a drive to re-establish the link between public administration and political science (Henry, 2007:30-33).

According to Diamant (1966:25), in the process of modernisation the political system undergoes transformation in both what it does for the society as a whole, and in the manner in which it transacts its business and how it is organised. In this transformation, the relations between the polity and the society are both autonomous and interdependent. The political system in a modernising society deals with a wide range of problems. The political system is not the only problem solver in a modernising society, as the principal emphasis is on government.

Political science has had an impact on public administration. During this phase the American precepts of political science were defined as the worth of democracy, a pluralistic polity, political participation, equality under law and due process. It was found that political science sharpened and deepened the commitment of public administrators to

the country's core concepts (Henry, 2007:33). The final approach to be discussed is the legal approach, and is elaborated on below.

## THE LEGAL APPROACH

The legal approach is a return to the locus of governmental bureaucracy. In the 1980s, a number of trends arose that resulted in a fundamental change in how government and its administration were perceived. These trends are globalisation, redefinition and devolution, and they caused major changes in the public, private and non-profit sectors. With globalisation came multinational corporations, the internet, faster international trade and travel. These developments challenged the traditional place and powers of government. Governments are increasingly re-inventing themselves less in terms of power and hierarchy and more in terms of partnership and collaboration. This includes trends such as empowering government workers and citizens, working with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to deliver services, introducing competition and measuring performance. Devolution is characterised by governments relinquishing their traditional powers to individual citizens through information technology, public-private partnerships and government associations (Henry, 2007:39-40).

Change has always been a driving force of transformations throughout history, and the changes that have taken place in the last 25 years have changed the entire world system. Transformations include changes in governments, governance and public administration. International relations now call for a "world order" and attempts at this convergence are evident. Two major changes of worldwide significance have taken place and have caused major transformations in government, governance, state-society relations and public administration. These are technological innovation and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower and these changes are elaborated below.

Technological innovation brought the computer, internet and satellite communications, and these have contributed significantly towards global integration and the removal of artificial barriers, making communication faster. These changes do not however challenge the boundaries of nationalism or state sovereignty, an example being the formation of supranational organisations such as the European Union. The technological

advancements in military and space areas is another major change of global significance. The ability of certain superpower nations to master knowledge, skills and tools to dominate the world through military threat through sky, land and water have reached new levels of global supremacy.

The collapse of the USSR ended the era of a bipolar world order in which the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR competed for world domination, control and expansion of their spheres of influence. Developing countries were divided under these two superpowers with opposing political, social and cultural orientations for several decades. While the Cold War characterised these superpowers relations, proxy wars were always fought in developing nations, and these represented the extended arms of the superpowers in the battlefield. When the USSR fell, the global bipolar world order ended, and a new global world order was claimed by the Western capitalist powers, especially the United States, which now claims to assume global leadership with plans of hegemony, domination and control, under the guise of market supremacy, capitalism and liberal values of freedom and democracy (Farazmand, 2007:5-8).

These major changes brought about global changes in society, politics and administration.

## THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH

The New Public Management (NPM) approach is a management tool that has been found to be ideally suitable for the public sector. It is a result of the 1980s idea that “private is better than public”. This was based on the premise that if the instrument was successful in the private sector, that it should be equally successful in the public sector. NPM is more than a management system or performance measurements. Its excessive customer orientation raised concerns about democratic accountability and control. NPM tries to realign the relationship between expert managers and their political superiors.

The old public administration which emphasised due process and rules was replaced with NPM, which focuses on goals and results and deriving lessons from private sector techniques in order to address public sector reform. The idea was that in order to achieve

better results in the public sector, governments should be run like businesses. The bureaucratic model of management worked well in its prime, but the times required a shift and a new approach to management, which emphasised team work and customer service, and ultimately challenged the traditional model of public administration (Kapucu, 2007:891-893).

NPM is an important policy tool for improved governmental performance, as it is a sub-set of all policy performance, and not a separable set of technical efforts. As a result, the reforms that ensued emphasised not only down-sizing, but also improved management capabilities significantly. NPM is accepted as a “gold standard for administrative reform” for most countries. The main reason for reforming government was if government guided private-sector principles were employed, rather than rigid Weberian hierarchical bureaucracy, it would perform more effectively and efficiently. OECD surveys arrive at a number of trends common to most countries, such as increased result and cost awareness, service provision, performance budgeting and monitoring and evaluation of results. The shift from bureaucratic administration to business-like professional management was promoted as a strategy across the public sector, and presented as a remedy to cure management ills in various organisation contexts. Anglo-American countries have also been observed to be at the forefront of NPM reforms (Kapucu, 2007:895).

NPM is relevant marginally to many newly emerging democracies whose needs are mainly that of eliminating corruption. For many countries public management reform is approached as a means for meeting domestic needs, the requirements of international lending institutions, the standards of international financial markets, or the practices of the European Community (Mathiasen, 2005:656). Significant for management reforms have been initiated by member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Although these cases have not resulted in definitive generalisations, these can only evolve through systematic comparative assessments and evaluations (Jreisat, 2002:145).

Public management reform has particularly meant using concepts and models developed beyond the boundaries of the country involved. Examples of these types of reforms are as follows:

- International lending institutions and countries highlight their support for measures to improve the public management capacity of client countries to manage development programs.
- The international finance community stresses the importance of national institutions that can manage the regulatory systems necessary to deal with international trade and capital flows.
- The OECD works with its members countries to facilitate the exchange of public management practice for wealthy industrialised countries and to establish standards for management effectiveness.
- Those that favour expanded free trade emphasise the importance of public institutions that foster efficient market economies.
- Former communist countries recognise that their inherited public management systems are incompatible with the responsiveness and transparency that are inherent in democratic systems.
- Countries such as Spain, Portugal and South Africa have restructured their public management systems as part of post-authoritarian reforms (Mathiasen, 2005:646).

Although the various authors have argued in favour of NPM as an ideal tool to ensure that governments perform more effectively, the fact that it is derived from private institutions makes it unsuitable for governments. Private institutions are inherently profit driven, whilst government institutions have more of a social responsibility to the public. To try and fit a profit driven model into an institution with a social responsibility would result in the government institution changing its focus.

## GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

During the last quarter century, industrialised democracies have seen a major change in the purposes and methods of government. Many factors combined to produce this change such as increasing government deficits, economic stagnation and a general

sense that the government was imposing itself on individual liberty. The administrative state became less hierarchical and more decentralised, and these changes challenged existing public administration theory. Historically there has been a reliance on public administration to define and account for the changes in the role and practices of government, it is not clear that a theory of governance exists to meet this challenge (Frederickson & Smith, 2003:207-209).

Laurence, E. Lynn, Jr. (2006:142) is recognised as a prominent researcher on governance, and he defines governance as the way sovereign power and responsibility are distributed both formally and informally, among a country's institutions.

Governance has become a prominent subject within public administration. The current pedagogical and conceptual use of the concept governance in the field takes on one or more of the following forms (Frederickson, 2005:283):

- i. It is the same as already established perspectives in public administration, although used in different terms.
- ii. It is the study of the contextual influences that shape the practices of public administration, rather than the study of public administration.
- iii. It is the study of inter-jurisdictional relations and third-party policy implementation in public administration.
- iv. It is the study of the influence or power of non-state and non-jurisdictional public collectives.

International regime theory is the study of relations between nation-states that accounts for the role of non-state actors and policy entrepreneurs in the context of the modern transformation of the nation-state. Adapting a theory of governance in public administration from international regime theory suggests three governance theories, namely: vertical and horizontal inter-jurisdictional and inter-organisational cooperation; the extension of the state or jurisdiction by contracts to third parties, including governments; and forms of public non-jurisdictional or non-governmental policy making and implementation (Frederickson, 2005:294-295). Governance in public administration may take on the named theories either singularly or in combination.

Vertical and horizontal inter-jurisdictional and inter-organisational cooperation, also known as inter-jurisdictional governance in public administration is:

- i. Actors in systems of governance either based in jurisdictions representing jurisdictional interests, or on non-governmental profit and non-profit organisations representing their interests.
- ii. Participation in systems of governance as a voluntary form of cooperation.
- iii. Mostly policy area specific.

The extension of the state or jurisdiction by contracts to third parties, including governments, also known as third-party governance displays the following characteristics:

- i. It extends the functioning of the state or jurisdiction by exporting jurisdictional tasks and responsibilities to third parties for policy implementation.
- ii. Its governance roles and responsibilities are based on formal contractual or grant documents upon which the contractor and contractee agree.
- iii. Its contracts and grants are time specific.
- iv. Its contracts and grants are policy area specific.

Public non-jurisdictional or non-governmental policy making and implementation is also known as public non-governmental governance, and it displays the following characteristics:

- i. Policy making and implementation by non-governmental institutions that bear on the interests of citizens.
- ii. Jurisdictional regulations, oversight and accountability have a limited effect.

Mervyn King (2003:98) states that in establishing a governance code in any country, the following characteristics of good governance are to be kept in mind:

- i. Corporate discipline which is being committed to the principles of good governance.

- ii. Transparency in the manner in which one communicates with stakeholders about the business of the company and its strategic decisions.
- iii. Independence, which is avoiding conflicts of interest.
- iv. Accountability, which involves being accountable to the company.
- v. Responsibility to the stakeholders and employees.
- vi. The organisation must be balanced and fair in its decisions.
- vii. Being aware of the triple bottom line, which is being aware of non-financial matters of the organisation's business and acting in a non-discriminatory, non-exploitative manner and acting with responsibility with regard to human rights issues and towards the environment.

These above principles are applicable to public administration and are considered to be in line with international best practices.

## **REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE: AU AND HUMAN SECURITY**

### **INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS**

Africa faces challenges of underdevelopment, high levels of poverty and marginalisation from the global economy. There is a need for strong African leadership, and the African Union was formed to promote and protect human rights, promote democracy and good governance. It is important that African countries align their national policies in line with the African Union's policies in order to achieve continental wide success. Therefore, the importance of strong public policies and strategic planning are not underestimated, as policies are a statement of intent in order to address a need, and strategic planning is how to execute these policies.

Interpretations of human destiny have always formed a part of the quest for social identity, and these interpretations are linked with the great world organised religions. This quest for human identity was a means to discover a path to a better future for human societies. This quest was reflected in the break between science and religion that was at the core of the European Enlightenment Project. The quest for social and political justice for societies is weakened if not abandoned during the process when a religion is being

organised and as a result, once a religion is established, it tends to be assimilated into the political forces, and further contributes to societal stability.

One of the most powerful and influential perspective that emerged from the Enlightenment Project was that initiated by Karl Marx, who insisted on the repudiation of religion and unscientific utopianism. Marx advanced the claim for science through “dialectical materialism”, which was a reconstruction of a future for humanity that was liberated from exploitation and conflict through revolutionary communism. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the visionary ideology of Marxism as operationalised by Leninism, it appears the ideology was a spent force. This development coincided with the ascension of the neoliberal global market forces, that even China could not resist the options neoliberalism presented in the form of private investment, and the pursuit of foreign economic policies that adhered to global market policies. During the same period efforts to reform world order and strengthen global governance emerged, and these efforts led to the way the world was politically organised, resulting in World War I. After the first World War, Europeans felt that they had paid a high price in the blood of the young men that fought in the war without achieving a worthwhile political cause.

Woodrow Wilson’s interpretation and advocacy of self-determination and the establishment of the League of Nations remains unclear in terms of whether he was putting plans forward for visionary reforms of the state-centric, war-prone European system of world order, or if he was pushing ill-conceived ideas that offered no preventative measures to avoid war in the future. What can be identified however is that these remedies were inadequate to address the international maladies that were at play. The lasting effects of these remedies were that they presented reforms at state level (self-determination) and of the international society (League of Nations). These realities have evolved into larger ideas that still fall short of their stated ideology to provide for peace and security at the global level. A more organised visionary movement emerged in the Western democracies during the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and took the form of advocacy of world government and proposals for complete disarmament. The World Federalist Movement displayed these proposals in various ways, and had the support of a selected group of wealthy and influential people, but it failed to garner mass support. This movement was at its peak during the interwar period in the liberal democracies, and it

was associated with the general belief that the only way to save humanity from itself was to establish a world political structure that eliminated war. World federalism did not devote any attention to social injustices, colonialism, or the domination of the North over the South, but it did view itself as an elite defence of individual freedom and market economies in relation to rival Marxist political outlooks. World War II shifted the debate as it overcame the belief that the main deficiency of international society was the recurrence of war. After 1945 the prevailing outlook was the important role of the military in containing the 'evil forces' that were let loose on the world. The pre-1939 peace movement was indicted for weakening the political will of the liberal democratic West to resist the expansionist and repressive Nazi regime at an early stage. The "lesson of Munich" was seen as the main principle of the post-1945 world order, and the lesson learnt from it was that appeasing dictators would not contribute to a peaceful world order, but would rather result in war. The mood after World War II was less critical of war than the antiwar sentiment after World War I. Anxieties about the safety of the civilisational and species survival surfaced especially if nuclear weapons were being used. A general acceptance by society that the military capabilities of the victorious states, particularly the United States of America had saved the world from the danger of Nazism, fascism as well as Japanese militarism. There was also a general acceptance that democratic patterns of governance could only be protected against future threats of the global political system by relying on military defence at the disposal of the states. The rapid growth of international public management over the past two decades has been significant. Public sector organisations globally have been involved in changing management practices, and adopting new approaches from other countries. International institutions have been also been involved in gathering information and knowledge about public management systems, developing guidelines for adopting them and using advisory teams to assist in applying these principles to individual country experiences. The number of advisors on international public management is vast, and these people have been at the forefront of political, economic and social changes across the globe. The political aspects can be seen as the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new democracies. The economic changes can also be seen in the advent of globalisation. The social changes can be seen as international attention being placed on issues of corruption, transparency and democratisation. Trends of international public management arose as a result of a perceived need for reform. Among these needs are rebellion against authoritarian

regimes, dissatisfaction with outdated public management systems and the need for public management to meet the challenges of the rapidly changing global economic trends. Public management reform also includes using concepts and models developed from beyond the boundaries of the country involved. (Mathiasen, 2005:643-646).

## **PEACE AND CONFLICT SYSTEMS: THE SYSTEMS THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

### **SYSTEMS THEORY**

In the fields of international peace and conflict the range of systemic concepts are vast. Each system must have a specific structure consisting of maintained relationships among the constituent parts. Systems analysis only makes sense if the various elements in the context of the overall pattern of interaction or interrelationship are analysed, and this approach will open up aspects of events and linkages. Systems theorists make an important distinction between concrete and abstracted systems. The first distinction refers to a non-random accumulation of matter-energy in a region which is organised into interacting, interrelated sub-systems or components. The second distinction describes relationships abstracted and selected by an observer in the light of his interests, theoretical viewpoint or philosophical bias (Dedring, 1976:35-36).

Bearing in mind the two definitions discussed above, it is evident that a concept such as “the international system” could be either a concrete or an abstracted system. When discussing the international system in a global context, then it a concrete system. A bipolar or multi-polar deterrence system can be categorised as an abstracted system. The interactions and interrelationships within the system are classified as energy or information processes (Dedring, 1976:36).

Systems theory is characterised by “natural systems”, which are defined as “open systems in a steady state”. This openness is present in global international systems, since systems draw their energies for maintenance from their surroundings. Non-randomness, entropy and homeostasis (when the system is in equilibrium), which are

abstract but central characteristics of systems, are important for the student and practitioner of international relations. The notion of equilibrium has been used throughout the ages to depict the goal of international politics. Non-randomness has shaped international relations as it is a certain regularity of the interrelations as is depicted in the rapidly growing field of international law and diplomatic relations. Entropy manifests itself as self-destruction in the system in the face of food, human, resource and energy security. Dedring alludes that as long as man exists, no consensus will ever exist on the best form of system maintenance; however, the fact that schemes for stable world order have been proposed indicates that man is aware of the feasibility of systemic rules and structures for the peaceful conduct of interstate relations (Dedring, 1976:37).

One school of thought has proposed that the best method of system maintenance is a unified or central decision making unit. In systemic theoretical terms, this would be the notion of a world government which is based on the assumption that the separate systems tend to amalgamate into more complex super systems, and that this phenomenon is equally applicable in social systems (Dedring, 1976:37-38).

Some scholars have diverged from the systems approach and developed alternative models of the structures and process of international relations, and one such model is the “field theory”, which was developed by Quincy Wright and further elaborated by Rudolph J. Rummel. Rummel attempted to visualise the sum total of all relations between all the actors in the international system as a field. These relations which can range from hostile to friendly behaviour are measured for certain attributes along a compatibility-incompatibility scale. Rummel used what is termed vector analysis, whereby the direction and strength of the chosen attribute can be given a numeric value (Dedring, 1976:39).

## **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES**

The discipline of International Relations (IR) is divided on the subject matter to be analysed, the methodology to be used when studying international politics, and the epistemological structure of the theories. These divisions have taken the form of the ‘great debates’ which have served as turning point in the short history of the discipline. The formal recognition of international relations as a discipline dates from the end of the

World War One (WWI), with the establishment of the Chair of International Relations at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth in 1919. Up until that time, international politics was shared by older disciplines, namely, law, philosophy, economics, politics and diplomatic history. There was little interest in WWI by historians, but more interest was devoted to the causes of the war, in order to prevent such catastrophes from reoccurring the in future. It was believed that peace could only be preserved through a system of collective security, which would involve transferring the concepts and practices of domestic society to the international sphere. These idealists invested their hopes for a new, peaceful world order in the international organisation, the League of Nations. After WWI, a discipline devoted to the study of international conflict emerged from the universities of the victorious states, namely the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus the discipline of IR was founded as a reaction to the aftermath caused by the war. The main argument amongst the idealists (liberals and utopians) of the causes of WWI was that the war transpired not due to human nature, but as a result of misunderstandings by politicians who lost control of events leading up to the hostilities in 1914. They argued that if 'secret diplomacy' could be replaced by collective security, and autocratic rule by democracy, war would be seen as a destructive tool of international statecraft, and if the lessons of WWI were understood and acted upon, then a peaceful world order could be established (Burchill: 2001, 3-5).

The early study of international relations was based on a reaction against the horrors of WWI, and at the time, this was seen as the war to end all wars, and only through a thorough study of the underlying causes of the war would its recurrence be prevented. The purpose of international theory was to change the world for the better. As the discipline progressed, it was supplemented by other theoretical issues, and became more concerned with a wider range of other international actors and philosophical questions. By the 1990s, the discipline had undergone a transition from a problem solving approach, to a strategic interaction between existing communities to a normatively engaged analysis of bounded communities and improved forms of political community. This represented a radical shift in the discipline's primary focus (analysing the causes of WWI).

In 1966, Martin Wight posed the question, "why is there no international theory?", and by this, he meant a body of knowledge to match that of the achievements of political theory. This lack of knowledge has since made a turn around, as there is now a rich field of

international theories such as liberal internationalism, neo-realism, rationalism and Marxism, which are all discussed later in this section. The discipline's more recent preoccupations are tabulated below (Burchill: 2001, 6-9).

**Table 1.1: Focus of International Relations Discipline**

PRINCIPLE	DEFINITION
<b>1. Relationships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic interdependence;</li> <li>- Relations of dominance and dependence that led to Third World and increasing global inequalities;</li> <li>- International trade;</li> <li>- Regional economic associations;</li> <li>- Balances of power;</li> <li>- Post-Cold War security.</li> </ul>
<b>2. Actors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nation states;</li> <li>- Transnational corporations;</li> <li>- NGOs;</li> <li>- Supra and sub-national political communities;</li> <li>- UN peacekeepers.</li> </ul>
<b>3. Empirical issues</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Globalisation and fragmentation;</li> <li>- Human rights;</li> <li>- Intervention and sovereignty;</li> <li>- Ethnic nationalism;</li> <li>- Identity politics.</li> </ul>
<b>4. Ethical and philosophical issues</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Epistemology;</li> <li>- Ontology and methodology;</li> <li>- Gender perspectives;</li> <li>- Ethics and foreign policy;</li> <li>- New forms of political community;</li> <li>- Moral issues between the West and non-Western societies.</li> </ul>

*Adapted from Burchill, 2000:9.*

## WHY STUDY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES?

One of the aims of studying the various International Relations theories is to make international politics more comprehensible, and to make better sense of the institutions, events and processes that exist in the world as we know it. Studying theories involves the testing of hypotheses, proposing explanations, describing events and explaining general trends and phenomena, with the ultimate aim of providing a better explanation of the world. These are known as *explanatory theories* of international relations.

According to Max Horkheimer in his 1937 essay entitled “Traditional and Critical Theory” (Horkheimer, 1937:188), theory for researchers is the sum-total of propositions about a subject, the propositions being so linked with each other that a few are basic and the rest deriving from these. He further contends that the real validity of theory depends on the derived propositions being consistent with the actual facts, and if real life and theory contradict each other, then one of the two must be re-examined. Horkheimer is of the opinion that scientists in various fields regard as the essence of theory corresponds to the immediate tasks they set for themselves. The manipulation of physical nature and specific economic and social mechanisms demand amassing a body of knowledge as is supplied on an ordered set of hypotheses (Horkheimer, 1937:194).

Theories provide order to international relations and enable the conceptualisation and contextualisation of past and present events, as well as a variety of methods of interpreting complex issues. Theories assist in critical, analytical and logical thought processes in interpreting the phenomena in the international arena. According to Burchill (2000:14), the theory of International Relations provides us with a choice of conceptual frameworks, and these assist in the analysis of events and issues that comprise international relations.

*Constitutive international theory* is concerned with examining the individual’s preconceptions, beliefs and experiences in their interpretation of international relations. Each person has preconceived notions about the international arena and world view in general, whether founded or unfounded, and these notions are affected by background, ethnicity, class and ideology. The beauty of theory is that it allows us to examine our

viewpoints in order to discover how valid or skewed our world view is. Often our viewpoints may not necessarily be grounded in intellectual knowledge, and this is unavoidable as no one can be neutral about a subject matter, there is always an opinion, regardless of whether it is valid or not. It is important that people become aware of their assumptions, prejudices and biases, and to subject these assumptions to critical analysis and review. Constitutive international theory is such that one cannot understand international politics until one understands why they have the view they hold. International relations theories are concerned with asking questions about these assumptions (Burchill, 2000:13-15). The various International Relations theories will be examined in the section following, namely: liberalism, realism, neo-realism, critical theory, the Frankfurt School and security studies. Security studies will be the focus of this study.

## LIBERALISM

There are differing schools of thought within liberalism, however a theme throughout the many writings is a more optimistic view of the possibilities for peaceful relations among humans. This is derived from a positive assertion that human beings are able to learn from their mistakes and are able to choose a rational course of action in politics. This rational action may be to promote self-interest. Liberalists later realised that human rationality must be consciously applied to the construction of international institutions that are specifically designed to overcome the negative effects of anarchy and to prevent wars from occurring. This thinking was the basis of the developments that occurred after WWI. Woodrow Wilson was instrumental in establishing the League of Nations, a first attempt at setting up an international organisation dedicated to preserving international peace and security (Lawson, 2003:42).

The foundations of contemporary liberal internationalism were laid in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by liberals who proposed a peaceful world order. These liberals proposed that the elimination of war lay within the tenets of democracy over aristocracy, free trade of autocracy, and collective security over the balance of power system. For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs, and war is unnatural and irrational. Liberals agree that war was created by militaristic and undemocratic governments in order to advance their own interests. They further believe that wars were crafted by a “warrior

class” bent on extending their influence through territorial conquest. Wars provide governments with the flexibility to raise taxes, expand their bureaucratic influence and increase control over their citizens. The remedy to war by eighteenth century and modern day liberals is democracy and free trade (Burchill 2000:32-33).

Woodrow Wilson is seen as one of the champions for democracy, and when he was elected Governor of New Jersey in 1911, he began a series of reforms which transformed New Jersey from a conservative to a progressive state. His campaign was known as The New Freedom, and was elected as President of the United States in 1912. Once elected as President, he embarked on a national programme of reform, including passing the Underwood Act in October 1913 which reduced tariffs on imports from 40 percent to 25 percent, and expanded the list of goods that could be imported without tariffs. In foreign affairs, he emphasised the importance of human rights, the right to self-government and the illegitimacy of the foreign empire. Wilson did not advocate the European imperialistic ideals, and felt that the United States had a pivotal role to play as a mediator of disputes between other states. When war broke out in Europe in 1914, Wilson declared that the United States would remain neutral since the United States had no interests in a war that involved imperialists with weak democracies, who were also involved in an arms race. However, when the German submarines attacked American ships in 1917, Wilson requested his Congress to declare war against Germany and its allies. The involvement of the United States in the war helped to turn the tide against Germany, and the war came to an end in November 1918 (Griffith, 1999:96).

Wilson’s reputation as a liberal internationalist was based on his vision for a peace settlement in Europe at the end of WWI, and his role in the establishment of the League of Nations to promote collective security and prevent another war of that magnitude from occurring in the future. This vision was encapsulated in his Fourteen Points, which were a series of principles and proposals that he announced in January 1918, and later shared at the Versailles Conference in December 1918. These Fourteen Points are (Griffith, 1999:97):

- i. Open covenants (agreements) of peace openly arrived at, with no secret agreements.

- ii. Freedom of the seas outside territorial waters.
- iii. Removal of all economic barriers to trade.
- iv. Reduction of national armaments to the lowest level consistent with domestic safety.
- v. Free, open-minded and impartial adjustments to colonial claims.
- vi. Evacuation of German troops from Russia and respect for Russian independence.
- vii. Evacuation of German troops from Belgium.
- viii. Evacuation of German troops from France, including the contested Alsace-Lorraine region.
- ix. Readjustment of Italian borders along clearly recognised lines of nationality.
- x. Limited self-government for the people of Austria-Hungary.
- xi. Evacuation of German troops from the Balkans and independence for the Balkan people.
- xii. Independence for Turkey and limited self-government for other nationalities formerly living under the Ottoman Empire.
- xiii. Independence for Poland.
- xiv. The formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity for large and small states alike.

Wilson attended the Conference at Versailles in order to ensure that his principles were implemented at Versailles, although he failed to include the United States Senate and the Republicans in his delegation. Wilson managed to secure an international agreement to establish the League of Nations which would be the first international organisation dedicated to the promotion of collective security internationally. The principles of collective security encouraged states not to use force against one another and were obliged to use force collectively if any state committed aggression against another state. According to Griffith (1999:97), states were most likely to be in favour of this principle when it was least necessary and unlikely to support it if it required them to go to war on behalf of other states. The carnage of WWI persuaded European statesmen to subscribe to the idea that peace and war prevention was in the general interest of the community of states, although not to the extent of sacrificing their own freedom of choice in national

security decisions. The League was inadequate in securing peace in post war Europe because the statesmen at Versailles were imposing severe peace conditions on Germany, as the redistribution of Germany's territories was based on the basis that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of WWI. Another element that weakened Wilson's vision was the fact that powers were not willing to surrender their colonies. Germany was stripped of its colonies in Africa (Rwanda and Burundi) and the Pacific, and these were transferred to other Allied Powers as mandates. The German colonies Rwanda and Burundi were transferred to Belgium. Britain refused to discuss any prospects of independence for its colony India, and no final decision was made on Russia, as it was in the middle of its civil war and a merger between Austria and Germany was prohibited despite popular wishes. Wilson was convinced that if only the United States could join the League could it hope to influence the future of international relations in a manner that was consistent with liberal ideals. Upon his return to the United States in early 1919, he campaigned to ensure that the Senate would accept the Peace Settlement, and the Senate was concerned about Article 10 of the League Covenant, which committed member states to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of other states, and Wilson had insisted that this Article was a building block of the League. Unfortunately this contradicted isolationist tradition of the United States' foreign policy, which stated that the United States should never become involved in any entangling alliances overseas that could not be justified to be promoting national interest, especially since the United States had enjoyed a separation from Europe for so long, and the Senate could not justify returning to European alliances. Wilson failed to secure the required two-thirds majority approval by the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty. 'Wilsonism' became an abusive term in the United States and 'Wilsonian internationalism' became a synonym for 'utopianism' in the study of international relations for the next seventy years (Griffith, 1999:98-99).

Liberalism has had an impact on modern industrial societies, and has spearheaded limited government and scientific rationality, encouraging individuals to be free from state power and persecution. Liberalism has advocated political freedom, democracy and constitutionally guaranteed rights and equality before the law. Liberalism has also had an impact in promoting capitalism in society as a means to best promote the general welfare by allocating scarce resources in society. The fall of the Soviet Union and Communism in

the early 1990's enhanced the influence of liberal theories of international relations (Burchill, 2000:29-30).

Free trade according to liberals is a more peaceful means of achieving national wealth because each economy would be better off than it would have been under an autocratic system. Free trade, they contend, would break down barriers between states and unite individuals into one community, thus promoting globalisation. Artificial barriers to commerce distort perceptions and relations between individuals, causing international tension. Free trade and the removal of barriers to trade are at the heart of modern interdependency theory, and the rise of regional economic integration in Europe was inspired by the belief that conflict between states would be reduced by creating a common interest in trade and economic collaboration amongst members of the same geographical region, thus encouraging states which solved their differences through war, to cooperation within an agreed economic and political framework for their mutual benefit, giving states a joint responsibility over their peace efforts (Burchill, 2000:37-39).

Democracy and free trade highlights another aspect of international theory introduced by liberal internationalists, human rights. Liberals believe that the legitimacy of domestic political orders was dependent on the promotion of the rule of law and the state's respect for the human rights of its citizenry, and just as it is wrong for an individual to break the law, the same rule should apply to the state. The idea of the universal human rights movement has its roots in the Natural Law tradition, debates in the West during the Enlightenment over the 'rights of man' and in the experience of individuals fighting against the rule of the state. The Magna Carta in 1215, the development of English Common law and the Bill of Rights in 1689 were significant steps towards the human rights movements as we know it today. Human beings are said to be born with fundamental rights, benefits and protection, and are the birthright of all humanity. The extension of these rights has an important place in liberal thinking about foreign policy and international relations for two reasons. Firstly, these rights provide a legal foundation to emancipation, justice and human freedom, and their denial by state authorities is a stain on the human condition. Secondly, states that treat their citizens ethically and allow them meaningful participation in the political process are considered to be less likely to behave aggressively in the international arena (Burchill, 2000:41-42).

Liberals argue for democracy because they are paranoid of concentrated forms of state power. Liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth century examined the international system and saw power being exercised by governing elites against the wishes of the masses, and named this secret diplomacy. Liberals did not agree with the view that foreign policy was practiced behind closed doors by diplomats away from the influences of national politics. The balance of power is defined as the absence of dominant military power in the international system. This was seen in Europe where smaller states would form temporary convenient alliances against the preponderant military power, and memberships of these alliances would change as new hegemonies emerged, and war was necessary every so often to dissolve the dominant power and distribute power in the region more evenly (Burchill, 2000:44-45).

## REALISM

Realism seeks to describe and explain international politics as it is, and is regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in International Relations. Realism has provided much structure to the sub-field of Security Studies and International Political Economy. The world according to realists is a dangerous and insecure place. In explaining the violence between nation states, focus needs to be given to the role of power and the importance of the super powers. Realists are pessimistic about the extent to which the international political system can be made peaceful and are of the opinion that the international system is characterised by conflict, suspicion and competition between states (Burchill, 2000:70).

## NEO-REALISM

In order to gain a deeper understanding of realism, the works of Edward Hallett Carr and Hans Morgenthau will be examined. The works of the neo-realists Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Krasner will also be examined.

E.H Carr (1892 – 1982) is widely known for his book *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1946*, which is a critique of Western diplomacy between the two world wars, and helped to establish the terms on which international theory has been discussed in the twentieth century, namely the ongoing debate between realists, idealist and utopians. Carr

graduated from Cambridge University with a degree in Classics when the first world war interrupted his studies. He joined the Foreign office and attended the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War. He was appointed Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth in 1936 and then returned to Cambridge in 1953 to work on his research into the history of the Soviet Union and produced 14 books on the subject.

In his book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* which was first published in 1939, Carr suggests that all human sciences tend to be prescriptive and subordinate the analysis of facts to the desire to reform the world in the infancy stages. He further argued that the study of international relations was overly influenced by ideas that were products of a balance of power in which Britain enjoyed a dominant role. Therefore international relations was committed to bring about international peace on the basis of norms and principles which were limited to the historical experience of domestic politics in Britain, and could not be applied internationally in a divided world with various degrees of power and commitment to international relations. One of the major beliefs were the natural harmony of interests derived from nineteenth century laissez-faire economics and collective security; which treated war as a consequence of aggression across borders.

If collective security was to be abolished, there would need to be an international organisation wherein states would commit themselves to the rule of law, and be prepared to punish aggressors through a variety of measures ranging from economic sanctions to the use of collective force to assist victims of aggression. Carr further argued that the optimism concerning collective security and the League of Nations which was the organisation that was to implement this, was based on the wrong assumption that the territorial and political status quo was acceptable to all the major powers in the international system, and would not be accepted in a world of sovereign states of unequal power.

Carr's recommendation was that both scholars and diplomats could have avoided some of the problems of the inter-war period if they had adopted a less idealistic and more realistic approach to international affairs (Griffiths, 1999:7-8).

## CRITICAL THEORY

The basis of intellectual work is grounded in a particular social and historical context, and as the context transforms, some elements of this work will lose its relevance, whereas as some elements may appear more important than before. The social and institutional context within which critical theory was developed will be discussed in the sections below, with particular focus on the Frankfurt School and Traditional and Critical theory (Wyn Jones, 1999: Chapter 1: 2).

## FRANKFURT SCHOOL

Germany was seen as the great hope for the international communist movement, largely due to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel's' influence. Germany's working class was large, well organised and militant. The German Social Democrat Party (SPD) was the chief supporter of the Second International, and it was assumed that the German proletariat would act as a catalyst for world revolution. When the SPD's leadership distanced itself from Marxism, the revolutionary left remained strong. The German Communist Party (KPD) was second in size to the Bolsheviks, when the Third International was established in March 1919. By the 1920s, Germany was no longer seen as a major source of inspiration, but rather as an example of the growing weakness of the left-wing political practice of socialist theory. These proved not to be the most favourable times for socialist theorists in Germany, as with the SPD, theory was regarded with suspicion, and with the Stalinist inclined KPD, theory became a means for the justification of Soviet policy. Previously, the working class had provided material for Marxist inspired socialist theory; now this same audience was becoming a receptive audience for Nazi propaganda. Ironically enough, it was during this trying period that the members of the Frankfurt School began reviving Marxian thought, and in hindsight, this was one of several groups during the time that attempted this.

The members of the Frankfurt School were supported by their institutional home, the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research-IfS), which was founded in 1923 and was affiliated with Frankfurt University, although completely autonomous. The IfS had its own facilities, and the director had a reasonable amount of control over its affairs.

Under the leadership of its first director, the Austro-Marxist Carl Grünberg, the IfS became an important institution for Marxist thought. Grünberg retired in 1929, and was replaced by Max Horkheimer, a German Jew. It was under Horkheimer's directorship that Marxism became assimilated into academia. He used his power and influences to collect a group of young intellectuals who specialised in various disciplines and constituted the core group of the IfS, namely: Friedrich Pollock, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno. Interestingly, this core group were all Jewish Marxists. A key characteristic of this intellectual group was their cooperation in integrating their various specialisations with an interdisciplinary framework guided by a version of Marxist social theory. This approach was dubbed by Horkheimer as "interdisciplinary materialism" and later renamed "critical theory".

Attempts were made to re-establish the institute in Geneva, and it was decided the Europe would not provide the required stability necessary for the development of interdisciplinary materialism, and in 1934, the IfS moved to Columbia University in New York, where it remained until the United States' entry into World War Two (WWII). The institutes' members, as Jewish Marxists,, felt estranged in a country in which Judaism and Marxism generated hostility, added to the fact that the speculative and theoretical nature of their work was received with uneasiness in a culture that valued empiricism and pragmatism above all. This isolation was further exacerbated by the IfS' insistence at publishing its work in German which left their work ignored and unexplored. Following the publication of Horkheimer's essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" in 1937, the outlines of the Frankfurt School's critical theory of society were sketched out theory (Wyn Jones, 1999: Chapter 1: 2-5).

## SECURITY STUDIES

Within the academic study of international politics, the concept of security has focused on state sovereignty, military power and the preservation of international order. Security studies have as a result, been influenced by experiences of the Second World War and Cold War. Critical security studies sought to investigate the meaning of security in the context of differing perspectives of global and local politics arising from various political,

methodological and philosophical standpoints. Critical security studies are a wealth of knowledge about security in the context of world politics (Booth, 2007:28-29).

According to Booth (2007:30), critical security studies is a sub-field within the academic field of international politics concerned with the pursuit of critical knowledge about security. Critical knowledge is concerned with gaining comprehension that is different from the prevailing structures, processes and ideologies, while taking into cognisance that the conceptual framework of security is derived from political, theoretical or historical perspectives. Critical theory seeks to provide a deeper understanding of oppressive attitudes and behaviour that will assist society in avoiding future crimes against humanity.

Booth (2007:30) further elaborates on the definition of a critical theory of security as being a theoretical commitment and political orientation concerned with the development of world security. World security as a theoretical commitment is a framework of ideas derived from a tradition of critical global theory, and this body of ideas provides a framework for the reconceptualisation of security. As a political orientation it is involved with the enhancement of world security through emancipator politics, which to a certain extent is true, given the promotion of democracy and globalisation by Western States.

Security means protection from violence, and this is the most basic service a government must provide its citizenry. A failed state is characterised by a complete breakdown of law and order, and is identified by violence from insurgents of varying kinds. The concept of security has been interpreted narrowly, and has been related more to nation-states than to people.

Human security is not a concern with weapons, but a concern with the preservations of human life and dignity. A discussion on human security must focus on four elements (UNHDR, 1994:22-23):

- a) Human security is a universal concern, and is therefore relevant to people all over the world.
- b) The components of human security are interdependent, because when a nation's security is compromised, other countries are likely to get involved, and the effects thereof are further exacerbated by globalisation.

- c) Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention, as it is less costly to prevent than intervene later.
- d) Human security is people-centred, as it is concerned with how people live and whether they live in conflict or in peace.

According to the United Nations Human Development Report (1994:24) there are two major components of human security, namely freedom from fear and freedom from want. People in developed nations seek protection from crime and drugs, HIV/AIDS, job losses and global warming. People in less developed countries require freedom from hunger, disease, poverty and the effects of war. At the global level, human security no longer means safeguarding against the threat of a nuclear holocaust, it means responding to the threat of global poverty, HIV/AIDS, global warming and terrorism.

The United Nations Development Report (1994:24-25) and Botha (2008:32) identify seven security areas, and they are described below as:

- a) Economic security, which is the ability of people to provide for themselves through securing income, and population growth, unemployment and illiteracy, can prevent people from having equal opportunities.
- b) Food security, which is access to sufficient food.
- c) Health security, which is the protection against disease and includes access to basic healthcare.
- d) Environmental security, which is the relationship between humans and nature. This includes the threat against global warming combined with the prediction that with the lack of food security, conflicts may arise based on environmental changes.
- e) Personal security, which is the protection against crime and violence.
- f) Community security, which is the relationship between people from various ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds.
- g) Political security, which is the relationship between the state and its citizenry.

Slaughter (2004:16) contends that the division between the proponents of state security versus human security is more than a disagreement about whether the security of state or the security of individuals is more important. Human security aims to protect the vital core

of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Interestingly, the traditional national security community in the United States, Britain and France is hostile to the notion of threats to security to include concerns about disease, poverty and illiteracy. It is argued that these are not threats, but long standing social ills that cannot be dealt with through national and international security structures. Slaughter further deduces that issues such as poverty and disease are not threats for those who have never faced them, which is true. It is easy to make a blanket statement like that if food security and education is a given in a state.

Therefore, state and human security are closely intertwined, as the collapse of a state can result in the population being driven into greater poverty and violence and conversely, improving health services can strengthen the population and requires the strengthening of the state machinery. If a combined approach to ensuring both state and human security can be identified, it could possibly divide the developing and developed world.

When the Cold War ended, African nations became free to pursue their national interests without “interference” and most became sovereign states, although indirect forces could impact on the protection of those interests, such as globalisation, the United States “war on terror”, disease, climatic changes and state debt. The challenge remains for African nations to formulate security strategies in light of these external, indirect forces. African states can learn much from Western nations in the development of these strategies; although cognisance of Africa’s unique circumstances need to be taken into account (Noteboom, 2008:83). In the absence of state power and resources of struggling states, there will be little to no improvement in the human and state security of these states. The time for developing and developed states to collectively revise the world security agenda is ideal.

Several considerations need to be addressed when discussing national security, namely:

- i The development of national security strategy, its terminology, methodology and its purpose;
- ii National security policy;

- iii Traditional national security strategy has focused on external threats to national security and overlooked the fact that within Africa the greatest threats to national security come from within the country.

## NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

National security strategy flows from national security policy, which is developed in advance in order to protect national interests. In order to understand the context of strategy as a tool in the development of a national security strategy, an overview of the definitions of strategy will be discussed as a theory primer (Noteboom, 2008:84).

The strategic planning paradigm of public policy making and implementation is a useful concept that aims to integrate incrementalism and rationalism and avoid their shortcomings. Strategic planning is a product of the world of business, and is a process that is performed by top and middle management, and is aimed at placing the unit in an active instead of passive position in relation to the organisation's environment. Strategic planning should be highly participatory and tolerant of controversy, and in this way, it reconciles incrementalist and rationalist approaches to public policy formulation (Dye, 2005:296).

Planning is a process used by managers to identify and select appropriate goals and courses of action for an organisation. The strategic plan that arises from the planning process specifies how managers intend to achieve these goals. The cluster of decisions and actions that managers take to help an organisation achieve its goals is called a strategy. Planning is a three-step process that involves developing an organisation wide mission statement, strategy formulation and strategy implementation (Jones & George, 2003:251).

National security strategy is used to advance and protect national interests. National interests are the perceived needs and aspirations of a nation, in relation to domestic and international matters. National interests are determined by the fundamental values of the nation, and these values are often documented in the core documents that establish a nation, such as a nation's constitution. A common theme in African constitutions is the

need to recognise the history of racial, ethnic and religious strife while focusing on national unity. A common national interest shared by every nation is the defence of the nation (Notebloom, 2008:86).

A discussion on national interests is based on the assumption that the organising principle underlying global affairs is the concept of the nation state. The world is organised into groups of geographically defined political units, characterised by governments, state sovereignty with fixed borders and a national identity. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of the nation state has been challenged on various platforms. Firstly, there are numerous instances where independent states were created, and although borders were maintained, no effective governments were in place. Examples can be seen in Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia. Secondly, at their creation, nation states showed early signs of destruction due to tribal, religious and political units which were incorporated into a single state and tensions that has existed between groups, continued to exist. Examples can be seen in Rwanda and Burundi. Thirdly, non-state actors operate outside the control of any single state and threaten the existence of some states. Examples can be seen in the rise of multinational corporations, the internet, world financial markets, the evolving role of the United Nations and the impact of globalisation on third world countries. All these factors pose a threat to sovereign states (Notebloom, 2008:84-85),

The methodology for the development of national security strategies is rather complex, as the strategy details how national power will be used to attain desired objectives, and state organs need to be involved in this process. A state's security strategy allows various state departments to develop a pyramid structure to fit their strategic plans to the national security strategy. Strategic planning, inter-governmental cooperation and consensus building are key skills required in the planning process, and expertise in these is required before progress can be made by a state. Seminars, joint governmental programmes and courses provided at universities are some tools available to develop these skills.

Consensus is a key aspect to the strategic planning process, and unless broad consensus is achieved amongst the public and implementing institutions, the long term viability of the strategy will be compromised (Notebloom, 2008:95-96).

## CHAPTER IV

### **CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA: BURUNDI AND RWANDA**

Regionalism has resulted in the 'great powers' becoming unwilling to intervene in conflict management in distant areas of the globe, as well as contribute the associated costs and burdens in areas where there were traditional ties. Security interventions are now more likely to take place at the regional level. As states increasingly participate within their regions, the burden of regional conflict and the associated management lies within the regions' structures (Lake and Morgan, 1997:5-6). This burden in Africa inevitable lies on the AU's shoulders.

Africa's background of intense conflict resulted in the 26<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly held in June 1990 deciding to work towards the speedy and peaceful resolution of all the conflicts in Africa. In June 1993, at its 29<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the first of its kind in Africa (Cilliers, 2005:3). The objective of the Mechanism was to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict, and the Declaration establishing the Mechanism made provision for the OAU to cooperate with the United Nations (UN) in the areas of peace making and building.

When the AU was formed to replace the OAU, African leaders were aware of the fact that conflict in Africa constituted a major stumbling block to the socio-economic development of the continent, and that peace, security and stability were prerequisites for Africa's development and integration. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the AU's standing decision making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and is seen as the vehicle for promoting overall security in Africa. The peace and security agenda of the AU relate to the establishment of a common defence policy, peaceful resolution and conflicts among Member States, and the prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States. Its functions are to: promote peace, security and stability in Africa, early warning and preventive diplomacy and making peace through the use of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian aid.

It is against this background that the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution's functions and activities will be analysed in order to assess its ability to anticipate and prevent situations of conflict in Rwanda and Burundi from 1993 – 2000. In order to support the efforts of the newly formed AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) in the areas of conflict anticipation and prevention, and the deployment of peace support missions and intervention, a Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund were established, pursuant to Article 4 (h), (j) and Article 5 (2) of the AU's Constitutive Act. These structures will also be analysed in order to assess their ability to respond to conflict situations in Rwanda and Burundi, from 2000 – 2005.

## **THE OAU'S MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION**

The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was established during the 29<sup>th</sup> session of the Assembly of Heads of State in June 1993. The Mechanism was preceded by Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, which was created in 1963, as an African response to conflicts in Africa. The Commission's activities were restricted to interstate conflicts, and unfortunately the Commission was never operational (Albert, 2007:47). The under-performance of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to settle disputes among Member States through peaceful means, resulted in the OAU Heads of State's heavy reliance on *ad hoc* committees in resolving African conflicts. The OAU occasionally undertook or endorsed less complex monitoring missions such as:

- The Bamako Ceasefire Commission – 1963;
- The Pan-African peacekeeping force that operated in the Shaba province of Congo – 1978-79;
- The Chadian operation – 1979-82.

The less than satisfactory record of the *ad hoc* committees for intervention called for a re-appraisal of the OAU's first generation peace and security agenda, particularly following the end of the Cold War. A combination of the above factors resulted in the OAU re-

examining its peace and security agenda at its Summit in 1990, recognising the effect that conflicts in Africa had on socio-economic development (AU, 2003). The first major discussions on the re-examination of Africa's peace and security agenda were held in Kampala in May 1991, at a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) convened by the African Leadership Forum (ALF). The general principles for CSSDCA are that the security, stability and development of every African country are inseparably linked with those of other African countries, and therefore, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other African countries. It was therefore suggested in Kampala that CSSDCA should be launched in order to provide a comprehensive framework for Africa's security and stability, and measured for accelerated continental economic integration for socio-economic transformation. CSSDCA shall encompass four major areas called calabashes, namely: security, stability, development and cooperation. The security calabash which is the study's focus highlighted that the concept of security went beyond military considerations, and embraced all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions. Therefore Africa's security framework would be underpinned by:

- Mechanisms for mediation, conciliation and arbitration;
- Peacekeeping operations;
- Confidence building measures;
- Non-aggression Pacts;
- Lowering of military expenditures; and
- African Elder's Council for Peace (ALF, 1991).

The OAU drew heavily from the results of these and other consultations in order to shape and develop the principles of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. To this end, the Mechanism was presented to the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1993 and adopted by all but two countries, namely Eritrea and Sudan who expressed reservations (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:9).

**FUNCTIONS OF THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION**

The Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 1993 established the Mechanism. Article 14 of the above mentioned Declaration states the following:

**The Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, the sovereign equality of Member States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also function on the basis of the consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict.**

Article 15 of the above mentioned Declaration states the following:

**The Mechanism will have as a primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource demanding peace-keeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance.**

The OAU's leaders decided that its primary focus should be on the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, while noting the organisation's lack of experience, resources and institutional capacity limited the role it would play in cases where conflicts had already erupted. It was agreed that peace-keeping and peace enforcement were not be the

OAU's priorities, and instead these tasks would be left to the UN, which was the international organisation responsible for maintaining international peace and security in any case (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:9).

## STRUCTURE OF THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

The Mechanism was comprised of two main bodies, namely the Central Organ and the Conflict Management Division. The Central Organ was composed of 16 states that were elected annually to serve as members of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and as such was the decision making body of the Mechanism which was charged with the responsibility to examine matters affecting peace and security. In order to ensure continuity, the states of the outgoing and incoming OAU chairs would serve as members of the Central Organ, and other OAU members including those from conflict ridden countries were invited to participate in these meetings. The Secretary-General and the Conflict Management Center would serve as the operational arm of the Mechanism. The Conflict Management Center would support the Secretary-General in the implementation of strategies to manage and resolve conflicts, and its duties as such were to:

- i. Collect, collate and disseminate information pertaining to current and potential conflicts in Africa;
- ii. Prepare and present policy positions to the Secretary-General on the best course of action to address current and potential conflicts;
- iii. Undertake or commission analysis and research into the causes of conflicts and their implications for conflict prevention and peace building;
- iv. Support and manage political, civilian and military observer missions; and
- v. Coordinate regional training policies in order to support peace building initiatives of the OAU (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:9-10).

The OAU also established key units to support the Mechanism, namely an Early Warning System, a Field Operations Unit and the Peace Fund.

## EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

The primary function of the Early Warning System was to gather information and provide the OAU with advance notice or early warning of impending conflicts, and its mandate was:

- i. To develop a database and analytical capability in order to keep track of developments and events that could lead to conflict on the continent;
- ii. Develop a communications capability in order to keep abreast of activities occurring throughout Africa and communicate these to OAU teams specifically assigned to work on particular conflict situations;
- iii. Establish a 24 hour watch center, which was to be run by trained military staff;
- iv. Develop the capacity to plan and coordinate peace operations in Africa; and
- v. Develop a network of national mediators at country level to respond quickly to conflict situations (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:26)

In 1996, the OAU Secretary-General organised a seminar to further conceptualise the modalities for the efficient functioning of the Early Warning System. The OAU was cognisant of the fact that the management and capacity structure of the Early Warning System would need to be carefully looked at, as well as the information gathering process and the System's relationship with sub-regional organisations. A key aspect of the Early Warning System was what happened after an alert had been delivered, as an effective Early Warning System would translate the knowledge of an imminent crisis into some sort of preventive action. Examples of the failure to do this can be seen in Rwanda and Somalia where there was awareness of the imminent crises in those countries, and yet both the OAU and the UN Security Council failed to act decisively. Muyangwa and Vogt (2000:27) contend that the key is to have an Early Warning System that is complemented by strong political will, as well as the capacity of the OAU to act quickly and decisively. Political will backed with strong policies and buy-in by all African leaders could possibly turn the disappointing results around.

In 1999 the OAU admitted that more than five years after the formation of the Mechanism the Central Organ still lacked adequate information to effectively plan for and manage the

prevention conflicts that had plagued the continent. The OAU also admitted that it lacked the capacity to provide the in-depth analysis and presentation of strategic options in order to it to effectively plan and manage the prevention of conflicts in Africa (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:26-27).

## FIELD OPERATIONS UNIT

The primary functions of the Field Operations Unit include coordinating the OAU observe and monitoring missions, as well as coordinating activities between UN peacekeepers and sub-regional organisations. The Field Operations Unit would rely heavily on military contributions from African states in order to carry out its functions. The Field Operations Unit has organised three civilian/military missions in the Comoros, Rwanda and Burundi. Although these missions were limited in scope and size, they enabled the OAU to develop a critical pool of trained observers. In 1996, the OAU requested its members to identify and delegate troops that could be called upon at short notice to participate in either UN or OAU operations (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:28-29).

## PEACE FUND

Article 23 of the Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 1993 states that:

**A Special Fund governed by the relevant OAU Financial Rules and Regulations shall be established for the purpose of providing financial resources to exclusively support OAU operational activities relating to conflict management and resolution. It will be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the OAU, voluntary contributions from Member States as well as from other sources within Africa. The Secretary-General may, with the consent of the Central Organ, and in conformity with the principles and objectives of the OAU Charter, also accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa.**

At the Council of Ministers meeting in 1995, it was highlighted that the inability and unwillingness of some OAU Members to pay their fees had resulted in the OAU's debt of over US\$58 million, and that this debt was affecting the OAU's conflict management capabilities. This situation resulted in the OAU threatening its ten slowest paying Members with sanctions which included the withdrawal of voting rights and participation in commissions, and this threat resulted in many Members paying their fees, however the situation of non-payment worsened over the years. This affected the Peace Fund as its budget is derived from the OAU's regular budget. Peace management is an expensive exercise, as it cost the OAU nearly US\$300 000 per month to maintain its observer mission to Burundi from 1994-96. This is a high figure, compounded with the fact that Africa has high conflict management demands. Although some Member States paid in their contributions, the majority of the contributions to the Peace Fund come from outside Africa, which is a worrying fact. In 2000, the OAU started exploring strategies for drawing funds from non-governmental actors as well from the African business sector (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000:25-26).

#### ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE OAU: TOWARDS AN AFRICAN UNION

It has been argued that the OAU failed to fulfil its obligations in many ways; however, it did provide a political platform for African leaders to conduct inter-African diplomacy. The OAU has been lauded with promoting effective regional integration in West, Central, South and East Africa. The OAU's efforts in resolving African conflicts and security challenges were not always successful; however, it is important to highlight its important role in the successful abandonment of apartheid in the then Rhodesia and South Africa. In its 39 years of existence the OAU experienced challenges in implementing plans and also had a rigid framework that prevented the OAU's involvement in serious internal security and conflict matters, particularly the principle of non-intervention. The end of the Cold War and resulting change in the international security environment resulted in the OAU having to adopt a fundamental shift in its security and conflict resolution approaches. The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa of June 1990 and the recommendations from the Kampala Leadership Forum of May 1991 recommended in a redefining of security, linking security to socio-economic development and good governance at national and regional levels. These

recommendations resulted in a drive to strengthen the institutional security and conflict prevention architecture of the OAU through the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. However, the focus of the Mechanism was more on conflict prevention, rather than their management and resolution. The structures established through the Mechanism and the experiences from the operations within its framework provided an important base for the OAU's reform in peace and security in Africa (Dokken, 2008:120-122).

In September 1999, the OAU convened an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, with the main purpose of reforming and operationalising the OAU. African leaders issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of the Africa Union, and agreed at this summit to replace the OAU with a new organisation, as well as incorporate the CSSDCA in the institutional structure of the new organisation. The OAU Council of Ministers were requested to take the necessary measures to prepare the constitutive legal text for the new organisation, which would be presented at the thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Lomé, Togo in 2000. The AU's Constitutive Act was enforced on 11 July 2000 (Dokken, 2008:125-126).

## FUNCTIONS OF THE AFRICAN UNION

The AU was designed in order to achieve three broad goals, namely:

- To bring together the large number of intergovernmental organisation in Africa to achieve continent wide cooperation;
- To create conditions to enable African states to engage in social, economic and political relations in order to eradicate war; and
- To design an institutional framework that will enable African states to participate in international negotiations related to security, trade and finance (Dokken, 2008:126-127).

A comparison of the OAU and AU principles as taken from the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU in Table 2.1 below highlights the AU's shift from its predecessor's pan-Africanist principles of non-interference.

**Table 2.1: Comparison of OAU and AU Principles (as taken from the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU)**

OAU Principles: Article III of OAU Charter		AU Principles: Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act		Notes
1.	The sovereign equality of all Member States.	a)	Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union;	<i>The emphasis of the AU is on the interdependence of Member States on one another.</i>
3.	Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.	b)	Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;	
		c)	Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
		d)	Establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
4.	Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.	e)	Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly;	<i>Settlement of disputes makes use of the AU's structures, and this is clearly outlined.</i>
		f)	Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
2.	Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.	g)	Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of	<i>It is clearly stated that no</i>

OAU Principles: Article III of OAU Charter		AU Principles: Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act		Notes
			another;	<i>Member State may interfere in another's affairs, however, it is not stipulated that the AU may not interfere.</i>
		h)	The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;	<i>The cases where the AU may intervene in a Member State are clearly stipulated.</i>
		i)	Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
		j)	The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
6.	Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.	k)	Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
		l)	Promotion of gender equality;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
		m)	Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule	<i>Not previously stipulated in the</i>

OAU Principles: Article III of OAU Charter		AU Principles: Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act		Notes
			of law and good governance;	<i>OAU's Charter.</i>
		n)	Promotion of social justice to ensure balances economic development;	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
5.	Unreserved condemnation, in all forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other States.	o)	Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassinations, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;	
		p)	Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.	<i>Not previously stipulated in the OAU's Charter.</i>
7.	Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.			

## STRUCTURE OF THE AU'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Although the establishment of the AU is important to this study in order to lay a theoretical primer, this study's emphasis is on the structure and modalities of the AU's security architecture. Pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the African Union's Constitutive Act, the AU called for the creation of an African security architecture, which is critical to the peace and security framework on the continent.

## PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

The process leading to the establishment of the PSC began in 2002 when AU Members realised the need for Africa to develop its own military mechanisms in order to deal with common security situations that threatened Africa's collective development. As a result of this threat, the Assembly called for the operationalisation of the provision within the

Constitutive Act regarding a common defence and security policy of the AU during its inaugural session in 2002 in Durban, South Africa. During July 2002 and January 2004, a number of meetings took place in order to develop a common defence policy (Dokken, 2008:128).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in Africa. The PSC is to be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund (AU, 2002:4).

The objectives of the PSC shall be to (AU, 2002:5):

- a. Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;**
- b. Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the PSC shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts.**
- c. Promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence.**
- d. Coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects.**
- e. Develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with Article 4 (d) of the Constitutive Act.**
- f. Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.**

The PSC is granted with 18 specific powers ranging from conflict anticipation, peace building, and development of policies for the AU's peace and security environment, support of humanitarian action in war situations, among others (AU, 2002:9-10). The PSC is composed of 15 Members, five of whom are elected for a period of five years, and the other ten for a two year period. The chairmanship of the PSC shall be held in turn by Members of the PSC in the alphabetical order of their names, for the period of a month. The PSC shall hold closed meetings, and any Member who is party to a conflict or agenda item for discussion by the PSC shall either not participate in the discussion or decision making process relating to that matter (AU, 2002:12).

## PANEL OF THE WISE

Article 11 of the PSC Protocol introduces the Panel of the Wise as a support structure of the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission in the area of conflict prevention. The tragedy of the genocide that took place in Rwanda was an important indicator of what could go wrong in the event that African leaders failed to respond and act appropriately on information regarding imminent internal conflict situations. In an effort to avoid this, the Panel of the Wise was constituted of five highly respected African personalities from various segments in society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent (ibid., Article 11.2). The Panel of the Wise would act in an advisory role to the PSC and Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (AU, 2002:16).

The PSC identified five criteria which should guide the panel members in setting their priorities for any given year, namely (Franke, 2009:144-145):

- i. The extent to which a conflict situation receives regional or international attention;
- ii. Whether or not the PSC is already working on a particular conflict situation, and whether additional intervention by the panel will add value to the PSC's initiatives;
- iii. Whether a country has been in conflict for a long time, or is in danger of deteriorating into a full blown conflict despite ongoing mediation and negotiation efforts;

- iv. Whether a conflict situation is experiencing difficulty in implementing a peace agreement.

Although the scope of this study is from 1993 – 2005, it is important to note that the AU's first Panel of the Wise was inaugurated at its tenth Ordinary Session in January 2007, and that its operating modalities were only adopted in November 2007.

## CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

The establishment of the Continental Early Warning System is a prerequisite of the PSC Protocol, and highlights the importance attached to conflict prevention and early warning by the AU. Its purpose is to provide timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa, and this role has an impact on the AU's ability to develop appropriate strategies in response to conflicts (Wane, 2008:6).

Article 12 (2) of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the institutional framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) shall consist of:

- a. **An observation and monitoring centre to be known as “The Situation Room”, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning module; and**
- b. **Observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.**

The Chairperson of the Commission would then use the information collected through the Early Warning System and thereafter advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. Member States would then commit themselves to facilitate early action by the PSC based on this information, leaving the Chairperson to work out the details for the establishment of the

Early Warning System in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms and the UN (AU, 2002:17-18).

Early warning systems by definition use open source material and aim to serve human security and not national or state interests. These systems depend on transparent methods and information sharing. Early warning information needs to be timely, accurate, reliable and verifiable, and implies a close link between analysis and action (Cilliers, 2005:1).

The key elements of the CEWS framework were defined along three iterative and interactive phases, namely:

- i. Ongoing information collection and monitoring;
- ii. Conflict and cooperation analysis; and
- iii. The formulation of policy and response options.

According to Cilliers, early warning systems need to address the following questions:

- i. What issues underpin and drive the conflict, be they manifesting issues, proximate or root causes?
- ii. What factors will halt the conflict and serve as the basis for peace to prevail?
- iii. Who are the key stakeholders in the conflict?
- iv. What are the practical options available to policy makers who wish to affect the emerging conflict, avoid human suffering in the short term and move towards a sustainable settlement in the long-term? (2005:2)

It is important to highlight that a concern noted in the development of the CEWS was the ability to engage AU decision makers, and that its success is dependent on the on-going training and technical capacity building of the AU staff concerned with peace and security building (Wane, 2008:7-8).

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

Article 13 of the PSC Protocol establishes the African Standby Force (ASF), which shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for deployment at appropriate notice. Member States need to take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the PSC or intervention authorized by the Assembly. The types of contingents and their degree of readiness shall be determined in accordance with established AU Peace Support Standard Operating Procedure (SOPs) and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on the prevailing crisis and conflict situations (AU, 2002:18).

The functions of the ASF are:

- a. Observation and monitoring missions;**
- b. Other types of peace support missions;**
- c. Intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;**
- d. Preventive deployment in order to prevent**

The adoption of the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) by the third meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS) in May 2003 resulted in the ASF's role being clarified. Conceptually the ASF would be based on three levels, namely the continental level (through the AU Commission), the regional level (through the Regional Economic Communities) and at the national level (through contributing countries). At the continental level, the Policy Framework envisages the establishment of a 15 person planning element within the AU's Peace and Security Department in order to provide a multi-dimensional, strategic management capacity. This unit's function would be to supervise the system of regional standby arrangements in order to ensure standardisation, consistency and that current information was available. At the regional level, each Regional Economic Community (REC) would be charged with establishing and administering a standby component for the ASF. Each standby component would need to have between 3000 and 4000 troops. At the national level, Member States which were contributing contingents to the regional brigades were

expected to train the individuals and units that would form a part of the standby brigades in basic military tasks, as well as the operating procedures of the ASF (Franke, 2009:157-158).

The key conclusions and assumptions that underpin the ASF's mission scenarios from the third meeting of the ACDS in May 2003, are as follows:

- i. **Scenario 1.** AU/Regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- ii. **Scenario 2.** AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- iii. **Scenario 3.** Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- iv. **Scenario 4.** AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI missions. Deployment required within 30 days from an AU mandate resolution.
- v. **Scenario 5.** AU peacekeeping force for complex multi-dimensional peace keeping missions, including those involving low level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days from an AU mandate resolutions, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.
- vi. **Scenario 6.** AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. It is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days (AU, 2003:3).

Franke (2009:159) contends that the Policy Framework's timelines for deployment in the above scenarios are too tight for deployment to take place in 30 days from Scenario one to four, and within 90 days for Scenario five and within 14 days for Scenario six. These deadlines also need to factor in the fact that a decision would still need to be made by the AU Assembly and the PSC. He further adds that such tight deadlines necessitate highly trained and interoperable units, and a fully equipped logistics infrastructure.

The Experts' Meeting on the Relationship Between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in March 2005 in Addis Ababa provided a roadmap for the operationalisation of the ASF. The meeting called for the establishment of the ASF in two phases, namely:

- i. **Phase One** (up to June 2005): The AU's objective would be to establish a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions, which the RECs would complement the AU by establishing regional standby forces up to a brigade size to achieve up to Scenario four.
- ii. **Phase Two** ((1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): It is envisaged that by the year 2010 the AU would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission Headquarters for Scenario four, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces.

The successes of Phase one and two may warrant another study as they fall outside the scope of the research report, however, it is interesting to note that the original timelines were not adhered to, with a third phase being introduced. It would also be of interest to track the progress of the REC mechanisms for peacekeeping.

## PEACE FUND

The Peace Fund was established in order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriation from the regular AU budget, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from member states and other sources from within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through fund raising activities (AU, 2002:27).

A study conducted by Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Prosper Addo, Emma Birikorang & Emmanuel Sowatey (2004:1) presented a summary of findings of a review of the performance of eight African governments against commitments made at the level of the OAU/AU in the areas of peace-building to promote human security in Africa. The countries were selected from the nineteen countries that had at the time of the study (August 2004) signed up to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). They are Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. The

voluntary contributions to the AU's Peace Fund of the eight countries as at March 2004 are tabulated below.

**Table 3.1: Contributors to the AU's Peace Fund – March 2004**

COUNTRY	CONTRIBUTION BY MARCH	OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
	2004 US \$	
<b>Algeria</b>	410 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace-making in Central Africa;</li> <li>• Algiers Agreement – sought to end the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.</li> </ul>
<b>Ethiopia</b>	100 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engaged positively in support of Sudanese and Somali peace process, despite war with Eritrea;</li> <li>• Contributed troops to African Mission in Burundi (AMIB).</li> </ul>
<b>Ghana</b>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In support of Liberian peace process, hosted Akosombo and Accra peace meetings, which involved logistical and financial commitments.</li> <li>• Taken the lead in trying to find a lasting resolution to Ivorian crisis.</li> </ul>
<b>Kenya</b>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has been involved in peacemaking process in Sudan from 1993, under auspices of IGAD.</li> <li>• On 5 June 2004 in Nairobi, President Mwai Kibaki presided over a ceremony during which the parties signed the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan.</li> </ul>
<b>Nigeria</b>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participated in peace-making process in Liberia and Sierra Leone</li> </ul>

COUNTRY	CONTRIBUTION BY MARCH	OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
	2004 US \$	
		<p>from early 1990's;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consistently provides troops, logistics and finances in ECOMOG operations.</li> <li>• Followed the peace processes in DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and the continent in general.</li> </ul>
<b>Senegal</b>	1 132	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participated in the ECOMOG operation in Liberia.</li> <li>• Demonstrated commitment to peace-making in the settlement of its border disputes with Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.</li> </ul>
<b>South Africa</b>	2 689 284	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has played an important role in peace-making and peace-building efforts in war ravaged countries.</li> <li>• Deployed over 3 000 troops to the DRC and Burundi to oversee peace-building efforts.</li> </ul>
<b>Uganda</b>	100 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gave backing to one of the main rebel groups in DRC the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), and also engaged in the support of SPLA/M in Sudan.</li> </ul>

Adapted by Halimana from Aning *et al* (2004:8-10).

#### CASE I: THE OAU/AU BURUNDI

The full extent of the political investment made by the region in the Burundian peace process can be evaluated against the background of three factors, namely:

- (i) The legal basis for international intervention;
- (ii) The regional context of African involvement in Burundi;
- (iii) The dynamics of international interventions in war torn states (Bentley & Southall, 2005:6).

i) The legal basis for international intervention in war torn countries

International law principles state that internal conflict within a state is a matter of internal jurisdiction and that intervention by the international community would be *ultra vires*. However, just because an action may be internationally legitimate, that there will be international will to support it. This is the case in Africa, where the UN was reluctant to become involved in Rwanda and Burundi's internal affairs (Bentley & Southall, 2005:6-8). The controversy over the term intervention, may be derived from the wide range of activities the term could imply. To some, the application of pressure on a state may imply intervention, while others would regard any type of coercive action such as sanctions, blockades, diplomatic and military threats and international criminal prosecutions as intervention (ICISS, 2001:8).

ii) The regional context of African involvement in Burundi

South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique committed themselves to deploying troops to Burundi under the auspices of the AU. The objective was to monitor the plan to end conflict, which was contained in the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of 28 August 2000 (Bentley & Southall, 2005:5).

iii) The dynamics of international interventions in war torn states

The UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, and the tasks of the deployed operation are set out in the Security Council mandate. Security Council mandates are purely situation dependent and in more cases than not, peacekeeping operations are deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or more comprehensive peace agreements (UN, 2008:16).

The basic principles of UN peacekeeping are:

- Consent of the parties – the main parties of the conflict need to consent the deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation.
- Impartiality – the UN peacekeeping operations must not favour or prejudice any party, however, this does not mean neutrality or inactivity.
- Non-use of force except in self-defence – UN peacekeeping operations are authorised to use force at the tactical level, with the authorisation of the Security Council (UN, 2008:31-34).

The UN is largely dependent on the willingness of the major powers (permanent members of the Security Council) to grant diplomatic, humanitarian, financial and military support where it is needed. An unofficial group of states headed by Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, colloquially known as “the regional initiative” enjoy the support of the wider international community in the decisions they take (Bentley & Southall, 2005:8).

The UN Security Council is tasked with the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, as well as to determine whether the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is necessary on a case by case basis. The Security Council has indicated that it may take the following factors into account when a peacekeeping operation is being considered:

- Whether a situation exists which could threaten international peace and security;
- Whether regional or sub-regional organisations and arrangements are in place in order to assist in resolving the situation;
- Whether cease-fire agreements exist and whether the parties have committed to a peace process;
- Whether a precise mandate for the UN peacekeeping operation can be formulated;
- Whether the safety of UN personnel can be guaranteed (UN, 2008:47-48).

## THE AFRICAN MISSION IN BURUNDI (AMIB)

At the Regional Summit held in Arusha in December 2002, the AU realised the importance of its responsibility to secure peace in Burundi in order to stabilise the Great lakes Region, especially under Article 4 (j) of its Constitutive Act, which states the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (Powell & Tiekou, 2005:226).

The OAU had been involved in Burundi since the events in 1993; however, it only seized the opportunity to mandate the first AU peace operation in Africa, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), in April 2003. The AMIB was mandated by the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at its 91<sup>st</sup> Ordinary Session held on 2 April 2003. The deployment of AMIB was mandated initially for a one year period, subject to renewal and pending the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force to be mandated by the UN Security Council (Agoagye, 2004:9-10).

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of 2000 originally called for a UN peacekeeping operation to assist with the implementation of that agreement, however, the UN would not authorise a military operation particularly because of the instability on the ground. The UN further added that it would only send a peacekeeping operation to Burundi if the following conditions were met:

- A comprehensive ceasefire agreement, including demonstrated commitment by all parties to advance the ceasefire process;
- Agreement by armed groups on disarmament of their combatants as a first step in the ceasefire process;
- Complete cessation of hostilities between all signatories of ceasefire agreements, including the operationalisation of a Joint Ceasefire Commission;
- Conclusion of Forces Technical Agreement and agreements on bilateral assistance for military reform (Powell & Tiekou, 2005:225).

The deployment of AMIB aimed to achieve the following objectives:

- To oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- To support disarmament and demobilisation initiatives and advise on the reintegration of 20 000 ex-combatants;
- To strive towards ensuring that conditions were favourable for a UN peacekeeping mission; and
- To contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi (Agoagye, 2004:9-10).

The concept of AMIB is similar to a UN peace operation, in that it was an integrated mission comprising of a civilian component and military personnel. The Head of Mission and Special Representative Mr Mamadou Bah of the Chairperson of the AU Commission was assisted by two deputies from South Africa and Tanzania. The Force Commander was from South Africa and his deputy from Ethiopia. In total AMIB which was concentrated in Bujumbura, consisted of about 3 335 with military components from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858) and Mozambique (228). There was also an AU observer unit from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia, totalling 43 personnel (Agoagye, 2004:11).

The AMIB was also responsible to ensure that secure demobilisation centres were opened, as well as facilitating the reintegration of former militia back into civil society. The centres supervised the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process. Other tasks included creating conditions that would allow internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees based in eight provinces in Burundi and three refugee camps in Tanzania to return home. The AMIB played a vital role in creating peaceful conditions as the UN was reluctant to enter into the volatile situation in Burundi (Murithi, 2007:5).

The administration and logistics of AMIB were undertaken through Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with the troop contributing states. Some of the provisions of the MoUs required that troop contributing states be self-sustainable for up to 60 days, pending reimbursement by the AU Commission, and in-mission supply of water and fuel.

The total budget of the deployment operations and running of AMIB was estimated at US\$110 million for the first year, and at the end of the 14 month mandate, totalled US\$134 million. The AU Peace Fund was inadequately funded, so the AU sought to fund AMIB's budget from pledges and donations from donors and partners, which came to US\$50 million, falling short of the budget (Agoagye, 2004:13).

## COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

An important aspect of the AU-UN strategic alliance was the fact that the deployment of AMIB was a holding operation pending the deployment of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated peacekeeping mission (Agoagye, 2004:13).

The authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Burundi known as United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) for an initial period of six months as from 1 June 2004, with the intention to renew it further. The operation was deployed to support and assist in the implementation of the efforts undertaken by the Burundians to restore peace and bring about national reconciliation as enshrined in the Arusha Agreement. The ONUB was headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General who chairs the Implementation Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement, and will be composed initially of existing AMIB forces. A further request was made to ensure that the transfer of authority took place from AMIB to ONUB's Special Representative for Burundi (UNSC, 2004:3). Interestingly, the former AMIB troops were incorporated into ONUB.

The ONUB was authorised to use all necessary means to carry out the following mandate:

- To ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements through monitoring their implementation and investigating their violations;
- To promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces present monitor and provide security at their disarmament assembly sites, collect and secure weapons and military material to dispose of it as appropriate;
- To carry out the disarmament and demobilisation portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants;

- To monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilisation of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilised;
- To contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced people;
- To contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place;
- Without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
- To ensure the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUB's personnel, and to coordinate and conduct as appropriate mine action activities in support of its mandate (UNSC, 2004:4).

## ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF AMIB AND ONUB

The AU's deployment of AMIB and ONUB showed commitment on the part of the African leaders to find African solutions to African problems in peace-building and security on the continent. The AU's commitment in implementing the provisions of its Peace and Security Protocol will go far in influencing the willingness of African leaders, civil society and the international community and donors in supporting the African peace and security infrastructure. The AMIB also contributed in stabilising parts of the country in preparation for the deployment of ONUB (Powell & Tieku, 2005:228).

One of the main tasks of AMIB was ensuring the DDR process, which proved to be less than successful. The AMIB was meant to disarm 20 000 ex-combatants, but during its year of operation, only managed to open one cantonment area. The cause of this failure is rooted in the inability of former warring parties to agree on issues regarding the restructuring of the national army, hampering the DDR process. There was also the added challenge of not having enough troops to guard the cantonment areas, which was due to the slow deployment of soldiers from Ethiopia and Mozambique, leaving South

Africa to operate on its own for several months. The lack of resources, capacity and funding of AMIB by AU member states contributed to the mission not being as successful as it could have been, with the mission relying on troop contributing states, donations from the international community, and the deployment of the UN troops (Svensson, 2008:15-16).

While taking cognisance of the fact that AMIB was the first AU led peace and security initiative, and that the organisation is still in its early stages, it is important for the AU to take ownership of its processes that is from funding, capacitating and leading its peace operations. The need for African solutions to African problems is a real one, as Africa is unique and cannot be compared to another continent.

## CASE II: THE OAU IN RWANDA

The Rwandan refugees who were in exile established the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in Nairobi, Kenya, in order to find a solution to the Rwandan refugees in Uganda. This party later became known as the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), and they launched an armed attack on Rwanda on 1 October 1990 which lasted until 1994. The government retaliated by massacring thousands of Tutsis. In 1993, the Rwandan government under national and international pressure signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the RPF, which was known as the Arusha Peace Accords. The agreements were meant to pave a way for power sharing as well as solve the refugee problem.

In 1992 peace negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF were held in Arusha, Tanzania. Observers from the OAU and the international arena were in attendance, as well as negotiators from Tanzania, Zaire, Uganda, Burundi and Senegal. The OAU had been on monitoring the events in Rwanda, but only became involved on 29 March 1991 when the first ceasefire was signed between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF in N'sele, which was later amended in September 1991 (Fransisco, 2004:113).

## THE OAU'S NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (NMOG)

In order to ensure compliance with the ceasefire, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) was created in order to verify, monitor and control the brokered ceasefire agreement. The NMOG was placed under the authority of the OAU's Secretary General, and NMOG was obligated to provide the Secretary General with updates on violations of the ceasefire agreement. The work of NMOG was supported by the establishment of the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC), which had its headquarters at the office of the OAU in Addis Ababa. The NMOG was initially composed of five officers from Uganda and RPF, however, it was restructured to accommodate ten officers from neutral countries, namely Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Mali, including the five seats allocated to the Government of Rwanda and the RPF, as well as observers of the peace process. At this stage, the NMOG could not adequately fulfil its functions due to logistical and financial shortages, resulting in the OAU seeking funding from international sources such as Belgium, France, Germany and the United States of America (Fransisco, 2004:114).

## UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) initially began with the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in June 1993 when the UN Security Council established it on the Ugandan side of the border, through Resolution 846. This group was made up of 50 observers from OAU countries and monitored the ceasefire in Rwanda. The mandate of the mission was to patrol, monitor and provide surveillance of the whole border area between Rwanda and Uganda. In 1993, it was replaced by NMOG II which consisted of a 130 strong force (Kühne, Lenzi & Vasconcelos, 1995).

The Hutu and Tutsi led government requested the UN to establish a peacekeeping operation in order to support the reconciliation process, and the initial objective of the mission was to support the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The mandate of UNAMIR was also to monitor the ceasefire agreement and the security situation as well as assist in humanitarian efforts. The violence resumed on 6 April 1994, when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing the president

and President Ntaryamira, the Burundian president. The military and organised bands of militia known as the Interahamwe executed what was known as the Rwandan genocide of 1994 on Tutsi's and Hutu's killing over a million people between April and July 1994. The RPF intensified its military attacks during this period, leading to the capture of Kigali on 4 July 1994 (ISS: no date). The OAU Mechanism was only a year old when the outbreak of the Rwanda genocide took place. In April 1994, UNAMIR's mission was adjusted so it could act as an intermediary between the warring Rwandan parties. The mission was plagued with insufficient financial and human resources, and as such could not ensure the overall security of Rwanda (Vasile, 2006/07:62).

As the situation in Rwanda deteriorated, the OAU requested the UN to intervene and change their mandate to protect civilians. This request came as the UN operation in Mogadishu, Somalia was still fresh in the UN Security Council's collective memory. During that operation, 18 American Rangers, 25 Pakistani peacekeepers and about 1000 Somali civilians were killed in October 1993. The UN reduced the number of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda from 2500 to 270, and instead requested that African countries provide troops for a mission to Rwanda. The deployment of the said troops was delayed for five months due to a lack of logistical and equipment required. The UNAMIR was overwhelmed and withdrawn from Rwanda, resulting in 800 000 people being killed in three months (Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000-12).

#### ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF NMOG AND UNAMIR

The effectiveness of any military intervention is facilitated by national, sub-regional and regional bodies that govern the military infrastructure. The UN and the OAU lacked political will on the parts of their Member States, as well as financial and logistical challenges. The UN should have been in the position to partner with the OAU and offer the assistance required, as the OAU was also experiencing logistical and financial constraints. It is understandable that some of the UN Security Council Members were still reeling from their experience in Mogadishu, however, as an organisation charged with the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, more could have been done.

The UN is still largely dependent on the willingness of the major powers (permanent members of the Security Council) to grant diplomatic, humanitarian, financial and military

support where it is needed. Agoagye (2004:15) contends that the UN and the international community needs to understand that the AU still requires assistance in its critical areas of need, beyond the limited 'soft' assistance towards training, and that the UN and the international community need to see themselves as partners in arms with the AU. While this statement rings true, it is still an inescapable fact that Africa needs to find African solutions to its own problems. The lives that were lost during the Rwandan genocide should not be in vain, and the mistakes of the past should not be repeated going forward.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### INTRODUCTION

Within the first thirty years of the OAU's existence, Africa had experienced a number of challenges with regard to its peace and security initiatives. It has been argued that the OAU failed to fulfil its obligations in many ways; however, it did provide a political platform for African leaders to conduct inter-African diplomacy. Although the OAU's efforts in resolving African conflicts and security challenges were not always successful; it did however, in its 39 years of existence experience challenges in implementing its plans and also had a rigid framework that prevented its involvement in serious internal security and conflict matters. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Member States hindered its ability to fulfil its burden of managing conflicts in Africa.

With the establishment of the Peace and Security Council as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, it was mandated to be the collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The PSC was to be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund. Despite the AU/OAU's efforts and successes, it did experience many challenges in securing Africa's peace and security efforts.

This research has sought to answer the question: "what has the African Union put in place in order to influence its Member States in maintaining peace and human security objectives?"

#### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this dissertation covers the following areas:

The study introduced and provided a historical background to the study. An overview and history of the OAU and its successor the AU in its efforts to maintain human security in Rwanda and Burundi were also discussed. The differences between the two organisations were highlighted, and the challenges faced by the AU in addressing the human security initiatives of war torn member states were summarised. An overview of Rwanda and Burundi's pre-colonial and colonial history was also looked into. The chapter institutional mechanism of the AU, which is the case analysis for this study was discussed. The study then proceeded to define the research problem, determine the objectives for the study, and the rationale for undertaking the study.

Further, an outline of the methodology and research design for the study, which describes the major research methods in social science research and provides the reasoning behind the selection of a case study approach to analyse the topic. The study describes the methods and instruments that were used to collect data and how the information collected was analysed. The study also addressed issues of ethics, validity and reliability for the research.

The study provided a review of the literature on human security within the field of international relations and politics, which also forms a theoretical framework of the study. The study discusses the topic in the field of Public Administration, through a survey of the major theoretical paradigms in Public Administration. The theoretical review focussed on the principles of the AU, namely, governance, human security and peace building.

The study also looked at a case analysis of the AU, with a focus on how the PSC's human security initiatives were implemented in Rwanda and Burundi. The PSC in relation to its design, function and operation was analysed.

Finally the study unpacks the findings of the research, and recommends areas of improvement for the AU in policy implementation. The study does not seek to be exhaustive but suggests how the AU can better implement the human security initiatives in Africa.

## ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Issue 1:

The focus of the OAU's Mechanism was more on conflict prevention, rather than the management and resolution thereof. The structures established through the Mechanism and the experiences from the operations within its framework provided an important base for the OAU's reform in peace and security in Africa.

### Recommendation:

***Lessons should be learnt from the OAU Mechanism's structures, and there should be a balance between conflict prevention and management and resolution. Conflict prevention should not be seen in isolation from conflict management and resolution.***

### Issue 2:

AU Members realised the need for Africa to develop its own military mechanisms in order to deal with common security situations that threatened Africa's collective development.

### Recommendation:

***The concept of Africa seeking solutions to its own problems needs to be strengthened. Although partnerships can be sought with relevant international bodies, Africa should not be heavily reliant on these.***

### Issue 3:

The policy framework surrounding the PSC's ASF deployment scenarios and the timing thereof may have been a bit ambitious.

### Recommendation:

***The inability of the OAU to respond quickly to Rwanda's genocide due to financial and logistical constraints should be carefully looked into, and therefore the timelines of the ASF's deployment could be revised.***

**Issue 4:**

Financial constraints plagued both the AU and its predecessor the OAU, and although there is adequate wording in the Constitutive Act regarding financial obligations of Member States, this is still not being adhered to. Peacekeeping missions are expensive, and Member States need to commit more financially.

**Recommendation:**

***Tougher measures need to be enforced on Member States for not fulfilling financial obligations to the AU.***

**Issue 5:**

Capacity constraints in conflict management plagued both the AU and the OAU, and this resulted in the inability of the, AMIB, NMOG and UNAMIR to adequately meet the demands of a peacekeeping mission such as was the case in Burundi and Rwanda.

**Recommendation:**

***It is important for the AU to take ownership of its processes that is from funding, capacitating and leading its peace operations.***

**Issue 6:**

Limitations in the mandates of both AU and UN led peacekeeping missions can result in a lot of lives being lost.

**Recommendation:**

***Resolutions that affect human security issues should be specific, however, these also need to take into account the capacity and logistic required to carry out a peace mission.***

**Issue 7:**

International politics can hamper conflict management in Africa, as was seen by the UN Security Council's reluctance to send more peacekeeping forces to Rwanda in the wake of a mass genocide.

**Recommendation:**

***An adequately capacitated ASF and successful peace negotiations could possibly be more encouraging to the UN to send their peacekeeping forces into Africa.***

The study has been able to identify areas where the AU's human security initiatives through the PSC have assisted Rwanda and Burundi in resolving conflicts, as well as the shortcomings thereof, which are mainly linked to funding and capacity constraints.

The study also attempted to identify how the AU can exert more influence on Member States to implement human security initiatives, which can only take place through the by in by all Member States in the affairs of conflict management.

The study attempted to investigate whether countries with histories of violence can implement human security initiatives, and although this is not an easy task, peace agreements are an important aspect of conflict management. The OAU/AU can be lauded for having the policy framework dealing with human security in place, however, without strong political will, these amount to nothing.

The study also aimed to identify gaps in the PSC's system of implementing its human security policies. This study does not intend to be exhaustive in its analysis of the AU's human security initiatives, and further research can be conducted in order to assess the PSC's efforts to manage conflict in Africa.

Aspects that can be further investigated are amongst others, the financing of peacekeeping missions, the strength of mandates of peacekeeping missions, capacitating conflict management in Africa, and the impact of AU peacekeeping missions.

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