

**A Critical Afrocentric Analysis of South Africa's SADC-mandated  
Mediation in Zimbabwe, 2007 - 2014**

**A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree in  
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations**

**By**

**BONGIWE PRINCESS MPHAHLELE**

**In the Department of Political Sciences at the**

**UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA**

**SUPERVISOR: PROF SIPHAMANDLA ZONDI**

**SEPTEMBER 2022**

## DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree DPhil (International Relations ) at the University of Pretoria is my own work and has not been previously submitted by me for a degree at this or any other institution.

**SIGNED: Bongiwe Mphahlele**

**13 September 2022**

## ABSTRACT

This study seeks to understand how South Africa has pursued the African agenda through its foreign policy and how it applied it during its mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014. South Africa's approach was criticised both at home and abroad for being "soft" on the governing Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led government when it seized land from white farmers and dealt violently against political opposition in the early 2000s. Pretoria's refusal to denounce the Mugabe government publicly even when internal activists called for condemnation provoked criticism from the human rights community that the African National Congress (ANC) government ignored human rights violations in Zimbabwe in blind solidarity with a fellow liberation movement. After assuming the mediator role in Zimbabwe on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), this criticism spread. Pretoria's approach was then labelled a 'quiet diplomacy' to suggest that it was keeping mum about what it needed to openly oppose. Some argued that South Africa chose African solidarity to shield violent and dictatorial African governments from criticism and censure over the need to speak truth to power. Furthermore, studies that have covered South Africa's foreign policy in Zimbabwe look at it from multiple theoretical perspectives, but none has so far employed an Afrocentric lens. This is despite the fact that a need to understand this which is called African solidarity in South Africa's approach.

This study responds to this gap in analysis by providing a critical Afrocentric analysis of South Africa's African agenda and how it shaped South Africa's approach to the mediation in Zimbabwe. It seeks to understand how the African agenda as understood by Pretoria may explain the dynamics of South Africa's foreign policy posture on Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2014 when it was a SADC mediator. On this basis, the study argues that the South African African agenda is underpinned by ideological frames coming from African ideas like Pan-Africanism, African Unity and African Renaissance that are crucial to fully account for South Africa's relations with fellow African countries. We argue that the South African approach to Zimbabwe cannot be adequately explained without understanding the core paradigm and principles of the African agenda and how this guided South Africa's choices concerning the Zimbabwean crisis. Mainstream analysis tends to associate the African agenda with the sustenance of demagogues. The weakness of such analysis is that it focuses on African leaders in which the interest of those leaders defines the good of Africa. Afrocentricity looks beyond just leaders; it focuses on people, culture and identity from a social, economic,

political and philosophical term. We also argue that if the African agenda is understood outside Afrocentricity, the focus is on leaders, but if understood within Afrocentricity, the focus is on African people. Consequently, the study found that despite South Africa's failure to meet international human rights standards by downplaying the ZANU-PF driven violations on Zimbabweans and failure to uphold democratic processes, Pretoria successfully promoted their African renaissance regional objectives, including regional solidarity, unity, respecting sovereignty of African countries, African- centered conflict resolution in the region and African solutions to African problems. The research is a qualitative analytical study reliant on primary and secondary data in the public domain.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank God for His faithfulness, guidance and the wisdom He bestowed on me. His Word and prayer grounded and kept me sane throughout this journey.

I would like to express my most profound appreciation to my supervisor, mentor and guide, Professor Siphamandla Zondi, who held my hand from the beginning: *Nondaba, Gagashe, Luqa, Thethane!* I'm very grateful for his dedication, patience, kindness, wisdom and humanity. His commitment and keen interest to help his students have been mainly responsible for completing my thesis. His scholarly advice and vast knowledge in the subject of foreign policy has helped me immensely to complete this project.

I owe a deep sense of gratitude to the National Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS) for their generous financial support. The funding I received allowed me to access the resources I needed to complete this thesis.

I'm also grateful to Professor Victoria Graham, Head of Department Political Sciences, the University of Pretoria, for all the support she afforded me. Many thanks to the Faculty of Humanities staff for their support and patience.

Finally, I'm grateful to my family and friends for their constant support and encouragement. To my grandmother, MaNkonyeni Thandiwe Ngcobo, who became my mother following my mom's passing in 1993, I wouldn't be where I am today without her love, tenacity, and prayers. To my family: *oNgcobo, oMapholoba, oMashiya' amahle!* I thank you for your perpetual love and guardianship. Grateful to the Mphahlele family for their support throughout my PhD journey.

## DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late mother and sister, who never lived long enough to see this dream fulfilled.

## ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>MDC</b>	Movement for Democratic Change
<b>ZANU-PF</b>	Zimbabwean National Unity-Patriotic Front
<b>GPA</b>	Global Political Agreement
<b>GNU</b>	Government of National Unity
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>ESAP</b>	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>OAU</b>	Organisation of African Union
<b>G77</b>	Group of 77
<b>NAM</b>	Non Alignment Movement
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organisation
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation
<b>UNHRC</b>	United Nations Human Rights Commission
<b>FAO</b>	Food Organisation
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Partnership for Africa's Development
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>DIRCO</b>	Department of International Relations Cooperation
<b>GEAR</b>	Growth Employment and Redistribution
<b>RDP</b>	Reconstruction and Development Programme
<b>WWII</b>	World War Two
<b>RECs</b>	Regional Economic Communities
<b>G8</b>	Group of Eight
<b>APRM</b>	African Peer Review Mechanism
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>CODESA</b>	Convention for Democratic South Africa
<b>EPA</b>	Economic Programme Adjustment
<b>SACU</b>	Southern African Customs Union

<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>MAP</b>	Millennium African Renaissance Partnership Programme
<b>NAI</b>	New Africa Initiative
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic
<b>MONUSCO</b>	The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>GPA</b>	Global Political Agreement
<b>ZIPRA</b>	Zimbabwe's People Revolutionary Army
<b>ZANLA</b>	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
<b>ZAPU</b>	Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union
<b>ZANU</b>	Zimbabwe African National Union
<b>ZNA</b>	Zimbabwe National Army
<b>CCJPZ</b>	Catholic Commission for Justice
<b>NDP</b>	National Democratic Party
<b>ANC</b>	African National Council
<b>FROLIZI</b>	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
<b>ANC Z</b>	African National Council Zimbabwe
<b>ZNLWVA</b>	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
<b>ADFC</b>	Alliance of Democratic Forces
<b>FTLRP</b>	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
<b>ZCTU</b>	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
<b>NCA</b>	National Constitutional Assembly
<b>JOC</b>	Joint Operations Command
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>MDC-T</b>	Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai
<b>MDC-N</b>	Movement for Democratic Change- Ncube
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch
<b>ZEC</b>	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
<b>CIO</b>	Central Intelligence Officers
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>COPAC</b>	Select Committee of Parliament

<b>ZEC</b>	Zimbabwean Electoral Commission
<b>ABSA</b>	Africa Peace and Security Architect
<b>AUPSC</b>	African Union Peace and Security Council
<b>SADCC</b>	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
<b>NGOs</b>	Non- Governmental Organisations
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom of Great Britain
<b>USSR</b>	Union of the Soviet Region
<b>HBCU</b>	Historically Black Colleges and Universities
<b>ZUM</b>	Zimbabwe Unity Movement
<b>CAZ</b>	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
<b>UANC</b>	United African National Council
<b>RISDP</b>	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
<b>SIPO</b>	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

## TABLE OF CONTENT

### Table of Contents

DECLARATION .....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
DEDICATION .....	vi
ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xiii
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
Introduction .....	1
1.1 Identification of research theme .....	1
1.2 Research Problem and Rationale for the study .....	6
1.3 Research Question .....	8
1.3.1 Sub-questions.....	8
1.4 The main aim of the study .....	9
1.4.1 The study objectives .....	9
1.5 Afrocentric Theoretical Framework.....	9
1.5.1 Pan- Africanism .....	10
1.5.2 African Renaissance .....	11
1.5.4 African Agenda.....	11
1.6 Research Methodology .....	12
1.7 Structure of the research .....	14
CHAPTER 2 .....	15
A Theoretical Framework: Afrocentricity .....	15
2.1 Introduction .....	15
2.2 Justification for an Africa centered theory .....	16
2.4 Traditional theoretical approaches.....	20
2.4.1 Realism.....	20
2.4.2. International institutionalism .....	20
2.4.3 Liberalism .....	21
2.4.4 Constructivism .....	22
2.4.5 Marxism .....	22
2.5 Conclusion.....	24

CHAPTER 3 .....	25
South African Foreign Policy and Africa: A Literature Review .....	25
3.1 Introduction .....	25
3.2 A review of International Relations theories .....	25
2.3 Foreign policy analysis .....	28
3.4 Foreign policy decision making and actors .....	29
235 Foreign policy .....	31
3.6 South African foreign policy discussions.....	32
3.6.1 South African foreign policy towards Africa .....	33
3.6.2 Human rights and Foreign Policy: the Values-vs-Interests Debate .....	48
3.6.3. Quiet diplomacy and conflict resolution.....	52
3.6.4 Africa and Multilateralism diplomacy .....	55
3.6.5 Middle power role .....	56
3.6.6 South Africa’s role in the southern African region .....	58
3.7 Conclusion.....	59
CHAPTER FOUR .....	61
South African Foreign Policy in Context.....	61
4.1 Introduction .....	61
4.2 The foreign policy of Mandela .....	61
4.4. Mbeki and the African agenda.....	64
4.4.1 The African renaissance vision.....	65
4.4.2 Institutional reform.....	68
4.4.3 An Economic Recovery Plan for Africa: NEPAD.....	69
4.4.4 Regional integration.....	70
4.4.5 Faith in diplomacy and negotiations.....	71
4.5 Africa policy under Zuma .....	74
4.6 Conclusion.....	76
CHAPTER FIVE .....	78
5.1 Introduction .....	78
5.2 Tracing South Africa’s intervention in Zimbabwe.....	79
5.3 The factors that drove the conflict in Zimbabwe.....	82
5.4 Signing the GPA.....	102
5.5 Conclusion.....	108
CHAPTER 6 .....	110

South Africa, African Agenda and the SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe: Data Collection .....	110
6.1 Introduction .....	110
6.2 Document coding and sources.....	110
6.3 Presentation of Data .....	112
6.3.1 Objective I: To describe and understand the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy .....	112
6.3.2 Objective II: To what extent do the objectives of the African agenda explain South Africa's foreign policy positions on African countries like Zimbabwe? .....	127
6.5 Conclusion.....	141
CHAPTER SEVEN.....	143
South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy and Mediation in Zimbabwe: An Analysis.....	143
7.1 Introduction .....	143
7.2 Afrocentric perspective.....	144
7.3 The consolidation of the African agenda .....	152
7.4 The debate about South Africa in Africa .....	156
7.5 The African renaissance debate.....	158
7.6 Redefining the African identity .....	161
7.7 A Pan-African vision .....	168
7.8 Zimbabwe crisis.....	175
7.9 Mbeki's response to the crisis.....	181
7.9.1 Critiques of the SADC mandated mediation .....	181
7.10 Analysis of South Africa's African-centred approach.....	184
7.11 Conclusion.....	186
CHAPTER EIGHT.....	188
Conclusions .....	188
8.1 Chapter outline .....	188
8.2 Summary of the findings.....	188
8.2.1 South Africa's African agenda and its engagement in Africa.....	188
8.2.3 The evolution of the Zimbabwe crisis .....	189
8.2.4 Understanding the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy .....	190
8.2.5 Theoretical framework.....	191
8.2.6 South Africa, African agenda and the Zimbabwe mediation: Reflecting on the data process.....	192
8.2.7 South Africa's mediation in Zimbabwe: an analysis.....	193

8.3 South Africa’s African agenda and the Zimbabwe mediation: reflecting on the objectives of the study.....	194
8.3.1 The African agenda policy .....	194
8.3.2 Explain South Africa’s foreign policy positions on Zimbabwe based on the African agenda. ....	195
8.2.3 To explain South Africa’s understanding and management of its SADC mandate to facilitate dialogue and a settlement in Zimbabwe. ....	195
8.3 Contribution of the study.....	196
8.4 Subject for future research .....	196
8.5 Conclusion- This chapter is concluding the study framework was useful .....	196
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	197

## LIST OF TABLES

<b>Table 1:</b> Coded documents of presidents, ministers	109
--	-----



# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

### 1.1 Identification of research theme

The Zimbabwe elections, which took place on 31 July 2013, marked the end of South Africa's decade long facilitation process in Zimbabwe, which had begun in the early 2000s. First, South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) declared the elections free and peaceful, and later the outcome was endorsed by African Union (AU) (Makokera, 2015). Zimbabwe was then welcomed back to the AU and SADC, with Mugabe becoming the SADC chair in 2014. In September 2008, South Africa, under President Mbeki's leadership, successfully persuaded Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Tsvangirai and the MDC Mutambara Africa to sign the Global Peace Agreement (GPA) (Makokera, 2015). The agreement paved the way for the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009 (Miti, 2012). This was a significant milestone for the South African government that led the mediation process and SADC that mandated SA to negotiate a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe. This also marked an end of a decade-long political conflict that began with tensions between the ZANU-PF leadership and war veterans that demanded large payouts in 2000 and subsequently land reform.

In 2007, SADC decided to intervene through A South African led mediation when the crisis in Zimbabwe reached a breaking point. The opposition members and civil society had staged demonstrations against the government of the ZANU-PF, which was met with ferocious violence by the national police (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015). At some point, opposition leaders and members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were detained and beaten by the national police. Following this violent event SADC convened a special summit where the regional leaders appointed South Africa facilitate talks between the protagonists in Zimbabwe (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013).

Mhandara & Pooe (2013) argue that one should consider the two legacies that shaped and defined the country's political landscape to understand the rationale behind the actions and emotions of various actors in Zimbabwe. First, they cite the legacies of the brutal and authoritarian colonial state brought to an end by independence in 1980. Second, it's the fact

that Zimbabwe's freedom was attained through armed struggle, which also came to an end formally in 1980. Both these developments continued to shape governance, politics and security after independence (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). Coetzee (2004) takes this further and argues that the political and economic crisis that gripped Zimbabwe in the 2000s is a mix of both colonial and post-independent experiences. Mhandara and Pooe (2013) reports that economic woes and political dissent in Zimbabwe started in 1990 when the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was launched, which presented a change from a state-led economy to a market-driven economy. This deepened socio-economic troubles as unemployment grew, wages declined, food shortages rose, and the general economic situation deteriorated right through the 1990s.

According to Zondi (2011), the cost of the military intervention in the DRC, the unplanned payouts of the war veterans in 1998 and land reform programmes exacerbated the economic ruin and political crisis in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's decision to send troops to assist Laurent Kabila's war in June 1998 cost Zimbabwe an estimated one billion dollars, strained resources earmarked for poverty alleviation and land programmes. It also caused the withdrawal of international investors and donors, exacerbating the economic decline (Coetzee, 2004; Zondi, 2011). According to Zondi (2011), the demand from War Veterans for fast-tracking of land reform caused panic in the governing ZANU-PF party, and they paid 50 000 war veterans \$50 000 each. In 1999 the ZANU-PF government sent 11000 soldiers to join the SADC military mission in DRC to support Laurent Kabila, causing a significant budget deficit in the public purse (Zondi, 2011). The emergence of the MDC in 1999 accelerated the demand for regime change in Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF soon felt the pressure of a new, more vigorous opposition. ZANU-PF's electoral defeat during a constitutional referendum was a watershed moment for the ruling party, who lost to the "No vote" driven by the MDC (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). Fearing the report of the referendum defeat, ZANU-PF resorted to institutionalized violence and intimidation in which members of the opposition party were severely beaten and jailed (Zondi, 2011). According to Mhandara & Pooe (2013), the crisis climaxed in March 2007 when government police violently attacked civil society. The opposition party had gathered for prayer at the Zimbabwe showground under the Save Zimbabwe banner when the attack took place.

At this point, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) goal was to address the economic and political issues and set conditions for harmonized and legitimate elections in 2008 through South Africa as the (Hamaswa & Chinyere, 2015). Although the 2008

elections were peaceful, there was no outright winner causing a stalemate which led to another instability relapse when both parties failed to secure the 50% plus which in an electoral law requirement for competing parties. Finally, the mediation process yielded positive results with the signing of the Global Political Agreement that paved the way for forming an inclusive government (Zondi, 2011). On 13 February 2009, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed between ZANU-PF and MDC to lead the country five years later until the next presidential elections.

Despite the gains, many criticized SA's approaches to Zimbabwe, which they described as too quiet and too soft on ZANU-PF, when what was needed was a robust and aggressive approach (Alden, 2002; Marthoz, 2012; Taylor, 2002). South Africa's foreign policy engagement in Zimbabwe as an expression of its African agenda has been the most debated and contested subject in foreign policy analysis. Due to international and local community interests, Pretoria's peace diplomatic initiatives were under extreme pressure. The international community had expected South Africa to support the imposition of sanctions by major western powers and public condemnation of Zimbabwe's President Mugabe (Prys, 2008). Instead, Mbeki opted for peaceful negotiations between the Zimbabwean parties when Thabo Mbeki took over as president of South Africa in 1999 and focused on strengthening the African agenda in foreign policy, strengthening relationships with African countries after the isolation of the apartheid regime (Landsberg, 2010). Zimbabwe was an opportunity for SA to demonstrate their commitment to the continent. According to Mhandara & Poee (2013), the South African government avoided solutions that contradict the progressive African opinion based on the Pan-African principles that characterize African politics. Consequently, South Africa decided not to criticize its neighbours on sensitive issues such as land reform instead opted for a negotiated approach.

The end of the apartheid regime affected changes in South Africa's foreign policy posture towards the African continent and the Southern African region. This posture is different from the one pursued by the apartheid regime, whose feature was isolation and dominance in Africa and Southern Africa. The change to the foreign policy occurred under the transformation rubric. Landsberg (2010) explains that the transformation posture was an attempt to provide a new narrative of South Africa belonging to a democratic, developmental state seeking to redress imbalances at home while mending the country's relations with the international community. There are many reasons why governments choose to redirect their foreign policy. Hermann (1990) examined the reasons why governments change their foreign

policy. According to him, it happens when existing governments decide to change their course in foreign policy, which he calls "self-correcting" change and a change that occurs due to regime change (Hermann, 1990:4). South Africa foreign policy underwent such redirection due to the transition from apartheid government to democratic government.

Two factors helped shape South Africa's foreign policy. The first factor is the changes in international dynamics brought about by the end of the Cold War. According to Landsberg (2010), global changes following the end of the Cold War required a new type of diplomatic engagement in international affairs. The second factor relates to the ANC's anticolonial, anti-apartheid, Marxist ideas, Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialist and African nationalist orientation on international affairs (Zondi, 2015). Landsberg (2010) validates this assertion confirming that the ANC government borrowed from the ANC old party documents to integrate the party's international strategies and doctrines into an official foreign policy. Indeed ANC documents such as the Freedom Charter of 1995, the Harare Declaration of 1989, ANC's Constitutional Principles of 1988 and the ANC's Foreign Policy Perspective of 1994 emphasizes the ANC's desire to build peaceful relations with international partners. The government's move to borrow from the ANC demonstrated a commitment to peaceful participation in international politics and a clear stance from the apartheid foreign policy of isolation and dominance.

After 1994, South African embraced a multilateral approach that places Africa at the centre of its foreign policy (Paterson & Dirk, 2014). The new democratic government under Mandela's leadership abandoned the apartheid government approach and committed itself to a relationship of equals with the continent. The government designed the foreign policy to reintegrate South Africa into the global community and boost Pretoria's diplomatic capacity. The Mandela government re-entered the multilateral field through re-admission to the Commonwealth; resuming its seats at the United Nations (UN); joining the G77, the OAU, SADC, the Non-Alignment Movement; UN Agencies such as ILO, WHO, UNHRC and FAO; and started engagement with the EU (Landsberg, 2010). Since 1994 South Africa has become a leading power in the African continent and the Southern African region.

Mandela's foreign policy is said by some to have been centred on human rights and driven by idealist orientations, with its diplomacy resting on moral and principled foundations (Nel & Carlsnaes, 2006; Landsberg, 2010). In an article featured in *Foreign Affairs*, Mandela declared that "Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy" (Mandela, 1993).

Concurrently, the new democratic government sought to re-establish South Africa as a non-racial, prosperous and just democratic country committed to its African destiny. Nelson Mandela emphasized this new posture to an audience in the United States in 1993, that “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny” (Mandela, 1993:89). South Africa positioned itself to be a key actor in the African continent post-1994, playing critical roles in economic development, peace and security, promoting human rights and democracy and humanitarian interventions throughout the continent (Landberg, 2007:196).

During Mbeki’s administration, the African agenda informed the foreign policy, which prioritized peace and security, economic development and democratic governance (Chris Landsberg, 2012; Paterson & Virk, 2014; Sidiropoulos, 2007). As such, South Africa played a significant role in institutional reform and development in Africa, including the transformation of the then Organisation of African Union into an African Union (AU), reforming the SADC peace architecture and the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Marthoz, 2012; Zondi, 2015)

In addition, Mbeki coordinated with other African leaders to promote the continent’s recovery and new global role under the African Renaissance vision in the multilateral forums (Sidiropoulos, 2007). This initiative was fostered through the “African solutions for African problems” slogan, reaffirming that Africans could govern themselves and develop their continent (Zondi, 2015:100).

Even much later, the *White Paper on South African Foreign Policy - Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu* specifies Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity as central tenets for South Africa’s foreign policy. Under Mbeki, the foreign policy priorities such as the African agenda and rebirth of Africa were operationalized through the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa Development initiatives (Landberg, 2007). Successive governments from Mandela to Ramaphosa led ANC governments have made the African agenda the most important of the concentric circles that describe foreign policy structure and decision-making in South Africa after 1994. Under these auspices, South Africa was the mediator for conflict resolution in Zimbabwe under the newly transformed South African foreign policy directives presented as the African agenda.

South Africa’s transition phase (1990-1994) received attention from scholars as they focused on South Africa’s new role in international politics and the African continent, as well as nuances and intricacies of the foreign policy (Hughes, 2004; Landsberg, 1994; Mills et al.,

1997; ). During the democratization phase (1994-1999), South Africa's role in global affairs was described as an "international norm entrepreneur" for its norm formulating role at multilateral forums (Geldenhuys, 2006). South Africa's role in the continent and the region was framed as a middle power, regional power and regional hegemony, which was linked to Pretoria response to conflict resolution in the continent. Under Mbeki's presidency, which happened during the continental engagement phase (1999-2008), the focus was on his African renaissance vision. During this period, scholars noted the contradictions in foreign policy. The ideological values of the African agenda policy premised on African solidarity clashed with Pretoria's human rights and democratic aspirations. South Africa's mediation in Zimbabwe has been used to highlight this contradiction. The quiet diplomacy policy employed in Zimbabwe has been studied as an example of African solutions for African problems dictum and an ineffective approach to conflict resolution in Africa. Despite the studies mentioned above, frameworks that locate conflict resolution within Afrocentricity and Pan-Africanism ideologies, which informed South Africa's approach in Zimbabwe, have not been used to analyze South Africa's African agenda behaviour in the continental and regional.

## **1.2 Research Problem and Rationale for the study**

Cresswell (2013) defined a research problem as "a general issue, concern or controversy addressed in research that narrows the topic". In this study, the pertinent issue under investigation is the South African foreign policy's African agenda in its intervention in the Zimbabwe crisis. Observers in the international and local community have struggled to understand South Africa's foreign policy and the African agenda tenets, particularly as applied during the crisis in Zimbabwe. As such, South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has been criticized as biased, appeasing and diffident (Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Marthoz, 2012; Qobo & Dube, 2015). South Africa has been accused of endorsing ZANU-PF by not denouncing Mugabe in public.

For instance, Human Rights Watch's Carol Berget criticized South Africa for siding with "reactionary" rather than "progressive" forces (Berget, 2008) Berget, 2008). On the Zimbabwe issue, she said, '...but many of us are now watching in dismay as the country's (SA) foreign policy often aligns with global enemies of human rights' (Berget, 2008:1). The G8 also took a jab at Thabo Mbeki during a G8 summit in Japan in 2008, where the international body resolved to send a UN envoy to Zimbabwe because they were fuming out of patience with South Africa's "softly-softly" approach (Wintour & Elliott, 2008).

Studies that have covered South Africa's foreign policy in Zimbabwe did not pay attention to paradigmatic and identity elements that underpin the orientation of the policy. For instance, Alden (2002) focused on South Africa's quiet diplomacy approach, while (van Nieuwkerk, 2006) focused on the South African foreign policy decision-making process. Other studies have focused on South Africa as a regional power (Habib, 2009; Prys, 2008; Omoruyi et al., 2020; Prys, 2009), post-apartheid policy, SA's multilateralism engagement in the region ((Dzimiri, 2017; Monyae, 2012), SA's peace diplomacy in the region, African peace-building approaches and the dynamics of Zimbabwean conflict (Mhandara & Poole, 2013b; Raftopoulos, 2013; Sachikonye, 2005). In addition, others have explained SA's foreign policy in Zimbabwe as a contradiction between human rights and liberal internationalist orientation and a policy appeasing authoritarian states (Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Marthoz, 2012). Finally, others have focused on the elements that complicated the mediation process, such as the multiplicity of stakeholders, the complexity of political setup and the questionable role of mediator (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015).

Such studies offer an understanding of continuities and shifts, which have decorated South African foreign policy since 1994 and an understanding of South African foreign policy decision making. However, they do not account for the ideological principles of the South African foreign policy, which is more helpful in enabling an understanding of SA's African agenda and South Africa's engagement in Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe. Secondly, there has not been an attempt to analyze the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy towards a particular country. What literature exists is generally focused on general and continental subjects on this. Hence, there is a need for a study that provides a case analysis of a single country testing how this African agenda in the foreign policy found expression and what bearing it had. In this case, the focus is on Zimbabwe. We will understand how the philosophical and ideological underpinnings and actual diplomatic practices informed the African agenda in reality.

In a rare case of explicit use of the non-Eurocentric lens of analysis, (Shai, 2016; 2018) employs the Afrocentric approaches to analyze the foreign policy of the USA towards Africa, using cases of Ghana and Tanzania. He also conducted an Afrocentric examination of the slave-master relationship between the USA and Nigeria, yielding insights into an Afrocentric analysis and interpretation of the USA's foreign policy within the African context. However, this Afrocentric examination is applied to a Western country's foreign policy towards Africa. Furthermore, no work has been found that analyzes the foreign policy of an African country

using the Afrocentric theoretical framework. Lastly, Afrocentric approaches to foreign policy have not been applied to South African foreign policy towards Africa. Thus, besides the lacuna on the analysis of Africanist concepts at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy's Africa agenda pointed out above, this study also intends to fill the gap in the literature on the Afrocentric approaches to the analysis of African foreign policy cases. This theoretical framework will provide an Afrocentric analysis and interpretation within the African context. It will enrich scholarly understanding of South African foreign policy's African agenda towards the African continent, particularly in countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, where South Africa has been criticized for ignoring human rights over African solidarity ((Marthoz, 2012; Nathan, 2008; Qobo & Dube, 2015).

### **1.3 Research Question**

According to Thomas and Hodges (2010), a research question is where the research project key issues are stated in a question. (Farrokhyar et al., 2010) suggest that research can be formulated after knowledge about the subject of interest increases by searching the literature or discussing colleagues. As such, the exposure to the above-discussed literature led us to ask the following question under the phenomenon investigated:

How does the African agenda holistically understood explain South Africa's approach to the mediation of the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014?

#### **1.3.1 Sub-questions**

The following sub-questions will guide the study:

- How is South African foreign policy's African agenda understood?
- To what extent do the objectives of the African agenda explain South Africa's foreign policy positions on African countries like Zimbabwe?
- Using the Afrocentric paradigm, how can we best understand South Africa's understanding and management of its SADC mandate to facilitate dialogue and a settlement in Zimbabwe?
- How can we best understand the role of agency as promoted through the African agenda policy? What does the case of Zimbabwe reveal about SA's African Agenda and its future?

## **1.4 The main aim of the study**

Thomas Hodges (2010) defined the research aim as 'a statement indicating a research project's general aim or purpose. The research aim is the overarching purpose of the study, and it is the reason for conducting the study. In our case, the aim of this study is formulated as:

To analyze the African agenda that underpins South African foreign policy towards the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014

### **1.4.1 The study objectives**

- To describe the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy
- To provide details of common interests and areas of divergence between South African foreign policy and African states.
- To use Afrocentricity to analyze South African foreign policy position on Africa and African countries like Zimbabwe.
- To explain the role of the African agency in the manner in which South Africa handled the SADC facilitation/mediation of dialogue in Zimbabwe.

## **1.5 Afrocentric Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical discussion of the study is grounded on the Afrocentric paradigm. The Afrocentric paradigm locates research within an African context and interprets research data from an African perspective (Asante, 2009). Engaging with Afrocentric views will allow us to examine, understand and explain South Africa's foreign policy's African agenda from an African perspective. According to (Asante, 2009), Afrocentricity is a "mode of thought and action in which the centrality of African interest, values and perspective predominate". Theoretically, it places African people at the centre of any analysis of an African phenomenon. Asante (1988) identifies four elements of the Afrocentric framework; a phenomenon must be located within African culture, history and continent; orientation is pursuing intellectual interest towards the direction of Africans; a phenomenon should be centred within the context of African history; viewing the world from an African perspective. Asante (Asante, M., 2009) emphasizes that Afrocentricity. It is about seeking the centrality of Africans in a given phenomenon (Asante, 1998).

In summary, the centrality of Africans in the continent and their culture forms the basis of the theory. Asante's work on Afrocentricity (1988), *The Afrocentric Idea* (1987) and *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* (1990) is credited for the philosophical substance to the Afrocentric concept. Other scholars such as Ama Mazama (2001) have expanded on the Afrocentric idea by extending similar views. For instance, Mazama (2001) argued that 'Afrocentricity contends that our main problem as African people is our usually unconscious adoption of the Western worldview and perspective and their attendant conceptual frameworks'.

The study intends to employ Afrocentricity theory to examine South Africa's African agenda through the lens of the African people, which is centred and located within the African culture. The aim is to understand how South African foreign policy's African agenda has been applied in Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, where South Africa's foreign policy approach has been criticized. Afrocentricity also expresses itself through key concepts which speak to African identity, unity, agency and orientation. Pan-Africanism, African renaissance and African unity are essential pillars for discussing South African foreign policy.

### **1.5.1 Pan- Africanism**

Pan-Africanism stresses the importance of culture, unity and identity in African agency when responding to a challenging environment. Pan-Africanism focuses on political practices and cultural issues and unifies the people of Africa and African descendants, and it encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide (Ta'a, 2014). The literature presented many definitions of Pan-Africanism, but this study will settle with Pooe's (2003) to discuss South African foreign policy's African agenda. Pooe (2003) has defined Pan-Africanism as an attempt by African people to creatively harness their cultural diversity and innovate around common challenges for the collective empowerment and development of the African peoples.

According to Qobo and Dube (2015) Mbeki's foreign policy drew heavily from the Pan-Africanist (and African nationalist) theme of seeking liberation from the West. In the same vein Zondi (2015) alludes that Pan-Africanism was one of the ideological features of South African foreign policy during Mbeki's era. Pan-Africanism as a concept is widely debated, multifaceted and complex (Boshoff & Owiso, 2017). The study will use the Pan-African lens to establish whether the South African foreign policy is grounded on African culture and identity. This will be done to understand the African agenda policy applied in Zimbabwe.

### **1.5.2 African Renaissance**

Ideologically, the African renaissance is a grand plan about the rebirth of Africa, and in policy terms it is a foreign policy instrument which seeks to respond to globalisation, an engagement strategy and a revival strategy for the African continent (Landberg, 2007; Van Kessel, 2002; Zondi, 2015). According to Zondi (2015:100), “African Renaissance narrative embodied the commitment by Africans to exercise agency to ensure peace, democracy and prosperity to return to the continent”. The literature revealed four elements of the African renaissance (Mbeki, 2000; Zondi, 2015); the first is the call for Africa agency for Africa to participate in global institutions and be treated as a subject rather than an object. The second is the rebirth or renewal of the African continent. The third is the encouragement of Africans to take pride in their Africanness. Fourth is the encouragement of an African-centred engagement, which encourages Africans to speak for themselves and decide the future of the continent. During Mbeki's administration, the African renaissance became the core of South Africa's African agenda (Zondi, 2015). The study will attempt to identify elements of Africa agency in the South African foreign policy by looking deeper into the application of the policy in Zimbabwe.

### **1.5.4 African Agenda**

African agenda is about how South Africa thinks about its place in Africa (Landsberg, 2010). The African agenda is not just a South African strategy towards Africa, but it is also an Africa strategy for Africa's progress. (Landberg, 2007:196) describes it as a policy that asserts "a search for a new partnership between Africa and the world" whose fundamental goal is to "integrate Africa into the global economy as a partner on the basis. According to (van Nieuwkerk, 2012a), South Africa played the role of an institutional builder and policy pioneer in Africa through the African agenda. Even though SA pursued a strategic partnership with prominent African leaders to realize all continents did not welcome the African agenda objectives, the South African initiative. For instance, (Landberg, 2007) reports that South Africa's championing of the development strategy in Africa was viewed by other African countries as South Africa's way of dominating the region. Which led us to ask; what does South Africa mean to the continent? Does it mean a 'domineering hegemon or 'Africa's voice'? The study intends to examine the African agenda policy using the Afrocentric paradigm to understand South Africa's orientation to the continent. We will also attempt to determine and explain how Pan-Africanism, African Renaissance, and African unity concepts express themselves in the African agenda.

## 1.6 Research Methodology

The study employs a qualitative approach which will allow the researcher to examine South African foreign policy's African agenda in Zimbabwe. A qualitative approach is favoured because it suits the objective and purpose of this study. Wagner et al. (2012:126) explains that a "qualitative approach is concerned with understanding the process and the social and cultural context which shape various behavioral patterns". According to Leedy & Omrod (2014), qualitative methods permit a researcher to attain insights about a particular phenomenon and provide an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of particular policies and practices. Cresswell (2007) adds to this, citing that a qualitative method allows the researcher to understand the situation in its natural setting and allows the use of multiple data collection methods.

This study adopts a case study design. A case study is suitable for learning more about an inadequately understood situation (Leedy & Omrod, 2014). According to Merriam (1998), case study design offers an in-depth understanding of the problem being examined and produces a complete account of a phenomenon. (Yin, 2014) defines a case study as an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon within its real-world context. The case examined here is South Africa's SADC mandated facilitation in Zimbabwe from 2007 to 2013. The unit of analysis is South African foreign policy's African agenda application in Zimbabwe during the political and crisis. Although according to Yin (1993), case studies can be based on single or multiple case studies designs. Yin (1993) discusses on three types of case studies: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. The first one is a single case study design that focuses on one case study, whereas a multiple case study design includes two or more studies within the same study (Yin, 1993). The second type is an exploratory case study is used when the goal is to develop relevant hypotheses and propositions for further inquiries. The third is a descriptive case study that provides a complete description of a phenomenon within its context. Finally, an explanatory case presents data using the causal effect to explain events (Yin, 1993). This study aims at both descriptive case study and single based case study design. An explanatory design allows us to explain which factor produced which effect, explaining the South African foreign policy's African agenda in the Zimbabwe case. The study did not favour exploratory was as the aim of the study is not to generate questions for future studies. However, the researcher aims to illustrate the relationship between the South African foreign policy African agenda and the case of Zimbabwe using the Afrocentric theory.

The task here is to explain South African foreign policy's African agenda and its application in Africa using the Afrocentric theory. The study intends to build plausible constructions of implementing the African agenda policy that surrounded the Zimbabwe case. The study seeks to explain South Africa's decision to prioritize African solidarity over human rights through the literature presented in chapter two. First, we present debates on certain subjects that have come out from implementing the African agenda in Africa. Then we organized the subjects into themes extracted from principles underscoring the South African foreign policy's African agenda, which include: human rights and foreign policy, the rhetoric of African renewal, peace diplomacy in Africa and Africa and multilateralism diplomacy.

The study relied on primary and secondary data sources. Primary data is raw data collected for the first time by the researcher for a specific research assignment either through interviews or observations (Kabir, 2018). The study is a document based research which has sourced its data from speeches, statements, media briefs, books, letters, annual reports, official documents and written pieces of President Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma, Ministers Assop Pahad, Aziz Pahad, Nkosazana Zuma, Frank Chikane Zola Skweyiya, Mashabane-Mankoane; Welile Nhlapo & Dumisani Kumalo; and President Mugabe & Morgan Tsvangarai. Secondary data is the existing data that others have produced (Kabir, 2018). Sources used for secondary data were existing literature on South African foreign policy's African agenda, post-apartheid foreign policy, South Africa's facilitation in Zimbabwe and Afrocentrism theory. This included reviewing the work of leading scholars and commentators recorded in books, journal articles, newspapers, and reports that deal with the subject under study. Key policy documents such as the White Paper on South African foreign policy titled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu set the groundwork for this study. Both primary and the secondary data provided an analytical parity for the thesis.

The study adopted the qualitative thematic analysis for the analysis of data. In employing this method, the study borrowed from Leedy & Ormrod (2014) notion of data analysis for a case study, which require categorization, thematization and interpretation of data. This activity is a common procedure in the analysis of qualitative data is the identification of themes and categories which is achieved through subsuming data into categories (Wagner, 2012). Document analysis refers “to an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their relevance and meanings” (Althede, 1996:2). According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003) at this stage a researcher needs to demonstrate creativity, enthusiasm and systematic searching.

## **1.7 Structure of the research**

### **Chapter 1: Introduction**

The chapter introduced the theme of the study, the research problem, research aims and questions and explained the methodological approach.

### **Chapter 2: Literature review**

Chapter two reviews existing literature on the subject of the study to provide the context within which the present study could be understood. The literature reviews also highlight existing gaps on the subject under study. Moreover, the theoretical framework is addressed. The key concepts include African renaissance, African unity, Pan-Africanism and African agenda.

### **Chapter 3: The Evolution of the Zimbabwean Crisis**

With the assistance of literature, Chapter Three traces the origins and evolution of the governance and economic crises that necessitated the SADC intervention in 2007. This will cover both the historical context and discuss factors that shaped the crisis.

### **Chapter 4: South African Foreign Policy in Context**

Chapter four reflects on the context in which matters of South African foreign policy's African agenda are discussed and demonstrate how South Africa operationalized this policy in its approach to the Zimbabwe crisis.

### **Chapter 5: An Analysis of the SADC-Mandated SA facilitation of Dialogue in Zimbabwe**

Chapter five outlines how South Africa was mandated on Zimbabwe and how it went about discharging its responsibilities. It will consider the dynamics that this mediation had to contend with, how it shaped the behaviour of various actors in Zimbabwe and what outcomes it produced judged against the terms of reference of its mandate.

### **Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations**

Chapter six will provide a review of the discussions from the chapters and provide recommendations on understanding South African foreign policy's African agenda.

## CHAPTER 2

### A Theoretical Framework: Afrocentricity

#### 2.1 Introduction

Theories are analytical tools created to explain, predict and understand a phenomenon. “They bring organization and capacity to assemble knowledge to a field, allowing scholars to tie together prepositions they have developed at different levels” (Coplin, 1971:9 in Mvulane Moloi, 2016). In addition, they can be used to challenge existing knowledge or extend it within the boundaries of a body of knowledge add (Schick, 2000). National Academy of Science (1999) has defined a theory as a loaded explanation of some part of nature supported by a massive body of evidence. Indeed, evidence supports theories, which allows scientists to predict what they should observe if the theory is verified to be true. Additionally, the evidence has to be tested many times for rigidity to ensure reliability. Consequently, (National Academy of Science, 1999) definition emphasized that the evidence is confirmed repetitively through experiment and observation.

A theory of international relations is a set of ideas that helps us explain how the international system works (Wasike & Odhiambo, 2016). In political sciences, there is no single common preposition that analysts use. Instead, they use theoretical frameworks (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). A theoretical framework is a structure that can support a theory of a research study. It comprises concepts and theories used by researchers in a particular study. In International Relations, frameworks are used to understand how the international system works and how nations interact (Groom & Light, 1994). These frameworks may vary and include realism, globalism, pluralism, postmodernism and structuralism (Groom & Light, 1994). Using these frameworks in foreign policy analysis, scholars can explain the objectives and motivation behind foreign policy decisions made by states (Norwich University Online, 2017). Thus, the Afrocentric theory is applied in this study to help us explain the facts.

This chapter deals with theory. It reflects on the mainstream International Relations theories from which the South African foreign policy has been explained and argues that these theories do not fully account for the African agenda policy's ideologies. The chapter then focuses on the Afrocentric framework and argues that Afrocentricity provides a useful

framework for understanding the meaning of the African agenda. The chapter also discusses Afrocentrism theoretical assumptions and then concludes.

## **2.2 Justification for an Africa centered theory**

The literature in foreign policy analysis relies on the mainstream International Relations main frameworks: realism, liberalism, institutionalism, and Marxism (O. R. Holsti, 2012). These theories have been instrumental in the analysis of foreign policy decisions. However, theories of International Relations have been criticized for marginalizing African based frameworks. For instance Dunn & Shaw (2001) strongly criticized the dominant IR theories and Western policymakers for marginalizing Africa on the assumption that the continent "lack meaningful politics" and hegemonic power. Dunn & Shaw (2001) point out that realists and neo-liberalists focused on great powers in theorizing about world politics, and yet Africa is central to discourses on security issues focusing on women, youth, governance and sustainable development. According to Dunn & Shaw (2001), traditional IR concepts, including the state, anarchy, the international/domestic dichotomy and the market, become problematic when applied to African situations. To this end, they suggest that IR matters have much to gain if theorized from the lens of African experiences. Falaye (2014) has also criticized the IR theories for their over-emphasis on states as a significant unit of analysis, ignoring other non-state actors at play. Falaye (2014) argues that state-centred relations are the foundations of IR theories and fits nicely into the European reality, while the African experiences move beyond states and emphasize non-state relations, which involves trans-border. Later Mvulane Moloji (2016) employed an Afrocentricity framework as effort towards Afrikan contribution to IR. Mvulane Moloji (2016) wondered what may have been the contribution of other non-Western/Eurocentric IR theories in the IR discipline, and challenges the Western philosophy informed IR literature and calls for consideration of Afrikan philosophical worldview informed by Afrocentricity. The above suggests that traditional IR theories are inadequate in explaining the African experiences. Furthermore, following Dunn and Shaw's (2001) and Mvulane Moloji (2016) call for an African model of analysis in International relations, this study seeks to contribute towards an African centered analysis in the International Relations discipline.

In light of this, the study moves from the traditional IR main theories such as realism, liberalism, and Marxism which have been used to explain South African foreign policy, and relies on Afrocentricity, which provided a useful framework for the understanding of South Africa's African agenda policy towards Africa.

### 2.3 Afrocentric paradigm

The above theories, particularly realism and liberalism, have been extensively used in international relations. As such, foreign policy studies in Africa often rely on these main International relations theory frameworks. However, attempts to explain foreign policy behaviour from an African perspective have been seen but are very limited. Afrocentrism was chosen for this reason. Scholars of social work, psychology and linguistic studies have used Afrocentricity lengthily, but it has received less attention from international relations scholars (Shai, 2016). As such, this study is an opportunity to apply it in International Relations, particularly in South Africa's foreign policy towards Africa. Shai (2016) is the first international relations scholar to apply Afrocentricity in the analysis of South foreign policy of an African country. His work lays a good foundation for using Afrocentricity as an alternative theoretical perspective for understanding the foreign policy behavior of African states in a changing geographical environment.

Because of the Euro-American view, academic literature in IR and US foreign policy is silent on the role of Africa and Africans in international relations and the International Relations discipline (Shai, 2016). Instead, Africans are often treated as a diplomatic and academic discourse subject rather than agents. Mazama (2001:387) describes this marginalization of Africans as “existing on borrowed European terms and not of Africans”. Similarly, Dunn and Shaw (2001) challenge establishing international relations theories and excluding Africa. They argue that African issues are central to understanding modern international relations. They make a point about the leading paradigms of IR’s (realism and idealism) inability to account for most of the international political behaviour of Africa today and Africa's role in teaching us to reimagine and reinterpret IR theory (Dunn & Shaw, 2001). They further argue that, in the context of Africa, states and non-states governments are a fundamental unit of analysis.

Furthermore, seeing that traditional IR theories ignore such a critical unit of analysis while focusing heavily on the state, the theories fail to explain the behaviour of African political actors (Malaquias, 2001). Simultaneously, (Dunn & Shaw, 2001:ix) assert that “less than one in a hundred university lectures on IR, particularly in Europe and North America, mention Africa”. An investigation by Mvulane-Moloi (2016) validates this; his research found that traditional IR theories enjoyed much attention from IR scholars and that Western-centric scholars dominated the field. However, he also found realism a dominant school of thought.

According to Shai (2016), this narrative feeds into the profoundly entrenched colonial power relations between the global north and developing countries. Thus Afrocentricity seeks to rectify this and reposition Africans as agents and actors of their history (Chawane, 2016).

The Afrocentric paradigm locates research within an African context and interprets research data from an African perspective add (Asante, 1998). According to Asante (2009), Afrocentricity is a “mode of thought and action in which the centrality of African interest, values and perspective predominate”. (Kumah-Abiwu, 2016). For Asante (2009), Afrocentricity addresses the question of African identity from the perspective of people as being orientated, centred, grounded and located. Mazama (2001) has a similar view, describing the basis for Afrocentric evolution as an attempt to tackle the common problem facing Africans across the world. Mazama (2001:387) contends that the main problem is the unconscious adoption of the Western worldview and perspective and their attendant conceptual frameworks by Africans”. It proposes that Africans view knowledge from an African perspective and look at issues from an African viewpoint (Chawane, 2016). Dr Danjuma Modupe identified three elements of the Afrocentric rise to consciousness which is outlined as grounding, orientation, and perspective (Modupe, 2002, cited by Brooks, 2018:7):

- Grounding is the process of learning that locates a phenomenon within African culture, history, and the continent. When African people view themselves as centred in their history, they see themselves as agents and actors rather than political or economic experience (Molefi, 2009:2), which means that the centrality of African people is at the core of the theory. Asante (1995:3) emphasizes that Afrocentricity 'is not a matter of colour but of culture that matters in orientation to centeredness'. It is about seeking the centrality of Africans in a given phenomenon (Asante, 1995). In summary, the centrality of Africans in the continent and their culture forms the basis of the theory. According to this paradigm, a phenomenon is expressed in the categories of space and time.
- Orientation is having and pursuing an intellectual interest in Africa and forming a psychological identity direction based upon that interest in the direction towards Africa.

- Perspective is a self-conscious ‘way of seeing and shaping the world which reflects African interests and is indicative of the quality, kind and amount of grounding and orientation ((Modupe, 2002 cited by Brooks, 2018:7).

Given the above, an Afrocentric theory locates research from an African perspective and creates an African-centred intellectual perspective. It focuses on African culture to understand African experiences and interpret research data from an African perspective (Mkabela, 2015).

The previous studies on South African foreign policy have been engrossed in Euro-American knowledge systems, which have been generalized as universally suitable for every foreign policy study (Shai, 2016). This study employs Afrocentricity theory in order to examine South Africa's African agenda through the lens closest to the African people, centred and located within the African culture broadly. The aim is to understand how South African foreign policy's African agenda has been applied in Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, where South Africa's foreign policy approach has been criticized. In particular, it considers Afrocentricity as a guiding tool to study South Africa-Africa relations and uses Zimbabwe as a case study. It should be understood that the application of Afrocentrism in this study does not suggest the replacement of traditional IR theories but should be read as an effort to lobby for the contribution of Africans to IR from an African perspective. Asante (2009;3) highlighted that “the basis of Afrocentricity is the coexistence of a boundless variety of cultures, and does not deny others their place”. Thus, Afrocentricity advocates for examining all data from the position of Africans as agents rather than as objects of European point of reference (Chawane, 2016). Mvulane Moloji (2016) argues that Afrocentricity has been marginalized in IR, and this should be corrected by efforts that would encourage more Afrocentric informed investigations. This study is an attempt to contribute to this.

Scholars including Ama Mazama (2001) have expanded Asante's work on the Afrocentric idea by lengthening similar views. For instance, Mazama (2001) describes the rationale for Afrocentric theory as an attempt to solve a common problem facing Africans around the world. She contends that Afrocentricity aims to give Africans their consciousness back and view the European voice as one among others and not a superior one.

## **2.4 Traditional theoretical approaches**

While the study relies on Afrocentricity for theoretical insights, realism, liberalism, constructivism, international institutionalism, and Marxism are presented as frequently used theories of International relations which do not fully capture the African phenomenon. This section highlights their basic principles.

### **2.4.1 Realism**

To reinforce our point regarding the traditional IR theories' irrelevance to the African situation, we will revisit the critical principles of realism. Firstly, power is a fundamental feature of international relations, and the state is the main player. Given this, power becomes important as realists assume that the international system is anarchic, meaning a central authority is absent to settle disputes between nation (Waltz, 1979). In an anarchic system, nations pursue power and security to protect their interest. One nation's quest for power leaves its adversary insecure, leading to hostile interaction. Consequently, a state's military capability becomes a key factor: 'those that fail to cope will not survive' (O. R. Holsti, 2012). Second, realists view states as unitary actors pursuing national interest, defined as survival, power, security and capabilities (O. R. Holsti, 2012). Their actions respond to the external environment rather than the domestic environment. Finally, realists agree that states are rational actors. The assumption is that they think carefully about their decisions to realize their goal of survival (Hill, 2003). Because of these principles, analysis of realism theory focuses on the state as the leading actor and ignores other non-state actors. Realism helped explain the international relations of great power, but principles/varieties of realism do not seem to be suitable for African international relations.

### **2.4.2. International institutionalism**

International institutionalists challenge realism for overly focusing on war and peace and suggest that welfare, modernization, and environmental issues should be considered motivators for states' actions add (Holsti, 1995:10). They are content about the capabilities of international institutions to attain cooperation among states (Maier-rigaud, 2008). Analysts who employ the theory focus on the growing number of international institutions to explain a state's cooperation and use international institutions to explain their behaviour in the international system (Maier-rigaud, 2008). Institutionalism argues that emphasis should be placed on international institutions to explain international relations (Devitt, 2011). According to international institutionalists, interdependence and institution building emanate from the states' inability to cope independently; they cooperate, hoping to collectively

mitigate or eliminate an international self-help system (Holsti, 1998). The institutional building reduces uncertainty arising from terrorism, trade, environmental threats, immigration and the emergence of pandemics. Although states continue to be the main actors, international institutionalists also recognize that states are limited in what they can do to determine their destinies. International institutionalists argue that the actions of non-state actors cannot be ignored as they could have potent effects on the state that transcends boundaries (Holsti, 1995). These may include military groups, NGOs and businesses.

While this theory provides insights into the motivations behind the international involvement of the state, it fails to explain the behaviour of African institutions, as it does not reflect on the complex cultural realities that influence and shape the behaviour of modern African states (Nganje, 2015).

### **2.4.3 Liberalism**

Analysis informed by the liberalism school of thought considers the domestic features of individual states (Slaughter, 1995). Often called idealism, it argues that power is not the state's primary concern, but states try to work towards a just world order (Newmann, 2005). According to (Moravcsik, 2002), liberal scientific research puts the state and social centre of world politics. Maravcsik (2002) identified three common assumptions of the liberal theory: firstly, individuals and groups, not unitary states, are key actors in international politics who interact to promote their interests. This means that individuals and non-state actors are essential in the international system.

Contrary to realism, Liberals consider the role NGOs, businesses, and military groups play in international relations. First, the states' behaviour in the international system is not determined by the distribution of capabilities or information but by the relationship between these multiple actors and the government representing them (Maravcsik, 2002). Secondly, the state is a dominant actor, among other domestic actors, representing the interest of the society in the international system through foreign policy. Liberals view the state as a representative institution subject to the influence of societal actors. Finally, the third assumption of liberal theory is that states' preference shapes their behaviour in the international system. A purpose drives states to undertake any significant foreign policy action. Each state seeks to pursue its foreign policy objectives under constraints imposed by other states' preferences (Moravcsik, 2002).

Democratic principles, freedom and democratic rights, the rule of law and the open market are some of the tenets of liberalism. Thus, it seeks to advance moral goals, ensuring that states individual interests are aligned to avoid conflict (Slaughter, 1995:729). Foreign policies of liberal states demonstrate pursuing and promoting world peace (Parry, 2021). Scholars have argued that Mandela's foreign policy can be primarily understood based on idealism (Vickers, 2002). This was reflected in promoting human rights, democratic governance, equitable SADC project, and the agenda that challenged the realist, hegemonic global order that characterized the foreign policy (Vickers, 2002). Youla (2009) challenged this conclusion and argued that Mandela's foreign policy was not consistent with the principles of idealism. As such, using idealism to explain the foreign policy of Mandela gives a simplistic understanding of the complex factors involved in foreign policymaking. (Youla (2009) concluded that idealism was insufficient to explain South Africa's foreign policy.

#### **2.4.4 Constructivism**

People who have used constructivism to explain foreign policy behavior have focused on the state's political, cultural, religious, economic and social characteristics that influence their foreign policy (Newmann, 2005). The principal assumption of constructivism is that states have identities that define their behaviour in the international system (Newmann, 2005). In world politics, constructivists view states and their identities as social constructs, and they consider the values, norms, ideas and social environment as the main elements that define these identities (Wendt, 1999). According to Wendt, three elements should be considered when analyzing social outcomes: material structure, ideational structure and structure of interest. Wendt (1999:139) suggests that these elements are interlinked, and points out that “without ideas, there are no interests, without interests, there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions, there is no reality at all”. This requires one to consider the role of culture, history and norms in understanding how ideas are created to understand the behaviour of the state. However, a social structure whose ideas were privately held knowledge would be “thin”. Thus a constructivist analysis should focus on socially shared knowledge or “culture” (Alexander Wendt, 1999:141). Culture is present where shared knowledge is found; for instance, it could be institutions, norms, rules, ideologies and organizations.

#### **2.4.5 Marxism**

Marxists challenge realism's war and the state-centred features and focus on poverty, uneven development, and exploitation between and within nations (Holsti, 1998). Karl Marx and

Frederic Engels, the pioneers of Marxist theory, challenge the world capitalist system characterized by the core and periphery structure (Aarons, 1972). In this structure, core countries produce high-profit goods for themselves, the semi-peripheral and the peripheral countries, while the peripheral provides raw materials and cheap labour to the core and semi-peripheral countries to produce the high-profit goods (Pal, 2018). This world structure has exacerbated the rich and poor gap and perpetuated the dependency relationship that peripheral countries cannot escape (Holst, 1995). Marx and Engels developed an analysis that exposed the class inequalities and suggested a revolutionary approach providing insights on developing a transnational movement of people (Aarons, 1972). Following Marx and Engels death, revolutionary theorists, including Rudolph Lenin, Antonio Gramsci and Trotsky, emerged and used Marxist ideas to explain the international processes. They recognized the importance of a revolution and the possibility of overthrowing the ruling class (Aarons, 1972). These theorists agreed with Marx and Engels that there was a great class divide in the world system and unequal production distribution. Amongst these theorists, Gramsci's concept of hegemony is used widely in today's world to explain states interaction in the international system. Hegemony underlines the domination of some states over others and considers social forces and human ideas in the explanation of international processes (Gramsci, 1971; Habib & Selinyane, 2006).

The above perspectives offer useful insights into the understanding of international politics. For instance, realism provides a helpful framework by focusing on the actions of states but is not so useful in explaining African circumstances in that leaves out non-state actors who have played a significant role in shaping global politics (Habib & Selinyane, 2006). Institutional becomes an option for considering the role of non-state actors. However, it fails to acknowledge the role of hegemonic powers in shaping the global system. For example, under the Trump administration, the USA's withdrawal from multilateral platforms to pursue a unilateral approach to global problems threatened multilateralism and cooperation. This reflects on the role of hegemonic powers in the international system. Gramsci's hegemony framework is useful in international relations because it connects human ideas and practices with social forces and their environment (Habib & Selinyane, 2006). However, it assumes that states are unitary actors and ignores the reality that different sectors within a state have different goals and ideas (Schoeman, 2007). These aspects should not be ignored when explaining South Africa's foreign policy towards Africa, as they influence its behaviour. For its part, constructivism emphasis on the importance of shared interests and values between

actors in the global system is useful. Identity and social reality in constructing international politics and determining foreign policy outcomes that highlight the relationship between actors, interests, norms and identities are also useful.

The initial review suggests that the Euro-American theories are inadequate for understanding African international relations, particularly South Africa's African agenda towards other African countries. They tend to ignore culture, history, religion and racism, which shapes the behaviour of African states in the international system.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that Afrocentricity is a useful framework for understanding of South Africa's African agenda policy towards Africa. It demonstrated that traditional International Relations theories have been useful in the analysis of foreign policy issues but lack the African perspective which is needed to deal with cultural, historical and the continental factors of African foreign policy. We argued that strength of the Afrocentricity theoretical framework is that African cultural experiences are placed at the centre of the analysis. In this view, this study is guided by Asante's valuable elements of the Afrocentric theoretical framework, including locating the phenomenon within the African culture, history and continent, pursuing intellectual interest towards the direction of Africans; and viewing the world from an African perspective.

The next chapter reviews the literature on South African foreign policy towards Africa from time Mandela declared the African identity feature of the foreign policy Zuma's implementation of the African advancement policy. This context is necessary to get an idea of how scholars have understood the African agenda. The chapter also reviews the International Relations theoretical approaches to foreign policy to highlight the gap in the literature in order to justify the need for an Afrocentric analysis in the International Relations discipline.

## CHAPTER 3

### South African Foreign Policy and Africa: A Literature Review

#### 3.1 Introduction

A literature review is a systematic and explicit process that involves identifying, evaluating, and synthesizing the existing body of completed recorded work produced by researchers, scholars, and practitioners (Fink, 2014). Its purpose is to contextualize the researcher's proposed topic, inform further research, and indicate a theory base for the chosen topic (Hofstee, 2006). According to Bolderston (2018:86), "a good review can extract new ideas from others' work by synthesizing and summarizing previous work". As a result, two types of literature reviews emerged: the first is the systematic literature review which involves meta-analysis that attempts to quantitatively gather information from different sources and produce a single dissertation document (Bolderston, 2018). The second is the traditional literature review, which evaluates an existing body of knowledge and summarizes that work (Wang & Li, 2018). A formal literature review was favoured because it helped demonstrate the gap in the analysis of South Africa's African agenda policy towards Africa, particularly Zimbabwe.

Thematically, the study has identified main themes central to South Africa's African agenda policy subject, which describes South African foreign policy's African agenda under Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma during each presidential period. This chapter consists of two sections; the first one will review the literature on foreign policy analysis. The second section will deal with post-apartheid South African foreign policy literature. This section will then be divided into two categories. The first category will review literature that emerged after the 1994 transitional period and focus on South African foreign policy's African agenda under the three presidents of democratic South Africa. The second section will review themes from South African foreign policy's African agenda literature. This study focuses on South Africa's African agenda and, in particular, its approach to the Zimbabwe crisis.

#### 3.2 A review of International Relations theories

The realism, idealism and constructivism theories of International Relations dominate literature on foreign policy analysis of states. Neorealism also received attention from scholars of international relations because of its balance of power principle to the systems

hegemony (Hill, 2003). Literature has revealed that Realism is the most popular of the theories and is known for its focus on state as a unitary actor of foreign policy (Hill, 2003; Holsti, 2012; Maier-rigaud, 2008; Smith et al., 2012; Tayfur, M., 1994; Webber & Smith, 2002). According to (Tayfur, 1994;) Hill, 2003;) Smith et al., 2012) realism puts emphasis on the state's use of foreign policy to maximize its power. Holsti, (2012) argues that realist view anarchy and security as structural features of the international system in which military capabilities becomes a state's crucial factor. Webber & Smith (2002) agree and argue that this meant that competition and insecurity characterised the international politics and the main task of foreign policy was to counteract threats and competitors' actions. According to (Holsti, 2012) realism was a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order during the tensions between East and Western Europe. However, Hill (2003) criticises this theory for overlooking the role of domestic factors into foreign policy decision making. Others have criticised it for its lack of rigor and precision concerning the use of power and national interest concepts (Haas, 1953).

The second theory that received attention is neorealism which Kenneth Waltz formulated to strengthen classical realism (Hill, 2003; Holsti, 2012; Maier-rigaud, 2008). Holsti (2012) identified three propositions of neorealism: first it assumes that the world system is anarchic, decentralized and not hierarchical. Second neo-realists assume that the ultimate goal of all states is providing for their own security. Third is the assumption that the distribution of capabilities amongst states in the world system is crucial (Holsti, 2012). Hill (2003) argues that in Waltz's view, the international system represented a balance of power. Maier-rigaud (2008) is of the same view and argues that structure and the states are important for neorealist in which the structure refers to the distribution of power among states. Hill (2003) has criticized neorealism theory for its limiting qualities as a foreign policy approach. According to Hill (2003) US scholars in foreign policy analysis have mainly used neo-realism because of its scientific aspirations and the appeal of the balance of power theory to the system's hegemon. It has not been helpful in other areas outside the US.

The third theory is idealism or liberalism which focuses on human nature as a critical feature of foreign policy practice (Tayfur, 1994). According to Tayfur (1994) the central proposition of liberalism is that state structure and agency matters. The structure of government affects the behavior of liberal democratic states in the international system. Liberalist holds that individual and moral freedom is essential. Burchill (2005) argues that liberalism remains an

influential and powerful doctrine in foreign policy for its role in democratic transition in the Northern hemisphere, Africa and the globalization of the world economy. According to Burchill (2005), liberalists advocate for democracy, constitutional rights and political freedom. Liberalism argues that free markets and capitalism promotes the welfare of all by allocating scarce resources to society. Thus, liberalism allows foreign policy discussions between the state and its citizens. Liberal themes underlined by governmental discourse include advancement of democracy, the benefits of commerce, the furtherance of human rights and the need for effective international institutions (Richardson, 2002). Both realism and liberalism focus on the state and power. According to Hopf (1998), the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union made people aware of the explanatory limits of mainstream international relations theory.

Constructivism is the fourth theory which also received attention from scholars in foreign policy. Literature agrees constructivism attempted to account for the limitations of other International Relations theories after the Cold War (Burchill, 2005; Hopf, 1998) and argues that actors brought social change and shaped the international system. It views the world as socially constructed and considers the effects of ideas and beliefs in politics. Constructivism also argues that agency and structure are mutually constituted (Theys, 2018). In foreign policy terms, the ability of states to act and bring change represent the agency, and the social relations between states represent the structure. Theys (2018) argues that structure and agency influence each other and view the social relations between two nations as representing intersubjective structure, which is both nations' shared beliefs and ideas. According to (Hopf, 1998) perspective, actors develop their relations with others through a mass of norms and practices. He further argues that in the absence of norms, power exercises would be meaningless, as such, constructivism emphasizes the importance of ideas, values and norms in international relations (Hopf, 1998).

Alexander Wendt (1992), the champion of constructivist theory and social change theory, criticized the neorealist claim that anarchic structure gives self-help exogenously to process. He further argued that self-help results from the process, not structure and that self-help and power politics do not follow anarchy (Wendt, 1999). According to Wendt (1999), shared ideas are crucial elements in international relations. This work advances our understanding of the state's actions, interests and identities. According to this explanation, shared ideas construct identities and define the state's interest, influencing its behaviour in international

relations. At the same time, Finnemore (1996) criticized Wendt's theory for ignoring the influence of international organizations in international relations.

Very little foreign policy analysis has applied alternative non-Eurocentric theoretical or conceptual tools such as Afrocentricity, Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. Therefore, this is a lacuna in foreign policy that this study seeks to respond to.

### **2.3 Foreign policy analysis**

Foreign policy discussions tend to fall into a sub-discipline of foreign policy analysis, which deserves some discussion in this literature review. Regarding other models of foreign policy analysis, Smith (2012) assert that Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Rosenau and Harold and Margaret Sprout centralized the discussion of foreign policy decision making process to foreign policy since, in their view, their approach had a lot to explain about foreign policy development. According to (Gerner, 1995), the work of these scholars created three main foci of research in foreign policy, namely: a focus on the decision making of individuals and groups; comparative foreign policy; and psychological explanations of foreign policy conduct.

Gerner (1995) agrees and shows that the work of these scholars was instrumental in foreign policy analysis development since they introduced a multi-level approach to foreign policy analysis, departing from the problematic traditional analyses which assumed the state as a unitary actor in foreign policy decision making. Other frameworks of foreign policy analysis that emerged from this foundation includes Graham Allison's three-model approach to foreign policy analysis (Allison, 1969) and the individual-level theories and artificial intelligence (Gerner, 1995).

Current studies on foreign policy are constantly seeking new ways of analysis but are generally inspired by this foundational scholarship. The work of the second generation of scholars was built upon this groundwork paying attention to the state, decision making, domestic and international actors and theories of the field of foreign policy (Neack et al., 1995). Hill (2003) is of the same view arguing that foreign policy analysis has been seen as a realist because it is state-centric. However, the analysis of foreign policy began in the 1950s when scholars attempted to understand and explain foreign policy decision making (Gerner, 1995). According to Smith et al. (2012), foreign policy analysis is theoretically grounded on human decision-makers who make foreign policy.

Foreign policy analysis looks deep into the behaviour of actors in the international system and analysis the decision-making process. Thus, while states' international behaviour is essential to understanding foreign policy, the behaviour of a state in its domestic environment is also equally important, and the interaction between international and domestic sources of behaviour cannot be ignored.

The literature above suggests that foreign policy analysis has always been concerned with who makes foreign policy decisions and how they are made.

### **3.4 Foreign policy decision making and actors**

There is an emphasis on foreign policy decision making in the foreign policy literature. Foreign policy scholars focus on how countries define their international goals and interests and what resources they regard as most appropriate for conducting foreign policy (Rothgeb Jr, 1995). According to Neack et al. (1995), the state is the sovereign entity that is in charge of its territory and the people living on it enforcing rules as it deems. Rothgeb Jr (1995) noted the importance of power in the international system highlighting the essential of this to the state's self-preservation and attaining these goals through foreign policy.

State's military capabilities also became an exciting area of study in foreign policy with the view that a country's ability to exercise power was determined by its military capabilities and strength Rothgeb Jr (1995). Hill (2003) asserts that the focus on nations' foreign policy shifted from military strength to economic goals, indicating that power was no longer defined in military strength but the economy. Rothgeb Jr (1995) also noted that 'the growth in interdependence and its importance for maintaining a sound domestic economy have placed economic relationships between nations at the forefront of the issues now at the core of foreign policy. Thus, the literature indicates that foreign policy analysis assumes the state's leading foreign policy actor.

Scholars have also paid attention to what foreign policy decision-makers are thinking and doing to explain foreign policy decisions (Allison, 1969; George, 1967; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). George, (1967) has argued that knowledge of belief system provides a critical input for behavioral analysis of decision making and leadership styles. Allison (1969) in his famous Cuban missile crisis analysis argued that his rational actor, bureaucratic political and organisational process models provided a useful framework for decision making analysis as they view a phenomenon from different lenses. Others have argued that decision making

analysis should be centred on actors because they are decision makers (Hudson, 2005). According to Carlsnaes (2012), actors and structures are always present and are crucial in foreign policy making. The focus on actors has been on those actively involved in foreign policy decision making, such as the heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers and secretaries (Hill, 2003).

Cognitive processes have also played a prominent role in foreign policy analysis. Current research on cognitive aspect of foreign policy analysis has evolved from Holsti and Rosenau who have examined the changes in the US opinion leaders' belief and perception (Neack et al., 1995). Rosati (1995) work was also built on this from this. Rosati (1995) argues that cognitive analysis helps us understand policy formulation and conduct and illustrates this by explaining the role of policy makers' beliefs and images. George, (1967) work on the operational code has also demonstrated that belief system of decision makers is critical for understanding foreign policy decisions. He argues that 'operational code' construct does this as it comprehends that aspect of the political actor's knowledge and structuring of the political world which he attempts to operate to advance his interest (George, 1969).

According to Rosati (1995) the cognitive approach challenges the traditional Western assumption premised on the rational actor that governments and their political actors think and act rationally and adapt to changes in the environment. Rosati (1995) concluded that a cognitive approach is helpful in foreign policy analysis because of its significant explanatory and predictive power. However, Rapport, (2016) has criticized cognitive theories of foreign policy analysis for their biasness towards populations that are industrialized, western, rich, educated and democratic. The challenge with cognitive analysis and its Eurocentric approach is that is heavily focused on leaders and their ideologies.

Given the above, Haney (1995) proposed an institutional perspective to be used for decision analysis during international to see how structures of foreign policy management built for a crisis can have patterned effects on the decision-making process that the group of leaders employ. This approach points to the importance of institutions and how they shape foreign policy. Moreover, it argues that the institutional perspective highlights the potential nature of the relationship between structure and process. Haney (1995) found that an institutional perspective may help to guide research in foreign policymaking processes by highlighting the potential nature of the relationship between structure and process.

Rational choice is another approach that has been criticized for its assumptions on rational actors, which assumes that international relations explanations can be reduced to individual actions (Hill, 2003). Farkas (1996) also pointed at rational choice's vulnerability due to its lack of theory explaining how non-rational individuals can behave as if they were rational actors. Rational choice is grounded on the assumption that actors follow a strategy that will maximize their utility based on their information and beliefs about the world's state (Farkas, 1996). Indeed, rational choice is limited due to its failure to account for non-rational actors and its assumptions that decision making should focus on individuals.

The public choice theory addresses these limitations and focuses on collective action (Hill, 2003). According to Willett (2002) public choice analyses inclusively focus on rationality, institutions' influence, and collective action issues. These approaches are helpful in foreign policy analysis but do not offer much for African cases. For instance, there is no consideration for the African culture (which differs from the American and European), or it is colonial history, which plays a significant role in the behaviour of African foreign policies in the international system.

For years, Africa has played a significant role in international relations, but surprisingly, this area is neglected by mainstream theories of international relations. As seen above, Foreign policy analysis literature is concentrated on American and European case studies and activities and tend to be quiet on international engagement in Africa. It does not account for liberation struggle history and the impact of colonialism, which both influences the behavior of African leaders on multilateral and bilateral platforms. As such, it fails to account for Africa's interstate, and recently, intrastate politics. As such, it approaches foreign policies of African countries from a Euro-American perspective. This perspective doesn't fully capture the experiences and the approaches of Africans. Subsequently, the absence of the African voice needed to tell African stories from an African perspective continue to be largely marginalized by the International Relations discipline.

### **235 Foreign policy**

Different scholars of international relations have provided different definitions and interpretations of foreign policy. According to Tayfur, (1994), foreign policy results from domestic processes that the state uses to interact with other states. Holsti (2012) also viewed foreign policy as actions of a state towards the external environment. Both definitions

illuminate that foreign policy involves the actions of states with the outside world. However, these definitions offer a constrained and exclusive description of foreign policy. In this regard, Smith et al. (2012) argue that 9/11, which involved attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 by the al-Qaeda group, changed the international system's structure. Following Smith's cue, we, therefore, consider regional bodies such as African Union (AU) and European Union (EU), international NGO's and military groups and companies as international actors.

Consequently, both definitions are inadequate because they exclude non-state actors mentioned above. On the other hand, (Hill, 2003) broadly defines foreign policy as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations. This definition by Hill accommodates both state and non-state actors who participate in the international system.

Landsberg (2010) agrees that foreign policy and diplomacy are concurrent, he also emphasizes that they do not denote one thing. For instance, foreign policy refers to the input side of the process or the strategy, whereas diplomacy relates to the output or execution by the state or non-state actor (Landsberg, 2010). In foreign policy, diplomacy is essential because it lays out how actors conduct their foreign activities. According to Smith et al. (2012), foreign policy is relevant because it contributes to understanding international actors' behaviour. Our focus is on the South African foreign policy and its execution: diplomacy.

### **3.6 South African foreign policy discussions**

The literature has identified two main strands of discussion on what shaped South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards Africa. The first is that the end of apartheid in 1994 prompted South Africa to search for a new national and international identity (Nel & Carlsnaes, 2006). The second contends that the end of the Cold War resulted in a retreat of the West from Africa, thus creating room for closer African cooperation (Landsberg, 2010). When South Africa entered the end of Cold War international space, scholars were interested to understand how the new foreign policy would frame South Africa's role in the global landscape (Geldenhuys, 2006; Landsberg, 1994). In response, Geldenhuys (2006) framed Pretoria's role as a norm entrepreneur after the country assumed a norm creator and promoter at multilateral forums. Since then, scholars have described the new foreign policy as a “human rights” policy owing to its strong focus on promoting human rights, democratic

processes and good governance (Borer & Mills, 2011). Although South Africa had established itself as a good global citizen, scholars noted that Pretoria struggled to play the norm promoter role in the continent while pursuing solidarity with other African countries (C. Alden, 2002; Nathan, 2008; Qobo & Dube, 2015). Similarly, Nathan (2008) has argued that Pretoria has struggled to balance the moral posture of the foreign policy with its ideologies and African interest under the African agenda policy. Both Alden, (2002) and Qobo & Dube, (2015) agree that South Africa's approach towards the Zimbabwe crisis highlights this imbalance. According to Sidiropoulos (2007), Mbeki's ascendancy to presidency accelerated this repositioning and signaled a shift from the norm promoter to the continent's recovery and weight in global platforms.

Two categories of literature which described the behavior of South African foreign policy were identified. . The first category focused on transforming South Africa's foreign policy, which Alden & le Pere (2006) call 'foreign policy of transition'. The scholars here focused on the African agenda, peace diplomacy, human rights diplomacy, multilateral engagements and international strategies of successive SA governments. The second category focused on South Africa's role and position in the international system; the debates were centred on; how South African identity might be described, South Africa's shifting foreign policy objectives and emerging powers, multilateral engagement.

### **3.6.1 South African foreign policy towards Africa**

South African foreign policy is discussed in wide-ranging themes covering many angles. One of them is the ambition to transform Africa. This has been reflected extensively in the literature examining different aspects of the new democratic government. Much has been said about the African agenda from different angles. It has been a subject of discussion wide-ranging way. Below is a thematic review of what has been argued.

#### **3.6.1.1 The African agenda**

Although South Africa was regarded as an international pariah during apartheid and hostile to its African counterparts, in 1994, it overhauled its foreign policy with a strong focus on the continent (Geldenhuys, 2006). Geldenhuys (2006) describes South Africa's transition from a pariah to an influential global player. According to Mills et al. (1997), a pariah state's domestic behaviour offends the international community. In this view, offensive behaviour is often associated with the country or a leader expected to mend their way by punishing them.

In their analysis, Mills et al. (1997) raise the question of who decides what constitutes offensive, punishable behaviour? Moreover, it concludes that the UN is the global body with the authority to call out and punish. However, this UN's rhetoric is challenged by Mutua (2001) for lack of balance as it fails to respond to the needs of the Third World.

Nevertheless, the discussion about SA's transition focuses on its pre-1994 and post- 1994. For instance, Geldenhuys (2006) noted that South Africa was ostracized by multilateral forums, including the UN General Assembly, UN Security Council and the Commonwealth, over its domestic racial policies and its occupation of South West Africa (Namibia). This was demonstrated by its role as a prominent norm formulator in multilateral forums, in particular Africa (Geldenhuys, 2006). Chris Alden and le Pere (2003) focused on Pretoria's new leadership in the continent and the globe and its new foreign policy priorities.

A significant focus of the South African foreign policy analysis relates to the so-called African agenda, its meanings, its manifestation, its champions and its impacts to different extents (Landberg, 2007; Landsberg, 2010; Sidiropoulos, 2007; Zondi, 2015). According to Zondi (2015), the African agenda was formed out of the interface between three traditions: Africanity, Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. The African agenda calls for Africans to re-become Africans, a united Africa, and it called for a renewal of Africa (Zondi, 2015), 2015). Landberg (2007) view the African agenda as a policy that considers political systems, accelerated economic growth and peace and security as drivers of development in Africa. Consequently, Lansberg et al. (2007) argue that South Africa has pursued activist diplomacy, politically principled and pragmatic, and economic conservative in nature through the African agenda. Sidiropoulos (2007) suggests that the African agenda policy should be viewed against the background of South Africa's continental role to influence a dialogue focused on good governance and democratic processes. Nabudere (2001) extends this argument and asserts that the African agenda policy should be viewed as South Africa's attempt to position Africa and South Africa in the new global context.

Bohler-Muller (2012) has defined the African agenda as the basis for a strategy through which South Africa wishes to be seen as a fundamental part of Africa. This definition describes the African agenda as a South African strategy and an orientation of South African foreign policy but does not say who is included and excluded. Zondi (2015) describes the African agenda as about asserting the African identity of South Africans and their desire to be part of Africa rising from the ashes. This means that the philosophical principles inform the

African agenda of African renaissance or renewal, which assert that Africa is rising and taking its place in the world while also ensuring that peace, democracy and prosperity are restored to the continent (Zondi, 2015). According to Landsberg (2007), the African agenda is a wide range of measures to make democracy, peace, security, and economic growth the basis for development in Africa. Landsberg (2010) later described it as an "African modernization strategy", and South Africa's role was to play a lead, amongst other African leaders, in negotiating Africa's post-Cold War and post-apartheid agenda and globally voicing out Africa's concerns in the arenas of global power and governance.

Literature has established that Mbeki's 'I am an African' speech launched the African agenda policy (Jili, 2000; Landsberg, 2010; Schoeman, 2007; Zondi, 2015). Indeed, in this speech, Mbeki used symbols, images, and metaphors to remind South Africans that the Republic remains attached to Africa and announced the new foreign policy orientation. Zondi (2015) identifies four declarations from the speech in which he argues it announce the African agenda framework as being about South Africa asserting its African identity and wanting to be part of Africa arising. Accordingly, Zondi (2015) highlights the proclamation as I am born of the continent of Africa; Africa is rising and will contribute to the evolution of humanity; Africa will prosper, and Africa shall be at peace.

Theoretically, the African agenda is grounded on Pan-Africanism. At this point, it is helpful to revisit the critical components of Pan-Africanist thoughts. First, Pan-Africanists promote African unity, and they believe that peoples of Africa should unite and become self-reliant (Murithi, 2007). African unity, which initially served as an inspiration to abolish and resist colonialism and imperialism in the modern era, is viewed from the point of African solidarity and a unifying symbol for all Africans to cooperate in shaping their future (Jili, 2000). Second, Regional integration is key to South Africa's foreign policy agenda because it promotes economic growth, maintains peace and security and alleviates poverty in Africa (Landsberg, 2007; 2015; Kornegay, 2015). Third, Pan-Africanists firmly believe in overcoming dependency on external assistance. Fourth, Pan-Africanists are driven by their aim to overcome any traces of colonialism and imperialism. Thus Zondi (2015) argues that ideological matters underpinning South African foreign policy are best captured by Pan-Africanism, Africity and African renaissance concepts provide a useful framework for understanding the meaning of the African agenda. Zondi's work lays a good foundation for Afrocentric approaches to South African foreign policy towards Africa. This study

contributes to this groundwork and argues that Afrocentrism provides a valuable framework for understanding South African foreign policy.

### **3.6.1.2 Mandela and the foreign policy moral values**

Scholars who have written about Mandela's foreign policy have focused on South Africa's transition period and the contradictions between the activist role of the foreign policy built upon the human rights norms, the African solidarity and the national interest. For instance, Alden & le Pere (2003) have argued that the foreign policy of Mandela struggled because of tensions between prioritizing South Africa's national interest and its role as a global promoter of democracy and human rights, as well as the lack of synergy between the Department of Foreign Affairs and domestic concerns. Similarly, analyzing Mandela's transformative state, Landsberg (2010) argued that Mandela's foreign policy struggled to harmonize the moral values and principles and its economic and commercial self-interest and articulate its national interest to address the socio-economic and developmental challenges. Regarding Mbeki's foreign policy, Alden & le Pere (2003) are persuaded that the Pan-African grounded policy also struggled to reconcile the global goals and their desire to do good, though Mbeki revamped the foreign policy to provide greater coherence and consistency. Nathan (2008) argues that Pretoria's foreign policy became entirely coherent under Thabo Mbeki's administrations, citing African and Africanist orientation, respect for human rights, democracy, multilateralism and conflict resolution as the themes which gave the foreign policy coherence. Graham (2014) links the challenges of foreign policy to the ANC. He argued that the ruling party's lack of a broader strategic foreign policy framework during exile, which could inform and direct the government's international efforts, was a disadvantage (Graham, 2014).

Amongst the challenges mentioned above, the desire for South Africa to realize its foreign policy moral goals through the promotion of human rights and the imperatives to shape African solidarity and unity was highlighted as the main contradiction (Landsberg, 2010; Landsberg, 2000; le Pere, 2014; Marthoz, 2012). There was consensus that Mandela's government was torn between realizing its ethical foreign policy objectives and the desire to champion African solidarity and unity. Some scholars praised Mandela for championing human rights and democratic governance at multilateral forums. However, according to Adebajo (2007) this caused irritation amongst African leaders when Mandela called for the isolation of Nigeria after General Abacha's gross violation of human rights. Scholars such as

Landsberg (2010) have used this case study to explain the foreign policy shift during Mbeki's administration. Landsberg (2010) argues that the moralistic ideals clashed with Pretoria's economic aspirations, prompting the government to reconsider its diplomatic approach in Africa. Interestingly, Although Mbeki's foreign policy had greater coherence and clarity, it was condemned for favouring African solidarity over human rights promotion (Nathan, 2008). According to (Nathan, 2011), South Africa's position on regimes responsible for gross human rights violations, including Burma, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, resulted from its Africanist agenda. (Nathan, 2011) argues that Pretoria's resistance to international pressure on dictatorial regimes was reactionary, shielding these regimes and undermining international protection of human rights.

Scholars have also identified four events that exposed the limitations of Mandela's moral and human rights driven foreign policy (Alden & le Pere, 2003; Landsberg, 2010; Landsberg, 2000; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). The first event is what the literature calls the “Two China dilemma” that has confronted South Africa under Mandela (Alden & le Pere, 2003). The Mandela government was faced with a need to make critical decisions on balancing South Africa's diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan) and relations with the People's Republic of China - hereafter called China (Alden, 2019) . The situation was complicated because China premised its relations with others to the “One China principle”, which decrees that Taiwan forms part of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the only government representing the whole of China (Wei, 2013) Therefore, recognition of China implied de-recognition of Taiwan and vice versa. As a result, the Mandela government had to decide whether to continue with the smaller country of Taiwan since it supported the ANC struggle against the apartheid regime or resume relations with China which were emerging as a global power player but had a terrible human rights record (Pfister, 2006). Eventually, on 28 November 1998, Mandela announced that South Africa would bestow full diplomatic recognition to China and downgrade relations with Taiwan (Alden & Wu, 2016).

The second event was the Nigeria imbroglio which concerned the execution of nine Nigerian human rights activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa, by Nigerian Head of state General Sani Abacha in 1995 (Landsberg, 2010; 2000; Schoeman, 2007). Scholars used the case study to highlight South Africa's limited influence in Africa as a peace builder (Landsberg, 2010). Others highlighted South Africa's failure to interpret the intricacies of African diplomacy

after Pretoria failure to garner support from other African leaders who viewed this move as pro-West and un-African (Adebajo, 2007). Alden (2019) and Landsberg (2010) agree that this incident prompted the ANC to review their Africa foreign policy and framed it as the African agenda.

The third event is what Alden & le Pere (2019) calls “Implosion of Zaire”, which involved an attempt by Mandela to broker a ceasefire agreement between Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila in 1997 (Pfister, 2006). South Africa intervened in Zaire with the hope to usher in a fluid and peaceful transfer of power. However, Kabila would only agree to a ceasefire if Mobutu were to descend power with immediate effect and he (Kabila) takes over as president. Eventually, Kabila walked out of the negotiations and later ceased power in May 2007.

The fourth event concerns South Africa's military intervention in Lesotho in September 1998 after an ongoing political instability was worsened by the 1998 elections outcomes (Pfister, 2006; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). Opposition parties and a group of activists disputed the election results of the 1998 elections. The government responded by setting up a commission to investigate whether there any irregularities. The commission found that the elections were not rigged, which kindled protest and an attempt to overthrow the government (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). South Africa responded by sending 600 troops to stabilize the country. The event highlighted contradictions in democratic South Africa's foreign policy in which Pretoria had initially refused to use hard power in the form of the military to respond to Maseru's request for support citing the use of military intervention in the Southern African region, an instrument used by the apartheid regime to destabilize the region (Pfister, 2006). Given this, most scholars agree that these 'tests' prompted South Africa to use quiet diplomacy as the primary approach of the foreign policy intervention in Africa, a concept associated with President Thabo Mbeki.

### **3.6.1.3 Mbeki's African agenda policy**

Mbeki's famous ‘I am an African speech’ accelerated the debate about the African agenda in the late 1990's. There were questions among scholars concerning who is African and who isn't (Jili, 2000; Maloka, 2001; Van Kessel, 2002; Zondi, 2015). Landsberg, (2015) argued that this speech was about South Africa's desire to be about of the continent and what they will seek to achieve. According to Landsberg (2007) the African agenda refers to a policy

designed to accelerate Africa's economic development by addressing peace, democratic governance and economic growth. Consequently, the literature has revealed that Mbeki solidified and shaped the African policy agenda during his tenure as president (Habib, 2009; Masters et al., 2015; Qobo & Dube, 2015). Habib (2009) argues that Mbeki put the African renaissance at the centre of South African foreign policy, prioritizing the African agenda. Qobo & Dube (2015) are of the same view reporting that South Africa emphasized African renaissance during Thabo Mbeki's term as president.

Scholars writing about the African agenda have demonstrated how Mbeki translated the African Renaissance policy into actions (Landberg, 2007; 2010; Zondi, 2015). First, Mbeki's preferred strategy was that of partnership and alliance formation, as a consequence, Mbeki established strategic partnerships with key African leaders such as Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Meles Zenawi, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza of Mozambique (Lansberg 2010). Mbeki chose to work with them because of their presence and influence in their sub-regions, continent and globally, and they shared similar interests with South Africa. Landsberg (2007) identified Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Chissano as Mbeki's 'closest and most strategic' allies due to their coordination that produced African foreign policy strategies. Indeed, this partnership produced RECs, NEPAD, MAP, and reform SADC and AU. In pursuit of the African agency, Mbeki and the African leaders resolved to discard the 'follower' identity to become a dominant geopolitical partner in global affairs. According to Zondi (2015:100), the group demanded that Africa be heard in global institutions. As such, Zondi observed that Africa's presence grew in the UN, and its voice gained prominence; the Group of Eight (G8) created Africa Action Plan and the Africa Partnership Forum.

### **Building new partnerships with the rich world**

Second, scholars (Landberg, 2007; Landsberg, 2012; Sako, 2004) view the NEPAD as an expression of the African renaissance's development aspect presented as a commitment and a pledge by African leaders to eradicate poverty end underdevelopment and marginalization of Africa. Sako (2004) asserts that the NEPAD sets the agenda for the continent's renewal that announces a new framework for Africa's engagement with the world. (Landberg, 2007) agrees and adds that the NEPAD was an attempt to build new relations with donor governments based on a shared commitment to upholding global standards of democracy. For instance Sako (2004) identified the NEPAD's objectives as implementing and developing

clear standards to ensure accountability amongst African government, transparency and developing solid institutions to support good governance, politics and economy. Sako (2004) argues that the AU should develop a vital institution to support and achieve the objectives of the NEPAD.

On the other hand, Landsberg (2007) emphasized that NEPAD highlighted greater coordination between African leaders as they collectively engaged the developed world to African support peace operations and increased the levels of trade. He points out that South Africa worked together with Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal to pursue a new and genuine partnership with the developed world. The NEPAD was a product of both the Millennium African Renaissance Partnership Programme (MAP) and the New Africa Initiative (NAI), which served as the AU's economic development plan for the African continent aimed at sustaining G8's development commitment in Africa (Monyae, 2012). The former was a developmental plan which contended for global partnership and put on the table the idea of Africa benefitting from the 'global revolution' (Landsberg, 2010). The latter was an effort to introduce new developmental discourse into African politics, and it called for a new partnership between Africa and its global partners (Landsberg, 2010). Saka, Momoh, Zakeri (2015) later conducted a study to assess the progress of the NEPAD since its inception. They found that the framework had implemented the impactful programme in agriculture, ICT, education, export and institutional transformation within the NEPAD. Despite this, they concluded that the NEPAD needed to consolidate domestic funding and recommitment of African leaders.

Third, the literature has revealed that the NEPAD informed the establishment of the APRM about taking forward the implantation of the excellent governance objective (Paterson & Virk, 2014). The Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as the central drivers of the development of the APRM in 2003, whose aim was to promote governance and democracy amongst African states (Landberg, 2007; Landsberg, 2012; Monyae, 2012). According to Sidiropoulos (2007), the establishment of punitive measures by Mbeki and Olusegun against the *coup d'état* highlighted the restructuring process of Africa's governance architecture. Landsberg (2012) agrees and adds that the two leaders used the "yellow and red card" analogy to warn non-complying nations. The "yellow" would be issued to warn the protagonist to return to democratic rule in the event of a coupe, and if they fail to comply,

they then face the punitive punishment of a red card and get expelled from the OAU (Landsberg, 2012).

Fourth, the literature has established that South Africa played a central role in the transition of the Organization of African Union (OAU) to African Union (AU) as part of the foreign policy goal's shaping of the continental and regional institutions (Landberg, 2007; Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014; Paterson & Virk, 2014b; Sidiropoulos, 2007). The transition was instituted after adopting the Abuja Treaty (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). For instance, Sidiropoulos, (2007) argued that South Africa's goal was to set up the continental architecture to ensure that it was well placed to effectively address security and development challenges in Africa, particularly conflict resolution. Indeed, an analysis conducted by Paterson and Virk (2014) revealed that AU and the NEPAD were at the centre of Mbeki's African agenda to promote the new architecture for the improvement of peace and socio-economic challenges. Mbeki became the first chairperson of the AU in 2002 and worked closely with Obasanjo of Nigeria to develop the AU Constitutive Act, shaped the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force (Murithi, 2007). South Africa placed enormous emphasis on institution building, creating norms, and creating a union of African states guided by shared values (Landsberg, 2007).

The reconstruction of Africa's institutional architecture saw the strengthening of the African Union (AU) and SADC to ensure economic stability and peace in the continent (Landberg, 2007; Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014; Sidiropoulos, 2007; van Nieuwkerk, 2012a). Some view it as an expression of pan-Africanism which highlights the solidarity and coordination of African nations to address the plague of problems they face (Landsberg, 2012; Murithi, 2007) Landsberg, 2012). For instance, Murithi (2007) noted the African leaders' efforts to institutionalize Pan-Africanism in the form of the AU but wondered whether the AU could translate its norms and principles into policies that could effectively address the challenges of instability, poor governance and underdevelopment. In response, Landsberg (2012:2) evaluated the progress of this "new pan-Africanism" and found that the AU has struggled to translate policies into action due to weak leadership and lack of resources. Oguonu & Ezeibe (2014) agree and argue that the perpetual rise of conflict in Africa highlights this limitation of the AU. Despite Mbeki and his allies effort to strengthen the AU, they continued to see increased conflicts. This highlighted the limitations of the AU as Africa's peace architecture.

## Regional integration

Sixth, the literature shows also that Mbeki's African agenda policy promoted Regional Economic Communities (REC's) intending to accelerate African development and integration (Landsberg, 2012; 2010; Zondi, 2015; 2012). Two themes emerging under RECs discussion are accelerating regional integration to strengthen regional security architecture, creating development frameworks, and South Africa's reluctance to exercise regional power.

Literature has identified the transformation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation as projects which Mbeki championed under this theme (Landberg, 2007; Landsberg, 2015; Matlosa, 2007; van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Van Nieuwkerk (2011) explores the relationship between the AU and its RECs, including SADC and ECOWAS, regarding peacemaking in Africa. He argues that the misalignment in vision between the AU and the RECs hinders these institutions from effectively tackling conflict in the continent because of the OAU reform. His study highlighted the need for greater alignment, which Mbeki sought to achieve through regional integration. Matlosa (2007) found efforts to improve these relations under Thabo Mbeki and argued that the foreign policy was more pronounced under Mbeki than Mandela. Zondi (2015) agrees and noted that Mbeki had played a role, including establishing a warning system and a standby force. According to Paterson and Virk (2014), South Africa also promoted trade through the Southern African Customs Unit (SACU).

Regarding the regional power, the literature suggests that scholars were disappointed that South Africa was punching below its weight regarding the leadership role in the region. This has led scholars to wonder whether South Africa's role in the region should be framed as hegemony, regional power or behemoth (Alden & Schoeman, 2015; Alden & Soko, 2005; Habib, 2009; Prys, 2008; Schoeman, 2007). Alden & Schoeman (2015) have argued that though South Africa's hegemonic dominance over the continent is challenged by the weakness of goods and inconsistencies in its foreign policy successes, the country continues to be considered as an influential player in the continent and is rewarded with international roles. They argue that this symbolic representation contributes to foreign policy dilemma for South Africa which is struggling to fulfil its hegemonic role in the continent (Alden & Schoeman, 2015). For instance, Schoeman (2007) wondered what South Africa's role is in Africa and concluded that the country is striving for a hegemonic role with elements of the partnership. Alden and Schoeman (2015) have argued that South Africa's hegemony is incomplete in its material form and cannot exercise leadership even when an opportunity

arises despite its status as regional representative on global platforms. Prys (2008) responded and argued that most are disappointed because of an academic failure and not necessarily an empirical failure of regional powers to fulfil their hegemonic roles. Claims that scholars struggle to understand South Africa's role in the region because most do not clearly understand what hegemony is not. Prys (2008) claims that the current theories of hegemony are defined at the global level and do not effectively explain the behavior of regional hegemons.

#### **3.6.1.4 Peace diplomacy in Africa**

What role South Africa played in peace diplomacy in Africa, what it had to gain from it and what results it produced is another area of debate in the literature. South Africa's peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa gained eminence towards Mandela's presidency term. Scholars focused on South Africa's involvement in Zimbabwe, the Great Lakes region and Côte d'Ivoire. Van Nieuwkerk (2012) defines South African peace diplomacy as a diplomatic tool used by the South African government to pursue Pretoria's peacemaking objectives in the African continent. In this regard, Miti (2012) identified two things that have influenced Pretoria's involvement in conflict resolution: the first one is the belief that conflict is a significant deterrent to development on the continent. Miti (2012) further argues that conflict perpetuates the negative image of a 'dark continent' associated with Africa, warding off investors which the continent needs to unlock its riches. Zondi (2015) also argues that Africans continue to be understood in terms of lack of peace, deficiency of governance and deficiencies of democracy: an image that Mbeki hoped to dispel when he called for an African renewal. Through the NEPAD, Mbeki argued for global partnership, a strategic partnership between the African continent and industrialized world and advancing democracy and good governance in Africa (Landsberg, 2010). In this regard, South Africa was unsuccessful in erasing this negative energy because Africa is still inundated by ongoing conflicts in different parts of the continent.

The second factor is South Africa's Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiation process that was seen as a conflict resolution model in the continent (Miti, 2012). It puts more emphasis on inclusiveness and compromise. Miti (2012) criticizes CODESA for its limitations when applied in other countries in the continent, underscoring that it cannot be replicated to other conflict situations because of the uniqueness of the South African situation. (Curtis, 2007) has also criticized this model's limitations when applied in Burundi

and Congo. Miti's (2010) analysis provides a background to South Africa's peace diplomacy approach towards the African continent.

Van Nieuwkerk (2012) also identified two phases in post-apartheid South African foreign policy to help us understand Pretoria's peace diplomacy approach towards Africa. The first phase is identified as the period between 1994 and 1998 in which the government of South Africa pursued the human rights foreign policy and projected a 'morally superior attitude' towards Africa. This was also when South Africa learned lessons about the limitations of its Africa foreign policy after the Nigeria imbroglio and Lesotho military intervention. The second phase was between 1999 and 2000, identified as a period of African renaissance characterized by a multilateral approach and institution building. Literature here focuses on Mbeki as the champion of the African renaissance and his strategies such as NEPAD and APRM.

Third, the literature also shows that SA pursued peace diplomacy and military deployment to stabilize the continent as part of the foreign policy's engagement. The SADC and Horn of Africa regions emerged as the areas of interest that dominated literature under South Africa's peace diplomacy theme (Alden, 2002; Bischoff, 2006; Sidiropoulos, 2007; Taylor & Williams, 2001a; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). Scholars noted a shift from a unilateral approach to conflict resolution to a collective diplomatic approach with a strong emphasis on the culture of cooperation under Mbeki's tenure (Bischoff, 2006). Quiet diplomacy emerged as South Africa's preferred method of conflict resolution in Africa. However, some scholars have wondered if it is the best method for tackling conflict in the continent (Alden, 2002). These concerns were later validated by van Nieuwkerk & Lalbahabur (2020), who have noted that there is continuing instability in most countries where South Africa has led peace intervention, including in the DRC Zimbabwe, Burundi, Sudan and Lesotho. Although in Burundi and the DRC, the views are mixed, with some noting South Africa success (Sidiropoulos, 2007) and some noting unsuccessful attempts (Taylor & Williams, 2001). Besides the lukewarm progress, some scholars have acknowledged South Africa's leadership in the launch of the AU's Peace and Security Council, the Constitutive Act and the creation of the SADC Organ on Peace, Defence and Security Cooperation (Chris Landsberg, 2012; Sidiropoulos, 2007).

### 3.6.1.5 The rhetoric of African renewal

Another theme in the foreign policy literature is on the rhetorical dimensions of the African agenda, primarily as championed by Mbeki. Peter Vale and Maseko's article on the African renaissance in the late 1990s framed this debate about the role of philosophy, ideas, and personality in making the post-apartheid South African foreign policy. In this article, Vale and Maseko explain South Africa's relationship with the African continent in the context of the African Renaissance. They do this by identifying two contrasting concepts of Africa's development; the 'globalist interpretation' contends SA pursues its economic interest through the African Renaissance. The 'Africanist interpretation' emphasizes that the African Renaissance should find a new African identity that will change the international circumstances (Vale & Maseko, 1998).

Since then, discussions on the African renaissance have focused on Mbeki as its champion, who pursued it under the African agenda strategy from 1998 onward (Landsberg & Hlophe, 1999; Maloka, 2001; Nabudere, 2001). (Nabudere, 2001) analysis has focused on the ideological perspective of the African renaissance arguing that the concept is useful in the struggle of Africans to redefine a political and an ideological agenda of pan-Africanism in the age of globalization. Nabudere (2001) argues that the African renaissance challenges the rights of Europeans to impose their culture on Africans' spiritual values relegating African cultures to the bottom. For this reason, Evaldsson & Wessles (2004) argues that the African Renaissance is necessary to decolonize the thinking of Africans who see themselves as inferior beings. Africans must believe they can change their lives. According to Landsberg & Hlophe, (1999) Mbeki's African renaissance was a call to Africans to bring change into their continent. They highlight how Mbeki used his speech to announce South Africa's Africa policy to respond to conflict, poverty and non-democratic systems. Maloka (2001) views the African renaissance according to three perspective. First, the globalist perspective which he associates with South Africa's aspirations for economic and political renewal of the continent. Second, the pan-African perspective locates the African renaissance debate within the pan-African tradition. Third, the culturist perspective views the African renaissance as a call to return to the African culture which has the notion of Ubuntu (Maloka, 2001). According to Landsberg (2010), the African agenda afforded South Africa a pivotal role in crafting a developmental and socio-economic plan to promote democratic governance and development that lured investment from the West, market access and aid. Mbeki pursued this role through the NEPAD. According to Landsberg (2010), Mbeki's ascension to power in

1999 put South Africa at the centre of continental and regional institution building, including negotiating strategic partnerships between Africa and global powers through the NEPAD. According to le Pere (2014), the Africa agenda was Mbeki's effort to engage intently and vigorously with the forces of globalization and the agents of the liberal global order to improve growth and development opportunities for South Africa and Africa. However, le Pere (2014) argues that South Africa's development and leadership efforts in the continent and region has been undermined by its failure to influence authoritarian governments to uphold human rights.

Scholars have criticized the African agenda's neoliberal underpinnings and its inability to balance South African foreign policy's human rights values and political interest. For instance, Nathan (2008) argues that the anti-imperialist character of the South African foreign policy overrides Pretoria's commitment to human rights and democracy. Qobo & Dube (2015) criticized Mbeki's African agenda for ignoring human rights concerns in Africa. Under the African agenda, South Africa did not appear to proactively defend African people's human rights, particularly in Zimbabwe (Qobo, 2017). Borer & Mills (2011) also criticize Mbeki's African agenda for overlooking human rights in Africa and other developing countries and argue that it contradicts ideologies. Theoretically, some scholars have explained South Africa's approach in Zimbabwe in terms of a shift from realism to idealism (Qobo & Dube, 2015; Taylor & Williams, 2017; Youla, 2009). However, (Lipton, 2009) criticizes this approach for being unsatisfactory because it assumes that all foreign policies involve interaction between idealism and realism. In this regard, Pfister (2006) noted that scholars were also divided according to these two IR theories: there was a group that called for a morally driven policy based on human rights and democratic governance that challenges the global hegemonic order (Borer & Mills, 2011; Vale & Maseko, 1998); and those who favoured a commercially driven neoliberal policy of Mbeki (Alden & Sako, 2005).

However, this analytical conversation is weakened by the excessive focus on African leaders while overlooking African history, culture and people giving the impression that the interest of their leaders defines the good of African people. The debate almost suggests that the African agenda, its ideologies and principles sustain demagogues' power at the expense of the citizen. Furthermore, the analysis on African agenda policy towards Africa has been informed by International Relations theories such as realism, idealism, constructivism, and neo-liberalism. When applied to African situations, the limitation of these mainstream theories is

their inability to explain phenomena from an African perspective. This shortcoming in the African agenda literature-inspired this study. The study benefited from the analysis and contestation found in the literature, which laid its background.

### **3.6.1.6 African policy during the Zuma years, 2009 to 2017**

In the literature, there is also a debate about whether there is continuity and change between the Mbeki years and the Zuma years concerning the African agenda (Landsberg, 2014; Mpungose, 2018; Olivier, 2012; Sidiropoulos, 2007; Zondi, 2015). There was consensus in the literature that Zuma's administration continued to promote the African agenda after Mbeki's unprecedented unseating in 2008. Landsberg (2014) argued that Zuma's foreign policy shows the idea of a concentric circle made up of the national interest, the African agenda, North-South, South-South engagement and African peace and security and political governance. He further suggested that it pursued African engagement under "African advancement", which was pursued under Africa continental and improving regional integration of SADC (Landsberg, 2014). The Zuma government saw continental integration through RECs as the preferred trajectory for Africa's development. According to (Landsberg, 2015), South Africa achieved this through SADC protocols such as improving security and stability, transport, public administration and infrastructure. Furthermore, the Zuma government pursued regional developmental integration through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which promoted trade, development and revenue in the sub-region.

The literature has shown that peace diplomacy continued to be a priority under the Zuma government (Olivier, 2012; van Nieuwkerk, 2012; Zondi, 2015). South Africa continued to lead peace initiatives in Africa through engagement and deployment of the military (Landsberg, 2012). There was also interest in Zuma's approach to conflict resolution, peacebuilding in the SADC region, Libya and the Ivory Coast crisis and the approach to the UNSC (Monyae, 2012; Naidu, 2015; Olivier, 2003; van Nieuwkerk, 2012; Siphamandla Zondi, 2012). However, there were still concerns about South Africa's voting pattern at the UNSC, framed as under-prioritizing human rights to strengthen new alliances with China and Russia (Olivier, 2012). In addition, South Africa's voting on Libya raised questions about its stance on African unity and the 'African solutions for African problems' dictum Naidu (2015:64). Naidu (2015) argued that South Africa miscalculated the Western sponsored UN Resolution 1973 of 2011 on Libya and exposed its weaknesses which affected its global

status as an influential actor on peace and security. Van Nieuwkerk (2012) has argued that Zuma's approach to conflict resolution was similar to Mbeki's quiet diplomacy in that it was accommodative, non-confrontational and preferred mediated solutions to Africa. Indeed, his approach in Zimbabwe demonstrated this preference. Despite this, others have suggested that Zuma strategically spoke harshly through SADC and his advisers to ensure successful implementation of the GPA (Zondi, 2015). Some expected Zuma to take a harsher stance on Zimbabwe, for human rights violations. In the end, there was consensus that Zuma's government-supported Mbeki's approach and committed to implementing the GPA (Landsberg, 2015). South Africa continued to promote peace, security and stability by sustaining involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa, as seen in CAR, DRC, Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe (Zondi, 2015; Landsberg, 2010).

In advancing the African agenda, the Zuma government continued with the NEPAD commitment advocating for Africa development on global platforms and political and economic development in the SADC region (Landsberg, 2015). Furthermore, South Africa continued to pursue peace diplomacy and military interventions in countries such as Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, CAR and Libya (Habib, 2012).

Globally, Mpungose (2018) has suggested a shift in the foreign policy focus in which South Africa's North-Africa dialogue activism was reduced, and there was more emphasis on the South-South engagements. South Africa's new BRICS membership in 2011 and strengthened relations with China emphasized this (Mpungose, 2018).. The literature has framed South Africa's engagement on peace and security based on peaceful engagements to resolve disputes through multilateral forums.

### **3.6.2 Human rights and Foreign Policy: the Values-vs-Interests Debate**

The supposed clash between the pursuit of national interests and a commitment to human rights and democracy promotion in Africa is a subject that picked momentum when Nelson Mandela failed to get Nigeria suspended from the Commonwealth over the killing of Ogoni activists by the government of Sani Abacha in Nigeria in the late 1990s (Adebajo, 2007; Borer & Mills, 2011; Cilliers, 1999; Landsberg, 2010; Nathan, 2008) . Cilliers (1999) has argued that the Nigeria crisis has highlighted limitations of Mandela's moral influence in Africa and the need to pursue an approach that would promote solidarity and African unity. (Adebajo, 2007) argued that Mandela's inability to secure support from fellow African

leaders to support the call for sanctions was one of South Africa's biggest policy failures. Borer and Mills (2012) were of the same view and argued that the Nigerian saga justified Mbeki's choice for quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe to promote solidarity. Landsberg (2010) also argued that this incident highlighted the inconsistency of Mandela's foreign policy in which the policy struggled to balance the moral posture and the African unity engagement.

South Africa's intervention in Lesotho also received attention from scholars (Cilliers, 1999; De Coning, 2000; Kent & Malan, 2003; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). Again, the concerns about Mandela's foreign policy's inconsistency and incoherence were still a hot topic amongst scholars as this incident saw South Africa abandoning their negotiated intervention in favour of a military one. However, there were differing views regarding the approach and the military operation. Van Nieuwkerk (2006) has argued that the multiplicity of actors involved in decision making with conflicting interests bred a conducive environment for the accusations of policy incoherence and inconsistency. Van Nieuwkerk (2006) has argued that the intervention has demonstrated weakness in South Africa's decision making. Cilliers (1999) had a different view arguing that South Africa's forceful intervention with its neighbours highlighted the requirement to formalize and legalize a sub-regional intervention framework. For him, the unclear mandate from SADC confused and raised questions about this intervention. De Coning (2000) agrees and argues that SADC's poor decision making and lack of clarity on this issue raised questions about the credibility of multinational's interventions. De Coning (2000) suggested that the issue also emphasized the need for a clear transparent policy on making a straightforward decision procedure for a mission to be authorized as SADC. This lack of explicit authorization on the Lesotho, De Coning, (2000) argues, resulted in uncertainty over the mission's legitimacy. The international media labelled the intervention a "South African intervention". Kent and Malan (2003) argue that from South Africa's perspective, the operation was successful as it met the military objectives of the mandate. The operation successfully stabilized the security situation in Lesotho and made way for a peaceful dialogue between belligerents (Kent & Malan, 2003).

According to Qobo and Dube (2015), the moralizing discourse of human rights became an essential factor of South Africa foreign policy during Mandela's tenure. Mandela's most quoted declaration, 'Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs,' affirms this. This human rights orientation stems from the ideas underlying SA's transformation, the country's peaceful transition to democracy and its democratic constitution (Hengari, 2014).

Zondi (2015) contends the Mandela government was driven by the desire to see peace and prosperity in the African continent wrecked by civil wars, violation

The debate on African solidarity overriding human rights promotion gained traction when President Thabo Mbeki started facilitating the peace process in Zimbabwe after the political and economic crisis in that country deteriorated (Alden, 2002; Dlamini, 2002; Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Marthoz, 2012; Nathan, 2013). The issue of Mbeki's quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe divided the scholars into two groups: some have viewed in terms of South Africa's moral obligation to meet international standards, arguing that quiet diplomacy threatened the values of democracy and human rights and risking Pretoria's international profile in favour of solidarity with African countries (Alden, 2002; Coetzee, 2004; Davies, 2008; Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Lipton, 2009; Marthoz, 2012; Qobo & Dube, 2015). For instance, (Alden, 2002) lambasted South Africa's choice of quiet diplomacy and argued that it demonstrated the limitations of Pretoria to act as a regional leader. Marthoz (2012) criticized the South African foreign policy during Mbeki's reign for compromising the human rights needs of Zimbabweans by not imposing sanctions instead cozying up with Robert Mugabe. Qobo and Dube (2015) further criticize Mbeki's policy for disregarding the human rights concerns of Africans, pointing out that the lack of concern with the human rights issues in Zimbabwe was an indication that human rights were no longer the only dominating factor of the South African foreign policy. Hamill & Hoffman (2009) have used the Zimbabwe case study to highlight the paradox of liberal governance and the entrenchment of liberal values in Africa. They argue that the quiet diplomacy policy has damaged Pretoria global profile and compromised its aspirations to promote democratic governance at regional and sub-regional level. Coetzee (2004) agrees and argues that South Africa's leadership aspirations for the continent has constrained its human rights advocacy commitment. This argument has been supported by scholars using different cases, arguing that South Africa's voting is in line with human rights abuses at the UN. For instance, (Nathan, 2008) has used Mbeki's cosying up with al-Bashir at the height of Khartoum's extensive violence against civilians in 2007 to demonstrate this. (Lipton, 2009) is of the view that this foreign policy behavior is driven by South Africa's interests, ideals and psychological factors that have shaped the post-apartheid foreign policy.

There is also a camp that has viewed South Africa's policy in terms of values and interests (Dlamini, 2002; Landsberg, 2016; Mckinley, 2004; Prys, 2008), arguing that Pretoria's

approach has based its economic interest or African solutions to African problems principle or reluctance to project its power. Landsberg (2016) argues that the quiet diplomacy policy is a form of the African solution for African problems. He views this policy as a form of African containment to prevent conflict from spiraling out of control, to reverse the effects of conflict and peaceful settlement (Landsberg, 2016). Dlamini (2002) argues that South Africa is reluctant to project its power to impose solutions to African problems to avoid the hegemony label. Prys (2008) opposed the notion about Pretoria's failure to exercise its hegemonic role and found that South Africa has played its role as a regional hegemony in the case of Zimbabwe and have projected their interest and provided regional goods, but not in a manner that global actors expected it to. Mckinley (2004) suggested that Pretoria's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has been driven by the class interest of South Africa's emerging black bourgeoisie.

This debate is undermined by a lack of framing that seeks to understand how Africans think and how that shaped the SA government foreign policy outlook on this issue that remains a significant point of contestation between the liberal West and the non-Westerns.

Mutua (2001) has argued about this contestation between human rights and culture both in his work captured in the 'Savages, Victims and Saviours: Metaphors of Human Rights. Mutua (2001) questions the universality and cultural neutrality of the human rights project as promoted by the UN, the Western States and International NGO's. He calls for the construction of a truly universal human rights body that is multicultural, inclusive and genuinely political (Matua, 2001). According to Ramina (2018) the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAAIL) movement supports this call and argues that the historical international model of human rights cannot respond to the needs of the third world unless if there is a restructuring of international order, including relinquishing universalization of an essentially European human rights corpus. Similarly, Bachand (2010) contends that human rights are a way to civilize people entangled in a savage and barbaric culture including imposition of European standards previously used during colonialism in the third world. In the same vein, Mutua (2001) uses a three dimension Savage-Victim-Savior (SVS) metaphor to expand this argument. According to Mutua (2001) the human rights corpus UN, Western governments, Western academics and NGOs constructed this three dimension prism which pits the good against the evil. Mutua (2001) identifies three flaws of the human rights corpus whose Eurocentric flaws are captured in SVS metaphor. The first flaw Mutua (2001)

identified is that the corpus is the product of the historical Eurocentric colonial project. This is problematic because this history undermines the universality of the corpus. Bachand (2010) is of the same view, arguing that the European based human rights were not designed to fight against colonialism and imperialist practices that the third world is subjected to. The second flaw is that the human rights narrative unfairly rejects the cross contamination of cultures and instead promotes the Eurocentric culture ideal Mutua (2001). This breeds the 'othering' process in which Western political democracy is the organic element of human rights and other cultures are seen as lying in the periphery of political democracy. The third flaw that Mutua (2001) has identified is the language and the rhetoric of the human rights corpus which has arrogant and biasness undertones hinders the human rights movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy. Fourth, uneven power within the corpus perpetuates inequality and endorses the Eurocentrism culture approach toward human rights. The fifth flaw is regarding the race in which Mutua (2001) argues that in human rights narratives savages and victims are non-Western and non-white and the saviors are white. According to Mutua (2001) this is challenging because the SVS metaphor promotes the continuation of the global racial hierarchy in which whites are superior and non-whites are less superior. Mutua (2001) argues that the human rights movement will fail because of the above flaws. He contests that the movement should seek to be anchored in all people's cultures.

Borer & Mills (2011) have argued that this contradictory international behavior is a result of clashing ideologies (between democratic principles and pan-Africanism), continental constraints and global constraints. Both Prys (2007) and Borer and Mills (2011) agree that the case of Zimbabwe highlights these contradictions in which South Africa attempts to mediate between the West and Zimbabwe while blocking external interferences in southern African issues. On the issue of Zimbabwe, we have seen scholars pushing for a morally driven policy based on human rights (Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Marthoz, 2012; Qobo & Dube, 2015) and Sudan (Nathan, 2011). These two cases have dominated South Africa's peace diplomacy, Africa. Hamill & Hoffman (2009) have argued that the 'quiet diplomacy' was ineffective in Zimbabwe because the strategy was a form of collaboration with the Mugabe regime. They also suggested that imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe would have yielded better outcomes.

### **3.6.3. Quiet diplomacy and conflict resolution**

On the other hand, Borer & Mills (2011) have argued that Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' policy was inclined to side with authoritarian regimes of Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir as a

consequence of contrasting ideologies that have influenced Mbeki- identified as Africanist, democratic and anti-imperialist (Borer & Mills, 2011). They continue to argue that Mbeki's African renaissance is contradictory in that it is both anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, which is pro-Mugabe; furthermore, it promotes democratic governance, which is anti-Mugabe. Borer and Mills (2011) identify land reform, which Mugabe has framed as undoing the wrongs of the colonial era, as an area of 'convergence' that resonates with Mbeki's anti-imperialist ideology. However, as Borer & Mills, (2011) points out, this anti-imperialist approach has resulted in gross violation of human rights in Zimbabwe- which Mbeki's policy aimed to promote. Elsewhere, (Nathan, 2008) argues that Mbeki's foreign policy towards Khartoum during the Darfur conflict displays contrasting ideologies, underlining that South Africa's anti-imperialist posture supersedes Pretoria's commitment to human rights.

South Africa's peace diplomacy in the Great Lakes also received academic attention. Scholars have paid attention to South Africa's peace facilitation in Burundi and the DRC (Ian Taylor & Williams, 2001; van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Assessments in this area have yielded mixed results. For instance, Curtis (2007) focused on South Africa's involvement in Burundi and DRC after signing the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in 2000 and the Sun City. He argues that the assumption that the successful South African peace model can be applied to any other African country is misleading, considering the vast difference like conflicts of each country. The model is characterized by a firm belief in non-violent conflict resolution, which involves dialogue between the belligerents to get everyone to compromise and reach a consensus on inclusive transitional political arrangement as part of a peace agreement. Usually, this agreement consists of the establishment of the following principles: national unity government involving the belligerent parties; provisions to address justice issues; confidence-building measures and security forces reform and a procedure and a timetable for the drafting of a new permanent constitution and the holding of democratic elections (Curtis, 2007). According to Swart & Tonheim (2015), South Africa has used this model in mediation in Zimbabwe, Burundi, Sudan, DRC and Cotê d' Ivory. Miti (2010) is of the same view emphasizing that this model will not work elsewhere in the continent due to its uniqueness to the South African case. One of the reasons is that the conflict in SA was driven by racial divides, which is not the case in the rest of the continent where conflict is driven by ethnic divides, political, economic, religious or geographical divides. Tonheim and Swart (2015) assert that the South African peace model is characterized by a firm belief in a non-violent conflict resolution approach that encourages dialogue and inclusion of all belligerents.

Taylor and Williams (2001) argued that the neo-liberal principles at the centre of Mbeki's African renaissance had provided the structural context that has created a conducive environment for 'vagabondage politics' encouraging 'warlord capitalism'. According to Taylor and Williams (2001), the African renaissance's neoliberal underpinnings indirectly perpetuate conflict in the Great Lakes region. Van Nieuwkerk (2012) has argued that South Africa's engagement in Great Lakes yielded positive results compared to Zimbabwe and Mozambique as such, South Africa's proactive leadership role in the Great Lakes carved a way for transition, particularly in a complex situation in the DRC (van Nieuwkerk, 2012:92). It was found that South Africa's peacemaking efforts in Africa have also been in the form of military intervention (Tonheim and Swart, 2015; van Nieuwkerk, 2012; Curtis, 2007). This was seen in Lesotho in 1998 when South Africa dramatically responded by sending troops to Lesotho to prevent a political collapse and war. In the DRC, South Africa sent soldiers to join MONUSCO during the civil war. Scholars have found this contradicting Pretoria's initial approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution of dialogues and compromise. As such, it has led some academics to label Mandela's foreign policy as ambiguous and inconsistent (Evans, 1991; Landsberg, 2010; Mills et al., 1997).

According to van Nieuwkerk (2012:90), states follow two paths to peace: “military solution” and “political solution”. After 1994 South Africa opted to follow the 'political solution' path using strategies such as soft power, which involved what Landberg (2007:202) called “trade-off” where South Africa would pursue the Industrialized North to commit itself to African development in African exchange leaders would commit to upholding democracy, good governance and maintaining peace. South Africa also used 'quiet diplomacy' as the preferred method of engaging conflicting parties to durable settlements that will ensure stability by introducing democratic governance regimes (Dlamini, 2002; Landsberg, 2010). Democratic South Africa opted for a 'military solution' for the first time when the country opted for military intervention in Lesotho during the 1998 crisis, contrary to its initial stance of abandoning intimidating and military approach in favour of preventive diplomacy. Van Nieuwkerk (2006) found that the Lesotho case demonstrated challenges of maintaining a non-threatening and amicable relationship with a dependent neighboring.

Bischoff (2006) concluded that South Africa was more successful when it collaborated with other Africa Union member states to fulfil its peace diplomacy priorities in Africa. Furthermore, the African renaissance policy prompted South Africa to rely heavily on

multilateral institutions and multilateral diplomacy to take its peace diplomacy in Africa. This literature has identified opportunities and challenges confronting South African peace diplomacy as its form of engagement in the African continent.

### **3.6.4 Africa and Multilateralism diplomacy**

South African foreign policy and its multilateral diplomacy gained currency in the academic space after 1994 when South Africa came out of the international pariah state and was re-welcomed into various global multilateral forums. Three phases in South Africa's foreign policy's multilateral engagement were identified: the first phase was between 1994 and 1999, in which South Africa was searching for new roles in the international system and a new identity that would be different to that of apartheid government (Geldenhuys, 2006; Landsberg, 2010; le Pere, 2014; Monyae, 2012). As a result, South Africa perceived its role and identity in global governance as contributing to transforming a global system to a ruled-based equal and just world order Naidu (2015). Pretoria was then viewed as a norm entrepreneur based on its role to formulate, advocate, uphold and formulate international codes and standards (Geldenhuys, 2006). This was expressed through the promotion of liberal democracy and human rights.

In this regard, Geldenhuys (2006:93) observed that “South Africa has been more than the exemplary holder of major codes of good state conduct; the country has also assigned itself the task of actively promoting such standards abroad and has become a prominent norm formulator abroad”. This commitment was followed by actions seen when South Africa played an influential and leading role in the 1998 extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was a consequence of democratic South Africa's departure from previous practices of the apartheid government add van Wyk (2012). Furthermore, South Africa also played a leading in the 1997 Ottawa Process on banning landmines and adopting the Rome Statute to set up the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba. In addition, Pretoria disarmament leadership also helped strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and the New Agenda Coalition (le Pere, 2014; Naidu, 2015).

According to Qobo and Dube (2015), in the early phase of democracy, the South African government highlighted multilateralism as essential in international relations. Monyae (2012) is of the same view arguing that South Africa embraced multilateralism to solve challenges confronting the international community. As such, South Africa has taken up leading roles in

numerous multilateral forums such as SADC, AU, UN, Group of 77 and China (G77 + China), Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), Commonwealth (Monyae, 2012:142). Through these forums, South Africa was able to develop a combined initiative in world talks, promote global arms control and humanitarian measures, develop joint initiatives for reforming global institutions and challenge decisions by UNSC (Nel & Carlsnaes, 2006). In addition, South Africa played a crucial role in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. However, Geldenhuys (2006) also points out that Pretoria failed to cajole its fellow African states into upholding such norms, exposing South Africa's limited influence on other African states. The literature has described this South African foreign policy phase as directionless and lacking in strategic coherence (Evans, 1991; Henwrod, 1996; le Pere, 2014).

The second phase was between 1999- 2008, in which South Africa's multilateral engagement in Africa was characterized by institutional building with the view to strengthen stability and boost economic development. Globally, this phase was marked by a shift from human rights promoter to Africa's representative.

The second phase was between 2000-2007 , in which South Africa played a “bridge-builder” role between competing global forces (Nel, 2006; Nel & Carlsnaes, 2006; Spies, 2010). This is also a period in which Africa and strengthening South-South cooperation became a priority in South Africa's global governance engagement. The latter was pursued to advance global governance reform; as a result, forums such as the India, Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forums and BRICS were formed (Nel, 2006). In addition, South Africa's approach to global governance was channeled through the African renaissance policy to enable the continent's reintegration and inclusive participation in the global system (Naidu, 2015; 67). Concerning this, Mbeki's government forged strategic partnerships with African leaders who shared similar economic, stability and development interests and values with South Africa (Landberg, 2007; Naidu, 2015). Together with the other African leaders, Mbeki engaged the Global North on Africa's development through the NEPAD using multilateral platforms such as the G8.

### **3.6.5 Middle power role**

The literature has defined this orientation as a middle power role (Chris Alden & le Pere, 2003; Mbete, 2018; Monyae, 2014; Spies, 2010). According to Spies (2010), South Africa's desire to exercise moral influence in multilateral platforms and its zeal for multilateral

qualified it for the central power role. (Jordaan, 2003) argues that South Africa should be identified as an emerging middle power instead of a traditional middle power because its role is dissimilar to that of traditional middle power states such as Australia and Canada. Jordaan (2003) distinguishes traditional middle and emerging middle power by influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Traditional middle powers such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Sweden are egalitarian and have affluent societies with established democratic systems; they advocate for peaceful resolutions in conflict disputes. They have the ambition to influence the broader global system, but they do not exert influence in their regions. Emerging middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey and South Africa, by contrast, are semi-peripheral, recently democratized and have a robust presence in their regions. They promote human rights and democracy on global and regional platforms and advocate for global reform and change that will favour them (Jordaan, 2003). Jordaan (2003) approach to middle power analysis brings a critical global South perspective to the literature by underlining the regional influence as the distinguishing factor between emerging and traditional regional power. Jordaan's (2003) findings complement Schoeman's (2015) analysis, which finds that the characteristic which defines emerging powers includes powers from the global South who are also regional powers who embrace the label and self-definition as a middle power.

Similarly, Öniş & Kutlay (2017) also identified four conditions that allow emerging powers to play a prolific role in a shifting international environment. These conditions include the ability to serve as a role model based on soft power resources; the ability to establish strong coalitions with both established and emerging powers; have governance capabilities based on the recognition of limits of middle power influence and avoiding a disparity of expectations; and their ability and capacity to identify areas both in regional and global governance where they can exert influence and make a unique contribution (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017). According to Schoeman (2007), South Africa qualifies for middle power status based on these characteristics.

In contrast, Monyae (2012) defines South Africa's multilateral role as a realist middle power and a pluralist middle power. As a realist middle power, South Africa had demonstrated that it would use force when it perceived its interest to be under threat. The sending of troops in Lesotho when the government in that country was under threat validates this. South Africa's

human rights advocacy on multilateral forums such as the UN qualifies it as a pluralist middle power (Monyae, 2012).

The literature has established that South Africa's multilateral activism was motivated by Pretoria's desire to promote global equity and justice through international cooperation (le Pere, 2014). South Africa's foreign policy has preferred collaborative approaches in its pursuit of North-South policy and South-South Africa policy. Though, Van Nieuwkerk (2012:86) points out that SA's initial approach to the continent on peace matters was unilateralism. However, this approach was abandoned when it proved to be limited when used in peacemaking diplomacy, and after that, multilateralism was adopted as the South African foreign policy approach in Africa. Since then, SA has pursued its Africa policy within multilateral structures such as SADC and AU.

### **3.6.6 South Africa's role in the southern African region**

Scholars have described apartheid South Africa's relationship with the SADC region as characterized by force and dominance. Adebajo et al. (2007) assert that the apartheid Government saw the Southern African region as an area of exploitations, penetration and destabilization. (Landsberg, 2015) adds that the apartheid geopolitics of the region mainly revolved around a 'white-centred' pursuit for ascendancy. Against this backdrop, scholars paid attention to South Africa's relationship with the southern African region after 1994 and how the new Democratic Government would position itself. There were questions of whether Pretoria would be a benign hegemony or a behemoth (Matlosa, 2007; Pfister, 2001). (Schoeman, 2007) has described hegemony as a country that plays a strong, firm and trustworthy leadership role enabled by its ability to exercise unchallenged leadership. Schoeman (2007) also described it as the state that prefers a unilateral approach and is not bothered by its policies' impact on other states.

Some scholars called for South Africa to play a hegemonic role and provide leadership in the region (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003; Habib & Selinyane, 2006; Schoeman, 2007). Habib & Selinyane (2006) argued that South Africa should play a hegemonic role in the region that should be monitored by civil society to prevent it from enforcing policies of dominance. However, the literature contends that South Africa opted not to advance hegemony but to promote its democratic governance policies in the region with great care. It wanted to avoid regional suspicions of behemoth character projected by the apartheid government (Adebajo,

2007; Landsberg, 2015; Schoeman, 2007). As such, South Africa pursued a cooperation approach to integration (Landsberg, 2015). In this regard, the literature identified two issues as critical in understanding this. The first is cooperation through trade that takes place in three multilateral bodies: the SADC, the Southern African Customs Unit (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) (Pfister, 2001; Landsberg, 2015). The second issue is cooperation through security, where South Africa has played a pivotal role in shaping the region's peace and security agenda through the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) drive by President Thabo Mbeki (Peterson & Virk, 2014).

The debates on security in SADC have centred on South Africa's role and promotion of the region's human rights and democracy policy. During Mandela's tenure, South Africa's military's intervention in Lesotho received minimal attention from scholars. This stance by Pretoria was a source of concern for scholars who felt that it was resonant of the apartheid government (van Nieuwkerk, 1999; Bischoff, 2006;). The approach also led some scholars to pronounce Nelson Mandela's foreign policy incoherent and inconsistent. The SADC mandated intervention by South Africa in Zimbabwe by Pretoria also attracted much attention from scholars. The focus was on South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy as a preferred method of engagement in peace and political process in the SADC region and the African continent (Pfister, 2006; Landsberg, 2015; Pfister, 2006).

These engagements reflect South African foreign policy's multilateralism in Africa and the North under the African agenda. In this literature, there were expectations that South Africa, as a middle power, would influence all African leaders to live to Pretoria's moral standard, particularly Zimbabwe. What is not considered here is the uniqueness of South Africa's struggle for liberation and how it ascended to global governance, how Pretoria should play the middle power role and its relationship with other African countries.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

The literature review above has demonstrated a wide range of South African foreign policy and African agenda. It focused on South Africa's African agenda policy and its global and continental engagement; African renaissance, peace diplomacy, human rights, and multilateralism emerged as the central themes under the African agenda policy. The review revealed that there had been much interest in implementing the African agenda in Africa. The majority of the analysis on the African agenda also addressed foreign policy analysis and

dealt with models and frameworks used by scholars to explain foreign policy behaviour. In this literature, we found that foreign policy analysis has always been concerned with explaining the foreign policy behaviour of nations. It was also clear that these models were Euro-America centred and could not be applied to African cases. The mainstream International relations theories were reviewed to justify Afrocentricity as the suited theoretical framework to explain the African agenda policy behaviour in Africa, particularly the highly contested Zimbabwe engagement. The chapter has revealed the shortage of Afrocentric based studies in the body of literature, particularly in the International Relations discipline. Therefore, this study is necessary as it provides an Afrocentric perspective to understanding African agenda engagement in Zimbabwe.

The following chapter explores the South African foreign policy implementation. It focuses on how the African agenda policy was interpreted by Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. This is necessary to provide context for the analysis of the African agenda implementation in Zimbabwe during South Africa's intervention.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### South African Foreign Policy in Context

#### 4.1 Introduction

Landsberg (2012) has argued that despite research work that has been produced on South Africa's post 1994 foreign policy there is a need to interpret the actual foreign policy decision making process on decisions taken by South Africa's executive. Landsberg, 2012) further highlights the lack of comparative analysis which focuses on issues of continuity and change between different administrations of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. The argument here is that there is a need to understand South Africa's foreign policy's African agenda from an African perspective in order to understand the foreign policy behavior in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the analysis in this study will help us understand why and how foreign policy decisions are taken. Studies conducted on South Africa's foreign policy towards countries in conflict concluded that South Africa preferred a cautious engagement with other African countries to avoid being called a bully or hegemon (Landsberg, 2010; Schoeman, 2007). Other studies have criticised Pretoria's foreign policy for ignoring human rights of civilians over African solidarity (Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Marthoz, 2012). What is missing in these studies is an Afrocentric analysis that will approach this subject from African perspective.

This chapter provides an overview of the democratic South Africa's foreign policy implementation. It focuses on how the African agenda policy was interpreted by the Three democratic Presidents of South Africa; Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. The anticipation is that this chapter will provide context on African agenda policy and how it has evolved under the three democratic presidents of the Republic. Section 4.2 focuses on foreign policy under Mandela administration. We do this to provide a context for the African agenda policy that was fervently pursued by Thabo Mbeki. Section 4.3 provides accounts of how the African agenda was implemented by President Mbeki. Lastsly, section 4.4 looks at the continuity of the African agenda policy under Zuma administration.

#### 4.2 The foreign policy of Mandela

Mandela was the centre of discussion of post-apartheid foreign policy which commenced in 1990 (Pfister, 2006). His release from prison signaled the beginning of a new era and he became the face of South African foreign policy, as such, the foundation of the new orientation of the foreign policy of the Republic was laid. Three themes from literature were

identified covering Mandela's foreign policy; African engagement (framed as African agenda), moral posture (Universality) and middle power. While our focus is on South Africa's foreign policy's engagement in Africa it is also important to underline the linkage between state identity and foreign policy. Landsberg (2010) fittingly explains the relationship between the two variables stating that the identity of state is an important influence to its foreign policy and its international orientation, 'state identity defines the country's domestic foreign policy'. For Mandela and the ANC it was imperative to redefine the state identity considering that SA was an international pariah state under the apartheid government.

Another identified aspect of Mandela's foreign policy is SA's orientation towards the international community post 1994. This refers to how SA perceived its role in the international system which Landsberg (2010:18) calls 'foreign policy role conception'. Literature identifies SA's foreign policy orientation in the global community as middle power role because of the republic's desire to be a bridge between the developed world and the developing world but mostly representing Africa on the global stage. The middle power role reflected choices of the ANC on how SA should position itself on the international stage and the global role they foresaw for the young democracy (Nel & Carlsnaes, 2006). The middle power role also meant representing socio-economic and political interest of the South particularly Africa. As defined by Mbete (2018) 'middle powers are states that hold a position in the middle of global economic and military rankings'.

Human rights and moral posture were the drivers of Mandela's foreign policy (Alden & le Pere, 2003; Landsberg, 2010; Nel & Carlsnaes, 2006; van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Contradictions and limits in Mandela's human right policy had the most traction in the literature. Mandela's administration adopted a values based policy which put human rights at the centre of South African foreign policy. The values were spelled out in an article published by *Foreign Affairs*, 1993 written by Mandela and have been repeated by a few scholars (Mathebula, 2016). Mandela himself declared that 'human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs'. According to Alden & le Pere (2003) the prioritization of human rights was the manner South Africa would participate in the new world order with a commitment to the humanist values and the interest of human rights, justice and equality and peace cooperation. Mandela's emphasis on human rights was motivated by his own experience, experience of his comrades and his people under the tyrannical apartheid government which grossly violated rights of non-whites South Africans for forty five years.

Mandela's government also declared that Africa was the "center-piece" of the South African foreign policy. According to Landsberg (2010) Mandela engaged with African states in the spirit of unity, solidarity and togetherness committing to continuously engaging with fellow African states to address problems facing the continent. South Africa was going to pursue human rights and also pursue African solidarity with some of the human rights violators at the same time. Practically, balancing values and embracing African identity proved to be a mountainous task for the new democratic government. The Nigerian imbroglio and the Lesotho crisis underline this struggle.

When Nigerian leader General Sani Abacha rejected Mandela's request to not go ahead with the execution of Nigerian activist who were protesting Abacha's tyranny, South Africa responded punitively to Sani Abacha calling for sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria and expulsion from the Commonwealth after the execution of Nigerian activist Saro Wiwa and other activist who stood against Abacha's oppressive leadership (Landsberg, 2010). A move that was applauded by the international community but distasteful to African leaders who criticised and accused Mandela's government of acting against the spirit of African solidarity (Landsberg (2010)). Mandela's call for sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria highlight an interesting convergence of actions pursued by South Africa and Nigeria previously acting against unacceptable behavior in favour of South Africa. Nigeria had used sanctions to prompt the release of Mandela by the apartheid government which was violating human rights of many South Africans, and Mandela used sanctions to prompt "prosecution" of Nigeria for failing to uphold human rights. Earlier in 1986 Nigeria had successfully championed a call for Commonwealth to impose sanctions on South African apartheid regime (Adebajo, 2007:216).

In return, Mandela visited Nigeria upon his release to express his gratitude for the country's relentless support during the liberation struggle. However, this romance was short-lived due to the unexpected turn of events. After Mandela's ascendancy tables were turned with Nigeria now being considered for expulsion from the Commonwealth and Mandela was at the centre of it (Adebajo, 2007). Since then Mandela government never really enjoyed a good relationship with their Nigerian counterparts due to Mandela's perpetual insistence that General Sani Abacha should democratize and promote human rights in his country. This approach left a lingering bad impression to General Abacha who viewed it as an attempt by Pretoria to set up competition between the two countries (Umezurike & Lucky, 2015). This act by Mandela was also met with criticism by the African Union who viewed this stance as

un-African and divisive. Perhaps many were struggling to understand South Africa's foreign policy human rights posture and its intention (Adebajo, 2007). It could be that South Africa's aspirations to be a human rights champion in the continent was misapprehended as hegemonic aspirations. Some have argued that Mandela's foreign policy wasn't easy to understand due to its disunion and inconsistency (Landsberg, 2010; le Pere, 2014). The Nigeria saga revealed that Mandela's government needed to learn to navigate complexities and dynamics of African diplomacy. Furthermore, the newly formed government demonstrated that it was still struggling with reconciling promotion of human rights and strengthening ties with their African counterparts. Prompting a need for South Africa to reshape its African foreign policy and then projecting it as African agenda under Mbeki's administration. Landsberg, (2007) fairly described Mbeki's African agenda policy 'as a wide range of measures to make democratic political systems, peace and security and accelerated economic growth the foundation of development in Africa'. The following section will consider Thabo Mbeki's African agenda policy.

#### **4.4. Mbeki and the African agenda**

Against this background there was a shift in South Africa's foreign policy which was characterised by a deportation from human rights orientation to an Africa orientated policy. Mbeki government's foreign policy was African identity based putting more emphasis on African unity and agency. Human rights was still an important part of South African foreign policy but for Mbeki, locating South Africa in Africa and finding a place for Africa in a new global order was more urgent. Mbeki's foreign policy was now centred on African Renaissance principled on African cultural, economic and political renewal. Before indulging further it is important to explain what prompted the shift of the South African foreign policy from human rights to African nationalism when Mbeki assumed presidency. According to Adebajo (2007) the Mandela and Abacha debacle raised concerns amongst South Africa diplomats fearing that Tshwane would be diplomatically isolated within the African continent unfavorably affecting South Africa's bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council . Furthermore, African National Congress had an emotional connection with Nigeria who contributed immensely to the party's fight against apartheid government (Adebajo, 2007). There was therefore a need to mend relations with Nigeria.

As such, Mbeki took it upon himself to repair relations between the two countries. Adebajo (2007) contends that Mbeki was the befitting individual to lead on reconciling the two nations owing to his experience as an ANC head in Lagos between 1976 and 1978. In his efforts, he

opted to engage with Nigeria on many different diplomatic engagements. Subsequently, South Africa's foreign policy was no longer driven by human rights but by African nationalism anchored in the African Renaissance. The African Renaissance project was to give SA an African identity different from the negative dark narrative portrayed by Europe. Adebajo (2007:224) defined African Renaissance as 'a doctrine for Africa's political, economic and social renewal and a call for political democratization, economic growth, and the reintegration of Africa into the global economy'. Whereas Landsberg (2010:150) defined it as 'the African Renaissance was a vision, the visualization of a more democratic, economically prosperous, and politically stable and peaceful South Africa and continent'. (Zondi, 2015) views the African Renaissance as a commitment by Africans to exercise agency to rejuvenate the continent's peace, democracy and prosperity.

#### **4.4.1 The African renaissance vision**

In policy terms the African renaissance is viewed as a renewal programme which would direct Africa's path to Africa agency, economic, political and democratic rejuvenation (Jili, 2000; Landsberg, 2010; Zondi, 2015). Conceptually, African renaissance is about African identity and rejuvenation of African culture<sup>1</sup> (M. Mbeki, 2000). According to Jili (2000) the African Renaissance was about; social cohesion, promoting democracy, economic growth and rebuilding, Africa agency and establishment of Africa as a significant global player. This reiterates what Mbeki said "when we speak of African Renaissance, we speak of rebirth and renewal of our continent" (Mbeki, 1999). Why was African Renaissance a necessary policy/strategy for South Africa and Africa and why was it important for Mbeki? Firstly, it is important to highlight that African Renaissance was not conceived or initiated by Mbeki, but it was Cheik Anta Diop who enunciated African Renaissance in his book *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development* written between 1946 and 1960 in which the Senegalese scholar outlined steps on African rediscovery (Makalela & Sistrunk, 2002). Makalela & Sistrunk (2002) argue in their review that "Diop's book lays the foundation on which to build African unity and to make the struggle for independence".

Another African to speak of African renewal<sup>1</sup> was Pixley Isaka ka Seme who articulated the African renaissance vision in his 1906 "Regeneration of Africa" speech. Kumalo (2015) argues that Seme's speech was the foundation of African renaissance such that it served as a point of departure for other African leaders such as Nkwame Nkrumah and Thabo Mbeki in

---

<sup>1</sup> African renewal and African Renaissance will be used interchangeably as they mean the same thing.

their call for African renewal and unity. Zondi (2015:98) corroborate this view by revealing that Mbeki “resurrected” Pixley ka Seme’s “The Regeneration of Africa” idea in his 1996 “I am an African” speech which would launch Mbeki’s African Renaissance strategy. Both Zondi (2015) and Landsberg (2010) agree that Mbeki popularised the African Renaissance by placing it at the centre of South African foreign policy. According to Zondi (2015) the African Renaissance was projected as African agenda policy by the new democratic government.

In order to understand what prompted this African agenda we identified four explanations in the literature which unpacked the rationale behind Mbeki’s African Renaissance policy. First, the African Renaissance was to redress the wrongs of the past. According to Jili (2000) the African agenda under the African Renaissance precepts was born out of atrocities of apartheid and colonialism. Landsberg (2010) asserts that the African Renaissance was invoked by the economic and developmental divide brought about by decades of apartheid in South Africa and colonization in Africa. As such, the African Renaissance would respond to the challenges of poverty, development and inequality caused by decades of apartheid and colonization. Second, the African Renaissance was to fulfil the quest for finding a new identity for South Africa. Zondi (2015:99) backs this assertion when he argues that Mbeki’s ‘I am an African’ speech pronounced the African Renaissance framework as being about the people of South Africa affirming the African identity and their desire to be part of Africa arising from the ashes. Mbeki himself has proclaimed this when he said “I am born of the continent of the people of Africa” (Mbeki, 1996). According to Landsberg (2010:126) Mbeki was resolute to shed the image of South Africa as a European outpost in the African continent, as a result the Mbeki administration sought to locate South Africa in Africa as part of Africa. One could wonder why identity is important in a postcolonial context. Jili (2000:2) argues that in Africa and South Africa, identity perspective was distorted by colonialism which divided African people and created new identities based on Western ideas. Jili (2000) presents an interesting analysis of a correlation between African Renaissance and identity in which he contends that issues of identity are important in a post-colonial context particularly in a post-apartheid South Africa where apartheid created divisions amongst black South Africans and isolated South Africa from the rest of the continent. Thus, the notion of African Renaissance is vital because it speaks of rejuvenation and revitalization. In this context it speaks of South Africa rediscovering herself in a post-colonial and post-apartheid era.

Third, the goal of African Renaissance was to promote multilateralism and cooperation with African states for development and economic emancipation of the African continent. Mbeki's administration and the African National Congress (ANC) believed in building strategic relationships with key African states for economic development of the continent and South Africa (Landsberg, 2007)). The ANC understood that South Africa's economic emancipation is interrelated to Africa's development hence they emphasized at the National Conference that "the fact that South Africa is part of the continent and that its economic development is linked to what happens in the continent as a whole" (African National Congress, 1997:7). Even though the new democratic government had peacebuilding aspirations and goals for the continent, Pretoria's foreign policy approach towards African conflict has been described as confusing, inconsistent, incoherent and contradictory (Landsberg, 2010; Vale & Maseko, 1998).

Two events have been identified to explain South Africa's shift from its conflict and security strategy and shaped South Africa's foreign policy. First, the Nigeria fiasco taught Mbeki and the ANC a painful lesson about multilateral approach to African issues, as such, Mbeki recognised that solidarity and collectiveness was crucial if South Africa was to be accepted by the continent. This was after the OAU condemned South Africa's call to boycott Abacha's regime describing it as 'not an African way to deal with African problems' (Vale & Maseko, 1998: 271). According to Landsberg (2010:114). The Nigeria experience prompted the ANC led by Thabo Mbeki to make a U-turn shaping the future of South African foreign policy. The ANC acknowledged this in their document "one of the very tests for us in the area of promoting democracy and human rights Nigeria highlighted the political limits of influence if we act as an individual country further highlighting the need to act in concert with others and forge strategic alliances" (African National Congress, 1997:4). Second, South Africa's peace-making efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) taught the Republic lessons about the realities on the continent and the deficit of unilateral approach to conflict in the continent. South Africa realised that in order to achieve its peacebuilding goal in the continent it needed to move together with other African states, a multilateral approach. In 1997 Mandela tried to broker peace between DRC leader Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila after an escalation of the rebellion of the Banyamulenge Tutsis in the eastern DRC that threatened to unseat Mobutu (Landsberg, 2002). Mandela held peace talks between the two parties aboard the South African warship *Outeniqua* in the Congo-Brazaville port of Ponte Noire in an attempt to resolve the conflict in the DRC (van Nieuwkerk, 2012:97).

However, South Africa's mediation efforts yielded no results as Kabila rejected the idea of a transitional government and insisted on him being the new leader of the country, as it turned out to be (Landsberg, 2010:116). These events also prompted the ANC under Mbeki's leadership to draft a discussion document in July 1997 titled 'Developing a strategic perspective on South African foreign policy'<sup>2</sup> specifically responding to this diplomatic paucity. The document highlights the Nigeria debacle and Zaire as eye opening lessons for the ruling party, regionalization an important aspect of economic growth, African renaissance key to economic and political revival and collaboration surpasses influence in international relations (African National Congress, 1997). South Africa's diplomatic strategy in conflict resolution in the Africa continent was based on neutrality which proved to be ineffective in the case DRC.

#### **4.4.2 Institutional reform**

Mbeki had a vision for a prosperous Africa that would see the continent overcoming poverty, unemployment and conflict. The ANC document also states that the African renaissance includes the economic recovery of the African continent as a whole (African National Congress, 1997). This sentiment was strongly entrenched in Mbeki such that African priorities were at the centre of South African foreign policy while he was still Mandela's deputy (Landsberg, 2010). He would action his vision through the AU, SADC and NEPAD. According to Landsberg (2007:195) these programmes were necessary to promote African integration, democratic governance and peace and security. Mbeki would work closely with with Nigeria in the transition of OAU to AU in 2002 (Zondi, 2015). Thabo Mbeki in particular is identified as the champion of this project whose ideologies shaped the formation of the AU (Landsberg, 2010). Mbeki also believed that Africa needed strong institutions to successfully create a "political independent and economically sustainable nation-state" in order to effectively participate on global platforms (Vale & Maseko, 1998:275). Landsberg (2010:152) backs this and asserts that the South African strategy placed emphasis on norm creation, institution building and creating a community of African states. In another publication, Landsberg (2007) is very clear that the transition of OAU to AU was actually instigated by Muammar Gaddafi the Libyan leader who initially proposed a United States of Africa which was rejected by the African leaders. Nonetheless, the AU was officially formed in 2002 in South Africa where Mbeki was elected as its first chairperson. That Mbeki was the

---

chairperson of AU gave South Africa leverage to take forward the African Renaissance strategy. This is in line with Mbeki's African Renaissance vision.

The "African solutions to African problems" mantra found expression in the African Peace and Security Architect (APSA) which consist of African Union Peace Security Council (AUPSC), Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, African Standby Force and the Peace (Landsberg, 2010). According to Nathan (2013:48) the "African solution to African problems" mantra is a global trend displayed by regional bodies to claim a prominent role in prevention and resolution of conflict in their regions. More importantly this mantra is a call for Africans to get involved in overcoming the continent's inability to deal with violent conflicts. Something that resonates with the African renaissance as Mbeki once said about the African renaissance in relation to conflict resolution "restoration not of empires, but the other conditions described by Leo Africanus: of peace, stability, and intellectual creativity, will and must succeed" (Mbeki, 1998:1). As such, Mbeki would work close with Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to establish the peace architect of the AU for conflict prevention management and resolution as part of the African renewal agenda (Nathan, 2013:48). There was a realisation by South Africa that conflict resolution was of vital importance in the renewal process of Africa. According to Miti (2010) this was motivated by the belief that both South Africa and Africa's development can only happen in a stable and peaceful environment. Miti (2010) further denounces conflict as the malevolent that prolongs the negative image of Africa as a "dark continent" which somehow averts external investment so much needed for the continent's growth. Mbeki has noted this perception about Africa "but still outside of our continent, the perception persist that Africa remains as of old, torn by interminable conflicts unable to solve its problems, condemned to the netherworld"(Mbeki, 1997).

#### **4.4.3 An Economic Recovery Plan for Africa: NEPAD**

The NEPAD which was initially the Millennium African Recovery Plan (MAP) and New African Initiative (NAI) was developed in 2001 as a strategy to operationalize the African Renaissance vision (Landsberg, 2010:139). The NEPAD is a collective pledge and a determination by African leaders to overcome poverty and integrate Africa into the globalising world (Sako, 2004). It forms part of the renewal of the continent vision initiated by Mbeki. Even though Mbeki worked closely with Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Senegal in developing NEPAD, the strategy was heavily influenced by Mbeki's MAP ideas. MAP was a developmental plan which put forward the idea of Africa benefitting from globalisation. Upon realizing that MAP was threatening to create division amongst African leaders due to it

clashing with OMEGA (another West African programme championed by Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade) Mbeki working closely with President Wade and amalgamated the two strategies (MAP and OMEGA) to form the New Africa Initiative (NAI) (Landsberg, 2010). According to Sako (2004) the heads of state and government adopted the NAI during the OAU summit in Zambia, July 2001. The Heads of State Implementation Committee changed the name NAI to NEPAD in Abuja, October 2001 (Sako, 2004). Landsberg (2010) argues that the NAI had borrowed from the MAP than the OMEGA such that it emphasised Africa's partnership with industrialised countries.

The implementation of African agenda policy in the SADC region was characterised by South Africa's role on transformation of SADC (Landsberg, 2010; Monyae, 2012; van Nieuwkerk, 2012; Zondi, 2012). There is a view that SADC formation was intended to expose and isolate the apartheid South Africa due to its hegemonic and destabilizing approach (Landsberg, 2010:41). This view is backed by the SADC Treaty document released in 1992 which stipulates that Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)<sup>ii</sup> "was established as a vehicle for reduction of economic dependence on South Africa and response to the massive destabilization and military aggression of the apartheid regime in South Africa". As such, the apartheid regime of the South African government didn't enjoy good relations with the Southern African region due to its racist and policy of dominance. Landsberg (2010:61) offer an explanation for this drift between South Africa and its neighbors that 'white government had tried to turn the southern African sub-region into a regional buffer and a cordon sanitaire that would be safe for apartheid government and white minority rule'. As such, SADC was instinctively placed at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy by the democratic government.

#### **4.4.4 Regional integration**

The democratic South Africa sought a relationship that was based on mutual understanding with the sub-region and pursued policies which promoted 'unity and solidarity'. Mbeki administration's commitment to regional development and shaping of SADC was a vital part of the African agenda policy (Landsberg, 2010:154). This commitment is recorded in the ANC discussion document stating that 'within the context of African Renaissance, the ANC and the government have correctly placed the Southern African region as a priority in terms of economic co-ordination and co-operation' (African National Congress, 1997:7). Mbeki administration implemented the African agenda policy in SADC in two different areas; security and conflict resolution and economic development. Economically, South Africa

developed the Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISP) which was aimed at promoting regional cooperation and integration of SADC into the global economy (SADC, 2017) under the rubric of African Renaissance. In terms of peace and security, South Africa led the SADC transformation through the development of the Strategic Indicative Plan between 2003 which focused on co-operation on peace and security in the region (van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Mbeki approached both processes with caution and sensitivity encouraging multilateralism as much as possible fearing the hegemony label. As such, the Republic applied “soft power”, an approach that is non-confrontational and non-threatening (Smith, 2012). There was a reason for this type of approach—it was responding to discomfort on South Africa’s neighbors with regards to the continuation of dominance of the new democratic country even though Pretoria’s foreign policy had taken up a new identity.

Habib & Selinyane (2006) and Schoeman (2007) have defined South Africa’s role in the region as hegemony crediting it to Pretoria’s leadership presence in the region. (Monyae, 2012) also defined it as “hegemonic revisionist”, a historical repetition which is associated with the Marxist doctrine. Elsewhere (Habib, 2009) explained South Africa’s role as a “regional power” owing to its leadership presence. Indeed, South Africa had resolved to lead and implement the African Renaissance policy in order to achieve regional integration. Landsberg (2010:154) explains the drive behind this approach was to boost international investor confidence and attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to the region. In terms of peace and security, South Africa led the SADC transformation through the development of the Strategic Indicative Plan for Organ for Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) between 2003 which focused on co-operation on peace and security in the region (van Nieuwkerk, 2012). In order to neutralize the hegemonic stigma, South Africa’s African agenda policy opted a multilateral approach to conflict resolution in the Southern African region and African continent (Matlosa, 2007; Schoeman, 2007).

#### **4.4.5 Faith in diplomacy and negotiations**

The African agenda policy was really tested when it was applied to conflict resolution particularly in the SADC sub-region. This was seen in South Africa’s intervention in Zimbabwe where conflict resolution was executed under the banner of “quiet diplomacy” a highly contentious and fervently debated approach which engages Africans in a non-militant and non-aggressive manner whose aim is to found a negotiated solution (Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Landsberg, 2010). Landsberg (2010:156) points out that most analysts have opted to highlight the limits of this method without clarifying the concept itself. Landsberg (2010)

describe quite diplomacy as a non-confrontational form of engaging states and belligerents involved in conflict persuading them to mend their ways, usually done away from the lime light. It must be noted that this research is not concerned with the origins of quiet diplomacy and its theories but it is interested to understand the elements of African agenda that prompted South Africa to employ this approach. As such, we are interested to understand what is African about this approach, what does it say about South Africa's place in Africa?

South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki's African agenda is one of the most controversial policy response to the 2003-2013 crisis of that country. From the time Mbeki started engaging the Zimbabwe belligerents the situation in that country deteriorated immensely. Land invasions, intermittent farm attacks, a collapsing economy, engineered elections, fast track land reform and violation of human rights combined with sanctions saw Zimbabwe dying a slow death (Landsberg, 2010). Even so, Mbeki was adamant that South Africa was pursuing the right approach. Mbeki's intervention in Zimbabwe pre-existed before SADC's mandate. According to Landsberg (2010) the Zimbabwe issue was already in Mbeki's agenda before he was elected to be president in 1999. Frank (Chikane, 2013) further illuminates that "His (Mbeki) initial involvement was based on early warning signs in late 1990's that Zimbabwe was heading for a crisis" (Chikane, 2013:93). Hamill & Hofman (2009:175) further explains that Mbeki viewed the Zimbabwe crisis as a threat to the region and the continent. It was estimated that the crisis in Zimbabwe could destabilize the region's economy, jeopardise inward investments, affect regional trade and create a migration crisis (Hamill & Hofman, 2009:176). Indeed, millions of Zimbabweans fled to South Africa and ended up competing with the host for basic services and opportunities building up tensions which led to the xenophobic attacks in 2008.

South Africa's main objective in the crisis was to stabilise Zimbabwe. Mbeki's administration had planned to resolve the crisis in three facades; assist rebuild Zimbabwe's economy, resolve the land crisis and get government to commit to a fair and free elections (van Nieuwkerk, 2006; Landsberg, 2010). Between 2000 and 2006 Mbeki had attempted different multilateral and bilateral tactics to execute his strategy. The sanctions options and military approach were out of question after the Nigeria imbroglio. In his bilateral attempts he worked with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to persuade Mugabe to a negotiated end to the crisis by encouraging fair and peaceful democratic elections but failed to get positive outcome (Landsberg, 2010: 158). Another attempt by Pretoria was the offering to pay-off Zimbabwe's 6.6 billion foreign debt and make money available for agricultural

essentials, medicine and fuel in exchange to stabilise the economy, an offer which was rejected by Mugabe. In another attempt Mbeki engaged the then United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan to play the role of easing tensions between Mugabe and the Western leaders and facilitate an end to the crisis (Landsberg, 2010:158). Mugabe was completely thrown off by the idea and suggested involvement of SADC regional leaders.

When Mbeki realised that his interventions were not yielding results, the African Renaissance champion sought multilateral intervention through the regional body, SADC. Mbeki's initiative was endorsed by SADC in and he was official appointed as a facilitator to end the Zimbabwe crisis at an Extraordinary Summit in Tanzania's capital, Dar es Salaam in 2007 (Landsberg, 2010:159). Chikane (2013:93) asserts that Mbeki's appointment by SADC was based on the fact that he had already started the facilitation process and had a better understanding of the dynamics, he exhibited good leadership in the continent and region and his track record in conflict resolution in Africa. In 2007 there was some sort of a breakthrough, the parties signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which assisted Zimbabweans to implement key reforms that would allow them to produce 'a new constitution and regulatory framework that would create an environment for free, fair and harmonised elections in 2008' (Chikane, 2013:93). This was a major milestone for both the South African government that led the mediation process and Southern African Development Community (SADC) that mandated SA to negotiate for a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe.

If we are to understand South Africa's policy approach to the Zimbabwe crisis then we need to understand Mbeki's style or approach to conflict resolution in Africa. Mbeki's approach was grounded on the principles of African Renaissance. Frank Chikane highlighted this in his book "Mbeki's particular approach on conflict resolution fell within the perspective of the rights of people to determine their destiny" (2013:92). Thus supporting what Zondi (2015:100) asserted "the African Renaissance embodied the commitment by Africans to ensure that peace, democracy and prosperity returns to the continent". Two other events motivated Mbeki's unique approach in Zimbabwe; the apartheid government had assumed a hegemonic role and pursued a policy of destabilization in the region using its military and economic muscle to steer the regional political economy to its advantage (Hamill & Hofman, 2009:174), therefore South Africa was careful not to be associated with the hegemonic role; on conflict resolution, the Nigeria experience humbled South Africa, exposed its limited diplomatic approaches and even threatened estrangement by AU.

The Mbeki presidency period saw Africa being placed at the centre of South Africa foreign policy. The African agenda policy emphasised building strong regional and continental institutions. Mbeki pursued the Africa agenda policy through conflict resolution in Africa, economic development and strengthening governance. Mbeki's diplomatic skills were undoubtedly the muscle of his African agenda policy. However, there seems to be a lack of balance between African solidarity and human rights values. This absence of balance was demonstrated in the Zimbabwe mediating process.

#### **4.5 Africa policy under Zuma**

South African foreign policy under Zuma was pursued as “African advancement and Enhanced Cooperation” (Landsberg, 2014). The Zuma administration identified a series of objectives to take this agenda forward. Even though Zuma's approach to foreign policy is associated with Mandela's style, the newly elected President of South Africa actually echoed similar values and priorities similar to those that buttressed both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki's presidencies (le Pere, 2014). Zuma also made a commitment to continue with the work started by Thabo Mbeki on African agenda in his first parliamentary address he affirmed ‘we will continue to prioritise the African continent by strengthening the African Union and its structures and give special focus to the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa Development’ (Zuma, 2009). On Southern Africa Zuma confirmed ‘... the strengthening of the regional integration with particular emphasis on improving the political and economic integration of SADC, towards the AU goal of a Union Government’ (Zuma, 2009). Indeed the Zuma administration advocated the African agenda under the rubric ‘African advancement and Enhanced Cooperation’.

Landsberg, (2014) used a very pragmatic illustration of Zuma's foreign policy where he employed the “Concentric circles” narrative to describe the foreign policy priorities. What is interesting is that the Africa priority borderlines the national interest locating it at the centre of South African foreign policy as promulgated by the Minister of DIRCO, Hon Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, continued the prioritization of Africa. The Africa priority was pursued under two themes; enhancing political and economic integration of SADC and Africa continental, (Landsberg, 2014:127). Four elements of the Zuma foreign policy have been identified which ascertain that African advancement policy was continuation of African agenda. First, Zuma's administration made a commitment to implement the NEPAD strategy for advancement of regional growth and development and positioning the development requirements of the continent on the global agenda, a policy that was very close to Mbeki's

heart (Landsberg, 2010, 2014; Zondi, 2015). Second, the Zuma administration also made a commitment to take forward African unity and development through the strengthening of the AU and its institution. Third, prioritization of African RECs as an essential building blocks of continental union which saw South Africa pursuing strategies to improve the political and economic integration of SADC such as contributing towards political cohesion and strengthening governance capacity in SADC (Landsberg, 2010:231). Fourth, South Africa under Zuma continued to prioritise conflict resolution in Africa under the African advancement rubric. According to Landsberg (2010:232) the Zuma administration adopted Mbeki's approach and strategies on conflict resolution policies in that South Africa's development was linked to peace and security in the region and the continent. In another publication Landsberg (2014:159) points out that the Zuma government undertook to distance itself from quiet diplomacy of Thabo Mbeki due to the controversies surrounding the approach. However, the posture adopted by Zuma in conflict resolution was similar to Mbeki's in that Zuma preferred a non-confrontational, mediated and accommodative solution to conflict in Africa (Landsberg, 2010:233). Under the promotion of peace, security and stability rubric the Zuma administration further committed itself to play an active role in reconstruction in post conflict countries such as Sudan, DRC, Burundi, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe.

On Zimbabwe, Zuma had two tasks to complete after Mbeki's unexpected ousting. The first was to facilitate the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which Mbeki had help the Zimbabwe parties sign in September 2008 leading to the formation of Government of National Unity (GNU) between ZANU-PF and MDC (Zondi, 2015:109). The GPA outlined reforms needed to be implemented by the government of Zimbabwe to pave way for fair and credible elections (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013:25). The second was to encourage the government of Zimbabwe to work towards free and fair election (Landsberg, 2014: 160). Indeed SADC declared the elections free and peaceful. In the same breath both SADC and AU endorsed the results of the elections and welcomed Mugabe who became the chairperson of SADC in 2013 and vice chair of the AU the following year (Makokera, 2015). Technically, South Africa had not fully delivered the SADC mandate to facilitate for an achievement of a conducive environment for free and fair elections (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). Still, Pretoria announced conclusion of diplomatic engagements. Even though the elections were free and peaceful they were mantled with irregularities. The Government of Botswana observer team reported that 'voters' rolls were released in hard copy two days

before the elections, allegations of people being denied to vote and irregular exclusion and inclusion of people on the voters' rolls' (politics web, 2013). In simpler terms the elections were free and not fair.

Unlike Mbeki, Zuma's approach in the Zimbabwe facilitation was accompanied by a bit of pressure. Zuma and his team insisted that Mugabe should implement reforms outlined in the GPA before setting an election date (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013:28). This approach left a bad taste on Mugabe and his cabinet who responded by undermining South Africa's mediation efforts and went ahead and set an election date without implementing the reforms (Makorera, 2015). Mugabe was so displeased with South Africa that he threatened to pull out of the SADC block should Zuma continue to press for delaying of elections and prioritization of reforms (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013:28). As such Zuma retracted and accepted both the election date and outcomes. In this regard, Zuma was unable to deliver the facilitation mandate in that Mugabe disregarded the requirements of the GPA that would ensure fair and credible elections. Instead, Mugabe chose a route that would ensure consolidation of power in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the political and economic crisis was far from being over. Zimbabwe was facing a severe liquidity crisis and fiscal pressure intensifying on fiscal budget threatening salaries of hundred thousands of civil servants (Makokera, 2015). This facilitation outcome suggest that there is a need to understand both Mbeki's African agenda policy and Zuma's African advancement in order to clearly articulate South Africa's approach in Zimbabwe. It also suggests that there is a need to understand both Mbeki and Zuma's personal interest at the time of facilitation.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

There exist a point of difference in conceptual emphasis in normative dimension of foreign policy between Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. Mandela steered a values based foreign policy characterised by human rights under the African agenda policy which Landsberg (2010) calls a "universalist approach" whilst seeking solidarity with other African states. It was discovered through literature that a foreign policy driven by values and principles is problematic. The Nigerian saga exposes the limits of unilateral approach of Mandela government's foreign policy. Mandela's foreign policy was described as unfocused and lacking direction whereas Mbeki was commended for giving South African foreign policy direction and putting Africa diplomacy at the centre of Africa's foreign policy. Mbeki's quiet diplomacy approach in Zimbabwe tainted South Africa's human rights champion image and exposed the shortfalls of the African agenda policy. Two instances demonstrate this: while

Mandela responded harshly to Sani Abacha's excessive human rights abuse in 1995, Mbeki chose to be quiet on human rights abuse by Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe in 2000. Zuma attempted to reconcile both Mandela and Mbeki's foreign policy but this approach proved to be impractical.

The next chapter explores the economic and political crisis of Zimbabwe from its independency in 1979 to the signing of the GPA. This background is necessary for the understanding of the factors that contributed to the crisis leading to the SADC intervention through South Africa in 2007. This context is essential for the analysis of South Africa's approach to Zimbabwe.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### The Evolution of the Zimbabwe Crisis

#### 5.1 Introduction

In September 2008, Africa and the world witnessed a significant occasion when the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Tsvangirai, and the MDC Mutambara signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which ushered in a formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in September 2008. The GNU saw the ZANU-PF and the MDC working together in parliament under challenging conditions (Mutisi, 2011). This was a major milestone for both the South African government that led the mediation process and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that mandated SA to negotiate for a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe. This also marked an end of a decade-long political conflict and instability that began with tensions between the ZANU-PF leadership and war veterans that demanded large payouts in 2000 and subsequently land reform. SADC intensified negotiations after the resurgence of conflict in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections in which the ZANU-PF reversed the 2008 election outcome at the hands of the MDC. As the negotiations continued between the belligerents, the economic situation degenerated, food and fuel became scarce, and inflation skyrocketed, leaving many Zimbabweans without jobs and food (Zondi, 2011). There was also a cholera epidemic outbreak in the country, which affected thousands of Zimbabweans in the villages. The confluence of these events created a negative cloud over the country. Despite this, South Africa recorded victory with the signing of the GPA in 2008, the implementation of the GPA resulting in the government comprised of ZANU-PF and the two MDC leadership, and delivered free and fair elections 2013.

This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of the Zimbabwe conflict and peace process to provide the context for analysing the SADC mandated mediation in Zimbabwe, to achieve this, the chapter identifies the key factors which led to the conflict in 2000 in Zimbabwe and eventually led to the deterioration of the political and the economic situation. Section 4.2 traces the history of South Africa's intervention in Zimbabwe during both apartheid and democratic regime. While 4.3 focuses on the factors that drove the conflict in Zimbabwe. Section 4.4 focuses on the signing of the GPA and its implementation, and lastly 4.5 conclude the chapter.

## 5.2 Tracing South Africa's intervention in Zimbabwe

There are two themes that characterizes Pretoria's engagement with Zimbabwe and the SADC region: the common enemy and regional leader. The "common enemy" theme covers South Africa's engagement under the apartheid regime while "the regional leader" speaks to the democratic government's engagement with its neighbours. Literature describes...Considering the historical relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Pretoria's involvement in the Zimbabwe crisis came as no surprise. The two countries have maintained strong political, military and economic ties since the 1890s. Their first political engagement can be traced back to Cecil John Rhodes occupation of the Southern Rhodesia under the British South Africa company. Since then scholars have described South Africa's pre-1994 engagement with Southern African region as dominant, violent and abrasive instead of exemplary and leadership (Landsberg, 2015; Mhanda, 2002). For instance Landsberg (2015) has described the apartheid regimes relations with the region as the one encompassed with a white dominated quest for ascendancy using tools of violence and dominance to conquer their neighbours. While Mhanda (2002) paint an ambiguous picture of South Africa's relations with its neighbours in which Pretoria pursued economic relations and concurrently destabilizing its neighbours. In response to Pretoria's hostility, the black-ruled Southern African neighbours formed the Front Line States (FLS) to counter South Africa's destabilization policies and aggression and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) to resist the republic's dominance (Landsberg, 2015). Meanwhile, the ANC maintained a cordial relationship with ZANU and a close one with ZAPU. The liberation party had more interactions with President Mugabe post-independence and even operated in Harare at Mugabe's invitation. This was a start of fraternal relations between the ANC and the ZANU-PF. Despite this, the Apartheid government maintained the hostility towards Zimbabwe which was now combined with destroying ANC operations and hunting its members who were based in Zimbabwe.

Besides the common bilateral engagements, a few events have driven South Africa's engagement with Zimbabwe under the democratic regime: the land redistribution project, emergence of the MDC, the 2000 parliament referendum and the violent land expropriation and displacement of white farmers (SALO, 2013). Landsberg (2016) has provided a list of reasons that prompted South Africa to respond to these developments. The first reason, which has also been highlighted by other scholars (Alden, 2002; Makorera, 2015) was to prevent a total economy collapse which could have a negative impact on South African economy and

the rest of the region. Second reason was to prevent further influx of refugees which could add pressure on South Africa's resources. The third reason was to contain the conflict within the borders of Zimbabwe to maintain stability in the Southern African region. The fourth reason was to prevent negative effect on Mbeki's African renaissance or African renewal project (Chikane, 2013).

South Africa has intervention in Zimbabwe is twofold: first, Pretoria intervened bilaterally in its capacity as concerned neighbour with economic ambitions. Second, the country intervened under the SADC mandate with ambitions to achieve regional partnership and solidarity. In its regional leader/concerned neighbour capacity, South Africa's engaging with Zimbabwe started in 1998, where they intervened with Prime Minister Tony Blair "to encourage the British government to honor the Lancaster House commitment of 1979 to financially provide for the Zimbabwe government to execute land redistribution in a non-confrontational manner" Mbeki (2016:9). Since then, South Africa undertook number engagements to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis including the 1998 International Donors on Land Reform and Resettlement Conference in Harare attended by international donors including the British government (Mbeki, 2016). Although the UK government had committed to reconsider the financial support for the land redistribution programme, they soon repudiated their commitment to honour the Lancaster agreement and distanced themselves from the responsibility. South Africa also intervened through the UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan who committed the UNDP to work with the Zimbabwe government to implement the land redistribution project using funds donated during the International Donor Conference. However, this project failed due to issues of mistrust and corruption and the land question remained unresolved.

South Africa has also engaged Zimbabwe in its capacity as a SADC mediator representing the regional body. Although South Africa was pursuing a SADC mandate, its approach in Zimbabwe was dubbed a "quiet diplomacy" strategy which is related to the idea that African leaders should be given space to deal with their policy challenges (Landsberg, 2016).

Pretoria's engagement under the SADC mandate commenced in 2002 to 2013 and delivered the signing of the GPA, the formation of the GNU, constitutional reform and two presidential elections in 2008 and 2013. During this period Zimbabwe surged into political violence and intolerance, the economy sank further down with inflation, consumer goods and unemployment plummeting to the highest peak it has ever been and the humanitarian situation deteriorated (Zondi, 2013). Despite this indication of state collapse, the SADC

envoy registered some progress as they continued to negotiate for democratic processes and peace.

The outcomes of the negotiations included the constitutional amendment number 18 which paved the way for the March 2008 harmonised elections, the signing of the GPA followed after months of intense negotiations. The agreement stipulated the sharing of executive power including the roles of presidents and the ministers. Moreover, the GPA made provisions for significant political change including a framework for the transformation of Zimbabwe politics and society, and an inclusive constitutional reform (Zondi, 2013). Both South Africa and SADC view these milestones as evidence that their mediation efforts were paying dividends. One of the mediators, Chikane (2013:93), was confident that the GPA “stabilised the Zimbabwe situation and offered the people an opportunity to produce a constitution and a regulatory framework that would create conditions for free and fair elections”. However, some scholars have labeled power sharing agreements as merely a compromise between competing parties (Mapuva, 2010). They argue that opposition parties are forced into GNU’s when long time ruling parties refuse to relinquish power after an electoral defeat. According to Zondi (2013) Tsvangarai expressed discomfort about the GNU and felt that election users were now using violence to force winners into a political power agreement. Despite this, the implementation of the GPA including constitutional reform and formation of the inclusive cabinet highlights some of the successes of South Africa’s engagement in Zimbabwe.

The postcolonial Zimbabwe state has undergone many changes since attaining independence in 1980. Complex power struggles and economic meltdowns have characterised the independent Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's political character is shaped by the liberation struggle of the nationalist movement and the Lancaster constitutional settlement of 1979 (Sachikonye, 2004). The year 2000 was a major turning point in the Zimbabwe political crisis's evolution, which saw the long-reigning ZANU-PF government experience its first electoral defeat during a referendum on constitutional reforms, which took place on the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> February (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015). In the face of growing opposition, ZANU-PF resorted to violent methods of electoral campaigns where members of the opposition and civil societies were bitten, abducted, and murdered. The situation was compounded by land invasion and seizing of white-owned commercial farmers by the war veterans (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003) . From 2000 the struggle constituted the maintenance of the ZANU-PF hegemony and upholding the one-party agenda in Zimbabwe. What is the nature of this conflict? What are the factors that drove the Zimbabwe political and economic crisis?

This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of Zimbabwe's conflict and peace process to provide the context for analysing the SADC mandated mediation process in Zimbabwe. To achieve this, the chapter identifies the key factors which led to the conflict in 2000 in Zimbabwe and eventually led to the deterioration of the political and economic situation. We also trace the deleterious events that followed after the year 2000, which further caused the degeneration of Zimbabwe's situation. ZANU-PF was working hard to maintain its political dominance. ZANU-PF's efforts of maintaining their hegemony and centralisation of power took place in phases: the first phase was the absorption of ZAPU into ZANU-PF after the 1987 Pact of Unity, which marked the beginning of a one-party phase (Onslow, 2011). This one-party period dominated Zimbabwe's political environment until 1999 when MDC emerged as a new opposition party. The second phase started in 2000. ZANU-PF maintained its hegemony, restructuring state power and interfering and manipulating the electoral process and the constitution accompanied by institutionalised violent campaigns. The year 2008 marked the end of this phase, which saw the GNU signing implemented in January. The third phase started in 2008 after implementing the GNU, a period marked by transition and deep economic woes, which ended in 2013 when ZANU-PF won the presidential elections.

### **5.3 The factors that drove the conflict in Zimbabwe**

#### **The one-party dominance: the trail of how ZANU-PF maintained its political dominance**

The year 2000 marked a major turning point in the Zimbabwe political crisis's evolution as the ZANU-PF experienced its first electoral defeat during a constitutional referendum in February 2000 (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015; Mhandara & Pooe, 2013a). The governing ZANU-PF lost the bid to adopt its proposed constitution to the 'No' vote sponsored by the MDC and civil society groups (Kagoro, 2005 in Hamausa & Chinyere, 2014). These results threatened the ZANU-PF one-party dominance and prompted Mugabe and the ZANU-PF to pursue violent campaigns to coax people to vote for ZANU-PF in the next presidential elections. This period marked the beginning of what Onslow (2011) calls 'the battle of the state' in Zimbabwe. The confluence created by the rising popularity of the MDC and the waning political influence of the ZANU-PF created an environment for a conflict between the ruling party and the white commercial farmers (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). This also marked the beginning of bitter racial politics characterised by land grabs and commercial farm attacks by the war veterans (Hamausa & Chinyerere, 2014).

### **i) Phase One 1980-1990: violence and absorption of PF-ZAPU**

The 1980s was a significant period in the Zimbabwe politics. It was marked by the transition of power from the colonial government to nationalist liberation struggle movements. The independence in Zimbabwe was attained by the liberation army such as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the army wing of the ZANU, and ZAPU's army wing Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (Manasungure 2008). Despite multiple political players, the Zimbabwean politics have been characterised by the domination of a single party. The period between the beginning of independence and the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 and the period from 1999 when the MDC emerged were crowded by conflict and economic and political deterioration in Zimbabwe. According to Masunungare (2006) the causal factor to this is the bipolar distribution of power which was initially represented by the competition between ZANU and ZAPU, ZINLA and ZIPRA and recently ZANU-PF and the MDC.

After the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979, both ZANU and ZAPU forged a coalition government in which ZAPU was a junior partner. ZANU's placing of ZAPU in a secondary position was done intentionally to maintain ZANU's one-party dominance (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003). The merger of ZANU and ZAPU was motivated by the belief that both parties shared a common vision of a non-racial, independent and united Zimbabwe. However, unfortunately, this marriage was short-lived. Both ZANU and ZAPU separated after the Lancaster House Conference, and tensions between the two parties grew, leading to the Gukurahundi conflict, which took place in 1980 (Masunungure, 2008). The dismissal of ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo and his members led to a build-up of tensions, culminating in tensions between Nkomo's supporters and the government. The friction started when Nkomo's supporters from the new government army abandoned the army and fought running battles with the government army (Masunungare, 2008). The government responded punitively by unleashing the Fifth Brigade, which embarked on the *Gukurahundi* campaign, killing around 20000 Ndebele people. According to Mhandara and Pooe (2013) the *Gukurahundi* was a military strategy undertaken by the North Korean trained 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) used to eliminate the threat of the oppositions who sought to subvert and undermine the ZANU government.

When Mugabe became the first Prime Minister of the new Zimbabwe in 1980, he had a gigantic task of uniting a nation subjected to 90 divisive and racist colonial rule.

Additionally, Mugabe had to integrate the two liberation army wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA who had a complex and violent relationship throughout the struggle. However, after taking over as president, Mugabe and ZANU sought to downplay the role that the Matebele played in the liberation struggle and made zero efforts to integrate the military wings of ZANU and ZAPU. The first decade of independence was dominated by major outbreaks of violence between ZANLA and ZIPRA in the early 1980s. The antagonism between the two army wings spilt over to the ZAPU and ZANU political parties leading to the annihilation of the Matebele executed by Mugabe's Fifth Brigade or the *Gukurahundi* (CCJPZ, 1997).

The ZANU government deployed the Fifth Brigade in Matebeleland North in 1983. The Fifth Brigade unleashed intense brutality, including physical torture, beatings, killings and burning of property. Many villagers incurred a loss of livelihood due to the burning of properties and granaries, whereas others were permanently disabled from the beatings. The Fifth Brigade operation ended in 1987 with the Zimbabwe National Unity Accord signing, which paved the way for ZANU-PF formation, merging ZANU and ZAPU into one party (Mhandara & Poee, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Commentators have reported that the signing of the Accord was not voluntary. ZAPU entered an agreement whose sole intention was to annihilate the party in exchange for an end of the Fifth Brigade operation. As such, ZAPU was powerless to negotiate an agreement that would ensure the party attains concession (Eppel, 2009; Rwodzi, 2020). The negotiations for the National Unity Accord started in 1985 and ended in 1987. The Accord stated that both parties will ensure the end to the killings in Matebeleland and have committed to unite under one party, ZANU-PF.

Ethnic divide drove tensions between ZAPU and ZANU since ZAPU was a Ndebele dominated party and ZANU a Shona dominated party. The ethnic differences were also the driving force of the factionalism between the ZANU from ZAPU and eventually led to the two parties' split in 1963 (Masunungare, 2006). Both parties contested separately in the first elections of 1980 after attaining independence, in which Mugabe came out as the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe (Nyere, 2016). Mugabe's ascension to power marked the beginning of a new era of militarised electoral authoritarianism political culture. Even though Mugabe led a coalition government, there were signs of intolerance and authoritarianism from the beginning. Nkomo's dismissal by Mugabe and the *Gukurahundi* operation demonstrated this. Some claimed that the *Gukurahundi* operation was used by Mugabe to eliminate the Matebele population and to liquidate PF-ZAPU from its stronghold to eliminate strong competition during the elections (Nyere, 2016). The *Gukurahundi* attests to the violent

political culture within ZANU-PF and sets the tone for how the nationalist government would deal with political opponents in the future (Mhandara & Poee, 2013). It also speaks to the belief held by ZANU-PF that violence parallels statecraft (Nyere, 2016). When the *Gukurahundi* operation failed to achieve the ZANU-PF intended with PF-ZAPU, Mugabe sought to look at the other options to erode and eliminate competition.

This episode revealed two things about President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF: the first is that violence would play a central role in continuing a dominant one party in Zimbabwe. The *Gukurahundi* killings revealed the extent to which the ZANU government would deal with dissidents who appear to threaten the nationalist government's position of power. Nyere (2016) provides an analysis of the role of violence in ZANU's political culture. This paper concluded that violence in Zimbabwe is entrenched in the political system and has been used as a tool to control the state in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, was used to colonize Zimbabwe and to liberate Zimbabwe. Nyere (2016:95) argues that the role of violence in Zimbabwe should be viewed as a continuum rather than an episodic. Ndlovu-gatsheni (2003) shares the same views that the ZANU-PF government is pervaded acquired from the liberation struggle by the culture of intolerance and violence. We identified two factors that have shaped ZANU-PF's political violent culture: the violent nature of colonialism in Zimbabwe and the alliance between ZAPU and ZANLA guerrilla warfare. To expand on the former, colonialism in Zimbabwe was violent by nature. It was characterised by aggression, which involved gun shooting and lawlessness (Nyere, 2016).

Violence was common amongst Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups and British colonialists during the colonial period (Nyere, 2016). The use of disproportionate force when dealing with dissents was a legacy of the colonial government. The violence was used by imperial powers to colonise Zimbabwe and was executed in this manner. First, the Rhodesian War saw the colonialists forcefully subjugating Zimbabweans by expropriating their land and the cattle and forcing them to work as labourers in their land Nyere 2016:97). This approach was strongly resisted by African nationalists leading to a violent conflict between the nationalists and the colonialists in 1960, which saw the banning of the National Democratic Party (NDP). This juncture created a series of events, including the formation of ZAPU and eventually the establishment of ZANU, which formed after a group of ZAPU members separated from the party due to differing views and opinions. Second, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was characterised by aggressive violence in which British colonialists would dispense military operations to crush African nationalists ascending to power (Nyere,

2016). According to Rodzwi (2020) Prime Minister Ian Smith's unilateral decision to declare a UDI after Britain's unwillingness to grant Rhodesia independence under white minority rule plunged the country into a deep crisis. Following this, the ZANU and ZAPU nationalist parties were embroiled in an armed struggle with the white government that lasted for fifteen years until the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979.

To achieve this, Prime Minister Ian Smith unleashed the following violent operations which display the violent nature in Zimbabwean politics: Operation Mardon was executed by the UDI in 1976 and included infantry attacks directed to ZANLA camps (Nyere, 2016:97). He also carried out Operation Dingo in 1977 by the Rhodesian force and Operation Uric/Bootlace which was a joint operation with South Africa executed in 1979 (Nyere, 2016). These events attest that violence was used by the colonialists as a tool of oppression and was also used by the nationalist party to gain independence (Nyere). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002) ZANU-PF has embraced this violent culture and has relied on it to deal with those who challenge their position.

### **The nationalist movement and the quest for power**

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002) admits that the colonialist government in Rhodesia ruled by coercion and intimidation of those who opposed the government but underlines that the nationalist party's contribution to this violent culture should not be ignored. As such, Nyere (2016) confirms that the army arm, ZANLA, of ZANU is also another contributing structural factor to ZANU's political culture in which enforcement of solidarity and discipline would be marked by violence. Gatsheni- Ndlovu (2002:102) points out that the Zimbabwe political culture is heavily influenced and shaped by the liberation struggle. The liberation struggle coerced and punished every African to give unreserved support to their movement, creating an institutionalised culture of fear. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002:103) the nationalist struggle was characterised by contradictions such that the liberation war became rife with plots, infights, factions, and assassinations. Masipula Sithole (1999) in (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003) explains these contradictions, which cultivated authoritarianism and intolerance within the Zimbabwe nationalist movement. The movement was a 'revolution that ate its children' in which revolutionary justice was a tool used to remove others (Sithole, 1999 in Gatsheni- Ndlovu). Different views on how the struggle should be executed and attaining independence begot splinter groups that were hostile to one another resulting in intolerance. 'Their war

within war became even more brutal as the liberation struggle against the white colonialist government intensified' (Moyo, 2012:6).

Indeed, despite the war against the common enemy, the Rhodesian government, there was an ongoing war within the nationalist parties, ZANU, ZAPU and the African National Council (ANC) contestation for power was rife. The ANC was a non-partisan political movement grounded on religious ethics that was led by Bishop Muzorewa in the early 1970s. The ANC emerged to oppose the Anglo-Rhodesian Constitutional proposals, which agreed to end racial segregation and improve Africans' participation in government. Still, it rejected the majority rule by Africans and independence (Chimhanda, 2003). It was an attempt by the political-liberal African church leadership in Zimbabwe to tackle the socio-political challenges facing Zimbabweans (F. Moyo, 2012). Both ZANU and ZAPU's interests were represented in the ANC leadership in which Edison Sithole, Eddison Zvogbo and Michael Mawema represented ZAPU Josiah Chinamno, Msipa, and Chadzingwa represented ZAPU (Chimhanda, 2003; Moyo, 2012). The ANC emerged to fill the gap left by the banned ZANU and ZAPU parties whose leaders (Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Leopold Takariwa, among others) were imprisoned and couldn't challenge the Home-Smith proposal (Rodzwi, 2020). Both ZANU and ZAPU had initially endorsed the ANC's role with the view that the Christian leaders were 'caretakers' and were too weak to compete with the nationalist parties for power.

However, things took a different turn when the Rhodesian government released ZAPU and ZANU leaders from prison in 1974, which resulted in struggles and tensions within the ANC. The release of the detained leaders changed the dynamics of the ANC. Competition for absolute control of the ANC among the nationalist leaders was mounting. Both ZANU and ZAPU had the ambition to take over the ANC leadership (Chimhanda, 2003). Power struggles and political ambitions saw the ANC disintegrate. The issues began when the ANC, ZAPU, and ZANU agreed to unite under the ANC and decided to hold a congress in 1975 to launch one political party and elect the new party's leadership. The ANC leader, Bishop Muzorewa, suggested for postponement of the congress after ZANU felt they were unprepared for the congress due to an internal crisis. However, ZAPU leader Nkomo went ahead and held the congress in September 1975, which was boycotted by ZANU, ANC and FROLIZI. The congress resulted in the formation of the ANC Zimbabwe (ANC Z) and elected ZAPU members into leadership with Nkomo.

The ANC converted from a lobby party into a political party with Bishop Muzorewa as its first president. This occurrence changed Zimbabwe's political landscape and threatened ZANU and ZAPU's political leadership (Sadomba, 2013). The ANC's non-violent approach to protest and the absence of ZANU and ZAPU in the political space created a confluence for the new party to flourish as another political option for Zimbabweans. The ANC's probability of being a strong contender prompted the ZANU and ZAPU to launch a character assassination campaign against Muzorewa to discredit him as a potential future leader of Rhodesia (Moyo, 2002). This revealed the complexities, contest and wrangles existing in the liberation movement. As such, political contestation for freedom within the liberation movement grew. The assumption that nationalist parties would unite against a common enemy, as seen in South Africa, proved wrong. Both ZANU and ZAPU viewed Bishop Muzorewa as an opportunist who betrayed their trust by turning his caretaker role to a national party leader. In this regard, (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003:104) reminds us the African nationalist movements, which have been regarded as 'beacon of hope' that ushered freedom and promoted human rights, were also schools of authoritarianism, violence, and 'cult of personality.'

Nkomo's move destroyed any hope of a united political front, and instead, it intensified the competition between the nationalist parties. This also caused animosity between the nationalist parties to escalate. An attempt was made to unite the nationalist parties by amalgamating the military wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA, forming Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). Competition, suspicions, and mounting tensions dominated the ZIPA camp. The tensions between ZAPU and ZANU leaders contributed to the hostile environment at the ZIPA camp. For instance, Nkomo didn't warm up to the idea of a united military wing and had denounced ZIPA as an imposition by neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, Mugabe sent a memorandum to the ZANLA guerrillas suggesting that Nkomo should be denounced as a counter-revolutionary as he was seen to be dining with the enemy. This was based on the fact that Nkomo had decided to start negotiations with Smith with the hope of achieving a peaceful transition. Mugabe's move intensified tensions between the ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres, resulting in the death of mainly ZIPRA militants killed after a fight broke-up at the Mgogoa Kingolwira camps (Chimhanda, 2003).

Consequently, the collaboration at the military level also failed. However, ZANU and ZAPU made another attempt for political collaboration by forming the Patriotic Front, whose aim was to end colonialism and minority rule and negotiate for a political transition from a

common position (Masunungare, 2006). Indeed, ZAPU and ZANU were able to come together under PF and negotiated for a transition that led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1979. Both Mugabe and Nkomo were able to speak with one voice under the PF at the Lancaster House Conference, representing the oppressed Africans' voices. According to Chimhanda (2003), the Lancaster House Agreement's outcomes were not what both leaders had anticipated, but the talks brought independence to Zimbabwe and allowed for majority rule. Despite this, (Rwodzi, 2020) believes that the Lancaster House Conference was blanketed in suspicions. The ZANU-PF violated the terms of the conference by having a portion of its militants on standby. In contrast, the conference required that all soldiers be put into assembly points. Hamauswa & Chinyere (2015:4) point out that the Lancaster House Agreement left many unresolved issues that shaped Zimbabwe's future. The land is one of those issues. According to Chimhanda (2003), 'the PF accepted a land reform program based on a willing seller willing buyer basis' making it difficult for the Zimbabwe government to redress the land inequities was actualised by the colonialism. The land issue later revealed the violent nature of ZANU-PF when dealing with dissents who disagree with them.

## **ii) Phase Two: 1990-2008, the emergence of the MDC and the violent electoral campaigns**

The excessive use of violence from the 1990s is associated with the nationalist government's failed nation-building project. The period between 1990 and 2000 in Zimbabwe was characterised by chaos and prominence of labour organisations, which also saw the MDC's emergence. Four events created a chaotic situation between 1997 and 2000, compounded the economic and political situation, and led to the MDC formation. During this period, violence was excessively used to quell the chaos. The first one is the hasty implementation of the neo-liberal ESAP, which was an attempt by the Nationalist Government to transform the economy of Zimbabwe (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015). The government implemented the ESAP without consulting Zimbabwe's people, which provoked widespread criticism by the students and workers (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003). With the implementation of the ESAP, the economy was no longer state-led but was now market drive (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). After implementing the ESAP, government subsidies on education, health, food, and other basic social protection schemes were detached. Prices of goods hit the roof, and retrenchments were also rising (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003).

The ESAP worsened the working class's economic conditions and the rural population and disproportionately contributed to the economic and political crisis that unfolded from the late 1990s (Hamauswa &Chenyere, 2015). In response, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions embarked on a national strike met with a government's violent response (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The implementation of the ESAP also gave power and prominence to labour unions allowing them to challenge and contest the government's decisions (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). After the adoption of ESAP, the ZANU-PF government became less concerned about the workers and peasants; as such, equality was no longer a priority (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). At the same time, the members of the civil society challenged government policies and corruption. The government responded by introducing the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1992, the Private Voluntary Organisations Act, and the University Amendment Act of 1990 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The Acts were introduced to silence the unions and the students by limiting their autonomy and extinguishing civil society; however, the civic group kept the pressure going.

The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA), whose mandate was to address their members' needs and interests, was one of the civil society groups that demanded to be compensated and given gratuity for their contribution to the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Therefore, the second contributor to Zimbabwe's economic crisis was the unbudgeted pay-outs made to the war veteran to recognise their contribution to the liberation struggle (Hamauswa & Chenyere, 2015). In 1997 the ZNLWVA accused the government of being negligent on the war veterans' plight and demanded compensation for their role in the struggle. The government gave in to the pressure of the ZNLWVA and awarded each war veteran a lump sum of Z\$50 000, a monthly grant of Z\$2000, and other social benefits. This pay-out was significant for ZANU-PF, who needed to co-opt the security forces to protect the position of power through institutionalised violence and intimidation (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). This also marked the beginning of a military-political state.

The third factor that contributed to the economic and political crisis is the deployment of troops to the DRC in 1998 to assist Laurent Kabila's regime costing Zimbabwe an estimated US\$1 billion. This happened after Laurent Kabila had clashed with rebels of the ADFL after seizing power from Mobutu Sese Seko (Landsberg, 2010). The rebels were joined by the security forces from Uganda and Rwanda to help overthrow Kabila's regime. At the request of Kabila, Zimbabwe, together with Namibia and Angola, sent some 11000 troops and

several helicopters at a hefty cost to the taxpayers to support DRC's forces (Zondi, 2014). This caused a considerable budget deficit in Zimbabwe's public purse as the money spent was unbudgeted for.

The fourth and last factor is the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000. In 1997 President Robert Mugabe entered into a truce with the war veterans in which he promised to redistribute land (Sadomba, 2013). In this truce, Mugabe agreed that white owned farms would be seized and given to the struggling Zimbabweans, and 20% of it given to the veterans (Sadomba, 2013). Mugabe's attempt to force the white farmers to give their land to poor Zimbabweans was met with strong resistance by the farmers who legally challenged the government. The white farmers challenged the government based on the Lancaster House Agreement, which bounded the government on the willing seller willing buyer land reform program and the private property rights making the radical land redistribution difficult (Zondi, 2011). When the state failed to honour the truce, the war veteran mobilised peasants and used a military approach to forcefully grab the land from the farmers in 1998, challenging Mugabe and the State. The government responded by violence, attacking the peasants and destroying their shelters. In this instance, violence was again used by the veterans to occupy the land using tactics from the guerrilla experience (Sadomba, 2013). At the same time, the labour movement, ZCTU, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, had evolved into a National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). The NCA was advocating for a new Zimbabwean constitution citing inadequacies in the Lancaster Constitution. The NCA gave birth to the MDC, which became ZANU-PF's strongest competitor (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015; Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003). Though the ruling party dismissed the MDC as a Western front neo-imperialism, the MDC was the only opposition party that threatened the dominance of ZANU-PF since independence.

### **A new challenge for ZANU-PF: The Emergence of the MDC**

The formation of MDC in 1999 changed the political environment in Zimbabwe, leading to ZANU-PF heightening the use of violence as a tool to eliminate dissents who threatened their reign. MDC's popularity meant that competition for power was now stiff. The new party was a strong force founded on civil society and labour movements led by a charismatic leader with mass mobilisation (Zondi, 2011). MDC also enjoyed external donor support and support by major Western countries; thus, ZANU-PF dismissed the MDC as a Western stooge whose aim was to reverse the liberation struggle's gains. The ruling party felt the MDC's presence

when Mugabe's government's proposed constitution was defeated in a referendum by 55 per cent “No” vote supported by MDC and civil society (Hamauswa & Chenyere, 2013:5). The result shook the government as this was unexpected. Fearing that this defeat would set a standard for the upcoming 2002 elections, ZANU-PF resorted to a violent electoral campaign.

The emergence of the MDC pressed the ZANU-PF so much that the ruling party resorted to unleashing its most aggressive nature, increasing beatings, abductions, arrest, and MDC (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:123). The ZANU-PF government used state security to suppress suspected dissents, particularly MDC members and other civil society members, to ensure that Mugabe claims victory in the impending presidential elections Onslow (2011). This competition propelled the ZANU-PF to institutionalise violence to ensure they remain in power. Having made payouts to the war veterans in 1998, Mugabe was now using them as the instrument of callous oppression to eliminate dissents. The war veterans also took over the Fast Track Land reform process without any State resistance as the land invasion was now legitimised (Zondi, 2011). At this point, the State was faced with a declining economy, a severe contraction of agricultural and industrial productivity, the informal dollarization of financial transactions and economic and political migration (Onslow, 2011:9).

### **The 2005 violent campaign, war veterans and land**

Between 2000 and 2005, the State of Zimbabwe was militarised through the war veterans and ZANU-PF youth militia, creating an environment of suppression and violence. This was an effort by ZANU-PF to push back on the post-nationalist framework driven by the MDC to maintain authoritarian nationalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:128). Since horrifying incidents of violence marked the 2000 elections, both the ZANU-PF youth and war veterans carried a terror campaign leading to the 2005 elections. Before these elections, the State, through the security forces, unleashed brutality against the opposition, including the beating up and abduction of MDC members, suppressing the media arrest and beating of critiques and activists, and strict control over donor funding (Zondi, 2013:11). Journalists were also arrested, abducted, beaten up, or killed. The ZANU-PF used violence as a strategy to subdue the middle class and the youth. The electoral violent campaign corresponded with the MDC divisions increasing ZANU-PF's chances of winning the 2005 elections. Indeed, ZANU-PF won the elections by 59.6 per cent of the votes than 39.5 per cent of the MDC.

After Mugabe's return to the Presidency, the brutal reign continued. Violence was now officially the state's tool to deal with opponents. In 2005 the government launched a military

clean-up called operation *Murambatsvina* (“Clear the filth”) (Nyere, 2016:100). During operation *Murambatsvina*, the state security force demolished informal settlements, including illegal market stalls and unauthorised houses. According to the State, operation *Murambatsvina* was carried out to clean the filth in the urban areas because they harbour crime, dirt and other social ills (Nyere, 2016; Zondi, 2011). The *Murambatsvina* was carried out in the most violent, aggressive and brutal manner drawing attention from neighbouring countries and the world. Mutambo (in Nyere, 2016) asserted that the operation *Murambatsvina* was aimed at punishing the urbanites for rejecting the ZANU-PF during the elections. An estimated 700000 Zimbabweans were disproportionately affected by this operation, leaving them without homes or livelihoods (Human Rights Watch, 2008:11). This demonstrates how violence has been systematically used in Zimbabwe to maintain the status quo.

Once again, the government used systematic violence in 2007, leading up to the 2008 presidential elections. The ZANU-PF heightened its nationalist authoritarianism and dealt violently with anyone who opposed them (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). At the same time, Zimbabwe's economy continued to deteriorate, marked by shortages of fuel, a high unemployment rate, and inflation (Hamauswa & Chenyere, 2014:5). The crisis reached its boiling point in 2007 when the state forces attacked the MDC's civil society and members during a "Save Zimbabwe" march at the Zimbabwe showgrounds. When the civil society leaders and MDC ignored warnings by the security force to cancel the event, the security forces responded by violence to disband the gathering (Mhandara & Pooe, 2014:10). This incident's brutality prompted SADC's intervention in which SA was mandated to facilitate between the Government of Zimbabwe and the political parties to find a solution to the Zimbabwe crisis. The violent attacks on civil society and opposition always corresponded with the runner up to elections. This signified the deepening authoritarianism and intolerance in the ZANU-PF government (Onslow, 2011).

The foundation of violence was deeply entrenched within the structures of ZANU-PF. The key drivers of violence were the ZANU Youth militia, the State's senior security force officials, and the war veterans (Onslow, 2011). Firstly, the ZANU Youth militia had been absorbed by the ruling party and endorsed to kill, torture, and beat up members of the MDC and civil society and other Zimbabweans suspected of having voted for the MDC during the 2005 elections (HRW, 2008). Secondly, the security state forces seemed to have occupied a few senior positions within the ZANU-PF and were members of the Joint Operations

Command (JOC) (Zondi, 2011). The JOC included the Heads of Government Security forces such as the Zimbabwe Defence Force, Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation, the Police, the prison services, and the then Minister of Rural Housing Emmerson Mnangagwa. The JOC played a key role in strategic decision-making on social, civic, and political issues and worked closely with Mugabe, explaining the military approach that the government had adopted post-2000 (Zondi, 2011). Senior police officers were responsible for ordering junior officers on the ground to commit politically motivated violence against MDC supporters, suspected supporters, civil society and journalists. The police officers were involved in a violent campaign in which the MDC members and suspected members were beaten, captured and tortured in Mashonaland East and Manicaland. The Defence Force was also implicated in the violent campaign conducting nightly raids searching for MDC members and beating them up and supporting the war veterans and the ZANU-PF supporters to aid them in carrying out acts of violence against MDC supporters (Kasambala & Gagnon, 2008).

Thirdly, the war veterans were involved in many incidents of violence in which they beat and abduct MDC supporters. The war veterans had army bases in Harare, Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Masvingo and Manicaland, where they carried out their violent operations such as abduction, beating and torturing of MDC supporters. It was reported that the war veterans would carry out raids and shoot MDC supporters during their gatherings (Kasambala & Gagnon, 2008). Together with the ZANU Youth militia and the army, the war veterans also carried out “re-education” meetings in Mashonaland Central, East and West. The meetings were conducted violently and targeted areas where the ZANU-PF experienced significant losses to the MDC or won with a small margin. The “re-education” meetings aimed to coerce Zimbabweans into denouncing the MDC and vote the ZANU-PF (Kasambala & Gagnon, 2008:23). ZANU-PF used the meetings were to punish those who had voted for the MDC through beatings and torture. The war veterans also created “no go areas” in Mashonaland to prevent victims from escaping to other places and to prevent journalists and human rights organisations from entering Mashonaland. As such, many people were unable to flee the violence and were unable to get food or medical care, particularly those who had wounds from the beatings (Human Rights Watch, 2008). This violent campaign aimed to ensure that Mugabe returned to the presidential position after the 2002 and 2008 elections and annihilated the MDC. Concurrently, the economy of Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate.

**Constant amendment of the constitution to benefit the ZANU-PF regime.**

Zimbabwe's constitution has undergone many alterations in the past 40 years to address the Lancaster House Constitution's compromised provisions. Still, most of the changes were driven by the ruling party to ensure that power was centralised and galvanise power (Dzinesa, 2012). In the 1990s, most Zimbabweans felt that the Lancaster House Constitution was deficient in many ways because it's undemocratic and compromised nature and its governmental imbalances. For instance, the president was given unrestricted powers to interfere with the electoral process and manipulate it to further ZANU-PF's one-party regime priorities (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003). As such, a movement driven by civil society comprised of churches, students, political parties, trade unions, human rights defenders, youth groups and women's organisations emerged under the NCA to advocate for a new inclusive and democratic constitution (Dzinesa, 2012). The NCA's constitutional reform advocacy was driven by the concern about the president's authority, which seemed to have no boundaries.

The ZANU-PF government responded positively and used the opportunity to scrap the Lancaster House Constitution but the ruling party designed a constitution that would ensure presidential control (Zondi, 2013). The ZANU-PF monopolised the Constitutional Commission work and controlled the review process. It is reported that the Chair of the Commission, Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku was a close ally of President Robert Mugabe, and the majority of the Commission's members were ZANU-PF members and supporters (Dzinesa, 2012). Indeed, the consultations took place to control. A draft constitution was submitted to the President in 1999, which made provisions for a bill of rights and a new government's institutional framework. The draft contained a broader bill of rights than the Lancaster House Constitution and gave the president the power to appoint and dismiss public figures. President Mugabe further changed the draft constitution to advance their party agenda raising fears among the civil society that the ruling party was using the constitution to advance the one-party regime agenda (Zondi, 2013:8). President Mugabe amended the constitution and introduced new laws forbidding same-sex marriage, compulsory military service, and a clause allowing "compulsorily to acquire agricultural land for settlement". ZANU-PF's efforts to pass this constitution failed, suffering a pushback from the NCA-MDC, which campaigned aggressively for a "No". The NCA-MDC argued that the Commission ignored people's views on limiting executive powers, amongst other things. After the year 2000, the ZANU-PF government continued to use the constitution to stay in power. At the same time, the economy of Zimbabwe declined rapidly after 2000. The GDP

shrank by 8% in 2000 and further shrunk by 14% by 2003, and the employment rate was estimated to be around 60-70% (Sachikonye, 2005).

Zimbabwe attempted another constitutional reform after the signing of the GPA of September 2008. The GPA required the formation of a transitional inclusive government comprised of the ZANU-PF, the MDC-T and MDC-N, and set up a COPAC to establish a constitution within 20 months after it has been formed (Dzinesa, 2012:5). In April 2009, the COPAC was established consisting of parliamentarians from ZANU-PF and the two MDCs offering the three political parties to develop a new democratic constitution for Zimbabwe jointly. Public consultations were carried out country-wide to ensure that the Zimbabwean people would own the new constitution (Dzinesa, 2012). The ZANU-PF used the consultation process to ensure that the one-party agenda is maintained, enforcing its preferences, such as centralising power to the president and removing the Prime Minister (Nyere, 2016). The ruling party also suppressed those who openly criticised the ZANU-PF government during the outreach phase. The police also violently dealt with MDC members who held consultation meetings, beating, and arresting participants. The constitutional consultation process was now reduced to party political interest in which coaching and intimidation of participants were reported (Kasambala & Gagnon, 2008).

To locate the above political developments in the constitutional context, we will consider how Zimbabwe's constitution was born out of the Lancaster House in 1979. First, it is important to mention that Zimbabwe's constitution is shaped by the liberation struggle and nationalism and the Lancaster House Agreement's constitutional settlement in 1979 (Sachikonye, 2004). The constitution was built on the backdrop of a nationalist movement that fought an oppressive minority regime. A provision in the constitution postulated that no significant changes should be instituted into the constitution for the next coming years after the white minority were allocated 20 seats in parliament and embedded land and property rights (Dzinesa, 2012). This was to ensure that there wasn't any substantial shift in social and property relations post-independence, particularly land reform. This and other decisions made during the Lancaster House negotiations were flawed as they kept the white minority in control of the economy of Zimbabwe and the majority of the land. In contrast, the black majority remained landless and poor (Rwodzi, 2020). The Lancaster House constitution was a huge compromise for the nationalist parties as they lost more than they had bargained. Even Mugabe once claimed that he was coerced to accept the proposed constitution by Carrington and the Frontline states when he preferred to emancipate Zimbabwe through military war

(Rwodzi, 2020). As a result, the constitution was described as an ‘obsolete, imposed and transitional document... which doesn’t represent the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe for good governance and development’ (Hlatshwayo, 1998 in Sachikonye, 2004).

Concurrently, Mugabe's post-independence government was not focused on developing and implementing reforms that would usher in good governance, development, upholding the rule of law and promoting democratic values. Instead, the ZANU-PF was more concerned with solidifying its hegemony within the Zimbabwean society. The pursuit for hegemony was aimed at a one-party state, a political arrangement strongly favoured by many within the ZANU-PF. The ZANU-PF constitution was to be used to advance this authoritarian and undemocratic political style (Sachikonye, 2004).

As seen above, the debate about the reform of Zimbabwe's constitution began when the civil society proposed amendments to the constitution, which they deemed necessary for political and social change. The initial noise about constitutional reform started outside ZANU-PF because the ruling party didn’t seem to possess aspirations to craft a more responsive constitution. This is despite their earlier commitment to reform the Lancaster House constitution (Rwodzi, 2020). The ZANU-PF used the opportunity to centralised power to the presidency by introducing amendments that would advance this agenda. There was a total of 15 amendments that had been made to the constitution by 2000, including the repeal of dual citizenship in 1983; award of powers to the President to appoint members of the Judicial Services Commission, the Attorney-General and the Electoral Supervision Commission in 1984; the abolition of the Senate and the creation of a 150 seat parliament; and the compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement in 1990. The ZANU-PF made these amendments to concentrate power within the presidency.

### **Using land to maintain one-party dominance**

The long-overdue land issue was used as a central theme for the ZANU-PF electoral manifesto. This was accompanied by the 'Land is the economy, and the Economy is the Land' slogan, which resonated with many black Zimbabweans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). As demonstrated above, the land movement was started by the war veterans in 1998 after President Robert Mugabe failed to honour his promise to expropriate land from the elites white farmers and redistribute the land to the Zimbabweans, including the war veterans (Sadomba, 2013). The land movement was a militant operation challenging white farmers, ZANU-PF elites, President Mugabe and the state to give the land back to the people.

Zimbabwe's land debate had been a dominant social feature for over a century in Zimbabwe, both within black communities and between white settlers and black Zimbabweans. In 1965 white Rhodesians seized the vast majority of agricultural farming land from black peasants, leaving them with nothing (Human Rights Watch, 2002). This motivated the formation of liberation parties such as ZAPU and ZANU, who went to war with the Rhodesian white government to land back to the people and independence. Ultimately, the British government-brokered negotiations between the white Rhodesian government and the liberation nationalist parties led to the Lancaster House Agreement and elections in 1980 (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Some clauses in the Lancaster House Agreement were problematic, particularly the “willing buyer willing seller” clause. As soon as the Lancaster House Agreement's constraints expired in 1990, Mugabe's government amended the constitution's provisions regarding property rights and introduced the Land Requisition Act in 1992, which granted the government powers compulsory acquire land for resettlement (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Despite the laws that were put in place, the government land acquisition and resettlement was slow. For instance, by the year 1997, the government had only resettled 71000 families (against the target of 165 000) on 3.5 million hectares (Human Rights Watch, 2002). By 1999 11 million agricultural land hectares were still in white people's hands while black Zimbabweans continued to live in poverty. Furthermore, the ZANU-PF government gave some of the land purchased to ZANU-PF elites and senior officials.

The year 2000 saw a reversal of this radical land transformation when black people took the land from white farmers and amended policies to effect this change (Matondi, 2012). Mugabe's lump-sum payments to the war veterans in 1997 were dubbed as the co-optation of war veterans by ZANU-PF and the State (Sadomba, 2013). ZANU-PF also agreed that white commercial farms would be seized and distributed to the landless Zimbabweans, and 20% of it given to the war veterans. Following this, 1471 white commercial farms were allocated for compulsory acquisition by the government. When the white farmers resisted this initiative, the redistribution of land stalled (Sadomba, 2013). The war veterans mobilised traditional leaders and peasants across the country and led thirty compulsory farm occupations in 1998. The war veterans did this in an aggressive military manner, which copied tactics from the armed struggle's guerrilla experiences (Sadomba, 2013). The state's response to the land occupation of 1998 was draconian. The government police torched their shelters and arrested the peasants and the war veterans. As such, the relationship between President Mugabe,

ZANU-PF elites, and the war veterans continued to be strained. The relationship was so tense that the war veterans threatened to disown Mugabe as their organisation

After the defeat of the draft constitution and MDC's emergence, President Mugabe saw the war veterans and the land revolution as valuable assets. Subsequently, Mugabe responded by tactically hijacking the land movement giving a blessing to the War Veteran Association (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Sadomba, 2013). The land issue was used as the central theme of the ZANU-PF campaign leading to the 2000 parliamentary elections (Ndlovu-gatsheni, 2003). ZANU-PF campaigned on the slogan 'Land is the Economy, Economy is the Land.' This was accompanied by political violence directed towards the MDC supporters perpetrated by ZANU-PF members and war veterans. To solidify this alliance between Mugabe and the war veterans, the government passed new laws. It amended different legislation pieces to protect the land movement occupiers and push back on the white commercial farmer's resistance.

To advance the land agenda, the ZANU-PF government officially implemented the FTLRP in 2000. The government removed farm owners and new beneficiaries were given the farms without any technical or financial support from the government (Matondi, 2012). The ZANU-PF targeted white commercial farmers to punish them for aligning with MDC. In response, the MDC worked with the white farmers and organised gangs to attack the occupiers in their bases and their homes (Sadomba, 2013). A total of 2706 farms were gazetted for compulsory acquisition between June 2000 and February 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2002). More than 1600 commercial farms were occupied by the land movement actors in violent events led by the war veterans (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Some scholars refute the claims that the occupations were chaotic and violent; instead, they reported that the occupations were principled, orderly, with minor violent clashes (Sadomba, 2013). For the 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF revived itself through the populist articulation of the land question, complemented by violent activities. The ZANU-PF won the election beating MDC by a small margin (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003). The land occupations and removal of white commercial farms continued until the 2002 presidential elections, which saw Mugabe winning and going back to the presidency.

After winning the 2002 presidential elections, ZANU-PF implemented the FRLRP to fully control the land movement, which was started by the war veterans (Sadomba, 2013). The state regained legitimacy and took control of the land movement's whole structure, and aimed

to eliminate war veterans from leadership positions at the national level. The state-led land movement included the invasion of land that was occupied by land revolutionaries, which would then be disposed of and given to ZANU-PF elites, senior members of the uniformed force, relatives and senior government officials (Matondi, 2012). This group was allocated prime land with good infrastructure and farmhouses and provided good government support. This process was marked by violent clashes between the revolutionaries and the states. Political clientism was now the character of the ZANU-PF party. The distribution of state resources marked political clientism to loyal party supporters on a 'reciprocity' basis (Magure, 2014). As such, the land redistributive process was used by ZANU-PF as a strategy used to win votes, in addition to violence and intimidation. The ZANU-PF government introduced Operation Murambatsvina's violent strategy to crash and dissipate the land revolutionaries (Sadomba, 2013).

It was noted that ZANU-PF won the 2005 elections by more than two-thirds of the majority reaping the benefits of the land revolution in urban and rural areas (Sadomba, 2013). Indeed, the land campaign had helped ZANU-PF to regain popularity in the rural and urban areas. Despite ZANU-PF's overwhelming win, the state carried out operation Murambatsvina after the 2005 elections, which led to the violent clash between the state and the war veteran leaders. The state had toned down on the use of violence leading to the 2005 election, but soon after the elections, the violent retribution resumed. The war veterans had felt that operation Murambatsvina was targeted at them as the forerunners of the land revolution (Sadomba, 2013). This is because the state felt threatened by the war veterans after they had organised and drove the land movement, demonstrating leadership capabilities that the ruling party and Mugabe felt threatened their power position. The state unleashed operation Murambatsvina in 2005, which was targeted at the urban and rural revolutionaries (Sadomba, 2013). The relationship between ZANU-PF and the war veteran began to crack after the operation against revolutionaries (Sadomba, 2013). Following the deterioration of this relationship, the ZANU-PF then pursued a new alliance with traditional leaders to 'dominate the rural polity' in preparation for 2008 elections fearing the war veterans might punish them for operation Murambatsvina. ZANU-PF bought the new alliance with prime land with beautiful farmhouses, good infrastructure, farming resources, including seeds and fertilisers, double cab vehicles, and support staff such as personal assistance and administrators given to the rural chiefs (Matondi, 2012). Indeed, the Murambatsvina operation left the war veterans bitter and angry; thus, the war veterans planned to oust Mugabe and the ZANU-PF in the

2008 elections by not voting ZANU-PF (Sadomba, 2013). As a result, ZANU-PF lost the parliamentary majority to the MDC owing to the lost votes in rural areas. ZANU-PF also lost the presidential elections in March 2008 but demanded re-run, sighting irregularities. The ruling party responded by unleashing violence to the rural and urban voters to coerce them to vote for ZANU-PF through Operation *Movhotera Papi* (Sadomba, 2013). The army now drove the violence due to the animosity between the state and the war veterans. Eventually, Mugabe won the second re-run of elections after Morgan Tsvangirai's withdrawal.

According to (Onslow, 2011), violence has been part of ZANU-PF political culture adopted from the colonial white government. Similarly, (Nyere, 2016) asserts that political violence has been a culture in Zimbabwe politics pre-colonial, during the colonial era, and the post-independence era. The second one is that the survival of ZANU-PF could be associated with the absence of a determined opposition who would democratically challenge the nationalist party.

### **iii) Phase Three: 2008-2013 towards democratic politics**

The signing of the GPA in September 2008 presented an opportunity for new beginnings for the Zimbabweans. This happened after a SADC mandated mediation process which was led by President Thabo Mbeki. The events that took place were gruesome, prompting SADC to intervene by facilitating a dialogue and eventually the signing of the GNA,. Even though the negotiations started in 2007, the year 2008, Zimbabwe recorded the highest inflation in the history of Zimbabwe's economy, and the economy was completely collapsing (Zondi, 2011) . The ZANU-PF government once again launched another violent campaign called *Mavhotera Papi*, leading to the March parliamentary elections and the June 2008 Presidential elections in which the security forces beat the MDC supporters and those who were suspected of supporting the opposition (Nyere, 2016). The MDC-T beat ZANU-PF by a narrow margin, winning 100 seats, while ZANU-PF got 99 seats (Nyere, 2008). The release of the March 2008 results was delayed by two months after the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's voting polls took place, raising suspicions that there were plans to manipulate the results (Zondi, 2011). There was no real reason for the stalling of the presidential election results by the ZEC. Others believed that the late release of the results was done intentionally as the commission was made to wait for the ZANU-PF to hold its leadership meetings on post-election strategies. According to the ZEC, technical failures were the cause of the delay in releasing the presidential results (Zondi, 2011). This raised fears that the ZEC had lost

independence and was now under Mugabe's control. There was fear that this could cause post-electoral violence, which could be negative consequences for the region. This was a concern for SADC who responded by urging the ZEC to release all the results. The results were finally released in May, revealing that the MDC won by 47% while ZANU-PF got 43%. These results necessitated a run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe scheduled for 27 June (Nyere, 2016).

In the run-up to the run-off elections, the ZANU-PF's militia and Central Intelligence Officers (CIO) unleashed gruesome violence towards the MDC supporters. The ZANU-PF did this to punish the MDC supporters for voting for the MDC and 'flush out' the MDC supporters (Nyere, 2016). The aggressive violence towards MDC supporters became worse towards the June 2008 Presidential elections, forcing Tsvangirai to withdraw from the run-off in June, citing impossible MDC supporters' conditions (Eppel, 2009). Tsvangirai's withdrawal made way for Robert Mugabe to win 85 % of the votes. The MDC and the civil society discredited Mugabe's win. It is supposed that at least two hundred MDC activists were murdered in state-led violent campaigns. Other 5000 MDC supporters were reportedly tortured, and a further ten thousand required medical care as a result of injuries (Nyere, 2016). It became apparent that ZANU-PF had devised a security plan to create a difficult environment for Tsvangirai to campaign for the run-off and eventually force him to quit the polls (Zondi, 2011).

#### **5.4 Signing the GPA**

Both the AU and SADC were dismayed by Zimbabwe's developments. SADC called for a political settlement through Thabo Mbeki. The AU declined to recognise the 27 June elections results and called for a government of national unity (Zondi, 2011). As such, Thabo Mbeki managed to get both the MDC and the ZANU-PF to the negotiation table. The parties signed the Memorandum of Understanding committing their parties to a dialogue to create a lasting solution to the Zimbabwe situation (Zondi, 2011). The MoU also committed the parties to produce an implementation framework and a global political agreement after talks by the end of the talks. Furthermore, The MoU included interim measures, namely: all parties would issue a political statement and condemn the political violence and ensure that its members and institutions associated with them restrain from using violence; refrain from the talks that incite violence; ensure equal application of the law; and assist the return of the displaced Zimbabweans (Zondi, 2011).

After an intensive six weeks of negotiations in secret locations, South Africa managed to push the two MDC's and the ZANU into signing the GPA in September 2008. The GPA is a power-sharing agreement between opposing parties. It's intended to create a transitional government that should aim to establish a new constitution within eighteen months and create a democratic environment for free and fair elections (Eppel, 2009). According to (Mutisi, 2011) the GPA, all parties committed to 'work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the situation in Zimbabwe. The negotiations were jerky, the MDC and the ZANU-PF hostile relationship created a tense environment. Many times, Tsvangirai threatened to pull off the negotiations citing harassment of the MDC members (Zondi, 2011). The MDC also threatened to pull out from the talks due to citing bullying from the ZANU-PF and the biasness of the mediator in handling the intense negotiations. MDC also called on the AU and SADC to change the mediator, Thabo Mbeki.

Mugabe was given the Executive Presidency, responsible for the government's overall strategic direction, while Tsvangirai attained the Prime Minister (Head of the Council of Ministers) responsible for overseeing the implementation of policies and government programs (Mutisi, 2011; Zondi, 2011). Arthur Mutambara of the MDC-M and Thokozani Kupe of the MDC-T were both Tsvangirai's Deputy Prime Ministers. According to the terms of the GPA, sixteen cabinet positions would be given to the MDCs and fifteen positions for the ZANU-PF. Regarding the cabinet and the ministers' council, they were 31 in total, 15 ministers came from the ZANU-PF, 13 from the MDC-T, and 3 came from the MDC-M (S. Zondi, 2011). According to the agreement, Mugabe became the Head of State and Tsvangirai the Head of Government. Mugabe lost a significant amount of power that he was in control of since independence, but he did retain significant power. For instance, powers to approve laws brought to his attention by ministers and signing treaties on behalf of Zimbabwe, powers to appoint ministers and ambassadors, conduct national ceremonies, and the authority to declare war (Mutisi, 2011). The Prime Minister was responsible for running the government and overseeing various departments and organs' coherent efforts to take forward national goals. The prime minister was also responsible for driving the national efforts to address Zimbabwean people's needs through social, economic, and political programs (Zondi, 2011). The agreement also made provisions which set out provisions for a more inclusive constitution. This would address the political and social issues that had contributed to the crisis in Zimbabwe. All parties agreed that proper consultation processes with Zimbabwe's

people should be followed in part of this. A Select Committee of Parliament would be set up and would appoint multiparty sub-committees to draft sections of the constitution and made public comments (S. Zondi, 2011).

The agreement set forth human rights as the foundation in which the new government and the society would be found. The agreement consists of articles that expound on how the collision government would promote human rights, including through the rule of law, freedom of association, freedom of political association, and respect for the constitution. The agreement also addressed the culture and violence system through Article 18 (Mutisi, 2011). Article 13 of the agreement addresses the economic crisis in Zimbabwe including food security, high inflation, inputs and seeds for the agricultural season of 2008-2009, and interest rate and exchange to ensure the restoration of the economy and growth through the development and implementation of an economic recovery plan (Zondi, 2011)

Despite the celebrations that came with the agreement's signing, many issues still existed between the ZANU-PF and the MDCs, particularly Tsvangirai's MDC. Both Mugabe and Tsvangirai expressed that they felt coerced and rushed into agreeing to the agreement's terms (Zondi, 2011). During his speech after the agreement's signing, Mugabe suggested that he was unwilling to work with the MDC and treat them as his subordinates. He positioned ZANU-PF as the senior party to the agreement that would mentor the inexperienced MDC, who could not run a government. ZANU-PF's approach to the agreement suggested that they intended to co-opt the two MDC's into junior partners. Though he signed the agreement, Tsvangirai didn't favour the power-sharing arrangement due to other African governments' experiences who have entered into such agreements, particularly the Kenyan experience. Tsvangirai had observed this growing trend in African leaders who wouldn't accept defeat would use violence to force winners of the election into the power-sharing arrangement (S. Zondi, 2011).

All the parties were due to meet the day following the agreement's signing to allocate ministerial positions, but this never materialised. Instead, ZANU-PF convened their Politburo meeting. ZANU-PF went ahead and released to the ministers' media appointment in which it retained key cabinet portfolios, including home affairs, defence, mines, foreign affairs, internal security, and finance (Zondi, 2011). To fan the flames, ZANU-PF went ahead and filled the cabinet positions, including the Ministry of Justice, Home Affairs, Defence, Information and Internal Security. This caused a war of words between the MDC and the

ZANU-PF as tensions were also rising. These ministers' appointment caused a back and forth between ZANU-PF and the MDC-T, which caused a major delay in forming the inclusive government. South Africa sought other methods to force the parties to form the government, including withholding the \$30 000 funds meant to help with Zimbabwe's agricultural activities until the government was formed. The AU and SADC also intervened, including resolving a resolution on the AU's Zimbabwe mediation process. The resolution made way for the reference group's appointment, consisting of the UN General Secretary Representative, the African Union Commission Chair and the SADC Executive Secretary.

Eventually, in February 2009, Tsvangirai and Mutangara were sworn in as the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively as per the provisions of the Constitution Amendment of 2009 (Mutisi, 2011). In January 2009 the swearing-in of MDC Ministers and Deputy Ministers took place, and the government was now fully formed. Despite the visible tensions between the MDC and the ZANU-PF, the inclusive government managed to make tangible reforms in governance and economic development. First, since the beginning of the GNU, the government was working towards restoring fiscal sanity and regression of hyperinflation. For instance, the hyperinflation was reduced from 230 million percent, in 2008, to 3 %, and there was recorded economic growth in 2009 (Mutisi, 2011). Second, to address the governance and democratic dearth, the GNU established independent commissions such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Zimbabwe Media Commission. Third, a Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee was established in April 2009 whose responsibility was to coordinate the consultation process for constitutional reform (Mutisi, 2011).

Despite the progress made by the GNU, the tensions between the MDC and the ZANU-PF pushed the inclusive government to the brink of a precipice. The different ideologies that inform the parties was one of the main driver in this situation. For instance, the ZANU-PF This caused major delays in the constitutional reform process, the economic and governance reform. There was also a delay in the appointment of the Governors, Auditor-General, Reserve Bank Governor and Ambassadors due to disagreements between the MDC and the ZANU-PF. The MDC insisted that it be part of the appointments, while the ZANU-PF maintained that these high profile positions were the President's prerogative.

Two years after the signing of the GNU, there were still outstanding issues. For instance, the constitutional reform process was moving very slow, and there were still sporadic cases of

violence throughout the country. The GPA had envisaged that the constitutional reform process would be completed in 18 months, but the process was completed in four months due to the tensions between the MDC's and the ZANU-PF (Sachikonye, 2013). There were reports about the ZANU-PF and the war veterans who were coercing and coaching people during the outreach to follow 'party lines' on presidential powers, devolution and checks and bank powers. This created fear and constrained people from engaging in debates and freely expressing themselves. Another major constraint that delayed the constitutional process was the unavailability of funds. Though the United Nations Development Programme donated \$21 million to support the constitutional reform program, it was still insufficient for the full roll-out (Sachikonye, 2013).

Regarding the implementation of the GPA, the constitution became the key area of contestation among the ZANU-PF and the MDCs between 2009 and 2013 (Raftopoulos, 2013). Article IV of the GPA makes provisions for Zimbabwe's people to make a constitution for themselves and the process carried out by a Select Committee of Parliament (COPAC) (Mutisi, 2011). The ZANU-PF and the war veteran insisted that the elections occur even if the new constitution was not in place. The MDC tried to block this and emphasised that elections should only be held after the constitution was completed (Sachikonye, 2013). The SADC, through Jacob Zuma, insisted that the constitution should be in place before the 2013 elections. Indeed a draft was produced by the COPAC in 2012 and presented to the government. However, this was redrafted by the ZANU-PF because it was the opposite of the people's views during the outreach. As such, a redrafted version of the constitution was presented to the MDC by President Mugabe. The ZANU-PF draft completely ignored the major reforms included in the draft prepared by the COPAC and proposed a return to the executive powers and party state rules as was stipulated in the 1980 constitution (Sachikonye, 2013). Both MDCs objected to the ZANU-PF's draft and pushed back on ZANU-PF's intention to undo the COPAC's process (Raftopoulos, 2013).

Despite the disagreements among the ZANU-PF and the two MDCs, all the parties could move forward and agree on 16 July 2013 to hold the referendum on the constitution (Raftopoulos, 2013). The draft considered presidential term limits, a more independent national prosecuting authority, more accountability of the security and judicial, limited devolution of power, and stronger citizenship rights (Zembe & Masunda, 2015). However, other parties were not happy that the draft constitution still contained a concentration of executive powers. For instance, according to the draft, the executive presidency retained the

power to appoint and dismiss senior public servants, including ambassadors, cabinet ministers and security chiefs (Sachikonye, 2016). As a result, there was a pushback from the NCA while filed a court interdict to stop the ZEC from conducting the referendum expressing that the Proclamation should be declared unlawful. This application was rejected by the High Court, citing that the President's conduct was not 'subject to review by the court' (Raftopulous, 2016:5). Nonetheless, the referendum took place on 16 March 2013. A staggering 3,079,966 voters voted in favour of the new constitution, while 179, 489 voters voted against the new constitution. This was the largest voter turnout since independence; it was also 60% larger than the 26% turnout of the 2000 referendum (Sachikonye, 2016). Harare and the other three Mashonaland provinces registered the largest voter turnout, while the turnout in two Matebeleland provinces and Bulawayo the turnout was relatively lower. The large voter turnout was credited to the unison of the GPA parties on the draft constitution, the non-violent political engagements, and the simplified voting process and relaxed voting requirements (Raftopulous, 2016).

Though SADC, EU, and the USA had welcomed the referendum's outcomes, they encouraged the inclusive government of Zimbabwe to fully implement the GPA and seek to hold free and fair presidential elections (Raftopulous, 2016). However, Mugabe ignored SADC's recommendations on the emphasis for full implementation of the GPA before the presidential election. In an unprecedented move, the Director for the Centre for Democracy in Southern Africa, Mr Jelousy Mawarire, filed an urgent application to the Supreme Court seeking an order that would direct the president to declare elections to be held no later than June 30, 2013 (Raftopulous, 2016). Indeed, the court ruled in favour of Mr Jelousy and stated that the date for elections should be set for 31 July, giving ZANU-PF to move forward with their preferred date of elections, defying SADC's call for full implementation of the GPA before elections (Zembe & Masunda, 2015). This caused friction between the SADC mandated mediator, South Africa, and the ZANU-PF. Leading to an exchange of words between Lindiwe Zulu of the South African negotiating team and Jonathan Moyo of ZANU-PF. Furthermore, Mugabe also threatened to pull out of SADC due to South Africa's persistence to implement the GPA before elections fully (Raftoulous, 2016).

The peaceful elections took place on 13 July 2013. The elections shockingly revealed that the ZANU-PF was regaining power. The ZANU-PF received an astounding 61% of the votes compared to the 44% won in 2008, whereas received 33% compared to 48% in 2008 (Raftopoulos, 2013). Regarding the parliamentary seats, the ZANU PF received 139 seats

compared to the 99 seats they received in 2008, whereas the MDC received 49 seats compared to the 99 seats they received in 2008 (S. Zondi, 2011). The regional and international bodies' response to the outcome of the elections was unanimously positive. The AU applauded Zimbabwe for a peaceful campaign noting that Zimbabwe had made improvements compared to the 2008 elections. SADC also declared the elections free, peaceful and generally credible (Zondi, 2012). South Africa also welcomed the elections' outcome and congratulated Mugabe and urged all parties to accept the elections' results (Chikane, 2013). The EU expressed doubt about the elections being free and fair; thus, the European body didn't endorse the elections (Raftopulous, 2013). The UN also commended Zimbabwe for peaceful elections and emphasised that the government should address the concerns raised about certain aspects of the elections. Though SADC had declared the elections free and fair, the US confirmed that it would continue with the sanctions (Raftopilous, 2013).

## **5.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has reflected on the evolution of Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis, including the historical-political background, the political violent campaigns during the elections, the violent fast track land reform and the signing of the GNU. This chapter observed that Zimbabwe's economic and political issues existed during the colonialism and intensified post-independence. The chapter also observed that the ZANU-PF utilised violence to impose the government's power and coerce the Zimbabweans to submit to colonial rule. The chapter observed that during the period between 1999 and 2009, Zimbabwe's political culture was characterised by violence and coercion, in which violence has been used as an electoral campaign instrument. This period also saw Zimbabwe plunging into a deep economic crisis recording the highest inflation rate and unemployment in the country's history.

The chapter also observed the Zimbabwe crisis as falling into three phases: phase one in 1980-1990; phase two was observed from 1990-2008; phase three was observed in 2008-2013. Phase one was marked by the transition of power from colonial rule to nationalist liberation movements. The chapter observed that violence, political and economic deterioration dominated this period, including ethnic driven conflicts and one-party state agenda. Phase two was characterised by chaos and prominence of labour movements and the emergence of the MDC. This period also saw collaboration between the ZANU-PF government and the war veterans to push the one-party state agenda and enforce the Fast

Track Land Reform Programme. Phase three saw regional and continental intervention to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis; the transitioning to democratic governance through the signing of the GPA; the constitutional reform and regrouping of the ZANU-PF.

This chapter has provided historical and political context that has shaped Zimbabwe's post-independence politics and the political developments that necessitated SADC's intervention through South Africa. The chapter has attempted to demonstrate the road that the parties in Zimbabwe have travelled to reach an agreement under the assistance of SADC mandated mediation. This will help us understand how the approach used by South Africa helped the parties in conflict reach an agreement.

The following chapter presents and discusses data collected from primary documents.

## CHAPTER 6

### **South Africa, African Agenda and the SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe: Data Collection**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the research findings relating to South Africa's African agenda and its engagement in Africa. The chapter presents the findings to respond to the main question: “How did the African agenda holistically understood underpin South Africa's approach to its SADC mandated mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014?” The study is further guided by four objectives: To describe and understand the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy; To explain South Africa's foreign policy position under the African Agenda banner on African countries like Zimbabwe; To use Afrocentricity to analyse South African foreign policy position on Africa and African countries like Zimbabwe and explain the role of the African agency in the manner in which South Africa handled the SADC facilitation/mediation of dialogue in Zimbabwe and; to analyse and explain South Africa's African agenda using Zimbabwe as the case study.

This chapter has the following outline: it begins with the description of sources and the different types of documents from which the data was collected. It then moves to the presentation of codes which the researcher used to identify the consulted documents. Table one below illustrates the codes of sources from which the data was extracted. The chapter then presents the data collected from different primary documents. The data is organised according to the four objectives of the study and presented. Consequently, themes were developed from this data and used for analysis in chapter seven. Finally, the conclusion at the end highlighted the findings from the extracted data.

#### **6.2 Document coding and sources**

In identifying the findings here, themes were developed from collected data and excerpts extracted from data to support these themes. Documents were the primary data source, the records of the key players involved in the mediation process both in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The key players include: Presidents (Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, Robert Mugabe); Ministers (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Aziz Pahad, Essop Pahad, Mashabane-Mankwana, Zola Skweyiya, Frank Chikane); Ambassadors (Welile Nhlapo, Dumisani

Kumalo); Institutions (International Relations Parliamentary Committee, ANC, DIRCO, SADC); Zimbabwe (Morgan Tsvangirai, Arthur Mutambara).

We analysed a total of 78 primary documents: 50 of them were speeches of presidents and ministers; two ANC discussion documents, there were 21 sets of minutes of the Parliament's Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation; eight DIRCO annual reports; five newspaper articles, one written popular piece by President Mbeki, a letter by Morgan Tsvangirai, three book chapters by Reverend Chikane, a chapter by Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, and one chapter by Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo.

**Table 1: Coded documents of presidents, ministers**

Document source	Document type	Document code
<b>President Thabo Mbeki</b>	Speeches Written piece	Cat 1-a
<b>President Jacob Zuma</b>	Speeches	Cat 2-a
<b>President Robert Mugabe</b>	Statements	Cat 3-a
<b>Minister Nkosazane Dlamini-Zuma</b>	Speeches	Cat 4-a
<b>Minister Assop Pahad</b>	Speeches	Cat 5-a
<b>Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad</b>	Speeches Media briefs	Cat 6-a
<b>DG Ntsaluba-Gobodo</b>	Speeches Media briefs	Cat 7-a
<b>Minister Mashabane-Mankwane</b>	Speeches	Cat 8-a
<b>Minister Frank Chikane</b>	Books	Cat 8-a
<b>Dr Zola Skweyiya</b>	Speeches	Cat 9-a
<b>Morgan Tsvangirai</b>	Letters	Cat 10-a
<b>Welile Nhlapo</b>	Books	Cat 11-a
<b>Dumisani Kumalo</b>	Books	Cat 12-a
<b>Parliament IR Committee</b>	Minutes from meetings	Cat 13-a
<b>DIRCO</b>	Annual reports	Cat 14-a
<b>ANC</b>	Documents	Cat 15-a
<b>Newspapers</b>	Reports	Cat 16-a

Human Rights Watch	Reports	Cat 17-a
--------------------	---------	----------

The above table illustrates the labelling and organisation of data; for instance, **Cat 1-a** will be used for the data taken from President Thabo Mbeki's speeches and articles. To break it down: **Cat** stands for the category of all Mbeki's speeches and written pieces; **1** is the label we have used for Mbeki- the first person we identified as the source for the data of the study, making Zuma number two; **a** represents the first speech we analysed under Mbeki's category, which means that the speech number two will be coded as **Cat 1-b**. The chapter is organised into four research objectives mentioned earlier. We extract the themes from the data to respond to these objectives

### 6.3 Presentation of Data

#### 6.3.1 Objective I: To describe and understand the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy

##### **African Renaissance**

The data reveals that the African agenda was the ANC strategy designed to engage with the African continent. The ANC viewed it as an effort to respond to the domestic economic priorities, which it pursued through a development policy to build the continent's development strategy. Furthermore, it was a strategy that would locate Africa and its people at the centre of everything, with a solid emphasis on the end of marginalisation of the continent on global issues. The ANC formalised it as its Africa policy at the ANC National Conference held in the North-West in July 1997. They also included it in the conference's discussion document, setting the agenda's objectives and outcomes. Most significantly, the African agenda policy foremost priority was the political and economic revival of the African continent. This was important for the ANC as they recognised that the economic development of South Africa is intertwined with the development of the continent. As such, through the Africa agenda, they sought to address peace and security challenges, governance issues and poverty:

The ANC designed the discussion document to reconcile the ethical principles underlying the foreign policy and issues of economic development objectives. Such a policy would ensure that South Africa plays its role as a human rights promoter in the continent while advancing its national interest through its foreign policy. The document identified two reasons why the

ANC should pursue an African agenda policy. First, the document suggested that South Africa should pursue the African Renaissance in its engagement with the African continent:

**Cat 15-a:** It is, in fact, in this context that the notion of the African Renaissance has risen as the best framework through which we could empower the continent to act for itself and its interest.

Second, to forge links with the continent and the 'South' to create an equitable world order through the African agenda policy:

**Cat 15-a:** The ANC correctively seeks to take an active part in shaping this order, both in the context of its relations with other parties and organisations and as the leading organisation in the government. Hence the importance of an agenda based of the vision of an African renaissance.

The ANC recommended the African renaissance framework to address some of the challenges that the foreign policy had encountered in the continent, as well as to highlight the key lessons from the first three years of the new government's engagement with the African continent:

- **Cat 15-a:** One of the first test cases for us in promoting democracy and human rights, Nigeria highlighted the potential limits of our influence if we act as an individual country. This incident further highlighted the need to work with others and forge strategic alliances to pursue foreign policy objectives.
- Despite the end of the Cold War, Africa as a continent is still a site for advancing some of the geopolitical and strategic interests of the powerful Western countries.
- Given the international image of our country and the president, South Africa's geo-strategic location and relatively high profile do not guarantee entry into the international arena on our terms.
- International relations are not merely based on solidarity but primarily on economic interest. This revelation is an important lesson for us.

Looking at his speeches, it is clear that Thabo Mbeki was the African agenda champion within the ANC. The African agenda policy became his signature in his engagement in Africa during his tenure. When speaking on international platforms, Mbeki described this policy as the 'rebirth of Africa', an African renaissance, which represented a new hope for a continent

engulfed by authoritarian regimes, extremism, instability and poverty. He used international platforms to advocate the rich countries, including the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA), to support the African renaissance policy.

In his speeches, he described the African Renaissance as:

**Cat 1-a:** After all, in the context of the evolution of the European peoples, when we speak of the Renaissance, we speak of advances in science and technology, voyages of discovery across the oceans, a revolution in printing and an attendant spread, development and flowering of knowledge and a blossoming of the arts.

Aziz Pahad described how Mbeki's administration implemented this agenda and said this:

**Cat 6-a:** The consolidation of the African Agenda serves as a pillar upon which we seek to achieve our developmental goals. This work requires a long term commitment to the successful restructuring of our REC's, strengthening of the AU structures and organs, including the implementation of the NEPAD and ensuring peace, stability and security in Africa within the framework of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy. The pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria experience is a pain I also bear. The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share.

In his advocacy, Mbeki sought to achieve three things: first, to promote partnership between Africa and the rich countries:

**Cat1-a:** By so saying, we are trying to convey the message that African underdevelopment must be a matter of concern to everybody else In the world, that the victory of the African Renaissance addresses not only the improvement of the conditions of life of the peoples of Africa but also the extension of the frontiers of human dignity to all humanity.

To calibrate a sense of self-reliance, responsibility and pride amongst fellow African leaders:

**Cat1-a:** "We are convinced that such a people have a legitimate right to expect of itself that it can set itself free from the oppressive historical legacy of poverty, hunger, backwardness and marginalisation in the struggle to order world affairs so that all

human civilisation puts as the principal objective of its existence the humane existence of all that is human!”

To call Africans to take pride in their Africanness:

**Cat1-a:** “the dignity restoration of Africans we have spoken of before demands that we deal decisively and quickly as possible with the perception that as a continent, we are condemned forever to depend on the merciful charity of those who are kind and ready to fill our begging bowls”.

To call on Africans to exercise agency to restore peace, democracy and development in the continent:

**Cat 1-a:** “And again we come back to the point that we, who are our liberators from imperial domination, cannot but be confident that our project to ensure the restoration, not of empires, but the other conditions in the 16th century described by Leo Africanus: of peace, stability, prosperity, and intellectual creativity, will and must succeed! The simple phrase "We are our liberators!" is the epitaph on the gravestone of every African who dared to carry the vision in his or her heart of Africa reborn”.

And to announce that Africa is ready to be an equal global player

**Cat 1-a:** “And we believe that one of the correct responses to that process of globalisation is to make sure that the smaller countries of the world, therefore, have a proper place in the decision-making processes of these institutions, which take decisions that have a universal impact”.

Aziz Pahad, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (DIRCO), shared the same sentiments:

**Cat 6-b:** “The consolidation of the African Agenda serves as a pillar upon which we seek to achieve our developmental goals, which requires a long term commitment to the successful restructuring of our REC's, strengthening of the AU structures and organs, including the implementation of the NEPAD and ensuring peace, stability and security in Africa within the framework of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy (PCRD)”.

Outside the ANC, the African agenda policy was understood as prioritising African solidarity over human rights. Human rights organisations and scholars have used Sudan and the

Zimbabwe cases to demonstrate this. For instance, Carol Borget was dismayed by South Africa's human rights issues involving Zimbabwe, Sudan, and other developing countries. She expressed that South Africa is:

**Cat 17-a:** “failing to support critical resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Iran to Uzbekistan and aligning itself with countries whose human rights records are abysmal by anyone's standard”. (Borget, 2008).

And that:

**Cat 17-a:**” The South African government's unwillingness to confront President Robert Mugabe on his extremely abusive governance of Zimbabwe is well known to South Africans and justly controversial”.

Regarding Sudan, she suggested that South Africa was collaborating with Sudan to help President Omar al-Bashir avoid the International Court of Justice for the genocide crimes he was accused of. Theoretically, Nathan (2008) has argued that Pretoria's position on Sudan reflects the anti-imperialist character of its foreign policy, which sometimes relegates human rights and democracy to second priority status.

### **African identity**

The data analysis suggests that the African agenda policy grappled with the complex issues of African identity, locating South Africa within the continent as an equal player and a regional leader or a regional hegemony rather than a behemoth. There was a desire to keep an identity that defined Africa based on her capabilities:

**Cat 6-b:** “The African identity is richly textured and layered and has been forged over three distinct epochs - the pre-colonial period, the colonial period and the post-colonial, neo-colonial period”.

South Africa acknowledged that colonialism was part of the continent's identity. As a result, Pretoria pursued identity formation through the African Renaissance to give the continent a new identity that I grounded on African culture and history:

**Cat6-b:** “These civilisations, with their centres of learning and culture, have contributed enormously to the African Identity and global knowledge and culture. But their impact has been blunted and muted by the primacy of the colonial and neo-colonial periods in shaping the African identity. In these two historical eras, identity formation resulted from the struggle

against colonialism and then against neo-colonial engendered corruption, dictatorship, and national and regional conflicts”.

The African agenda was an affirmation that South Africa after apartheid was 'rebecoming' African again following years of isolation and running as a pariah state. The African agenda was a call to Africans to embrace their African identity and be proud of their Africanness even though the Western nations often looked down on them. During the transition period, Thabo Mbeki used his public platforms to encourage South Africans to unite with one another and other peoples of Africa and to embrace their African identity. His speech during the passing of the democratic constitution demonstrates this:

**Cat 1-b:** “I am an African. I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa”

The above statement reaffirmed that despite the domination policies of the apartheid government, South Africa was still part of the continent of Africa. Furthermore, it was to confirm that the new South was ready to participate in the continent's emancipation and rebuilding. South Africa demonstrated this readiness in the speech as it highlighted the fundamental principles of the African agenda policy, including peace and security, democracy, and development. The address also launched South Africa's new approach to the continent. Following this declaration, the government used continental multilateral forums and formal gatherings to assure fellow Africans that South Africa is indeed one of them and was embracing their Africanness:

**Cat 9-a:** indeed, the most apparent aspect of the celebration today is our Africanness, our pride in our identity, heritage, cultures and our resilience. As diverse as our culture may be across the continent, African is the one factor that binds us together.

The African identity and Africanness was closely associated with the African Renaissance. However, there was a strong emphasis that the African Renaissance would fail unless Africans had a clear understanding of who they are, and who they wanted to be:

**Cat 1-a:** Whence this confidence? Unless we can answer the question “Who were we?” we will not be able to answer the question “What shall we be?” This complex exercise, which can be stated in simple terms, links the past to the future and speaks to the interconnection between an empowering restoration process and the consequences or the response to acquiring that newly restored power to create something new.

Not only was this African identity the pillar of the new South African foreign policy, but it also became the strength of the ANC's foreign policy:

**Cat 15-a:** Our movement is part of the progressive movement of our continent. It is therefore involved with other political formations to promote the goals of the AU and NEPAD. Four objectives stand at the centre of these goals. One of these is strengthening democracy to ensure that the people govern. Another is the eradication of violent conflict within and between states to entrench conditions of peace and stability. Another is the socio-economic upliftment of the masses of the African people to end poverty and underdevelopment and ensure the achievement of the goal of a better life for all.

By pursuing the African Renaissance and a policy grounded on African identity, South Africa attempted to reassure African nations that Africa was also South Africa's interest. Mandela's confession that “South Africa cannot escape its African identity” demonstrates this (Mandela, 1993:3).

South Africa's declaration of the African identity was followed by a series of objectives that Pretoria pursued under the African agenda policy. The intention was to restore peace and stability to a continent that the conflict had ravaged:

**Cat1-c** South Africa will continue to assist in the African continent's reconstruction and development, especially in post-conflict situations.

A commitment to ensuring sustainable development in the continent:

**Cat 1-c:** The main goal of government for the medium term is to ensure that our foreign relations create an environment conducive to sustainable economic growth and development.

A pledge to strengthen African institutions to better respond to issues of economic development, conflict resolution and governance:

**Cat1-c:** To this effect, we will continue to prioritise the African continent by strengthening the African Union and its structures and implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

The policy also sought greater regional coordination in the SADC region:

**Cat 1-c:** equally important, and closer to home, is the strengthening of regional integration with particular emphasis on improving the political and economic integration of SADC towards the AU goal of a Union government. We will establish a South African Development Partnership Agency to promote developmental partnerships with other countries on the continent.

In addition to peace, development, and regional integration, Mbeki pursued an African university to join the Renaissance. Mbeki encouraged universities to adopt the African identity by being indigenous orientated. He describes how a university with an African identity should look like at a meeting with universities in Cape Town:

**Cat 1-i:** As part of our Renaissance, we may want to view the African university through several features, which could include the following:

- An African identity and vision that provides an overarching education philosophy that is consonant with the cultures of the people;
- African identity and vision in higher education that represents a critical point of departure from the current colonial-Western identity, which is neither suitable nor compatible with this identity;
- African identity and vision create a new paradigm that locates the African condition, knowledge, experiences, values, worldview and mindset at the centre of our scholarship and knowledge-seeking approach.
- A vision that places education at the centre of our development programmes would create a developed and prosperous continent.

Despite South Africa's assumption of African identity, their leading role in these areas often led to suspicions and mistrust by fellow Africans, owing to Pretoria's hostile relationship with the continent under the apartheid government. As a result, South Africa chose not to embrace the regional hegemony title but preferred multilateralism to promote its policy objective. Accordingly, they built strategic partnerships and coordinated with key African leaders to advance the African renaissance vision.

**Cat 15-a:** In other words, at the core of the vision for an African Renaissance is a sustained and vigilant challenge against the strategic orientation of globalisation. To

realise this requires close cooperation between progressive forces on the continent to define this common agenda (ANC, 1997:52).

The findings under this sub-heading have revealed how South Africa's African identity characterised their engagement in the continent. The African identity was also a reassurance to fellow Africans that the new South Africa was seeking a relationship of partnership, distancing themselves from the bullying approach of the apartheid government. The motivation to pursue an African identity centred foreign policy was linked to South Africa's economic development aspirations after recognising that South Africa's development is intrinsic to the country's development.

### **Pan-Africanism**

Data shows that the motivation for the Pan-Africanist posture in the African agenda policy was to underline the significance of African unity. The African Renaissance was a call for Africa to unite behind a shared vision to rebuild an independent continent. Speaking at the launch of the AU in Durban, July 2002, Mbeki called the African leaders to unite behind the African renaissance vision and participate in the renewal:

**Cat1-d:** The first task is to achieve unity, solidarity, cohesion, cooperation among peoples of Africa and African states. We must build all the institutions necessary to deepen the African continent's political, economic, and social integration. Third, we must deepen the culture of collective action in Africa and our relations with the rest of the world.

The above excerpts underline the significance for Africa to speak in one voice when engaging the outside world. It also introduces multilateralism as the best channel to take this vision forward. We also noted that the African agenda pan-Africanism pursued economic freedom for Africa through the NEPAD strategy. Accordingly, African leaders sought to end the marginalisation of the continent and become an integral part of the global economy:

**Cat 1-e:** Through NEPAD, the continent leaders proclaim a new beginning in the relationship between Africa and the developed world. As Africans, we are saying however weak we are, and how meagre our resources may be, we will do everything we need to achieve the African Renaissance.

The Millennium African Renaissance Partnership Programme (MAP) development plan was a precursor to the NEPAD. It was developed into a socio-economic development plan that would support the African renaissance vision. It shared similar objectives with the NEPAD:

**Cat 1-f:** The MAP programme is a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take ownership and responsibility for the continent's sustainable economic development. Our starting point is a critical examination of Africa's post-independence experience and acceptance that things must be done differently to achieve meaningful socio-economic progress. It would not be easy to accomplish our historic task of improving the lives of our people.

Through this plan, The African leaders sought an equal relationship with the global partners, particularly the great powers who decide on Africa's development. Africa made a demand to be heard and to speak for itself:

**Cat 1-f:** We propose a Global Partnership for Africa's development and inclusion in the world. This poses a challenge and an opportunity to all countries of the world. However, the continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process and the social exclusion of the vast majority of our people constitute a severe threat to global social stability.

The NEPAD plan kicked off the Pan-African campaign for economic freedom for Africa, seeking investments and access to international markets to boost growth in the continent:

**Cat 1-d:** Africa's leaders and its people demand nothing less than total control of their social, economic, and political destiny. They assume this in company with a growing partnership of developed and other countries that see the vast investment prospects inherent in the NEPAD arrangements. It is a partnership of global significance, and it belongs to Africans.

The pan-African campaign emphasised Africa's independence concerning economic development. In this regard, Africa sought a new relationship of equals with the West characterised by fairness and an end to Africa rip-off. In particular, having equal access to international markets to allow Africa to enjoy the same benefit afforded to developed countries:

**Cat 1-g:** We will not have achieved all our goals if we do not focus on matters of trade and finance, with particular attention to African access to markets and trade flows. We face a global reality where the present financial architecture makes it difficult for developing countries, especially Africa, to attract capital, where the debt burden partly stems from unequal relations.

The African agenda policy also linked this to African ownership in which the continent would set their path on Africa's natural resources. There was also a demand by Africans to be given space to determine the continent's destiny and to speak for itself:

**Cat 1-g:** The New Partnership for Africa's Development answers Blyden's call for African ownership, African possession and asserts that Africans can and must advance by methods of their own and indeed are able "to carve out our way."

The demand to set its agenda accompanied the commitment by African leaders to hold each other accountable on issues of democracy, human rights and corruption through the APRM:

**Cat 1-g:** The New Partnership is unique in African history. African leaders have pledged to co-operate and be accountable to one another and their people in terms of the development strategy, plans, and delivery of programmes.

Mbeki called on fellow Africans to exercise agency to ensure restoration of peace, good governance and economic development in Africa:

**Cat 1-g:** to ensure the establishment of a climate for economic growth throughout the continent; that security exists for the people of these countries; to put in place measures for good governance through which our governments as accountable to their peoples; That best practices are agreed upon and put in place for economic and political governance. We must do these things because we owe this to our people. Our ability to possess reality and a future are dependent on the conditions existing for its success, on resources being utilised to attain these goals.

African unity is one of the fundamental principles of the African agenda policy. Mbeki often underlined the importance of Africans to unite to revive the economy and peace of their continent. However, in the same vein, he encouraged the peoples of Africa to be proud of who they are despite the dehumanising experiences of colonisation and slavery:

**Cat 1-c** First, they had to do what many previous African leaders had done very well, namely to continue to take pride in their African roots and put into proper perspective the history of their continent, which had suffered enormous distortions in the past.

On the other hand, the African agenda underlined the unity of African nations as the essential instrument for the success of the African agenda. The African Renaissance visions call on Africans to speak with one voice. The strong emphasis on African unity was to confirm that when African nations are united, they can resolve their problems:

**Cat 1-c:** Within this milieu, Africa also saw the emergence of a new generation of democratically elected leaders who were and still are committed to deepening democratic ideals, entrenching peoples and human rights and ensuring that good governance and the rule of law become permanent features of Africa's political life. Undoubtedly, a new season of hope had arrived.

### **Africa-centredness**

Mbeki often used African history to encourage Africans to take pride in who they are by acknowledging the outstanding achievements of their ancestors. History was also used to decolonise the Africans who believed Africa was a continent incapable of dealing with their challenges, a less achieved continent with no good story to tell. As such African history, art and culture were used to replace the demoralising Western knowledge of Africa:

**Cat 1-c:** First, they had to do what many previous African leaders had done very well, namely to continue to take pride in their African roots and put into proper perspective the history of their continent, which had suffered enormous distortions in the past.

As well as:

**Cat 1-a:** The wealthy king of Timbuktu keeps a magnificent and well-furnished court. Here are a great store of doctors, judges, priests, and other learned men, that are bountifully maintained at the king's cost and charges. And hither are brought diverse manuscripts or written books out of Barbarie, sold for more money than any other merchandise: Leo Africanus.

Dr Nkosazane Zuma was of the same view and confirmed that:

**Cat 4-a:** The African continent was an epicentre of learning in the ancient world, with flourishing ports, communities, universities, palaces and cities. Of course, the trade

and craft centres would shift from time to time as people moved and migrated to other places.

This cue reminded the developed countries that Africans could revive their continent, and the time for revival and renewal had come. As such, the African agenda emerged out of South Africa's desire to develop African solutions that would work for the continent:

**Cat 1-h:** Having learned from history and faced with the stark reality of ever-deepening poverty levels, as Africans, we decided that we will formulate our agenda for development, taking into account programmes that have been tried in the past, retaining those that have worked well and discarding the failed ones.

Africa-centredness was used to describe the approach of pre-colonial African leaders to African issues, including development, peace and education. Their approach was Africa-centred, meaning it was driven by their history and the knowledge of who they are. Their solutions were grounded on the needs of their people:

**Cat 1-h:** The liberal solution is to locate politics in civil society, and the Africanist solution is to put Africa's age-old communities at the centre of African politics. One side calls for a regime that will champion rights, and the other stands in defence of culture. The impasse in Africa is not only at the level of practical politics.

As well as:

**Cat 1-h:** This leadership knew and still knows that taking pride in one's history, cultures and traditions is not a negation of modernity. Indeed, Asians are an excellent example of people who moved into modern times without abandoning their history and traditions.

Conclusion: there was a view that solutions developed partners have designed have not worked for the continent. Instead, they have perpetuated the waning capability of the continent. The African agenda sought to address this by offering solutions that Africans modelled:

**Cat 1-h:** Indeed, developed partners made several interventions to address Africa's underdevelopment in the past. Most of these interventions were done with noble intentions to pull the continent from the quagmire of poverty. Yet, outsiders designed these for Africans, with little input from the Africans themselves.

As such, the African agenda was driven by Africans to overcome development issues in the continent:

**Cat 1-h:** Having learned from history and faced with the stark reality of ever-deepening poverty levels, as Africans, we decided that we will formulate our agenda for development, taking into account programmes that have been tried in the past, retaining those that have worked well and discarding the failed ones.

The aim was to attain stability, peace, development and democratic governments in the continent:

**Cat 1-h:** In this regard, we transformed the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) and thus moved from an era in African politics whose dominant feature was the concentration of energies and resources for the unity of the continent and the total liberation of all our countries, towards a new period of using our collective strength to work for peace and stability, to strengthen democracy, to ensure respect for people's rights and to embark on a far-reaching programme of the regeneration and development of all our countries.

There was an idea that African universities should support the Africa renaissance by shifting their approach to education from a western perspective to an African perspective.

Accordingly, Mbeki engaged with African universities and promoted an Afrocentric orientation to data:

**Cat 1-i:** Accordingly, an African university cannot be an essential and critical part of the African Renaissance. The challenge for an African university should be viewed as a call that insists that all vital and transformative educators in Africa embrace an indigenous African worldview and root their nation's educational paradigms in an indigenous socio-cultural and epistemological framework.

As well as:

**Cat 1-i:** As part of our Renaissance, we may want to view the African university through several features, including the following: An African identity and vision that provides an overarching education philosophy that is consonant with the people's cultures.

It was necessary to bring in the African university because of the belief that the success of the African Renaissance required an 'all continent approach'. The aim was to place Africa at the centre of the curriculum by aligning the university content with the African renaissance vision. Their role was to contribute towards building an African grounded knowledge:

**Cat 1-i:** Among others, this implies that all educational curricula in Africa should have Africa as their focus, and as a result, be indigenous-grounded and orientated. Failure to do so may result in education becoming alien and irrelevant, as is the case with the legacy of colonial and neo-colonial education systems.

Mbeki viewed universities as agents of change as opposed to bystanders. Accordingly, he urged them to adopt a de-colonial approach to embrace an African identity. Scholars were therefore encouraged to depart from an education system that is Western-centric:

**Cat 1-i:** An African identity and vision in higher education represent a critical point of departure from the current colonial-Western identity that is neither suitable nor compatible with this identity.

This was an opportunity to de-Europeanise the African education systems with the proper African knowledge, information, scientific inventions, and history. This African knowledge system had been marginalised, excluded, and replaced by the Eurocentric education system. The African academics were reminded of the unmatched contribution of the ancient African intellectuals who used knowledge and scientific inventions to find solutions to African challenges:

**Cat 1-i:** We know very well the long and rich history of higher education on this continent from the time of the flowering of Nubian civilisation to the great temples of knowledge in ancient Egypt, to the era of the great centres of learning in Timbuktu in the middle of the second millennium A.D. Those who understood the role of a university in the greater human setting correctly referred to the scholars of Timbuktu as ambassadors of peace.

The view was that African universities and academics would lead the generation of a pure African knowledge system entrenched in African philosophies. In this essence, universities would play a similar role played by the Timbuktu learning centres who generated the knowledge that was essential to effect change:

**Cat 1-i:** To address this state of affairs, we need a distinctively African knowledge system, which would have as its objective the goal of recovering the humanistic and ethical principles embedded in African philosophy.

Establishing universities as agents of change was necessary for rebuilding the continent. It was believed that an African centred knowledge system would empower African people to participate in the African Renaissance and drive the change they wanted to see in the continent:

**Cat 1-i:** Such an African knowledge system would also constitute an effort to develop both a vision and a practice of education that lays the basis for African people to participate in mastering and directing the course of change and fulfilling the idea of learning to know, learning to do, learning to be, and learning to live together as equals with others.

This education system should be designed to fight poverty, restore peace and build good governance in Africa. In this context, it should consider the cultural, social and political factors of the continent:

**Cat 1-i:** A vision that places education at the centre of our development programmes to ensure that we create a developed and prosperous continent.

### **6.3.2 Objective II: To what extent do the objectives of the African agenda explain South Africa's foreign policy positions on African countries like Zimbabwe?**

#### **Multilateralism**

South Africa favoured a multilateral approach in its engagement with other African countries. Accordingly, the African agenda focused on strengthening institutions, including the AU, the RECs, the APRM and the NEPAD. FM Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has explained this approach:

**Cat 4-a:** The formation of the African Union (AU) came partly from recognising that the conditions now existed to realise African potential. NEPAD became a flagship project of the AU, a concrete developmental initiative of what Africans can do together to take charge of our destiny.

Although South Africa regarded the AU as a vehicle for the implementation of the NEPAD, SADC was their immediate focus and a top priority with regards to the attainment of the African agenda policy:

**Cat 1-j:** One of our immediate and continuing challenges is the steadfast pursuit of our African Agenda. The acceleration of the political and economic integration of the Southern Africa Development Community, including progress towards establishing a Free Trade Area.

At the SADC region, multilateralism was the form of engagement on development, peace and security, and governance. Zimbabwe and the intra- Africa trade policies are an example of this. In Zimbabwe, South Africa facilitated a SADC mandated mediation:

**Cat 1-k:** Now, let me say: you know that in March 2007, SADC asked South Africa to facilitate discussions between the Zanu-PF, the government of South Africa and the MDC on political questions, which happened, again, as you know.

The ANC identified regional integration as one of the African agenda policy objectives. They believed that regional integration would fast track economic growth in the SADC region, boosting South Africa's distressed economy:

**Cat 6-a:** SADC is the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional integration and development within all priority development sectors. SADC is recognised as a building block of the AU and serves as a key NEPAD implementing agent. South African government seeks to enhance the capacity of SADC to provide a framework that will allow each member state an opportunity to reach its full potential in terms of peace, security, stability, economic and social development, civil society participation, and gender equity.

The aim of this approach was to actual affect South Africa's intention to that its efforts at SADC were aimed at:

**Cat 6-a:**“the maximisation of the potential of each SADC member state in terms of security and stability; economic and social development and civil society interaction...’; in support of the revitalisation of the SADC development and integration agenda, in particular the effective operationalisation of RISDP, SIPO (Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ) and NEPAD” .

The findings have revealed that Zimbabwe was South Africa's intervention under the African agenda policy:

**Cat 1-j:** “As the Honourable Members are aware, we have been mandated by SADC to assist the leadership of Zimbabwe in finding a lasting solution to the challenges they face. We intend to move with speed in executing this mandate. We are encouraged in this regard by the positive attitude displayed by the protagonists in that country who, we are confident, do recognise that the people of Zimbabwe expect nothing less than concrete action to extricate them from the difficulties they face currently”.

The above statement demonstrates that South Africa's multilateral approach to Zimbabwe reflected on the orientation of the African agenda policy. Pretoria's involvement in Zimbabwe was part of the promotion of the democracy strand of the foreign policy:

**Cat 1-k:** As the Chairperson of SADC and Facilitator, we will promote inclusive government until free and fair elections are held in Zimbabwe.

The ANC understood that the Zimbabwe crisis would undermine South Africa's efforts to achieve regional integration and development in the SADC region, as well as the attainment of stability, peace and security:

**Cat 1-k:** The plight of the Zimbabwean people has hurt the SADC region, especially South Africa. We call upon all peace-loving countries to support the inclusive government to achieve economic recovery.

The emphasis placed on Zimbabwe and SADC's stability further illustrated South Africa's commitment to take forward the objectives of the African agenda policy. For them, SADC was an essential tool for the implementation of NEPAD to enhance development in the region:

**Cat 6-a:** SADC is the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional integration and development within all priority development sectors. SADC is recognised as a building block of the AU and serves as a key NEPAD implementing agent. It is an objective of the South African government to seek to enhance the capacity of SADC for it to provide a framework within which each member state would have the opportunity to reach its full potential in terms of peace, security, stability and economic and social development, as well as civil society participation and gender equity.

## **African unity**

The data shows that African unity was a fundamental element of the African agenda policy. It was used to emphasise that cooperation and multilateralism were critical for the African agenda's success. African unity was also used to encourage Africans to come together to rebuild the continent, as well as to underline that Africa is capable of initiating solutions for the continent's problems:

**Cat 1-e:** The first task is to achieve unity, solidarity, cohesion, cooperation among peoples of Africa and African states. Second, we must build all the institutions necessary to deepen the African continent's political, economic, and social integration. Third, we must deepen the culture of collective action in Africa and our relations with the rest of the world.

In contrast, other data reveals that African unity was difficult to achieve, as there was minimal support from fellow African leaders. Challenges that were hindering the achievement of African unity included the conceptual differences, infrastructure, geography, sovereignty, RECs, conflict and Rivalry, institutional building and the challenge of globalisation IR parliament committee found that:

**Cat 13-a:** the conceptual definition and premise of African Unity had not yet been probably defined. There was no clear mind-set or proper debate held on this issue by the various African governments, non-governmental organisations and other stakeholders.

Regarding the infrastructure in the continent, the committee noted:

**Cat 13-a:** Except for South Africa, most of the African continent lacked basic infrastructure. The slow rollout of energy (electricity) to Africans resulted in Africa lagging far behind the rest of the world in delivering energy (electricity) to the African masses. Aviation on the African continent was also a cause for concern as many airlines did not offer direct flights to African destinations and major cities in Africa. This problem, coupled with an inadequate transport system, did not bode well for African unity.

South Africa's role of championing peace, stability and development in the continent was not welcomed by all African leaders, leading to diplomatic tensions between Pretoria and other

countries. The tensions threatened its ambition to play the leading role, as well as the middle power role:

**Cat 13-a:** “There had been a significant rise in diplomatic tensions between African states. The recent criticism by President Wade (drafter of the Omega Plan) of the mediation efforts of President Mbeki (drafter of the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan) in Zimbabwe was one such example. The only way to curb these conflict scenarios was for African states to implement an integrated early warning system to see the rapid mobilisation of regional brigades to squash any attempt by non-democratic entities”.

On the other hand, this unity was linked to Pan-Africanism to underline that Africans located in different parts of the earth should come together to take forward the rebirth vision and build an independent continent:

**Cat 4-a:** “We need to ask ourselves very fundamental questions. These include paraphrasing President Thabo Mbeki: What is the African doing consciously to free themselves from the position of a perpetual underling? What can Africans and the Diaspora do together to change their condition and reclaim their pride and prosperity?”

Pan-Africanism is a theme that was dominant in the ANC foreign policy. It was used to underline the ANC's approach to engaging with Africa under the African agenda policy. It underscores the ANC's collective approach to African challenges:

**Cat 15-a:** “To realise this (African Renaissance) requires close cooperation between progressive forces on the continent to define this shared agenda”.

South Africa also organised several consultative conferences to promote the unity of Africans under the African agenda policy:

**Cat 4-a:** “The discussion today should also contribute to what we can do for the continent's unity. This discussion should also contribute to what we can do to strengthen the unity of Africa. In July, there will be a grand debate to discuss how to enhance our agreement politically and economically”.

### **African solidarity**

The data demonstrates that South Africa promoted African solidarity in the region and the continent as part of the African agenda policy and multilateralism. However, due to the negative history of its unilateral engagement with other African countries, government and the ANC preferred and promoted consensus-building approaches on continental and regional issues. This was done to avoid isolation and build trust amongst fellow African leaders. As such, findings revealed that the international community heavily criticised South Africa for its approach in Zimbabwe. The International Relations parliamentary committee also noted the criticism during a discussion on Zimbabwe:

**Cat 13-a:** “Ms C September (ANC) gave a vote of appreciation for South Africa's path in dealing with Zimbabwe. South Africa had been under enormous pressure from the international community to take a more hard-line approach in dealing with Zimbabwe”.

The idea of solidarity was also promoted by the government of Zimbabwe, who welcomed South Africa's approach to the Zimbabwe crisis:

**Cat 13-a:** said that a common destiny linked the two countries and that South Africa had been a sober and constructive friend.

### **6.3.3 Objective III and IV: To use Afrocentricity to analyse South African foreign policy position on Africa and African countries like Zimbabwe and to explain the role of the African agency in the manner in which South Africa handled the SADC facilitation/mediation of dialogue Zimbabwe.**

Data relating to South Africa's management of its SADC mandate indicates that it fulfilled all its requirements. The mandate required Thabo Mbeki to facilitate political settlement between the government and the opposition parties. The mandate's objectives included creating “a conducive environment that would allow Zimbabweans to freely and democratically decide on the new constitution to govern their country: to give them space to elect leaders of their choice rather than imposing leaders on them from the outside” (Chikane, 2013:92). The that reveals that South Africa linked the mandate to its African agenda objectives in this manner: first, respecting the sovereignty of Zimbabwe by allowing the Zimbabweans to decide their future, instead of telling Zimbabwe what they should do. Second, South Africa borrowed from the Afrocentric posture of the African plan to emphasise that the Zimbabweans should

lead the process of finding the solution for their country. This meant that any solution should have the interest of the Zimbabweans, which explains why regime change was not an option.

### **African solutions to African problems**

Data analysis suggests that Mbeki's approach to the Zimbabwe crisis was also related to the African solutions maxim, which is based on the idea that African leaders need space to develop solutions to the continent. Mbeki sought to keep the issue within the region by blocking attempts from the West to interfere in Zimbabwe. He has explained this agenda in his 2016 letter:

“There were others in the world, led particularly by the UK, who opposed our approach of encouraging the Zimbabweans to decide their future. These preferred regime change-the forcible removal of President Mugabe and his replacement approved by the UK and its allies” (Mbeki, 2016:7).

Mbeki and other African countries were against the idea of the West deciding on Africa's future. He was not willing to allow them to impose a solution on Zimbabwe that would protect their interest while disadvantaging Zimbabweans. This reflected on the aspiration of the African Renaissance, which emphasised that Africa should seek to be its liberator:

**Cat 1-a:** “However, reality, including the purposes of the Cold War, dictated that the former colonial powers continued to hold in their hands the ability to determine what would happen to the African people over whom, in terms of international and municipal law, they no longer had any jurisdiction”.

Mbeki emphasised that Africans can free themselves from the oppressive historical legacy of poverty, marginalisation, hunger and backwardness that continues to hold the continent back. The findings have revealed that Mbeki linked South Africa's approach to the African Renaissance's aspirations to correct the colonial injustices of the past. For example, the land question and the Lancaster House Agreement resolved the Zimbabwe crisis. Initially, he corroborated with the UK to correct the colonial legacy of land inequality in the country:

**Cat 1-i:** “When the war veterans and others began to occupy white-owned farms, we intervened first of all with Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1998 to encourage the UK Government to honour the commitment that had been made at Lancaster House in 1979 to give the Government of Zimbabwe the financial means to carry out the required land redistribution in a non-confrontational manner”.

This was validated by Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, who was exiled in the UK with Thabo Mbeki during the Lancaster House Agreement when he said:

**Cat 11-a:** “Mbeki was familiar with the historical context and the other important matters, including the more delicate details related to the Lancaster House talks and the land issues in Zimbabwe”.

Ambassador Nhlapo proceeded to confirm that Mbeki and his team were also familiar with the “willing buyer-willing seller” arrangement which was the outcome of the negotiations. This arrangement strained the post-independence government efforts to return the land to the Zimbabweans as it required the government to purchase the land from the white farmers. However, the financial cost to purchase land for the government was too much as the country was dealing with a declining economy. As such, the land redistribution process was moving at a snail pace. This slow progress caused tensions between the government and African Zimbabweans, particularly the war veterans expected the government to reward them with land for their liberation contribution. He also revealed that the UK, who had initially agreed to support the land redistribution, financially undermined Mbeki's efforts to address this “willing buyer-willing seller” when they retracted:

**Cat11-a:** The land restitution programme agreed upon with (Mark) Malloch-Brown, when he was head of the United Nations Development Programme and endorsed by Kofi Annan at the UN, was compromised by the British. When Tony Blair, the British prime minister, started renegeing, Mbeki had to engage Malloch-Brown, who was kowtowing to pressure from Tony Blair's office

The data shows that Mbeki's blocking of the UN Security Council was the second way to put the African solutions to African problems into practice by preventing the intervention of the UN before Africa had exhausted its efforts. Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo, South Africa's UN permanent representative at the time, confirmed that Mbeki's moved with speed to ensure that the Zimbabweans were given space to choose their destiny instead of the UN Security Council deciding for them. This was because of the double standard at the UN due to the influence of powerful Western countries. Ambassador Kumalo used the case of Kenya to demonstrate this:

**Cat 12-a:** “After the 2007 elections, when people were killed as Kibaki and Odinga jostled for political power, there was never a meeting in the UN Security Council to

try and enforce regime change in Kenya. Why? The British and the Americans were not going to allow it. What was unfair was that Kofi Annan was the special envoy for Kenya brought in by the British and the Americans to resolve the political disputes. Still, he never once submitted a report on the Kenyan issue to the Security Council. Yet, when it was Zimbabwe, they reported to the UN every day. These were the double standards that were questioned and challenged by President Mbeki”.

Reverend Frank Chikane, who was the Director-General and part of the mediation team, has also confirmed that South Africa collaborated with Russia and China to block a resolution that would allow the placing of heavy sanctions on Zimbabwe. This move was part of Mbeki's efforts to drive the course of letting Africans solve their problems without interference of the UN Security Council:

**Cat 8-a:** “The battle raged on until it reached the UN Security Council, where both the USA and the UK pushed for sanctions against Zimbabwe. They both lost twice on this matter against the position held by South Africa supported by the AU and SADC. However, the veto of other UN Security Council members was helpful to the course of letting Africans resolve their problems. China and Russia chose to support the SADC and AU positions”.

Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo revealed that South Africa's behaviour at the UNSC on the Zimbabwe issue was motivated by their solidarity with other African countries. They had decided as the ANC that they would stand with the fellow Africans as they have supported them during the liberation struggle:

**Cat 12-a:** “Our issue was that we would never allow an African country to be subjected to the kinds of selective pressure that powerful Western were imposing. The African countries represented our struggle at the UN and took care of our interest when the liberation movement was in exile. Therefore, it was important for South Africa to continue representing Zimbabwe at the UN”.

The above text illustrates how South Africa resisted "Western solutions "to the Zimbabwe crisis as part of the renewal of the colonial project. Regime change was another theme that emerged.

## **Regime change**

The UK and the USA resisted the quiet diplomacy as they preferred a more drastic set of actions culminating in a deposition of a ZANU-PF government, a strategy that became known as a regime change agenda. Mbeki explains that the Western countries were opposed to quiet diplomacy approach because it didn't serve their interest. The regime change option involved Mugabe's forceful removal to be replaced by leaders preferred by the UK and the USA. This was favoured by the MDC and other Zimbabwean civil society groups only because it would shift power to them quicker than via prolonged street fights and negotiations, perhaps not because they had imperialist motivations in their case. South Africa had gathered information about the UK and USA's plans through their Minister of Intelligence, Lindiwe Sisulu, who was engaging both countries on the issue:

**Cat 1-1:** “Accordingly, it was not from hearsay or third parties that we learned about Western plans to overthrow President Mugabe, but directly from what they communicated to a representative of our government”.

Data on regime change also revealed that South Africa and SADC opposed the regime change option to block any form of modern colonisation. The West instructed Africa on how to run the continent. They resisted the call for regime change. Chikane recounts that the UK and the USA unleashed the following strategies to get South Africa and SADC to support this option:

1. **Cat 12-a:** “Imposed sanctions against the president of Zimbabwe, specific individuals within government and some corporate entities. This affected the whole country.
2. All forms of covert operations and propaganda focusing on Mugabe, ZANU-PF, opposition parties, civil society, Mbeki and his facilitation team, SADC and the African leaders”.

Chikane also pointed out that the two power countries kept tabs with the process by covertly and overtly monitoring the negotiations through cyber monitoring of communications between the facilitator and the parties, planting moles within the delegation teams. The media also played its parts in undermining the negotiation process and the facilitator. Chikane stated two incidents relating to the press that demonstrated they were working with the Western powers. First, the media circulated reports about a 'Mbeki report' allegedly leaked at a 2007 SADC conference in Lusaka. According to Chikane, the media had reported that Mbeki had

blamed the UK for Zimbabwe's deepening crisis in the 'report'. Indeed, the Guardian newspaper led the story and said that:

South Africa has blamed Britain for the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe by accusing the UK of leading a campaign to "strangle" the beleaguered African state's economy and saying it has a "death wish" against a negotiated settlement that might leave Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF in power. (Chris McGeal, 2007, August).

The Guardian article further stated that Mbeki explicitly detailed in the document that the British remain a 'significant obstacle' by imposing sanctions that Mugabe blames for Zimbabwe's economic crisis. The Guardian also quoted an excerpt from the "Mbeki report" as saying, "the most worrisome thing is that the UK continues to deny its role as a principal protagonist in the Zimbabwean issue and is persisting with its activities to isolate [Zimbabwe]". The South African government denied drafting such a report. In his capacity as the Director-General at the Presidency during this period, Chikane confirmed that the report did exist; if it did, an agency might have engineered it to cause friction between the UK and South Africa.

Second, the media ran a story about Mbeki ignoring a letter that Morgan Tshangarai wrote to him expressing displeasures about handling the negotiations. Chikane recounts that the MDC publicly corroborated the media reports and confirmed that Morgan Tsvangirai had written to Mbeki. However, the letter never reached the Presidency because the responsible delivery person opted to withhold it out of fear that it would collapse the negotiations and intensify the conflict in Zimbabwe. Chikane has indicated that the South African media wouldn't have it despite categorically stating that the Presidency never received the letter. The copy of the letter was then shared with The Times newspaper, which published it as proof that it existed. This led to a back and forth debate between the journalists and the Presidency, culminating in reports that the Presidency disregarded the MDC's concerns about the negotiation process. Chikane indicated that this incident was part of the international communications strategy to push the regime change agenda:

**Cat- 8-a:** "A massive strategy was unleashed to force Mbeki to deviate from or abandon the SADC mandate and join the regime change campaign to remove Mugabe. When Mbeki resisted, he became the target of many complex, intelligent projects to force him to abandon the SADC mission and adopt his approach or force him out as a facilitator".

Chikane (2013) that Mbeki did everything he could to neutralise the regime change campaign because it was not the best option for Zimbabwe. South Africa believed that dialogue amongst Zimbabweans was the only way to resolve the crisis. The findings indicate that South Africa blocked the regime change proposal because they feared the West could do it all African countries, undermining the aspirations of the African agenda policy for an independent Africa. Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo has confirmed this:

**Cat 13-a:** “If regime change had happened in Zimbabwe, it could have happened to any other African country- including democratic South Africa”.

The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Essop Pahad, corroborated this:

**Cat 6-a:** “We all understood that a regime change in Zimbabwe would have devastating consequences for us in South Africa; they could do the same thing to us if they did not like our policies, they could initiate a regime change”.

### **Quiet diplomacy**

The data shows that adopting the quiet diplomacy strategy was another way South Africa put the African solution to African problems mantra into practice during the Zimbabwe mediation. Mbeki revealed that they chose quiet diplomacy to allow the Zimbabweans to decide their future rather than an imposed solution by the West. Mbeki also indicated that the quiet diplomacy strategy proved to be an effective tool because it produced the GPA, which paved the way for constitutional reform and peaceful elections. Finally, Mbeki justified the reason South Africa opted for quiet diplomacy:

**Cat 1-l:** “Consciously, we took the position that democratic South Africa should at all costs avoid acting as a new home-grown African imperial power that would have given itself the right unilaterally to determine the destiny of the peoples of Africa!”.

This statement corresponds with what Mbeki has said regarding the aspirations of the African Renaissance. He maintained that South Africa consciously decided to respect the sovereignty of other African countries.

**Cat 1-l:** “Accordingly, none of us seeks to impose any supposedly standard models of democracy on any country but wants to see systems of government that empower the people to determine their destiny and resolve any disputes among themselves by peaceful political means”.

This excerpt suggests that South Africa intentionally decided to refrain from imposing solutions on Zimbabwe. They opted to nudge the ZANU-PF government and Mugabe, who were an obstacle to democratic processes and promotion and human rights, persuading it to halt the idea of one state and allow Zimbabweans to exercise their democratic rights by choosing their preferred leader. The discussion above revealed that South Africa's reluctance to project its power in Zimbabwe and the region is motivated by its desire to build a much friendlier relationship with the region based on mutual respect. Mbeki and the regional leaders also believed this approach would avoid regional instability.

Mbeki's South African government came under pressure over the quiet diplomacy policy, most notably the powerful Western countries, civil society, MDC, and the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA leader, Tony Leon, declared quiet diplomacy as dead in December 2003. He said "It took its last breath in the waning days of December when Obasanjo announced that he would not, after, be allowing Zimbabwe to attend the Commonwealth meeting in Abuja this week" (Leon, 2003). In 2008, Morgan Tsvangirai also expressed disdain over the handling of the mediation in a letter written to Mbeki, which also asked him to recuse himself as the lead mediator. The Guardian reported that the MDC leader had written a letter on May 3 2008, accusing Mbeki of siding with Mugabe and the ZANU-PF, as well as turning a blind to human rights violations in Zimbabwe:

**Cat 10-a:** "Your lack of neutrality became increasingly evident when I arrived at the Lusaka summit to see you and Mr Mugabe on television together proclaiming there is 'no crisis in Zimbabwe'".

He further criticised Mbeki for contributing to the spiralling of the crisis in Zimbabwe:

**Cat 10-a:** "When you started meditating, Zimbabwe still had a functioning economy, millions of our citizens had not fled to other countries to escape political and economic crisis, and tens of thousands had not yet died from impoverishment and disease. In fact, since the March 29 election, Zimbabwe has plunged into horrendous violence while you have been meditating. With respect, if we continue like this, there will be no country left".

Although the media published the letter, the analysis reveals that the South African didn't receive it. Chikane claimed that the MDC person designated to deliver the letter resolved not to deliver it, fearing that it might cause disruptions and halt the mediation process. He said:

**Cat 8-a:** “We had checked all our records and our carefully managed registry. We also checked with our embassy in Harare if the letter had been delivered to them. However, there was no trace of it. Using our information gathering system, we discovered that the person responsible for delivering it had not done so out of concern that it would collapse the negotiation process and return to intensified conflict; in other words, more violence and disaster for Zimbabweans”.

Chikane indicated that this was part of an international overt and covert operation to paint Mbeki as the bias mediator who should be removed for unfitness to facilitate the negotiation. Chikane indicated that this reflects on the role of external players on African issues and their strategy to pin Africans against each other to take forward their policy objectives. Findings have revealed that despite the attempt to discredit the mediator, the SADC member states supported Mbeki and his approach to resolving the crisis.

### **The power sharing deal and the formation of the GNU**

Data has revealed that South Africa’s mediation efforts led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), a new constitution and a legal framework that would make way for free and fair elections. The Declaration of Commitment by all the parties to the agreement:

“the parties hereby agree to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation, and in particular to implement the agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country” (DIRCO, 2008).

The data has revealed that the agreement contained provisions for different political and economic reforms to pave a way for acceptable elections and politics.

South Africa’s response to the signing of the GPA:

“The agreement has once more underlined our often stated view that only the Zimbabwean people, acting with support of the international community, can author their own destiny out of the current political challenges facing their country” (DIRCO, 2008)

Chikane has confirmed that this South Africa's first milestone in their SADC mandate. He stated that:

“the reality, however is that Zimbabwe's GPA facilitated by Mbeki assisted the Zimbabweans to stabilise the situation and gave them an opportunity to produce a new constitution and a regulatory framework that will together create conditions conducive for free and fair elections” (Chikane, 2013:93).

And further:

“The political parties reached a settlement on 11 September 2008 and signed the GPA on 15 September 2008” (Chikane, 2013:93).

However, while the GPA has been celebrated by SADC, AU and international community, the US and the EU response towards the agreement was lukewarm because they were expecting regime change.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

We extracted the data presented in this chapter from speeches, books, discussion documents, minutes and written pieces from key players who were involved in the Zimbabwe mediation. Regarding the understanding of the African agenda, the findings have revealed that the African agenda was an ANC initiated strategy for its engagement with Africa. Furthermore, South Africa's effort was to respond to its domestic economic and developmental challenges. South Africa sought to integrate Africa into the global system as a partner rather than an afterthought through this policy. We have found that African identity, solidarity, unity and Afrocentricity underlined this policy and have informed South Africa's engagement in Africa.

In applying the African agenda in the Zimbabwe mediation process, the findings have revealed that South Africa's approach was guided by the African agenda's objectives, including respecting the sovereign rights of African countries and locating Africans at the centre of a political social-economic process. Mbeki's blocking of external players reflects on the "African solutions for African problems" mantra, which suggests that Africans should lead on peace, development and social issues in the continent. The findings indicated that the quiet diplomacy strategy expressed the African solutions for African problems as the preferred method over the regime change. The UK, USA and their allies, including the MDC, also on this wagon, resisted this approach. The findings have revealed that Mbeki was

determined to ensure that SADC and Zimbabwe handled the process to fulfil the aspiration of the African Renaissance.

Using Afrocentric lens in the Zimbabwe case, the findings have revealed that the African agenda is also about the centralisation of African people in the phenomenon. As such, it was revealed that Mbeki's main priority was to afford the people of Zimbabwe space to decide their future. He opposed the regime change because it was not in the interest of the Zimbabweans but of the British nationals. The centralisation was also reflected at the UN Security Council, where Mbeki blocked the Western nations from deciding the future of Zimbabweans. He also made a point about Africans being at the centre of decision making on African matters.

The next chapter analyses the African agenda policy and SADC mandated mediation in Zimbabwe. The chapter also applies the Afrocentric framework to South African foreign policy approach towards Zimbabwe.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy and Mediation in Zimbabwe: An Analysis

#### 7.1 Introduction

Scholars have used the Zimbabwe case study to demonstrate South Africa's limited influence in the Southern African region (Alden, 2002; Mckinley, 2004; Schoeman, 2007). Human rights violation, poor governance, electoral violence, economic and political crisis, and Mbeki's quiet diplomacy's failure to improve governance in Zimbabwe are used to show the ineffectiveness of Mbeki's African agenda in SADC. There is relative consensus that the quiet diplomacy approach is an ineffective element of the African agenda policy when applied in an African conflict situation (Alden, 2002; Lipton, 2009; Mckinley, 2004; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). In 2000, a confluence of problems propounded the Zimbabwe crisis. These included the Fast Track Land Reformed Programmed coincided with the emergence of the MDC, the Implementation of ESAP. The human rights abuse and the violent and illegal land occupations led the Western powers to impose sanctions and withdraw financial support for the land programme. During 2000 and 2005, South Africa received an avalanche of criticism as human rights violation, abuse and undermining of democracy propounded in Zimbabwe (Prys, 2008).

International and local actors blamed Pretoria for failing Zimbabwe through its quiet diplomacy policy. In particular, the West had expected a tougher stance from South Africa such as imposition of sanction after gross violation of human rights were reported in Harare (Chikane, 2013). However, Mbeki opted for a quiet diplomacy approach which involved engaging President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government behind the scenes through diplomatic avenues, nudging them and the MDC to sit on the table (Landsberg, 2016). Known as the 'softly-softly' approach to its critiques, quiet diplomacy is defined as the combination of techniques that include encouraging secret negotiations or subtle persuading in an effort to end a conflict or governance crisis (Dlamini, 2002). This study seeks to understand why South Africa chose this approach in Zimbabwe and how its understanding of the African agenda informed it. The study contends that the Eurocentric frameworks often used to analyze this policy approach have not adequately explained the reasoning behind the

South African policy approach to the African continent and conditions under which it emerged.

This chapter explores the implementation of the African agenda policy in Africa policy in Africa. It centres on South Africa's approach towards conflict resolution in Africa as part of the African renaissance vision. It uses Afrocentricity to understand the ideological underpinnings that influenced South Africa's approach in Zimbabwe. The meaning of the African agenda is discussed to understand the country's view on the renewal of the continent. Guided by the Afrocentric theory, the chapter responds to the question: *How did the African agenda holistically understood underpin South Africa's approach to its SADC mandated mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014?* The study argues that the South Africa approach to Zimbabwe cannot be adequately explained without understanding the core paradigms and principles of the African agenda and how this guided South Africa's choices in Zimbabwe. The South African policy is underpinned by ideological frames including pan-Africanism and African renaissance that are crucial to conceptually understand in order to fully account for the country's relations with fellow African countries.

The text is organised in the following manner: it looks at the meaning of the African agenda and policy formulation and implementation. This is followed by an examination of the African agenda principles including the African identity and pan-Africanism. It then moves to the examination of the Zimbabwe case study to understand the implementation of the policy during the mediation process. We do this by looking at South Africa's response to the Zimbabwe crisis in form of quiet diplomacy, the role of external players and regime change. The strength and weakness of South Africa's response will also be explored.

## **7.2 Afrocentric perspective**

The Afrocentric paradigm suggests that if a project is to be Afrocentric, African people and their systems must be at the center of it, meaning they have to drive it. It is from this point of view that the African agenda policy will be discussed. The discussion will focus on the Afrocentric assumption of the African agenda regarding its implementation, approach towards conflict resolution, economic development, and governance in the African continent. As such, the Afrocentric assumptions of the African agenda can be viewed in terms of :

- i) African renaissance

- ii) Quite diplomacy strategy
- iii) Regional organisations

### **African renaissance**

The African renaissance policy or strategy for African development is considered Afrocentric because it's a project focused on African agency and is concerned with African people leading economic development of their continent. (Zondi, 2015) describes it as a commitment by Africans to exercise agency to ensure the restoration of democracy, peace and prosperity. It was a demand for Africa to decide its future and speak for itself on continental affairs. Indeed, Africa's voice increased at the UN as a result of the collective work of prominent African leaders including President Olusegun Obasanjo, Abdoulaye Wade, Muammar Gaddafi, Meles Zenawi and Abdelaziz Bouteflika who argued for a relationship of equals between the continent and the West. While they were not opposed to Western initiatives, they preferred to be included in the decision making of development projects for the continent. Engagement between the African leaders and the big economies culminated into the NEPAD strategy which was evidence that Africa's voice was gaining relevance on global platforms. This description confirms that the African renaissance project had the interest of African people at its centre. As such, the African renaissance project achieved its objectives of inclusion of African people on development initiatives that concerns their continent.

### **Quiet diplomacy**

Mbeki's approach towards the Zimbabwe crisis was African centred in that it followed a process that was led by Africans and sought to satisfy the needs of the Zimbabweans. It was centred on creating an environment that would allow the Zimbabwean people to make decisions about the future of their nation. To achieve this, Mbeki blocked all external interferences by the North, especially the call for regime change which he argued was not in the best interest of the Zimbabweans (Chikane, 2013). Consequently, Mbeki's response to the Zimbabwe crisis was based on three assumptions. Firstly, the response was a form of the "African solutions to African problems" doctrine and the idea that "African leaders need space and autonomy to craft their solutions without the Western interference" which signalled Africa's capability and readiness to deal with their problems without the interference of the West (Nathan, 2013:48). On this commitment to defend Africans to resolve their issues, Mbeki fiercely resisted the UK and USA's effort to impose a solution for Zimbabwe during the mediation process. He later re-emphasized his stance on this and stated "there were others

in the world, led particularly by the UK, who opposed our approach of encouraging the Zimbabweans to decide their future. These preferred regime change”. (Landsberg, 2016) argues South Africa opted for the quiet diplomacy approach as a way to actualise “African solution to African problems” which conveys the idea that Africans should be afforded space to address the continent’s conflict and development challenges. Indeed, Mbeki has justified the quiet diplomacy policy according to “African solution” dictum and explained why South Africa chose this approach towards Zimbabwe: He argued:

“This approach was informed by our unwavering determination to respect the right of the people of Zimbabwe to determine their future, firmly opposed to any foreign, including South African, intervention to impose solutions on the people of Zimbabwe” (Thabo Mbeki, 2016:7).

Responding to the West imposed regime change solution, he argued:

“What was wrong with ‘quiet diplomacy’, which led to the adoption of the GPA discussed by Mukori, was that it defended the right of the people of Zimbabwe to determine their future, as opposed to the desire by some in the West to carry out regime change in Zimbabwe and impose their will on the country!” (Mbeki, 2016:7).

Earlier, Reverend Chikane, who was part of the mediation team had corroborated with this point in his book. He stated that:

“Europe and the USA were deliberately put on the burner. Our view was that the African Renaissance required that Africa reassert its sovereignty and its capacity to make its own decisions about its future without the dictates of superpowers. African countries had to stop being ‘client states’ or ‘proxy’ governments that governed in the interest of powerful countries and not in the interest of the people of Africa” (Chikane, 2013:55).

Secondly, it was based on respecting the sovereign right for the Zimbabweans to independently make their own decision about the future of their country (Chikane, 2013). This included creating conducive conditions for the Zimbabweans to elect their preferred leader democratically and decide on the constitution that would govern the country. Mbeki has confirmed this in his 2016 letter:

“Throughout these years we defended the right of the people of Zimbabwe to determine their destiny, including deciding on who should govern the country. This included resisting all efforts to impose other people’s solutions on Zimbabwe”(Thabo Mbeki, 2016:9).

Regarding South Africa’s approach, the study has identified three factors that informed Mbeki's approach to Zimbabwe: first, he was determined to implement the objectives of the African renaissance, which was to end the conflict in Zimbabwe. This objective drove Mbeki's motivation to create an environment that would allow the Zimbabweans to make decisions about their future. Chikane (2013:92) describe Mbeki's facilitation role as a “mediator” and “enabler” to emphasize that his role was that of a helper and not a dictator. This was also to underline that South Africa had distanced itself from the UK and the USA's regime change ideas.

Second, Mbeki sought to be consistent with the approaches of SADC and the AU, which was to assist the Zimbabweans in deciding the country's future. SADC had directed Mbeki to “facilitate discussions between the ZANU-PF, the government of South Africa and the MDC on political questions which happened” (Mbeki 2008:Cat1-s). Both the AU and SADC intended to keep the matter within the region and minimize external interferences to keep with the objectives of the African renaissance vision.

Third, this was also the position of the ANC, which had brotherly relationship the former liberation movement in power in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF (Hamaswa & Chinyere, 2015). According to (Pahad, 2016), the ANC had agreed that regime change would have consequences devastating for the region. The ANC understood that the West powers calling for the regime change in Zimbabwe could do the same to South Africa. So, it too wanted the solution to be found through internal negotiations.

While there is consensus scholar that the quiet diplomacy approach was not very practical for the Zimbabwe situation (Alden & Schoeman, 2015; Hamill & Hoffman, 2009; Lipton, 2009; Mckinley, 2004; van Nieuwkerk, 2006), a regime change imposed by Western actors was also not the best option. A regime change driven by the West would undermine the role of regional bodies and imply that SADC lacks the ability to resolve regional conflicts.

For Mbeki, the regime change was against the ideals of the African renaissance, and it would have caused regional instability. Indeed, the African renaissance sought a partnership with the

West, where Africans led on continental issues. Mbeki had clarified this when he emphasized that:

“Accordingly, none of us seeks to impose any supposedly standard models of democracy on any country but wants to see systems of government that empower the people to determine their destiny and resolve any disputes among themselves by peaceful political means” (Mbeki, 1998: Cat1-a)

He questioned the legitimacy of the USA and the UK’s activism for “regime change” to promote democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe (Mbeki, 2016). In some instances, it uses its foreign policy’s ethical values to promote their national interest, without considering the damage of this approach to the receiving country. This selective activism informed Mbeki’s position on the Western sponsored regime change. He opposed this position on the grounds that it was not in the interest of the Zimbabweans (Chikane, 2013). Instead, Mbeki felt that it was serving the interest of white Zimbabweans who had lost their assets following the government’s FTLR policy. However, the call for regime gained momentum as opposition parties and civil society groups became part jumped on the wagon.

Despite Mbeki's plea for non-interference, the UK and the US pressed hard for Mbeki to push for Mugabe's removal while ignoring the contributions of the Lancaster House Agreement to the crisis (Zondi, 2015). Moreover, the MDC, some civil society, media, and scholars were also not interested in the effects of the Lancaster House agreement in the crisis. They ignored the US and UK's commitment to pay for the land that would be returned Zimbabweans (Chikane, 2013). For instance, multilateral and bilateral donors pledged US\$5 billion, which never reached Harare (Zondi, 2015). External players undermined Mbeki's attempts to block Western influence in the mediation process who were keen to control the outcome of the process. According to Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Mbeki and the mediation team were aware that even the MDC was sponsored through a Freedom Democracy programme to push for a regime change (Nhlapo, 2016). This was problematic for Mbeki, who was trying to block the influence of external players on African politics. He aimed to enforce the African renaissance and debunk the contemptuous view that Africans cannot establish and maintain sound governance systems (Mbeki). He sought to use an African based approach in Zimbabwe to demonstrate that Africans can resolve governance issues. He was also frustrated with the African press, which perpetuated this view about the African continent and expressed that:

“The second reason that our supposed defenders of press freedom insisted so much that we should elevate the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism above the Constitutive Act of the African Union was that they are convinced that as Africans, we cannot be trusted to promote democracy in Africa without the guardianship of the Western countries” (Mbeki, 2003:Cat1-e)

Mbeki was caught in the dilemma which required him to balance conflicting interests. He had to honour and respects the SADC’s mediation mandate which required him to facilitate a political settlement between the belligerents and create an environment for free and fair elections (Chikane, 2013). At the same time he had to maintain the perception that he was not isolating the West, NGOs and the Zimbabwe’s opposition (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013).

Scholars have suggested various reasons for South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy (Alden, 2002; Landsberg, 2016b; Prys, 2008). For Landsberg (2016) the quiet diplomacy option was a trade-off strategy in which Pretoria offered to help Zimbabwe with economic recovery and the land issue in exchange for a dialogue with the MDC, free and fair elections and a peaceful transition that would end the tensions in Zimbabwe. (Landsberg, 2016) also argues that Pretoria’s approach was motivated by Mbeki’s geo-strategic ambitions on confronting conflict in the DRC. According to Landsberg (2016) Mbeki considered both Mugabe and Kgame strategic players in the DRC conflict, as such, Zimbabwe had to be stable so he could work with Mugabe in resolving the conflict. For Prys (2008) South Africa’s strategy was motivated by economic ambitions. Consequently, South Africa's economic links with Zimbabwe rendered the sanction option inexpedient as this would have a negative impact on Pretoria’s economy and also aggravate the migration crisis. (Alden, 2002) argues another reason is that South Africa's hegemony requires a careful approach in the region favouring persuasion and multilateral platforms.

Mbeki's approach met much resistance from the West, particularly the USA and the UK, who called for a regime change in Zimbabwe. Their point of departure was the violation of human rights, poor governance, and disregarding the rule of law (Prys, 2008). The US and the UK openly collaborated with the MDC to push the regime change agenda. According to Chingome (2010 in Shai 2016), their interest was motivated by their kin and kith (white farmers) disadvantaged by the land reform programme. As such, both the UK and the USA opposed SADC’s approach of encouraging the Zimbabweans to decide their future (Mbeki, 2016).

While Mbeki's centralization of Zimbabwean people in the decision-making process is acknowledged, he failed to recognize that the absence of ethical leadership in Zimbabwe contributed to economic and political degeneration. According to Dauda (2019:165), "ethical leadership deficit" hinders the actualization of the African renaissance, as it compromises internal processes, including governance and democracy. According to Dauda (2019), the lack of trustworthiness, transformational and inspirational characterized the dearth of ethical leadership. Dauda (2019) argues that leadership concerning ethics, constructive will and character are central in any discussion about African renaissance and pan-Africanism. (Mayanja, 2013) is of the same view and argues that strengthening ethical leadership is the key to rebuilding Africa. Mayanja (2013) then proposes that strengthening of ethical leadership should be grounded on *Ubuntu* philosophy which focuses on humanity, collective good and interconnectness of all beings. Mbeki (2005) often spoke about an emergence of a new generation of leaders who would drive the African renaissance. They are accountable; they promote democracy and good governance and entrench human rights. However, in his quiet diplomacy approach, these were omitted or muted. This omission reveals the inconsistencies in Mbeki's implementation of the African agenda policy in Zimbabwe.

### **Regional organization**

South Africa's African agenda policy adopted a multilateral strategy that places Africa at its center (Paterson & Virk, 2014). This reflected on the policy's collective and collaborative approach on peace and security, development and governance in the continent. For instance, according to Paterson and Virk (2014) SADC promoted a collective response to political crisis such as in Lesotho in 1998, Zimbabwe between 2007 and 2013 in which South Africa was a key player. Mkabela (2015) has argued that an African centered project should be based on the collective ethic which recognizes that all actions are within a collective context, seeks to maintain harmony and balance and stresses humanness. (Mkabela, 2015) further stresses that when the community is part of the decision making of a project, it helps guide the project towards improving the situation or neutralizing the crisis. Based on Mkabela's (2015) assertion, an African centered collective approach should be inclusive of African leaders and community members and maintain harmony and balance amongst the community (country). Mbeki's collective efforts which involved working with some prominent African presidents, regional organisations and RECs to strengthen African peace and security, governance and enhance economic development through the transformation of SADC, AU,

creation of APRM, NEPAD and PAP reflects on the African centredness of the African agenda policy. This is further explained in the below extract:

Pahad emphasised said:

“There is an urgent need for a closer alignment and mutual reinforcement of South Africa's multilateral and bilateral priorities within Southern Africa. The aim of this approach should be to give actual effect to South Africa's stated intention that its efforts in Southern Africa should be aimed at '... the maximisation of the potential of each SADC member state in terms of security and stability; economic and social development and civil society interaction...'; in support of the revitalisation of the SADC development and integration agenda, in particular the effective operationalisation of RISDP, SIPO (Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ” (Pahad, 2007: Cat5-a).

In addition to SADC, Mbeki also worked with Olusanjo Obasanjo and Bakili Muluzi of Malawi to nudge and cajole Mugabe to bring change in Harare. Landsberg (2007) has argued that South Africa's preference for a multilateral approach in the region was motivated by its desire to counter perceptions about its aspirations to dominate the region as previously done by the apartheid government. Given these suspicions about Pretoria, a multilateral approach to conflict resolution in the region was one of the tactics to refute the suspicions (Landsberg, 2015). Mbeki also used the Commonwealth channel through the Commonwealth Troika, which comprised the Prime Minister of Australia, Rt Honourable John Howard, President Obasanjo and President Mbeki. Their mandate was to “determine appropriate Commonwealth action on Zimbabwe in harmony with the Harare Commonwealth Declaration and the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme” (DIRCO, 2002:1). They concluded that they would revisit the issue after a year depending on whether Zimbabwe had progressed in the Commonwealth Harare Principles and the Commonwealth's Secretary-General's report.

Mbeki and the South African government emphasised that the crisis of Zimbabwe shouldn't be separated from the Lancaster House negotiations as they believed that the UK's failure to honour the agreement contributed to the land grabbing crisis (Mbeki, 2016). Mbeki was of the view that South Africa's interest would be best served if the UK and Zimbabwe worked together to resolve the crisis. His first response was triggered by the occupation of land by war veterans in 1998. In his written peace he stated that:

“When the war veterans and others began to occupy white-owned farms, we intervened first of all with Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1998 to encourage the UK Government to honour the commitment that had been made at Lancaster House in 1979 to give the Government of Zimbabwe the financial means to carry out the required land redistribution in a non-confrontational manner” (Mbeki, 2016:4).

His intervention was his second response from the South African side after the ANC had written a document reprimanding the ZANU-PF of Zimbabwe's deteriorating economic and political situation (Mbeki, 2001). Mbeki's intervention included an engagement with the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to nudge him to honour the Lancaster House financial commitment and organize the International Donor's Conference Reform and Resettlement. Chikane (2013) claims that the UK and other donors failed to honour their commitments at the conference because the ZANU-PF was too corrupt to handle the finances. Another effort by Mbeki was through the UN, Sweden and Norway, which committed to funding the land redistribution, which failed to produce results (Chikane, 2013). These governments had pledged millions on the condition that Mugabe stops the violence and violation of human rights. However, they later withdrew when the violence and land occupation escalated (Landsberg, 2015). Chikane (2013) argues that this response by the UK led to the forcible occupation of land by the war veterans. While the UK and US evaded addressing the land question, there was consensus among the Commonwealth Heads of States that the land was the central issue of the crisis. During their annual Summit in 2002, they agreed that:

“... the land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from other issues of concern. The Commonwealth will be ready to assist Zimbabwe to address the land question, and to help with its economic recovery, co-operating with other international agencies” (DIRCO, 2002:).

### **7.3 The consolidation of the African agenda**

Three events triggered the ANC to pursue the African agenda as their African policy: first, the failed South African push for the sanctioning of the Nigeria junta for the assassination of anti-oil activist, Ken Saro Wiwa, in Nigeria's Niger Delta region highlighted the limits of South Africa's unilateral approach shifting stronger towards a multilateral tactic (Landsberg, 2010). Second, the dilemma on who to choose between two Chinas (People's Republic of

China and Republic of China) underlined the difficulties of balancing the ethical and the universality doctrine (Alden & le Pere, 2003). Third, Pretoria's military intervention in Lesotho uncovered the inconsistencies of its peace and security policy in the SADC region (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). Analysis revealed that ANC concluded at its national conference of July 1997 that the policy of the transitioning government was problematic for its ambitions in the continent and its global aspirations. The aim was to avoid isolation by the continent, sabotaging the ruling party's economic aspirations in Africa. Economic development was a top priority for the ANC who desperately needed to overcome the socio-economic legacies of the apartheid regime, including poverty, inequalities and social ills. It was also essential to depart from the pariah state image and wear an identity representing their new relationship with the continent.

The first translation of the African renaissance into practice was to work with five key strategic countries to transform the OAU into the AU. He worked closely with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania and John Kufuor of Ghana build common values and principles and persuaded 53 African countries to work together to build the Africa they want (Landsberg, 2006). During the launch of the AU in Durban in 2002 Mbeki outlined the purpose of this transition and stated that

“by forming this union, the peoples of our continent have made the unequivocal statement that Africa must unite! We as Africans have a common and a shared destiny, together we must redefine this destiny for a better life for all the people of this continent” (Mbeki, 2002:Cat1-m).

Mbeki further stated that:

“as Africans we have to come to understand that there is no sustainable development without peace, without security and without stability. The Constitutive Act provides the mechanism to address this change which stands between the people of Africa and their ability and capacity to defeat poverty, disease and ignorance” (Mbeki, 2002:Cat1-m).

This was to indicate that the AU would be used to progress the peace agenda of the African renaissance. Indeed, Mbeki coordinated with Obasanjo to strengthen the AU's Peace and Security Commission.

The second translation of the African renaissance into a concrete development plan, first called the New African Initiative (NAI), Millennium Africa Plan (MAP), before it became known as the NEPAD. Mbeki championed the construction of the NEPAD but strategically coordinated with Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria to support this strategy as a collective vision (Landsberg, 2006; 2010). NEPAD was responding to the renaissance call to end Africa marginalisation and Africa's right to be heard. During a visit to the National War College in Abuja, 2003, Mbeki stated that "through the NEPAD the leaders of the continent are proclaiming a new relationship between Africa and the developed world. As Africans we are saying however weak we are, and however meagre our resources may be, we will do everything we need to ensure we achieve the African renaissance" (Mbeki, 2003:Cat 1-n). The NEPAD was an effort to build new partnership between African leaders and the developed world based on the trade-off agreement of African leaders holding each other accountable in exchange for developed world recommitting itself to support Africa's development (Landsberg, 2006). Through the NEPAD, Mbeki, Bouteflika, Obasanjo, Wade and Gaddafi increased Africa's voice at global multilateral forums. They presented Africa's development case at the Group of Eight (G8) and lobbied for the rich countries to support the NEPAD, leading to the formation of the Africa Action Plan (Paterson & Virk, 2014; Zondi, 2015).

After the development of the NEPAD, Mbeki introduced the African Peer Review Mechanism as the African renaissance strategy to commit African leaders to good governance, democracy and promotion of human rights (Landsberg, 2007). Mbeki has explained the APRM is "an initiative to which Member States accede voluntarily. It is a monitoring mechanism that helps the participating countries to conform to agreed political, economic and corporate policies and practices" (Mbeki, 2007: Cat 1-o). the APRM is based on an integrated approach which incorporates a set of economic, political and corporate governance values to which African countries are encouraged to adhere to voluntarily (Sako, 2004). Through this mechanism, South Africa successfully promoted civil society participation, gender empowerment, good governance, free and fair elections, judiciary

independence, corruption combating (Landsberg, 2007). The AU established the APRM to support the development vision as articulated by the African Renaissance (Landsberg, 2010).

The pursuit of piece diplomacy in countries which were in conflict was another priority of the African agenda. This was translated into action through the strengthening of the management and governance of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation to achieve greater political stability in the region (Zondi, 2015). Mbeki's approach on regional peace was based on the understanding that policy formation at regional level will support the broader continental vision on peace and security (Landsberg, 2015). As such, regional integration became the key pillar of the African agenda policy. (Zondi, 2015) provided a useful summary of how this was operationalised in three ways: first, promoting regional integration through a continental wide dialogue. Second, was to mobilise support for the harmonisation and rationalisation of RECs for acceleration of regional integration. Third, African leaders mobilised regional economic communities to create blueprints and strengthen regional security architecture. Most of this work went into restructuring SADC, which included reorganising the secretariat and improving the political and economic institutions. A lot of work was put into reviewing the Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP) to responds to the NEPAD, and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) to deepen and strengthen cooperation in the areas of politics, defence and security cooperation to drive peace and stability in the region (SADC, 2010). SIPO is the strategy for security cooperation in the region that encompasses peace support operations, humanitarian assistance and police services.

Beyond the making of policy and crafting of the above plans and programmes, South Africa also played a role in the implementation of these policies in the region, in particular on peace and security. For instance, Pretoria has led peacebuilding and peace-making missions in the region including in the DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, Burundi, CAR, Comoros and Zimbabwe (Bischoff, 2006; Paterson & Virk, 2014; van Nieuwkerk, 2012). There are questions of whether the African renaissance was able to end wars in the region to advance development. For instance Taylor and Williams (2001) have concluded that Mbeki was unsuccessful to resolve the conflict in the DRC, which was also undermining his efforts to bring about the African renaissance. They argued that the principles of neo-liberalism have contributed to the erosion of neo-patriotism and encouraged the growth of "warlords capitalism" in the DRC.

This also creates a dynamic in which certain external actors sustain the war to pursue selfish interest which do not benefit the people of the DRC.

#### **7.4 The debate about South Africa in Africa**

Drawing from the Afrocentric perspective, we recall that South Africa's African renaissance vision was expected to put African interest at the centre of any development discussion. An Afrocentric project should put Africans at the centre of decision making, planning and execution (Asante, 2008). Indeed, Mbeki's call for Africans to drive the continent's renewal reflected on these African-centred principles. It sought to do this through multiple strategies, including the establishment of institutional building (AU, NEPAD, APRM), quiet diplomacy and regional integration through RECs. The ANC documents reflect the government's intent stating that "in this context, the notion of the African renaissance has risen as the best framework to empower the continent to act for itself and its interest" (African National Congress, 1997:47).

As well as the government public speeches, such as this remark by Aziz Pahad on the occasion of the luncheon for West and Central Africa Ambassadors to South Africa in May 2007:

Cat 6-a: "The consolidation of the African Agenda serves as a pillar upon which we seek to achieve our developmental goals. This requires a long term commitment to the successful restructuring of our REC's, strengthening of the AU structures and organs, including the implementation of the NEPAD and ensuring peace, stability and security in Africa within the framework of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy".

Mbeki went on a continental tour to set the agenda and garner support from major African countries, including Nigeria and Egypt. Next was a global tour to the USA, Japan and Europe to acquire support for the NEPAD strategy of the African renaissance. The African renaissance also sought to end the marginalization of the African continent by the big economies, which often sat at the global table and made decisions that impacted the continent's development aspirations. He said:

"And we believe that one of the correct responses to that process of globalization is to make sure that the smaller countries of the world, therefore, have a proper place in the

decision-making processes of these institutions, which take decisions that have a universal impact” (Mbeki, 1998:Cat 1-a).

The African agenda found expression in the idea and vision of African renaissance, a sort of recalling of a history of building great things in Africa in order to assert the agency of Africa about its new role. Mandela had said in 1993 that Africa was capable of taking its destiny in its hand (Mandela, 1993). Mbeki later posed a rhetorical question whether African could own its destiny in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, so whether the century belonged to Africa. Mbeki outlined African renaissance idea during “I am an African” at the adoption of the South African Constitution in May 1996. In the speech, he highlighted three things that defined the new African agenda policy to advance the African renaissance vision. First, he spoke about South Africa's African identity, reaffirming that South Africa had a common bond with Africa and signalled the focus of the foreign policy: “I am an African, I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa” (Mbeki, 1996:1). Second, it outlined the main priorities of the African agenda policy when it spoke about stability/peace, insisting: “Whatever the difficulties, Africa shall be at peace.” It also underlined the prosperity of the continent, saying: “However improbable it may sound to the sceptics, Africa will prosper!” (Mbeki, 1996)

Mbeki further promoted the Renaissance idea to fellow African countries, the EU, the USA and other major economies. To the African leaders’ cohort especially at the OAU, he located the African Renaissance within the Pan-Africanism paradigm, calling for unity, solidarity, cohesion, and cooperation among the African people to redefine the continent's destiny for a better life for its people rejuvenate the African continent (Mbeki, 2002). In the EU and the USA, he used the African renaissance to challenge the marginalization of Africa from the globalization process, calling for an equal relationship with the North, and advocating that African leaders to be at the centre of decision-making that concerns their destiny, economic, social and political (Mbeki, 1998). He challenged the Eurocentric description of African history, which has portrayed Africa as a dark continent that has not contributed to knowledge development (Mbeki, 1998). Mbeki further called out the former colonizers for downplaying Africa's success and its earliest human civilization (Mbeki,1998). He reminded them of the Africa’s glorious past including prosperous kingdom of Timbuktu, which produced intellectuals, Egypt's Kemet, Ethiopia, which successfully defended their nation from colonizers, and

Sudan, who have contributed to modern civilization (Kumah-Abiwu, 2016; Shillington, 2012).

Asante (2003 in Chawane, 2016) and Mazama (2001) have challenged this Eurocentric ideology which places Europeans at the centre of world history whilst ignoring the contributions made by Africans towards world development. Kumah-Abiwu, (2016) advances this argument and makes a case about using the Afrocentric theory as a foundation for advancing policy ideas to redefine the current conditions of African people. Kumah-Abiwu (2016) recognizes the significance of the theory and calls for extension of the centralization of African people ideas to shape policy outcomes that will transform the lives of African people. Kumah-Abiwu, (2016) emphasizes that Africans need to reclaim their dignity and identity and the freedom to reclaim their world through their lens. In his case, he poses the question: how could the tenets of the theory help shape the policy idea? He further highlights the role of higher education centres, including the Historically Black Colleges and Universities, in taking forward the extension of the Afrocentric theory in the policy-focused domain.

Mbeki's idea of an African renaissance resonates with the thinking of these scholars in that it seeks to integrate Africa into the global debate after many years of being placed in the periphery. It calls on Africans to lead the revolution of the change they want to see in the continent which includes restoration of peace, eliminating poverty, promoting democratic governance and Africa's development.

### **7.5 The African renaissance debate**

Mbeki's I am an African speech accelerated the public debate on the African renaissance. People wondered what the African renaissance was and what Mbeki meant. These were not just ordinary people, it was also African leaders, international governments and members of the media (Smith, 1997). In 1998 some African ambassadors gave South Africa a lukewarm response after they were invited to the African renaissance conference. Thami Mazwi, the conference organiser, had complained about the ambassadors' response and said they asked "what's this African renaissance nonsense?" (Haffajee, 1998 in Maloka, 2001). Some have raised concerns about the African renaissance's lack of historical accuracy and clear political programme (Van Kessel, 2002). Others have warned against the neo-liberal aspect of the African renaissance that could perpetuate another form of capitalism, in particular countries which are rich in natural resources (Taylor & Williams, 2001).

We have divided the debate on the African agenda into three categories: the progressive African agenda, pan-Africanists, African identity. The progressive African agenda is what we associated with Thabo Mbeki. The emphasis here is on economic, political, and continental rebirth, as well as improvement in Africa's political position in the world (Maloka, 2001). The ANC discussion document of 1997 stated that "the concept of African renaissance provides a powerful vision not only for the African continent but for the development of a just and equitable world order" (African National Congress, 1997:51). Mbeki's progressive African agenda refers to creating a conducive environment for development in Africa by addressing peace and security, governance, economies issues (Landberg, 2007). The agenda seeks to achieve development, peace and security, economic growth, democratic governance, strengthening of the AU and SADC institutions, construction of the NEPAD and reforming the RECS (Landsberg, 2007). The ANC 1997 document specifically outlined the elements of the African renaissance as follows:

- The economic recovery of the continent as a whole; the establishment of political democracy in the continent.
- The need to break neo-colonial relationship with Africa and the world's economic powers.
- The mobilisation of people of Africa to take their destiny into their hands thus preventing the continent being a place for attainment of geo-political and strategic interests of the world's most powerful.
- Fast development of people driven and people-centred economic growth and development at meeting the basic needs (African National Congress, 1997).

Accordingly, when Mbeki was promoting the African renaissance at the United Nations University in 1998, he proclaimed that:

**Cat 1-b:** "Ours must become a continent of democracy, justice and respect of human rights. It must become a continent of peace and stability. It must become a continent of prosperity and a decent and rising standard of living for all its peoples. It must be part of the world revolution in science and technology and a beneficiary of the benefits that come in its wake. Africa must flower once again as a continent of learning, of art and thriving cultural activities. No longer sliding towards a slow and painful death at the margins of an advancing global community, Africa must regain her place as an equal among the continents".

Zondi (2015:99) captured the pan-Africanists perspective well suggesting that “the idea of a united Africa, the unity of a diverse African heritage united behind a vision to build and independent united Africa”. The pan-African perspective attempts to locate the renaissance debate within what Landsberg (2012) calls “the new pan-Africanism”, which puts interventionism at the centre of the agenda. According to both Zondi (2015) and Landsberg (2012) this quest for unity resulted into the birth of two things. Firstly, African leaders united to speak for Africa at global institutions to demand for Africa voice to be heard. This saw the leaders uniting behind the NEPAD strategy for Africa and agreeing with the rich world to support Africa’s development through this strategy (Zondi, 2015; Landsberg 2012; 2010; 2007). Secondly, it was the birth of the AU to address the inadequacies of the OAU which included restoring peace and security, democratic governance and development Pan-Africanism advocates for the unity of African people with the aim to achieve advancement complete liberation and mobilisation of African descent people (Dauda, 2019). Indeed, in the African renaissance context, pan-Africanism “serves as a symbol of unification for all Africans to work together to shape their future” (Jili, 2000:35). In this regard, Mbeki worked with African leaders to demand for a new position for Africa in the global community (Zondi, 2015). This was to respond to the renaissance’s call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the world (Landsberg, 2007).

The cultural perspective sees the African renaissance as the return to the roots. (Nabudere, 2001) has located the African renaissance in the cultural component which challenges the right of the Europeans to impose their cultural spiritual values on African communities while attempting to abolish the spiritual and the cultural rights. He argues that the concept is a useful tool in the struggle of the African people to redefine a new ideological and political agenda in the globalisation era (Nabudere, 2001). According to (Nabudere, 2001) the only way South Africa could achieve an African renaissance is on the basis of their culture and lived historical experience of their struggle that real liberation can unfold and be completed. Nabudere used Vusi Mavimbela’s “workable dream” to demonstrate that South Africa was struggling to articulate the African renaissance concept in its launch phase. He pointed out that Mavimbela’s examination of the “new proletariat class” as the leading key role players is not adequate to explain how the African renaissance will be achieved. He suggested that “such a force cannot be the motive force in the African renaissance unless really new conditions of their emergence and role are clearly laid out within its African mass cultural setting” (Nabudere, 2001:21).

Nabudere, (2001) further reflected on Mavimbela's "three moments" and contests that this depiction of the African renaissance is narrow and fails to locate the origins of the struggle of the African renewal correctly. According to him, the role of both the middle class and the proletariat class were limited in the context of globalisation taking place in the world (Nabudere, 2001). As such both groups have not sufficiently benefitted from the globalisation of the world as they are not clear about the role they should play. Nabudere (2001) concluded by suggesting that the African renaissance idea should be clearly laid out and explained for the African masses who should be the key actors in the agenda. According to him it is only when the African renaissance is based on African people's cultural and historical experiences that real liberation can unfold and be completed (Nabudere, 2001). (Jili, 2000) is of the same view arguing that the success of the renaissance depends on the extent to which the African renewal idea is filtered to the ordinary people. Jili (2000) examines the African renaissance debate by looking at the role of culture and African identity. He argues that identities are constructed by socio-cultural environments and that diversity of African cultures should be considered in the renaissance discourse. Mbeki's approach to work closely with other African leaders suggest that his African agenda policy has acknowledged these African cultural diversity.

## **7.6 Redefining the African identity**

When dealing with the African agenda's African identity, it is good to use Mbeki's "I am an African" speech as a point of departure. This is because the speech announces the African agenda policy as being about declaring South Africa's African identity and their desire to be part of the revival of the continent (Zondi, 2015). The themes that stood out in Mbeki's speech are: African identity, Africa's peace and security and Africa's economic development. These themes were indicative of the African agenda's key focus areas. As such, South Africa focused on African peace building and conflict resolution, democratic governance and economic development (le Pere, 2014). This found expression in South Africa's role on the AU reform and the strengthening of its peace architecture (Zondi, 2015). The proclamation that "Africa shall be at peace" was South Africa's response to Africa's struggle with the unending conflicts after realising the urgent need for peacebuilding in the continent. Peace and stability were necessary to create a conducive environment for Africa's prosperity as it was believed there wouldn't be any development without peace. A prosperous Africa would

be able to contribute to the evolution of humanity. Mbeki (1998:1) argued that “the African Renaissance addresses not only the improvement of the conditions of life of the peoples of Africa but also the extension of the frontiers of human dignity to all humanity”. This could be achieved through cooperation and unity of African leaders. This section discusses elements of the African renaissance ideology that informed the Africa policy by centralizing African people. The section will discuss the African identity as the outstanding feature of the African agenda policy in order to show how it was constructed and it was put into practice through the engagement with the African continent. To this end, we will focus on Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech to demonstrate how he used symbols and myths to assert the African identity of the South African people and their desire to rebuild the continent. We will then discuss how he operationalised the “themes” in his speech which highlighted South Africa’s main areas of focus including peace and security, economic development and democratic governance.

Following the African identity speech, views were constructed based on the question: “who is African and what it means to be one” (Jili, 2000:3). These views focused the African renaissance debate on the African identity. Commentators were keen to understand what makes one African in order to clarify who the drivers of the renaissance in Africa would be in the age of globalisation (Jili, 2000; Landsberg & Hlophe, 1999; Vale & Maseko, 1998). Ndubisi (2013:223) suggests that we address the question of “what characterises a person as an African?” first to understand what makes one an African, and what African identity is. To do this, we will locate the African identity within the pan-Africanist framework, and then use Mbeki’s speech to demonstrate how he used myths and symbols to announce South Africa’s African identity. Tembo (2016) located the African identity within the pan-Africanism framework and argued that the 19<sup>th</sup> century pan-African set a conceptual orientation from which the notion of African identity emerged. Tembo (2016) constructed five conceptual orientations using Wilmot Blyden and Alexander Crummell’s pan-Africanism ideas which located African identity within the African cultures and values/ the five conceptual orientations included: upholding native African values and cultures; setting the African idea in ontological opposition to what is considered western; the homogenization of individual and collective socio-political and cultural agency of black people into the notion of African identity; the tendency to expose particular issues of one country as representing the whole continent; the idea of reducing African authenticity to native African cultures coupled to the

vindication of African past has resulted in the reconstruction of the African past as the only option for liberating the native people of the continent (Tembo, 2016).

Similarly, Gabrielsson (2010) looked at the construction of the common African identity since the decolonisation period in the 1960's using pan-African movements and institutions like the AU. Gabrielsson (2010) reminds us that myths concerning the past are political tools to build perceptions of common identity. They are used to remind people of their common past to call the community or the region to move forward and build. Smith (1998 in Gabrielsson (2010) is of the same view and asserts that by reminding people of their past and ancestors it give them a sense of common belonging, and connect the past with the present and the future. Indeed Mbeki's use of myths and symbols as an effort to build national identity and African identity. This is reflected in his "I am an African speech" where he says:

"I owe my being to the Khoi and the San whose desolate souls haunt the great expanses of the beautiful Cape - they who fell victim to the most merciless genocide our native land has ever seen, they who were the first to lose their lives in the struggle to defend our freedom and dependence and they who, as a people, perished in the result" (Mbeki, 1996: Cat1-p).

Regarding the common African history he said:

"I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St Helena and the Bahamas, who sees in the mind's eye and suffers the suffering of a simple peasant folk, death, concentration camps, destroyed homesteads, a dream in ruins" (Mbeki, 1996: Cat1-p).

In the same vein, Gabrielsson (2016) argues that national and regional identities contain symbols which create an idea of a common belonging. She used the AU to demonstrate how politicians use symbols to call for African unity and solidarity. Similarly, Thabo Mbeki used symbols in his speech to announce South Africa's African identity, call for African unity and solidarity. Phrases such as "I am an African", "It feels good to be an African" "Africa shall prosper", "Africa shall be at peace" "nothing can stop us now", as well as words such as dignity, diversity, pride and heroes have a symbolic value for African identity. They are about declaring South Africa's African identity.

After declaring South Africa's new African identity, Mbeki focused his work on building a common identity through the African renaissance idea. According to Vale and Maseko (1998), Mbeki used the African renaissance idea to reinforce South Africa's commitment to the continent and define its policy towards Africa. van Kessel (2002) calls it a modernizing vision that is political and economically focused, which resonates with the Pan-African ideas.

Although Mbeki officially launched the African renaissance vision at a business summit in the USA in 1997, the African renaissance began in the early 20th century as part of the evolution of African nationalism, which was a response to the heinous colonial system (Zondi, 2015). The ANC's response to colonialism and the struggle against discrimination and segregation of black South Africans by the apartheid government influenced this pan-African ideological order. Furthermore, Landsberg (2010) suggests that the ANC borrowed the ideological aspect of the foreign policy from the Freedom Charter of 1955 and the ANC Constitutional principles of 1988.

As part of Mbeki's efforts, he redefines the African image and identity to ensure that Africans were in charge of the rebirth. He declared, "I am an African, I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa" (Mbeki, 1996:1). This also served as an invitation to fellow South Africans to join him in embracing their African identity following the demise of the atrocious apartheid government. As Kumah-Abiwu (2016) suggests redefining the African identity is key to pan-Africanist orientation. Mbeki's declaration could be linked to gaining cognitive independence to bring economic emancipation and development to the continent. The redefinition of the African identity was taken forward to fellow African leaders to reassure them that South Africa is one of them and is ready to play a role.

Aziz Pahad, then Deputy Minister, reminded his fellow African leaders at an Africa Day celebration in 2007:

"Indeed, today's most apparent celebration aspect is our Africanness, pride in our identity, heritage, cultures, and resilience. As diverse as our culture may be across the continent, African is the one factor that binds us together" (Pahad, 2007: Cat 3-a).

As well as to the developed world:

“But whence and whither this confidence? I would dare say that that confidence, in part, derives from a rediscovery of ourselves, from the fact that, perforce, as one would who is critical of oneself, we have had to undertake a voyage of discovery into our antecedents, our past, as Africans” (Mbeki, 1998:Cat1-a).

While reasserting the African identity, Mbeki sought to build a new image for the continent to counter the negative image about Africa portrayed as a dark continent during colonialism (Kumah-Abiwu, 2016). As such, the continent was associated with poverty, inadequacy, inefficiency and incapability; the lack of prosperity, deficiency of governance, the inadequacy of democracy (Zondi 2016). Mbeki expressed disdain of this Western created African image which weighs down on the confidence of Africans. Therefore, “Mbeki stated that the African renaissance was necessary to empower Africans to overcome this

“I speak of this long-held dogma because it continues still to weigh down the African mind and spirit, like the ton of lead that the African slave carries on her shoulders, producing in her and the rest a condition which, in itself, contests any assertion that she is capable of initiative, creativity, individuality, and entrepreneurship. Its weight dictates that she will never straighten her back and thus discover that she is as tall as the slave master who carries the whip” (Mbeki, 1998: Cat1-a).

Mbeki was frustrated by the role played by the African media in perpetuating the idea of a dark continent. Addressing the African media at a SANEF conference in 2003, he bemoaned:

“Sections of the African media have felt no sense of shame in demanding that the G8 countries should not support NEPAD if our countries do not implement the wishes of these countries... Contemptuous of the principle and practice we hold dear, of the right of our nations to self-determination, they say that Africa's future should be decided by those who are more prosperous than ourselves. In exchange for full stomachs they will feed, we must be ready to sacrifice our liberty and independence” (Mbeki, 2003:Cat1-c).

A critical of this change in image was to draw from the positive African history. Chawane (2016) argues that when Africans view themselves as centred and grounded in their history, they view themselves as agents and actors rather than objects of development plans. Indeed,

the idea of the African renaissance is to call Africans to drive the change they want to see in their continent. Part of this building was grounded on African history and Africa's contribution to international politics. Chawane (2016) says this means emphasizing African contributions to global development while highlighting the heinous damage of colonization and enslavement in Africa. African renaissance was to challenge this Eurocentric view of Africans in their history. While promoting the African renaissance vision, Mbeki often pointed out the achievements of Africans in ancient times to challenge the Eurocentric narrative that Africa has no history or influence on civilization:

“To answer this question, as Africans, we recall the fact that as the European Renaissance burst into history in the 15th and 16th centuries, there was a royal court in the African city of Timbuktu which, in the same centuries, was as learned as its European counterparts” (Mbeki, 2016:Cat1-e).

According to Chawane (2016), Timbuktu also had one of the first and the most prominent universities globally, which facilitated 25000 students in the 14th century. However, the West downplayed this history because it did not suit the colonizer's narrative. As Mbeki narrates, Africans were known as scary creatures with nothing good to give to the world:

“These images must have frightened many a Roman child to scurry to bed whenever their parents said, The Africans are coming! The strange creatures out of Africa are coming!”(Mbeki, 1998:Cat1-a)

The above quotes reveal two significant points. First, they confirm that Africans were on a rediscovery journey as the African renaissance began. The recalling of the historical achievements of Africans underlined the capability to drive the African renaissance, end poverty and bring development to the continent. Second, they counter the negative Eurocentric image of Africans in which black is associated with the symbol of fear and evil. This was necessary to eradicate the dogma “because it continues to weigh down the minds and spirit of Africans” (Mbeki, 1998:Cat1-a).

In response to these efforts at rediscovery of African agency, there has always been a response from Eurocentric voices. For instance, Lefkowitz (1996) rejects the narratives that ancient Egyptians influenced the Greeks civilization as argued by Afrocentric. She criticized

Garvey (1923) and Anta Diop's (1967) work on Egypt's contribution towards civilization, calling it baseless and lacking evidence. She further disapproved assertions by other Afrocentric scholars on the same subject, including George James (1954), Asante (1990) and called it cultural expropriation and scholarly dishonesty.

Therefore, Mbeki sought to emphasize that Africans needed to know their ancient history on Africa's civilization and to take Africa's rebirth forward into the African renaissance. According to Mbeki, this knowledge would boost confidence to participate in the African renaissance. This assertion echoes (Asante, 1998:21) slogan, "I am most free when I am most active based on own volition". The aim was to use the revisiting of African identity in order to build the confidence of Africans and have them ready to participate in the continent's rebirth. An effort to repair the African identity. An embrace of the African identity drove the African agenda policy.

Critiques of the African renaissance have questioned how African culture, history and identity contribute to the continent's renewal. For instance, van Kessel (2002) noted that the African renaissance is a modernizing programme that concentrates on political and economic dimensions but less on the cultural element. Furthermore, Van Kessel (2002) questions whether African history is a building block for the future. He further points out that civilization and empires existed in pre-colonial history but lacked the notion of a typical African civilization and shared destiny. Regarding the African rebirth priorities, including gender equality, democracy and governance, economic development and technological advancement. Van Kessel (2002) refutes the proclamation that people should drive these priorities as seen in pre-colonial history. Van Kessel's (2002) analysis of Africa's renewal vision raises essential points but fails to grasp how Mbeki used history as one of the grounding elements of the African renaissance.

Contrary to Kessel's views above, Mbeki used history to remind Africans of their greatness and abilities with the view to mobilize them to rally behind the African renaissance is appropriate. It is important to note that van Kessel (2002) Eurocentric approach to the analysis was inadequate to explain the relevance/irrelevancy of Africa's ancient history's relevance and irrelevancy to modern-day development. Chawane (2016:85) explains the contribution of African history in rebuilding the continent:

“The primary argument is that Africans have been dislocated, disorientated and decentered. As such, they see the world from a European perspective. Afrocentricity endeavors to relocate and center the African as an agent in human history to eliminate the illusion of the peripheries” Chawane (2016:85).

Chawane (2016) further argues that the Eurocentric view of seeing Africans as people with no history was utilized as a tool to colonize and enslave Africans. The aim was to foster slave mentality in Africans and relegate them to sub-human. Kumah-Abiwuh (2016:13) extends this view and argues that the colonizers perpetuated the idea that Africa had no history before colonization nor had any influence on modernization to continue marginalizing Africa on policy issues. According to Nkrumah (1964), colonial imperialists distorted African history to suit their narrative such that it produced a confusing future for Africans. This engineered history disempowered Africans so that they could not stand on their own. Keto (1994:18) explained this from a centeredness perspective “Africa centred perspective begins with Africa, which is holistically, connected to new derivatives centres, which are useful enough to construct new knowledge”. The image that Mbeki was painting by evoking African arts and cities provides the foundation for African cultural identity. This explains the reason for African leaders emphasized history, African personality, and unity as the foundation for the continent's liberation. For instance, Nkrumah (1963) emphasized that African unity and African liberation require inspiring natural African history. The main argument here is that the African history of art, empires, education centres and knowledge is linked to the African identity. Redefining the distorted history is equal to awakening Africans to the fact that they can rebuild their continent.

### **7.7 A Pan-African vision**

Having discussed the South African identity and identity formation above, we shall now turn to the Pan-Africanist vision and how South Africa put it into practice. Will first look at the OAU and what it failed to achieve. We will then move to the AU and how it was transformed to serve the pan-African vision. Following this, we will discuss how the vision was operationalized. The Pan-African vision, a vision that saw Africa as a single whole, shapes the pursuit for an African renaissance that will address the marginalized and underdeveloped African continent. Cossa (2009:5) rightly captured this when he says the African renaissance is a re-ignite of the spirit of Pan-Africanism. According to Legum (1962), from a Pan-African perspective, the African renaissance was a determination to re-form the African

society into its form drawing from its pre-colonial past what is valuable and desirable. The African renaissance emphasized the political unification of African people to collectively address challenges facing the continent (Iroulo, 2017). Thus, pan-Africanism embodies the political, economic, and social liberation and the unification of Africans. The African unity found expression in the formation of the OAU, by leaders who believed that unity was the only way to resolve imperialism and neo-colonialism problems in Africa (Ackah, 1999 as cited in Tondi, 1991). The purpose of the OAU was to promote, African unity and solidarity, to cooperate to achieve prosperity for the African people, establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa as well as defend sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity (Organ. African Unity, 1963). The OAU failed to bring peace to the continent because of the non-intervention principle which prevented the institution to intervene in conflict situations in Africa (Murithi, 2007). This meant that fellow African leaders could only intervene when invited by the state(s) in conflict. As such, conflicts in Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leon, DRC, Somalia and Sudan worsened. New conflicts emerged in 1994 including the devastating Rwanda genocide which killed millions of people, even under the operational Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). This situation exposed the limitations of the OAU to intervene and resolve conflict, and highlighted the need for a strong institution and an effective peace architecture (Murithi, 2007). The AU was then established in 2001 after the OAU failed to achieve greater unity, promote peace and security, and development (Dauda, 2019). African leaders committed to the Constitutive Act of the AU's objectives including to achieve greater unity and solidarity, promotion of peace, security, stability on the African continent, good governance, democratic principles and institutions, and defend sovereignty and independence of Member states (African Union, 2002). The purpose of the AU is to promote unity and solidarity, cooperation and combined efforts (Murithi, 2007). During the launch of the AU in Durban in 2001 Mbeki declared that:

“By forming the Union, the peoples of our continent have made the unequivocal statement that Africa must unite! We as Africans have a common and a shared destiny! Together, we must redefine this destiny for a better life for all the people of this continent” (Mbeki, 2001:Cat1-c).

This call for unity and collective effort is also extended to “all levels and segments of society including women, youth, labour, and private sector” (Mbeki, 2002:1). For South Africa, the transformation of the AU was an expression of pan-Africanism. Mbeki believed that it was

only through pan-African institution that Africa could be able to address all its problems and become self-reliable. The African renaissance vision would achieve the pan-African aspirations:

“Such are the political imperatives of the African Renaissance which are inspired both by our painful history of recent decades and the recognition of the fact that none of our countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest, and that none of us can truly succeed if the rest fail” (Mbeki, 1998:Cat1-a).

South Africa played a crucial role together with other African leaders at transforming the OAU to AU in 2002 to fashion it to champion peace and security and economic development. That is, working together of African states to achieve common political and economic goals guided by common goals, instead of a federal interstate system. Due to fierce competition from fellow African leaders including Muammar Qaddafi who vividly campaigned for the United States of Africa (USAF), Mbeki worked hard employing diplomatic tactics to convince other African leaders to support the establishment of the African Union. Although Mbeki was pro-union of African states ideas and opposed to USAF, it was also clear that Nkrumah's African unity influenced his ideas to promote African unity through solid institutions. Nkrumah canvassed that:

“Under a major political union of Africa, there could emerge a United Africa. Great and powerful, in which the territorial boundaries which are the remnants of colonialism will become obsolete and superfluous, working for the complete and total mobilization of the economic and social planning and organization under a unified political direction”. (Nkrumah, 1963:221)

According to Nkrumah (1970), this continental union would seek to achieve a complete and overall continental planning and organizing on a continental scale, a unified military and defence strategy, and a single foreign policy and diplomacy for external engagement. The OAU was founded in 1963 by Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and others to take forward these objectives. In a true Pan-African spirit, Mbeki also worked closely with other African leaders from Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania to articulate the right approach to peace processes in the continent, including the intervention regime which allowed the AU to intervene in conflict situations of a country (Landsberg, 2007). The

transitioning of the OAU into the AU was about institution building, shared norms and creating a community of African leaders guided by shared values and mutual respect (Landsberg, 2010). Mbeki played a central role in the whole organizational overhaul and institution design, including establishing the Pan-African Parliament, the AU Commission, Assembly of the Union, the Peace and Security Council, and eighteen new organs of the AU. The transition of the AU engendered the strengthening of the peace architecture and the quest for peace diplomacy. This was in line with his proclamation that “Africa will be at peace” (Mbeki, 1996).

It was evident that matters of peace and security were at the heart of the African renaissance vision. As such, Mbeki's administration dedicated a substantial amount of time and resources to strengthen the peace and security structures of the AU and transform SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Once again, in 2005, Mbeki could confirm that:

“Africa's season of hope is also predicated on the critical matters of peace, stability and democracy. In this regard, we have created some of the essential organs of the AU, including the Peace and Security Council and the Pan African Parliament (PAP)” (Mbeki, 2005, cat-d).

A common misconception related to the African renaissance is that it was just a grand idea with no policy content, and the African renaissance vision was left to decay in the archives. Vale and Maseko (1998:276) observed that “South Africa's idea of an African renaissance is abstruse, confusing, more promise than policy”. Landsberg (2010) correctly states that this was a mischaracterization of African renaissance, which has become a realm of visions and concrete plans by 2000. Dauda (2019) stresses that the African renaissance represents an action plan to build an Africa with a solid cultural identity. For him, the vision responds to the Pan-Africanism call for unity and the African continent's political, economic, and social liberation. Landsberg (2010:140) expanded this argument and comments:

“Mbeki went beyond merely articulating a new vision of African renaissance; he transcended it with a clear action plan, South Africa's own foreign assistance programme targeted for the African continent, as well as modernizing continental development plan” (Landsberg, 2010:140).

Lansberg (2010) furnished evidence to demonstrate that Mbeki's government translated the vision into action plans to support his claims. First, in 2000 Mbeki established the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF). The Fund aims to promote economic cooperation between South Africa and other countries by offering financial assistance to support their development projects (ARF, 2008). The Fund supported development projects fashioning Pretoria's economic diplomacy strategy to foster political influence in the continent. The Fund was a loan to promote the priorities of the African agenda policy, including promotion of democracy and good governance; conflict prevention and resolution; socio-economic development and integration; and humanitarian assistance. According to Landsberg (2010), the ARF has successfully funded projects in the continent, including an R13 million Defence project to destroy unexploded explosive devices in Mozambique; a contribution of R10 million by the South African government towards the SADC observer mission to Zimbabwe in 2008; donated humanitarian assistance valued at R22 million to Western Sahara.

Second, the strengthening of African institutions was at the heart of the African agenda policy. In the below statement, President Thabo Mbeki (1999) reiterated the government's commitment during his State of the Nation Address and outlined the plan of activities to take forward the African agenda policy:

To this effect, we will continue to prioritize the African continent by strengthening the African Union and its structures and focusing on implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Mbeki, 1999:Cat1-b).

Thabo Mbeki worked closely with Olusegun Obasanjo, Chissano and other African leaders to strengthen the AU and SADC peace architecture and peace engagements in countries grabbing conflict (Zondi, 2015). The African leaders worked to strengthened the AU action on conflict prevention, resolution and management with a special focus on the DRC, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Burundi, Libya and Sudan (Landberg, 2007). They operationalised this through the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) institution which was established through the Protocol relating to the PSC in 2002 to replace the OAU Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). The PSC is a legal institution of the AU which is responsible for preservation of peace in the continent (Murithi, 2007). Its objective is to promote peace and security and stability in Africa, guarantee protection and

preservation of life and property, prevent conflict and undertake peacebuilding and peace-making operations to resolve conflict (African Union, 2002). The PSC has 15 members and is the highest decision making body on crisis and conflict. It also includes the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System and the Military Staff Committee (African Union, 2002). Mbeki and the African allies emphasised the importance of strengthening RECs and the AU relations to use RECs and the implementing agencies the AU peace operations (Landsberg, 2007). Regarding regional efforts, South Africa played a key role in strengthening of the SADC peace architecture through a standby force and an Early Warning System (Zondi, 2015).

Third, the African leaders also put systems in place for governance, democratisation and the rule of law to ensure greater participation, accountability, transparency, pluralism. Regarding democratic processes in the continent, they ensured that Africans participate freely by entrenching democratic processes (Landsberg, 2007). As a result, most African countries were holding elections and were working towards creating a free environment for democratic process (Zondi, 2015).

Fourth, Mbeki worked with Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria to craft a continental development plan, NEPAD. According to Landsberg (2010:147), the NEPAD was "a modernizing, pro-growth plan designed to foster democratic governance, promote stability and development that lured Western investment, market access and aid". The strategy identified five critical issues necessary for the continent's development: governance, democracy, peace and security; economic and corporate governance; information technology and infrastructure; human resources development; and agriculture and market access (Sako, 2004). In addition, the African leaders agreed that NEPAD would be hosted by South Africa, granting Pretoria the advantage of shaping and pushing the implementation of the strategy's objectives. This move was significant for Mbeki because he used the NEPAD as a guarantor to garner support for Africa's development and peace programmes in exchange for African political, economic and accountability. The NEPAD was successfully translated into action plans and projects which were supported by donor governments and African institutions. It became a formwork for Africa-EU dialogue and Africa's engagement with the G8 (Zondi, 2015).

Fifth, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was initiated as a way to get fellow Africans to conform and commit to international best practices. African leaders working with

Mbeki used this instrument to promote good governance and promote democracy in the continent (Landberg, 2007). The aim of the APRM was to supply African leaders with information and develop systems required to build institutions that could help them achieve the objectives that the AU had set up (Mbeki, 2003). During a lecture at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs in December 2003 he stated that:

“This will enable us voluntarily to assess one another`s progress with regard to the matters that are fundamental to the achievement of our development goals. I refer here to the questions of good political, economic and corporate governance” (Mbeki, 2003:Cat1-e).

However; the APRM received mixed reactions upon its launch. African leaders did not quite warm up to its international best practices notion because of suspicions that Western ideologies heavily influenced the mechanism (Landsberg, 2007). In contrast, some scholars have argued that the APRM has been classified as the most innovative governance promoting the plan (Monyae, 2012; Spies, 2010). Others have been disappointed by its non-confrontational and cautious quiet diplomacy approach in confronting the African leader's political performance (Alden, 2002; Mhango, 2012; Olivier, 2003). There is a view that quite diplomacy is not an effective strategy for conflict resolution in the SADC region (Mhango, 2012). Despite this, the developed economies applauded the mechanism and viewed it as a positive move towards building a new partnership with the continent (Olivier, 2003).

By 2005, Mbeki and his administration could tell the world that his African renaissance vision was moving forward. While in Singapore, he confirmed that:

“In this regard, we transformed the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). We thus moved from an era in African politics whose dominant feature was the concentration of energies and resources for the unity of the continent and the total liberation of all our countries. Instead, we are towards a new period of using our collective strength to work for peace and stability, to strengthen democracy, to ensure respect for people's rights, and embark on a far-reaching programme of the regeneration and development of all our countries Mbeki” (2005:Cat1-d).

Mbeki could report on the progress in the development of more effective continental and regional peace and security architecture. This has been enhanced by increased coordination between African leaders on peace and security issues and increased political will among African leaders (Sidiropoulos, 2007). The coordination between South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique and Senegal was instrumental in the passing of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the inclusion of the right to intervene principle on grievous conflict situations (Paterson & Virk, 2014). The launching of the AU Peace and Security Council was another of South Africa's contribution. Regarding the regional peace and security, Mbeki could also report on the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security. Although this was a milestone for Mbeki, the Organ's inability to address conflict in the region remains a challenge (Zondi, 2015). NEPAD was another successful project which South Africa championed. This part of the vision was successfully translated into action plans and projects, thanks to Mbeki and other African leaders who remained committed to the course. Although there was resistance in some areas, the above demonstrates that Mbeki's pan-African approach to the implementation of the African renaissance achieved a considerable amount of solidarity and unity amongst African countries.

### **7.8 Zimbabwe crisis**

A common trend across post-colonial African states is the failure of post-independence leaders to transform the economy and the state. Zimbabwe sticks out among complicated post-colonial project with layers of structural issues emanating from its historical experiences. The land issue has always dominated Zimbabwe's history because of three historical moments. First, the colonial exploitation, which involved the displacement of black Africans for their agricultural land. Second, the Lancaster House Agreement, which shaped the post-independent land reform process. Third, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme policy, which constituted the land grab (Sachikonye, 2006). The Lancaster House constitution adopted at independence shaped the political system of the post-independence government and was the genesis of Zimbabwe's political and economic abyss that has spanned over four decades (Sachikonye, 2004). It was problematic because in relation to land reform it confined the government into the "willing buyer willing seller" principle in that it entrenched property rights laws and shielded the interest of minority whites at the expense of previously disadvantaged Africans (Rwodzi, 2020). ZANU and ZAPU accepted this skewed proposal because such an arrangement made it impossible for the new government to access state

power with the hope to reform the political and economic system of independent Zimbabwe. African Zimbabweans have never thoroughly enjoyed the benefits of independence because of the Lancaster House constitution and ZANU-PF's failure to govern. Although Zimbabwe was independent, minority whites were still in control of the economy, and the majority of citizens did not have access to land and therefore remained poor (Zondi, 2012)

The Zimbabwe crisis is complex, driven by layers of factors deriving from their historical experiences. These factors include the ethnic divides, the tentative land question, the colonial legacy of discrimination, the one-party political system, the intolerance of political dissents, unequal economic regime and the war veterans (Rwodzi, 2020). For instance, political parties in Zimbabwe are supported based on ethnic groups in which Shona speaking groups were for Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the Ndebele speaking for Nkomo's PF-ZAPU (Gregory, 1986). These ethnic divides must have planted "One party state" system seeds. According to Gregory (1986), the common trend of "one-party state" in Africa has been explained as correcting the colonizers' unsuitable government systems imposed on these territories. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, was a firm advocate of a 'one-party system' in Africa and argued that a "two-party system" encourages the growth of factionalism and disunity highlighted the contrasts between the Western:

Our own (African) parties had a very different origin. Their aim was not to challenge any ruling group of our people, as seen in the West. On the contrary, they formed to challenge the foreigners who ruled over us. They were not, therefore, political parties but nationalist movements. Furthermore, from the offset, they represented the interest of the whole nation (Nyerere, 1972 as cited in Quigley, 1992:617).

Nyerere spoke against the "two-party system" in the African set-up and claimed that:

Trying to import the idea of an opposition party into Africa may very likely lead to violence because the opposition party will look like the majority of our people. Moreover, it will lead to the trivial manoeuvring of opposing groups who spend time constructing artificial difference into some semblance of difference for the sake of preserving democracy (Nyerere, 1972 in Quigley, 1992:617).

This was evidence in Zimbabwe after the ZAPU and the ZANU split in 1963, followed by intermittent factional fights between the new parties in 1964. Competition grew between ZAPU and ZANU as each party sought to present itself as the legitimate Black Nationalist.

According to Rwodzi (2020), ZANU went for the jugular and portrayed ZAPU as a "club of traitors" while elevating itself as the true representative of the black Zimbabweans. ZANU also attacked their supporters and launched a smear campaign to paint Nkomo as the revisionist and retreating for opting to negotiate over a war settlement (Rwodzi, 2020). This move was a build-up for the 'one-party system' that the ZANU wanted to pursue. In particular, Mugabe favoured this system, which was grounded on Marxist-Leninism ideology and had adopted it after the 1980 elections. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF believed one party-state system was necessary to usher in unity as a prerequisite for socialism (Rwodzi, 2020). As such, Mugabe believed that opposition parties were unnecessary. This explains Mugabe's fervent agility to eliminate existing and emerging opposition since the advent of independence.

However, Mugabe had to abandon the party's socialist economic system when the ZANU-PF government failed to transform the capitalist system, leaving the white minority to control the economy while most Africans continued to suffer (Rodzwi, 2020). Despite this, his party's intolerance for opposition persistently grew, culminating in the swallowing of the ZAPU in 1982, the main opposition party, (Moyo, 2014). This saw the sacking of the senior leadership of ZAPU from the cabinet, including Nkomo, Lookout Masuku, Ndumiso Dabengwa, and Cephas Msipa massacre, which the ZANU-PF government-sponsored (Gregory, 1985). Small opposition parties, including the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), ZANU-Donga and Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), were also dissipated and died a slow death after the leadership roles were left vacant (Moyo, 2014). This happened after the arrest of the United African National Congress's (UANC) Mozerewa and after ZANU's Ndabaningi Sithole went into hiding. Concurrently, thousands of ZAPU supporters were mutilated during the *Gukurahundi* massacre, using the Fifth Brigade to eliminate the opposition in 1982. The *Gukurahundi* operation's aim was to wipe out the ZAPU and the Matebele's contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle (Nyere, 2016). ZANU-PF continued to use violence and intimidation to maintain the 'one party' dominance in the 90s up to the 2000s (Onslow, 2011). The punitive political violence characterized the following decade in Zimbabwe. It was clear that the military and violence had become the ZANU-PF government's primary tool of settling political disputes. Their intolerance for the opposition was quite conspicuous in the late 1990s, having partnered with the war veterans and the ZANU youth arm. The MDC was no exception; the ZANU-PF used state resources to dismantle and squander the new party.

There are four decisions by Mugabe that triggered the economic and political in the late 1990s. First, the unbudgeted and unplanned payouts of pensions of Zim\$ 50 000 to 50 000 war veterans which the state could not afford, to correct the omissions of the Lancaster House (Mhandara & Poee, 2013). Second, the implementation of the FTLR which saw black Zimbabweans' radical repossession of land from white farmers led by the war veterans and the ZANU-PF youth brigade drive (Zondi, 2012). The unplanned deployment of Zimbabwe troops (estimated up to 10 000 men) to the DRC in 1999 to support Laurent Kabila which cost about US \$3 million dollar a month caused a major budget deficit in the national purse (Hamauswa & Chinyere, 2015; Sachikonye, 2005).

The MDC's emergence in 1999 created a significant shift in the political environment of Zimbabwe. The new party was a force to be reckoned. It had a strong civil society base and had adopted a mass mobilisation approach to politics (Zondi, 2012). The MDC pushed for democratic change in response to ZANU-PF's one-party policy. Mobilising the masses to demand for a constitutional reform in 2000 was their first campaign. Their activism, together with the civil society, forced the ZANU-PF government to establish a new constitutional committee of 400 people tasked with the drafting of the new constitution (Rwodzi, 2020). The committee successfully produced a draft constitution to President Mugabe for review. The draft constitution made provisions for a bill of rights, forced Zimbabwe to respect international law and conventions, and made provisions for a new institutional framework from government (Zondi, 2012).

However, Mugabe and ZANU-PF adjusted the changes suggested by the committee to suit their one party agenda. The ZANU-PF proposed constitution had omitted the citizens views which were gathered by the committee. For instance, they left out the public's suggestion of reducing the extensive power of the President should and strengthening of the legislature (Sachikonye, 2004). The citizens expressed their rejection of the changes through a No campaign which was championed by the NCA. The No campaign won by 55% in the referendum defeating the proposed constitution by 45% (Sachikonye, 2004). What followed was a crackdown on the civil society and the MDC. ZANU-PF used the state security to punish and intimidate the opponents to secure Mugabe's position in the next presidential elections (Zondi, 2012). Consequently, the culture of organised intimidation and political violence characterised the election campaigns in Zimbabwe.

The government intensified violence and intimidation towards white farmers and the opposition using the war veterans and the youth brigade leading up to the parliamentary in 2000 and the presidential elections in 2002 (Zondi, 2012). This way the ZANU-PF managed to circumvent defeat and clung on to power for another term under controversial condition. Violent campaign continued to be a common trend leading up to the 2002 presidential elections which saw Mugabe securing his presidential position under controversial conditions (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). Simultaneously, the economy continued to deteriorate and poverty intensified. The GDP had shrunk by 14% and unemployed had increased up to 70% (Sachikonye, 2005). By 2005, it was clear that violence had become Mugabe and ZANU-PF campaigning tool. As such, the road to 2005 parliamentary elections was marred by violence and state brutality directed towards opposition, media and NGOs (Zondi, 2012). The 2007 violent attacks on the MDC and civil society members as an attempt to crush out the MDC before the 2008 election (Hamauswa & Chenyere, 2015; Zondi, 2012). Morgan Tsvangirai and other members of the civil society were brutally beaten and detained when they led a march after further economic decoration. This incident prompted SADC to appoint South Africa to facilitate a dialogue between the ZANU-PF government and the opposition parties. According to Hamauswa and Chenyere (2015), Mbeki's mediation efforts sought to get the protagonists to the table, creating conditions for peaceful elections, addressing the propounding socio-economic challenges, and assisting Zimbabwe's reintegration into the international.

Although the mediator was criticised for the handling of the mediation process, the mediation recorded three achievements that are worth noting. The first achievement was the constitutional amendment number 18 which sought to pave a way for harmonised elections in March 2008 (Zondi, 2012). The amendment also changed the presidential term from six to five years. It altered the size of the House of Assembly, the house with full powers for policy and law making, from sixty six to ninety three. The amendment established the Zimbabwean Human Rights to be chaired by a lawyer with a minimum of five years' experience and recommended for five female commissioners to be included. The Commission was responsible for the promotion of human rights and monitor and investigate any human rights abuse by government officials.

The second achievement included creating an environment for harmonised elections in March 2008. This saw ZANU-PF toning down on the violence campaign giving the MDC to campaign without fear of intimidation and arrest. The third achievement was a power-

sharing deal signed in September 2008, which was about the sharing of the executive power. As such, it provided the executive in two tiers: the first tier included a cabinet of ministers chaired by President Mugabe responsible for the government's strategic direction. The second tier was a Council of Ministers liable for administering the implementation of government policies and programmes chaired by the Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (Zondi, 2012). The agreement also resolved that Arthur Mutambara and Thokozani Kupe would be the Deputy Prime Minister. Regarding the sharing of powers between the President and the Prime Minister, Mugabe remained in charge of law approval and appointment of the cabinet Members, while Tsvangirai maintained powers to run the government. Despite the notable achievements of the GPA, Mbeki's approach to the Zimbabwe issue under the quiet diplomacy banner remains a hotly debated and criticized approach of engaging Africans in a non-forceful manner (Landsberg, 2010).

The African agenda promoted multilateralism as the best approach to deal with African matters continentally and globally. This approach would allow Africa to oppose and minimize Western influence and interference on African peace, security, and governance. This explains the motivation behind the whole-of-SADC approach in Zimbabwe. As such, South Africa, the regional body appointed to facilitate the dialogue, and Mbeki became the face of the mediation process between 2007 and 2008.

“As the Honourable Members are aware, SADC has mandated South Africa to assist the leadership of Zimbabwe to find a lasting solution to the challenges they face. We intend to move with speed in executing this mandate and are encouraged in this regard by the positive attitude evinced by the protagonists in that country who, we are confident, do recognize that the people of Zimbabwe expect of them nothing less than concrete action to extricate them from the difficulties they face currently” (Mbeki, 1997:Cat1-d).

SADC appointed South Africa as a mediator at the Double Troika Summit in Dar es Salaam in April 2007. As a result, the Summit agreed to send six members of the Troika to Zimbabwe to engage different sectors and supports all efforts building towards stability. The members included Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa (van Nieuwkerk, 2009). Additionally, through its Chair, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, the SADC Organ on Politics and Security, had engaged Harare to influence Mugabe to adopt accepted democratic processes and protects human rights of the Zimbabweans ( Zondi, 2012)

## 7.9 Mbeki's response to the crisis

### 7.9.1 Critiques of the SADC mandated mediation

South Africa quiet diplomacy policy received constant criticism throughout Mbeki's time as the facilitator. The West, International and local civil society, and opposition parties criticized him and his conduct as the facilitator (Alden, 2002; Rusell, 2008). Mbeki became a target of attack by all entities who opposed the quiet diplomacy policy, including the South African and international media (Chikane, 2013). Civil society members, including South African church leaders, were dismayed by Mbeki's approach. In 2003 members of the church of South Africa commented

“we are confused by the moral call for regeneration in our country by leaders who appear to defend or overlook moral corruption in neighbouring countries...To remain silent any longer renders us complicit in the brutality being visited by Zimbabwean authorities on their own citizen. We cannot and will not remain silent any longer. To do so would be to be unfaithful and discredit the history of our own transformation” (IOL, 2003:1)

Like other international relations policies, quiet diplomacy or constructive engagement was a highly contested policy within and outside the discipline. Some commentators concluded that the policy was ineffective in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis adequately (Alden, 2002; Mckinley, 2004; van Nieuwkerk, 2006). Alden (2002) argued that the policy failed because of the misreading of Pretoria's influence over Mugabe, citing the unsuccessful use of bargaining through the application of incentives. He concluded that failure revealed that South Africa's failure to act as a regional leader. They criticized the policy police for failing to take a stance in defence of democracy in Zimbabwe explicitly and for harming Pretoria's global reputation as a promoter of democracy.

Hamill & Hoffman (2009) argue that Mbeki's refusal to publicly condemn Mugabe discredits his African initiative and make them appear “cynical and hypocritical” Hamill and Hoffman (2009) failed to acknowledge the contribution of pre-independence colonial illegal land occupation, the Lancaster House agreement and the colonial legacy land debacle and economic shortcomings inherited by the independence government to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Chikane (2013:75) explains why the land issue is the crux of the problem in Zimbabwe:

“As the land question was tied to the Lancaster House constitution, attempts were made to amend the constitution, which led to violent conflicts over a referendum about the issue. The conflict spilt over into the subsequent national elections until the 2008 elections, which the GPA guided” (Chikane, 2013:75).

Former Ambassador Welile Nhlapo was of the same view; he said:

“if the British had addressed their part correctly, we would not have had that disaster of farms taken over by the Zimbabweans” (Nhlapo, 2016:280).

Hamill and Hoffman's (2009) analysis also concluded that Mbeki's reluctance to condemn Mugabe's human rights compromised SADC's democratic values and the rights of Zimbabweans to free and fair election in favour of liberation solidarity, SADC unity and governments of national unity, an approach which was designed to preserve Mugabe and ZANU-PF's power. They seem to suggest that Mbeki hid behind the “SADC solidarity” to encourage Mugabe's violation of human rights. They argued that Mbeki thereby condoned Mugabe's behaviour and “has virtually accused Mugabe's human rights critics of supporting an imperialist plot to overthrow Mugabe” (Hamill & Hoffman, 2009:9). Some have blamed South Africa for the continued crisis of human rights, democracy, governance, and the rule of law and suggested that its international credibility as a human rights values champion was questioned (Alden, 2002; McKinley, 2004). Contrary to what others have found, Landsberg (2016) and van Nieuwkerk, (2006) agree that despite Pretoria's reluctance on public demonstrate their distresses over the crisis, but they privately harboured severe concerns about Mugabe's behaviour and the Zimbabwe situation. Welile Nhlapo (2016) corroborated this and confirmed that Mbeki's efforts included a "hard-hitting" letter to the ZANU-PF in which he wrote about how the party had lost its revolutionary zeal and why this was problematic. According to Mbeki, the rationale for this "behind the scene" approach was to avoid imposing solutions on Zimbabwe:

“Consciously, we decided that democratic South Africa should at all costs avoid acting as the new home-grown African imperial power which would have given itself the right unilaterally to determine the destiny of the peoples of Africa” (Mbeki, 2016:9)

As such, Prys (2008) concluded that South Africa did assume its role as a regional hegemony in the case of Zimbabwe by projecting its values and interest and providing public goods.

Considering the “regionality” of South Africa's hegemony, Prys (2008) argues that studies that have used quiet diplomacy to reject South Africa's regional leadership are founded on the misguided understanding of hegemony based on the USA's global role after WWII. This was in response to scholars who concluded that quiet diplomacy demonstrated the limitations of Pretoria's willingness and capacity to act as a hegemon (Alden, 2002; Alden & Sako, 2005).

Overall government response to the internal and external critics was to resist regime change and sanctions at all costs. Despite the pressure from the Western powers and other local constituencies, “Mbeki stood firm against the most powerful of the world” (Pahad, 2016:105). Chikane (2013) claims that in response to Mbeki's resistance, a “massive international strategy” was unleashed to force Mbeki to push the regime change agenda. In the end, Chikane (2013) concluded that Mbeki's mediation efforts were successful:

“The reality, however, is that Zimbabwe's GPA facilitated by Mbeki assisted Zimbabweans to stabilize the situation and allowed them to produce a new constitution and a regulatory framework that will together create conditions conducive for free and fair elections”. (Chikane, 2013:93).

Although some commentators didn't view the GPA as success, the agreement was an important milestone for political transformation and reconstruction of Zimbabwe. Some of these changes include the establishment of fiscal stability and the retreat of hyperinflation (Mutisi, 2011). The agreement also made provisions for the formation of the Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee whose aim was to coordinate the consultative process a more inclusive process for constitutional reform. Both ZANU-PF and the MDCs agreed that the people of Zimbabwe should play a central role in drafting of the constitution (Zondi, 2015). Regarding electoral systems, the GNU established an independent Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Zimbabwe Media Commission. Mbeki maintains that they succeed in their goal to ensure the process was led by the Zimbabwean people. In his view:

“Though we acted as a facilitator, the fact of the matter is that the three Zimbabwean political parties negotiated and elaborated the GPA whom the Zimbabwean people elected democratically in the 2008 elections. The facilitator did not impose any part of the agreement on the Parties” (Mbeki, 2016:5).

### **7.10 Analysis of South Africa's African-centred approach**

Although Mbeki's facilitation of the Zimbabwe mediation led to the signing of the GPA, a few weaknesses of the facilitator are worth noting. First, the Zimbabwe case has revealed South Africa's struggle to balance its global aspirations to be a human rights and democracy champion who promotes respect for the sovereignty of nations. Turning a blind eye on the absence of ethical leadership, human rights, poor governance and militarisation of state by Mbeki's government demonstrate this.

Second, Mbeki and the ANC's strategy was to avoid any public condemnation of Mugabe or ZANU-PF, hoping that Mugabe would abandon his punitive response and violation of human rights. However, this strategy backfired as Mugabe hardened his heart in the face of a growing call for regime change. This incident revealed South Africa's limited bilateral influence in the region, confirming suspicions that some neighbouring countries were wary of South Africa's intention. Third, Mbeki missed an opportunity to publicly encourage the Zimbabwe government to uphold SADC principles and values and put their people first. This could have reaffirmed South Africa's commitment to promoting good governance at the backdrop of African renaissance principles to “hold each other accountable”. SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Elections set standard guidelines to ensure the member states uphold this democratic necessity (SADC, 2004). However, Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF set out their non-democratic principles, which involved excessive violence to circumvent their removal from power. For this reason, Mbeki's success in implementing the African agenda objectives of upholding governance, including promoting human rights and democratic processes, was limited.

Mbeki also avoided addressing Mugabe and the ruling party's military utilization to settle political disputes with the opposition and the citizens. This was crucial because the ZANU-PF was using national security to sway electoral results in their favour. The MDC supporters and civil society reported grievous human rights abuse by the security forces, ZANU-PF's youth militia and the war veterans (International Crisis Group, 2002). The beating, torture, killing and arresting of MDC supporters and those who resisted voting for the ZANU-PF signalled the government's failure to uphold democracy and denied the citizens their rights to vote for a party of their choice. Zondi (2012) and Mhandara and Poe (2013) agreed that the state-sponsored violent campaigns were ZANU-PF's efforts to hold on to power after the emergence of the MDC and its waning political strongholds.

Mbeki's failure to effectively communicate and motivate his approach and position to the protagonists, civil society and the Zimbabweans compromised him as the mediator/facilitator and raised questions about his African agenda policy in Africa. He could have explained the conflicting principles involved, including sovereignty against Western dominance the inconsistency in its upholding of international human rights standards, and the use of human rights and democracy to advance Western interest in Zimbabwe. Although Aziz Pahad (2016) agrees that they shot themselves on foot by failing to communicate their position in Zimbabwe, he maintains that political parties, civil societies, Zimbabweans, the international community and the media misunderstood Mbeki's position on the negotiation. Chikane (2013) has defended Mbeki's position and argued that people disregarded the fact that Mbeki was carrying out the AU and SADC mandate, not his own. The AU and SADC instructed Mbeki to assist the Zimbabweans to independently make their own decisions regarding their country's future without external interferences (Chikane, 2013). His approach was in line with this objective.

Indeed, the MDC-T and the MDC-M often criticized Mbeki his biasness towards the ZANU-PF. According to Hamauswa (2015), some MDC officials had expressed that Mbeki favoured the ZANU-PF during the negotiations. In the same vein, Chikane (2013) expands this assertion and explain that the MDC's unhappiness stemmed from Mbeki's adherence to the SADC mandate, which excluded regime change and sought to empower Zimbabweans to decide their future. When Morgan Tsvangirai realized that the SADC objectives clashed with his party's, he became more inclined to the EU and the USA position. For Tsvangirai, the EU and USA's regime change position corresponded with his party's primary objective, which was the complete removal of Mugabe and the ZANU-PF from power (Chikane, 2013). Their distrust of Mbeki and his quiet diplomacy resonated with the UK and the USA's position of Mugabe's removal, but the AU, SADC and Mbeki did not give their agenda a chance. The MDC-T went as far as publicly condemning Mbeki and calling for his removal as a mediator. They even wrote a letter to Mbeki asking him to recuse himself as a mediator, but, unfortunately, the letter never reached Mbeki (Chikane, 2013). The MDC's behaviour demonstrated their loss of touch with regional political dynamics and the influence of external players in the negotiations. Mhandara and Pooe (2013) concluded that this behaviour exposed the MDC's lack of experience and understanding of African regional politics. Indeed, SADC, the AU and South Africa were thrown off by this behaviour as it did not align with their “African solution for African problems” doctrine.

Mbeki might have succeeded in blocking the West from influencing the mediation process, and helping Zimbabweans reach an agreement through the signing of the GNU. However, his mediation process marginalized the rest of the Zimbabweans. The actual dialogue was closed and centred on the antagonists. Reverend Frank Chikane has confirmed that civil society groups were excluded because the dialogue was between the political parties. He said: “despite attempts by these groups (civil society) to be included directly in the negotiation, they were not accommodated because the decision of the SADC was concerned with the dialogue between political parties” (Chikane, 2013:101). This is inconsistent with the tenets of centralization of African people, which argues that when black people see themselves at the centre of a phenomenon, they see themselves as actors and participants instead of marginals on the periphery of a political experience (Molefi, 2009). As a result, the civil society groups were not happy with the outcome of the dialogue as they also favoured regime change. Despite South Africa's claim that the negotiation had prioritized the people's interest, their marginalization from the process reveals that Mbeki had prioritized the interest of the politicians in the negotiations. This reveals the inconsistencies concerning the implementation of the African agenda in Zimbabwe.

Despite the successful implementation of the African agenda policy on the continent, the study notes that there has been continued conflict and regression on promoting human rights and democratic systems in Zimbabwe and the DRC and Lesotho. This reflects the shortfalls of the African agenda policy's approach towards conflict resolution in the continent. This indicates that South Africa lacks a strategic security policy that would guide its approach to conflict resolution and detailed plans for peace sustenance. DIRCO could revive The African Renaissance International Cooperation Fund (ARF) to support Burundi, DRC, and Sudan (Singh, 2020) .

### **7.11 Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated that the implementation of the African agenda in Zimbabwe, through quiet diplomacy policy as an effort to respond to conflict in the region was misconstrued. We found that the expectations of the West were in conflict with the expectations of SADC, the AU and Mbeki. The West together with the MDC and CSOs expected Mbeki to push for a regime change to ensure complete removal of Mugabe. On the other hand, the African bodies were opposed to the idea of the regime change or imposition of foreign solution by external players. When Mbeki opted for a quiet diplomacy approach, South Africa's ability to play its leadership role in the region was questioned. We found that

Mbeki's approach was informed by the Pan-African and Afrocentric ideologies which are the cornerstone of his African agenda policy. The Zimbabwe case study has revealed that the quiet diplomacy policy might have failed to achieve perceivable results according to the standard of the international community governance, but with regards to the African agenda standard, it achieved three things. First, it achieved African solidarity amongst the regional leaders and former liberation parties. The SADC governments and the ANC distanced themselves from the international bashing of Zimbabwe and opted to engage Mugabe and his government based on its commitment to the SADC code of governance, democracy and protection of human rights. This is because African states abhor demonizing one of their own. This highlights the existing competing principles between the African agenda and the international governance principles.

The case also revealed the African agenda policy's struggle to balance African solidarity with the calling of African leaders to account for human rights abuse and undermining of democracy. This means Mbeki made minimal progress in implementing the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights and Guidelines Governing Democratic. He missed an opportunity to enforce South Africa's commitment to building a continent of democracy, justice and respect for human rights.

The next chapter will provide the conclusion of this report. It will also reflect on the objectives of the study.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### Conclusions

#### 8.1 Chapter outline

This chapter will interpret the study's findings and reflect on the research process and methodological challenges that emerged during the data collection process. It starts with the summary of findings, followed by a reflection of each chapter. The chapter will also reflect on the objectives and how the African agenda and Zimbabwe crisis data responded. Next, it will highlight the study's contributions to the body of knowledge and the present suggestions for future studies. This will include some comments regarding the Afrocentric approach to African international relations and Afrocentric theory to international relations policy issues. Finally, in conclusion, the chapter will reflect on the usefulness of Afrocentricity for this study.

#### 8.2 Summary of the findings

This study used the Zimbabwe case study to analyse South Africa's African agenda policy towards Africa from an Afrocentric perspective. It has allowed us to address the gap in South Africa's African agenda studies within the continent. The Afrocentric theory has helped us understand the application of the African agenda policy in Zimbabwe and why South Africa opted for a quiet diplomacy approach from an African perspective. Although this study cannot claim that Zimbabwe's case represents all the African continent countries, the study used this case to demonstrate South Africa's application of the African agenda policy in Zimbabwe. Using the Afrocentric theory, the study has found it inadequate to analyse South Africa's engagement in Zimbabwe from a Eurocentric vantage point only. As such, it demonstrated that Afrocentricity is useful in the understanding of the behaviors of African international policies.

##### 8.2.1 South Africa's African agenda and its engagement in Africa

In chapter one, we provided the background to the main research question and discussed how this study aims to contribute to the body of knowledge to understand better South Africa's African agenda policy and its engagement in the continent. In particular, we focused on how this policy was applied in the Zimbabwe crisis. South Africa was criticised both abroad and at home for its soft approach to the Zimbabwe political crisis under Mugabe's regime following

the ZANU-PF's seizure of land from white farmers and dealt violently against political opposition in early 2000. This intensified, resulting in the SADC mandated mediation by South Africa in which the country was criticised for the quiet diplomacy approach. South Africa's quiet diplomacy was also criticised. Some argued that South Africa chose solidarity to shield violent and doctoral governments from criticism and censure over the need to speak truth to power. Such studies focus on Mugabe, suggesting the African agenda, demagogues, and ideologies. We suggested that Afrocentricity provides a useful framework for profoundly understanding the African agenda policy. It is not easy to fully account for the overall consistency in the country's pursuit of its African interest outside this framework. We located South Africa's SADC mandated mediation within the nature of post-colony that Zimbabwe has been since the 1980s, especially the difficulties it experienced in the 1990s, as well as the appointment of South Africa to mediate between the ZANU-PF and the MDC in Zimbabwe, which was guided by the African agenda. We then posited the central question: How did the African agenda holistically understood underpin South Africa's approach to its SADC mandated mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014?

The chapter provided a review of literature that helps explain the debates, discussions, themes, and issues of emphasis concerning South Africa's African agenda. It divided it into two sections. The first section discussed foreign policy analysis to build a theoretical foundation for the analysis of this study. The International Relations were reviewed to strengthen the argument for an Afrocentric analysis. We did this to demonstrate that IR mainstream theories are inadequate for understanding South Africa's Africa policy. The second section reviewed the themes that have dominated South Africa's African agenda policy analyses. These themes include African identity, human rights, Africa renewal, peace diplomacy and multilateralism. The literature revealed the lack of research that applies the Afrocentric analysis framework to understand the African agenda policy. It has shown that previous studies did not fully account for ideological frames of the South African foreign policy emanating from African ideas, including Pan-Africanism, African unity and African renaissance. Consequently, it justified choosing Afrocentrism as the theoretical framework for this study.

### **8.2.3 The evolution of the Zimbabwe crisis**

Chapter three provided a review of the Zimbabwe crisis. It focused on the evolution of Zimbabwe's political and economic situation, including the historical-political background, the violent political campaigns, the violent fast track land reform and the GNU signing. The

chapter starts by reflecting on the year 2000 and the political activities that climaxed the political situation of Zimbabwe. This period marked the beginning of the violent elections, characterised by state-sponsored violence driven by the ZANU-PF to maintain the one-party agenda. This period also marked the beginning of racial politics characterised by land grabs and commercial farm attacks driven by the war veteran and the youth brigade. The chapter argues that this violent pattern was ZANU-PF's effort to maintain the one-party state agenda, a process that started at independence. To substantiate this argument, the chapter also observed the Zimbabwe crisis as falling into three phases: phase one in 1980-1990; phase two was observed from 1990-2008; phase three was observed in 2008-2013. Phase one was marked by the transition of power from colonial rule to nationalist liberation movements. The chapter observed that political and economic deterioration dominated this period, including ethnic driven conflicts and one-party state agendas. Chaos and the prominence of labour movements and the emergence of the MDC characterised phase two. This period also saw collaboration between the ZANU-PF government and the war veterans to push the one-party state agenda and enforce the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Phase three saw regional and continental intervention to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis, the transitioning to democratic governance through the signing of the GPA, the constitutional reform and regrouping of the ZANU-PF.

The chapter concluded that the conditions of the Lancaster House Agreement, ZANU-PF's preservation of one-party agenda and obsession with centralisation of power created the environment for the maturity of the crisis in Zimbabwe that plunged the country into a political and economic abyss. SADC's intervention was necessary to avoid spillage of the crisis to the entire region. The chapter has attempted to map the road that the parties in Zimbabwe have travelled to reach an agreement under the assistance of SADC mandated mediation. This has enabled us to build the context for the analysis chapter.

#### **8.2.4 Understanding the African agenda in South Africa's foreign policy.**

Chapter four has discussed the critical issues of the South African foreign policy post-1994, which are relevant to the study's sub-questions. It focused on how South Africa has pursued its role in Africa through the African agenda policy. It looked at how South Africa has done this under its three consecutive democratic presidents. The first section discussed Mandela's African engagement and moral posture. The second section discussed Thabo Mbeki's progressive agenda and institutional building. The third section discussed continuity and change under Zuma's administration. The African agenda policy started when the ANC

framed their engagement with the African continent as African renewal. They figured that a South Africa focused development goals would not benefit them or the continent as this would be challenging to conduct business with crumbling economies. Instead, the ruling party chose the African renaissance vision, which involved South Africa driving the continent's renewal to revive African economies, strengthened governance pillars and peace and security as their preferred engagement strategy. The chapter demonstrated that the African renaissance vision was not just a pipe by discussing the projects that Mbeki championed, including the construction of the AU, the reform of the AU and SADC peace architecture, the establishment of the NEPAD and the RECs reform.

The chapter concluded that the African agenda was driven by three ideological aspects: African solidarity, unity, and African centeredness. On African solidarity, the policy sought to encourage African leaders to stand together against Western interferences on African issues. These are also some of the objectives that South Africa foreign policy sought to achieve in the continent.

### **8.2.5 Theoretical framework**

This chapter discussed the theoretical framework from which the notion of the African renaissance has been discussed. The chapter focused on the Afrocentric framework and its elements. It argued that Afrocentrism provides a useful framework for understanding the meaning of the African agenda. Afrocentrism locates research within an African context and interprets it from an African perspective. It is grounded and centred on African people. The chapter started by discussing dominant International Relations theories, including realism, international institutionalism, liberalism, constructivism, and Marxism, from which the South African foreign policy has been explained.

Moreover, it points out how these theories do not fully account for South Africa's pursuit of the African agenda. They do not account for South African foreign policy's identity and ideological matters. On the other hand, Afrocentricity accounts for both identity and ideology. It addresses the question of identity from the perspective of Africans as being orientated, grounded and centered.

The chapter further identified three elements of Afrocentricity, including grounding, orientation and perspective, which guided the analysis of the African agenda policy and its implementation in Africa. The chapter concluded that Afrocentricity is a suitable framework for understanding the African agenda policy towards Africa and its application in Zimbabwe.

Its strength is that it places African experiences, history and culture at the centre of a phenomenon.

### **8.2.6 South Africa, African agenda and the Zimbabwe mediation: Reflecting on the data process.**

This chapter presented the research findings relating to South Africa's African agenda policy and its engagement in Africa. The aim was to respond to the main research question: "How did the African agenda holistically understood underpin South Africa's approach to its SADC mandated mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014?" The data mining from the documents as evidence regarding South African foreign policy's African agenda and the SADC mandate was straightforward. It began with the detailing of the documents on which the study drew. This included primary documents; speeches, books, minutes from meetings, annual reports, letters and unique written pieces from key players in the Zimbabwe mediation. It then described the process of theme building through coding. Finally, it discussed themes from the data responding to the study's objectives.

Based on the findings, the chapter concluded that South Africa's African identity was expressed through the African agenda policy, which was the ANC's preferred strategy for its engagement with the continent. This identity also informed South Africa's national interest and its global engagements. The chapter found that African renaissance, identity, unity, solidarity and Afrocentricity informed this policy. Regarding the application the Zimbabwe mediation process, the findings revealed that South Africa's approach was guided by the African agenda's objectives, including respecting the sovereign rights of African countries and locating Africans at the centre of a political social-economic process. The findings indicated that the quiet diplomacy strategy expressed the African solutions for African problems as the preferred method over the regime change. Using an Afrocentric lens in the Zimbabwe case, Mbeki's main priority was to afford the people of Zimbabwe space to decide their future. He opposed the regime change because it was not in the interest of the Zimbabweans but of the British nationals.

Based on the data, the chapter concluded that Pan-Africanism, African solidarity, African-centered, quiet diplomacy and African solutions for African problems emerged as the main themes meaning from the data on South Africa's African agenda towards Africa. These were expressed in the speeches, statements and briefings. The themes also constitute the ideas and ideologies which informs the African agenda policy. The chapter also concluded that the

quiet diplomacy was a form of African solutions for African, which included using Africa's preferred approach to the Zimbabwe crisis.

### **8.2.7 South Africa's mediation in Zimbabwe: an analysis**

Chapter seven explored the implementation of the African agenda policy in Africa to respond to the main research question: "How did the African agenda holistically understood underpin South Africa's approach to its SADC mandated mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis between 2007 and 2014?" It used the Afrocentric framework to demonstrate that issues of African identity, African renaissance and Pan-Africanism, which underpin the African agenda policy, guided South Africa's approach towards the SADC mandated mediation in Zimbabwe. It argued that it is difficult to fully understand South Africa's approach towards Zimbabwe without understanding the African agenda's core paradigms and ideologies. The chapter found that although Mbeki failed to meet international standards on promoting human rights and democratic governance, he was successful in implementing some of the African agenda objectives including regional solidarity, unity and protecting sovereignty of African countries. The chapter begins by discussing the meaning of the African agenda to understand South Africa's views on the continent's renewal. It does this by dividing the section into the formulation and implementation of the policy post-1994 and debates on the African renaissance.

It discussed South Africa's desire to fashion a vision through the ANC's idea of the African renaissance. The debate was divided into the African agenda programs, African identity and Pan-Africanism. These sections revealed that South Africa championed by different projects to restore peace, uphold governance, promote democracy, and accelerate economic development in the continent to implement this vision. First, the African identity discussion revealed that South Africa sought to be part of the continent's revival by championing peace and security, economic development and democratic government. Regarding pan-Africanism, the chapter revealed that achieving African unity was the goal for Mbeki. He pursued this objective by heightening coordination with other African leaders and the transition of the OAU to AU. This section focused on the OAU and what it failed to achieve. It also examined the transition to the AU, its objective and what it was able to achieve under the leadership of Mbeki and other African countries. The African agenda sought to achieve African unity, solidarity and African renewal by putting Africa at the centre of South Africa's engagement. It then discusses the African agenda ideologies, including African renaissance, African unity and Pan-Africanism.

Finally, it examines the Zimbabwe case study to understand South Africa's mediation approach. Upon analysis, the case has revealed that South Africa's approach was guided by the ideologies and paradigms of the Africa agenda policy. The chapter found that regional stability, African unity and African solidarity were a priority for South Africa to ensure that the crisis in Zimbabwe does not hamper the implementation of the African agenda projects, including regional integration.

The chapter concluded that despite Mbeki's failure to uphold international human rights standards, he succeeded in advancing African agenda objectives in the region which included African unity, continental and regional solidarity, respecting sovereignty of African countries, African-centered conflict resolution in the region and African solutions to African problems. Mbeki's success to keep the Zimbabwe political process within the AU and SADC while keeping big economies at bay demonstrate this. Furthermore, both the AU and SADC were all for the quiet diplomacy approach and rejected the "regime change" idea proposed by the US and the UK. This revealed that Mbeki was able to achieve a certain level of solidarity and unity within the region on the Zimbabwe. In keeping with the African solutions for African problems maxim, Pretoria insisted on respecting sovereignty of Zimbabwe, averting interferences by the USA and the UK whose agenda was to change regime in favour of a government of their preference.

### **8.3 South Africa's African agenda and the Zimbabwe mediation: reflecting on the objectives of the study.**

#### **8.3.1 The African agenda policy**

Our study agrees with the previous study's findings (Zondi, 2015) that African renaissance, African identity, and pan-Africanism ideologies help in the understanding of the African agenda policy. Indeed, these ideologies emerged as dominant themes from the data, supporting the study's argument that African renaissance, identity and pan-Africanism underpin the African agenda. The study found that the African agenda was about driving a continent renewal vision that views Africa as a united continent with a single goal to address underdevelopment and marginalization. The implementation of the vision saw a pan-African approach to Africa's revival through increased coordination amongst African leaders, reform and establishment of Africa's peace, development and governance institutions, and an increased Africa's voice on global platforms. Consequently, the data was

### **8.3.2 Explain South Africa's foreign policy positions on Zimbabwe based on the African agenda.**

After analysing the data on the African agenda and Zimbabwe, it was clear that South Africa's approach was under the objectives of the African agenda policy. Two actions by Mbeki suggested this: his resistance to the UK and USA's imposition of regime change on Zimbabwe and sanctions and the blocking of the UN Security Council's intervention on Zimbabwe was an expression of the "African solutions for African problems" dictum. This was in line with the African renaissance's demand for the agency on setting the agenda for Africa's affairs. Previous analyses on Zimbabwe have concluded that South Africa's policy option failed (van Nieuwkerk, 2006) because of the poor organizational structure of the foreign policy decision machine in Pretoria. This study went beyond a model located within the Eurocentric context to get a deeper understanding of the policy option in Zimbabwe. The researcher believes that an Afrocentric analysis would provide a deeper understanding of South Africa's approach towards the Zimbabwe crisis. Upon closer look, we found that Mbeki sought an African-centred solution anchored on "African solutions for African problems", the solidarity of African leaders and African unity. On the other hand, we found that this approach did not meet international standards on protecting human rights and democratic governance.

### **8.2.3 To explain South Africa's understanding and management of its SADC mandate to facilitate dialogue and a settlement in Zimbabwe.**

Both primary and secondary data is clear that multilateralism was Pretoria's preferred method of engagement under the African agenda policy. In response to South Africa's mediation management, the data was clear that the SADC mandate guided South Africa's approach to the meditation. To recap, the mandate required Pretoria to facilitate a dialogue that would pave the way for a lawful democratic process and give the Zimbabweans the right to determine their future. Indeed, the solidarity of SADC leaders in Zimbabwe regarding South Africa's approach points that this was a regional decision. Data collected from records of South African officials confirmed that Mbeki's firm opposition to the UK and USA regime change campaign was motivated by his commitment to carry out the SADC mandate at all costs.

### **8.3 Contribution of the study**

This study makes four contributions to the body of knowledge. Firstly, it adds to the existing literature on South Africa's engagement in Africa by delving a little deeper into connections between the African agenda, SA foreign policy and the SADC mediation. Secondly, it contributes to the International Relations theory by employing Afrocentricity that studies the Zimbabwe case study from an African perspective. Thirdly, it deepens the understanding of the African agenda policy and its application in Africa, particularly in conflict resolution cases. Fourthly, it encourages scholars to consider ideological underpinnings such as pan-Africanism, African renaissance and African identity that underpin the African agenda policy when studying South Africa's engagement in Africa.

### **8.4 Subject for future research**

This study has highlighted the need for more future studies on South Africa's African agenda towards the continent to be approached from an Afrocentric perspective. This will enhance the understanding of South Africa's engagement in the continent. Furthermore, an Afrocentric approach to African policy issues will allow African academics to study African phenomena from an African perspective rather than the Eurocentric view. Currently, the African voice is missing in International Relations as most subjects are viewed from a Eurocentric perspective. Allowing Africans to tell their stories about themselves will increase this voice and enable African scholars to contribute to the academic discourse on International Relations.

### **8.5 Conclusion- This chapter is concluding the study framework was useful**

The study shows that the Afrocentric framework was a useful framework for analysing South Africa's African foreign policy approach to the SADC mandated mediation. It demonstrated that ideological matters of the South African foreign policy are essential for understanding the behaviour of the African agenda policy. The Zimbabwe case study demonstrated that Afrocentricity provides a different analytic lens that genuinely captures the essence of African reality. The study has underlined the need to shift away from the Eurocentric approach to the African phenomenon and emphasised the usefulness of Afrocentricity as an alternative theory used in African foreign policy studies. It demonstrated how African pan-Africanism, African identity and African renaissance shaped and informed the African agenda policy in the Zimbabwe crisis.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aarons, B. (1972). Marxist Theories of Revolution. *Australian Left Review*, 1, 18–24.
- Adebajo, A. (2007). *South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: an axis of virtue?* (A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji, & C. Landsberg (eds.)). University of KwaZulu Natal Press.
- Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A., & Landsberg, C. (2007). Introduction. In A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (p. 39). University of KwaZulu Natal Press.
- Adebajo, A., & Landsberg, C. (2003). "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons". In M. Baregu & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *From Cape to Cairo: Southern Africa's Evolving*. From Cape to Cairo: Southern Africa's Evolving.
- African National Congress. (1997). Umrabulo: Discussion Document for ANC National Conference. In African National Congress (Ed.), *ANC National Conference* (pp. 44–56). African National Congress.
- PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION, 5 (2002).
- Alden, C. (2002). South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy and the crisis in Zimbabwe. *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, 2, 187–211. <https://doi.org/10.4000/cea.1341>
- Alden, C., & Large, D. (2019). *New Directions in Africa-China Studies* (C. Alden & D. Large (eds.)). Routledge.
- Alden, C., & le Pere, G. (2006). South Africa's Post Apartheid Foreignpolicy. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid* (pp. 50–63). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Alden, C., & le Pere, G. (2019). *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy — from Reconciliation to Revival?* (First Edit). Routledge. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315000794>
- Alden, C., & Schoeman, M. (2015). South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa. *International Politics*, 52. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.47>
- Alden, C., & Wu, Y. (2016). South African foreign policy and China : converging visions , competing interests , contested identities. *Commnwealth and Comarative Politics*, 54(2), 203–231. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2016.1151170>
- Alden, Chris, & le Pere, G. (2003). Chapter 1: Mandela and the Foreign Policy of Transition. *The Adelphi Papers*, 43(362), 11–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714027923>
- Alden, Chris, & Sako, M. (2005). South Africa's economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its discontents. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(3), 367–392. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X05001011>
- Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *The American Political Science Review*, 63(3), 689–718. <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html,bycontactingJSTORatjstor-info@umich.edu,orbycallingJSTORat>

- Asante, M., K. (1998). *The Afrocentric Idea*. Temple University Press.
- Asante, M., K. (2009). *Afrocentricity*.
- Asante, M. K. (2009, April 13). *Afrocentricity*. Asante.Net.  
<http://www.asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/>
- Berget, C. (2008). *South Africa's Human Rights Reputation Tarnished*. Human Rights Watch.  
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/07/south-africas-human-rights-reputation-tarnished>
- Bischoff, P. (2006). Towards a Foreign Peacekeeping Commitment: South African Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Africa. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* (pp. 147–163). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Bolderston, A. (2018). Writing an Effective Literature Review Writing an Effective Literature Review. *Journal of Medical and Radiation Sciences*, 39(86–92).  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmir.2008.04.009>
- Borer, T. A., & Mills, K. (2011). *Explaining Post-Apartheid South African Human Rights Foreign Policy: Unsettled Identity and Conflicting Interests*.
- Boshoff, E., & Owiso, O. (2017). Pan-Africanism and development in the twenty-first century: A critical analysis of the New Partnership for Africa's Development. In M. Adanney & M. . Nyarko (Eds.), *Ghana @ 60: Governance and human rights in twenty-first century Africa* (pp. 266–277). Pretoria University Press. 978-1-920538-74-3
- Brooks, Z. (2018). *OPTIMIZING THE FUNCTIONAL UTILITY OF AFROCENTRIC INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFIGANCE OF SYSTEMIC RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & NECESSITY OF A SEPARATIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANDPOINT* [Temple University].  
<https://scholarshare.temple.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.12613/2634/TETDEDXBrooks-temple-0225M-13339.pdf?sequence=1>
- Burchill, S. (2005). *Theories of International Relations* (S. Burchill (ed.); Third Edit). Palgrave Macmilan.  
[https://professorbellreadings.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/scott\\_burchill\\_et-al-\\_theories\\_of\\_intern.pdf](https://professorbellreadings.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/scott_burchill_et-al-_theories_of_intern.pdf)
- Carlsnaes, W. (2012). Actors, Structures and Foreign policy Analysis. In S. Smith, A. Hadfield, & T. Dunne (Eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors and Case* (Secnd Edit). Oxford University Press.
- Chawane, M. (2016). The development of Afrocentricity: a historical survey. *Yesterday and Today*, 16. <https://doi.org/10.17159/2223-0386/2016/n16a5>
- Chikane, F. (2013). *The Things that Could Not be Said: From A (IDS) to Z (imbabwe)* . Picador Africa.
- Chimhanda, C. (2003). *ZAPU AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE 1957-1980* [University of Cape Town]. <https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/10235>
- Cilliers, J. (1999). *AN EMERGING SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY INDENTITY?*

- Coetzee, C. (2004). *South Africa 's Foreign Policy of Quiet Diplomacy Towards Zimbabwe : Constructivism as a Framework to Highlight the Contradictory Norms of Human Rights and African Solidarity*. University of Stellenbosch.
- Cossa, J. A. (2009). African Renaissance and Globalization: A Conceptual Analysis. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 36(1). <https://doi.org/10.5070/F7361009576>
- Cresswell, J. W. (2007). Five Quality Approaches to Inquiry. In J. W. Creswell (Ed.), *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (pp. 53–84). Sage Publications. [http://www.sxf.uevora.pt/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Creswell\\_2007.pdf](http://www.sxf.uevora.pt/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Creswell_2007.pdf)
- Cresswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design* (Third edit). Sage Publications.
- Curtis, D. (2007). South Africa: “Exporting Peace” to the Great Lakes Region. In A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post Apartheid Era* (p. 21). University of KwaZulu Natal Press.
- Dauda, I. A. (2019). African Renaissance. *Special I Ssue*, 163–183. <https://doi.org/DOI:https://doi.org/10.31920/2516-5305/2019/s1n1a8>
- Davies, J. E. (2008). South Africa and constructive engagement: Lessons learned? *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 34(1), 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070701832858>
- De Coning, C. (2000). Lesotho intervention: implications for SADC. Military interventions, peacekeeping and the African renaissance. *Africa Dialogue Monograph Series*, 1(1), 39–75.
- Devitt, R. (2011). *Liberal Institutionalism : An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo ?* E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/>
- Dlamini, K. (2002). Is Quiet Diplomacy an Effective Conflict Resolution Strategy? *SA Yearbook of International Affairs*, 3, 171–178.
- Dunn, K. C., & Shaw, T. M. (2001). *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave.
- Dzimiri, P. (2017). African Multilateral Responses to the crisis in Zimbabwe: A responsibility to Protect Perspective. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39(2), 50–77. <https://doi.org/DOI:https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v39i2.283>
- Dzinesa, G. . (2012). *Zimbabwe's Constitutional Reform Process : Challenges and Prospects*. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.
- Eppel, S. (2009, February 27). *An Overview of the Circumstances of the Unity Accord of 1987 in Comparison to those of the Global Political Agreement of 2008*. The Times. <http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/essays/GPAversusUA.pdf>
- Evaldsson, A., & Wessles, A. (2004). THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE : A BRIEF HISTORICAL ORIENTATION. *Southern Journal for Contemporary History*, 29(1), 82–99. <https://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/jch/article/view/403>

- Evans, G. (1991). *Continuity and Change in South Africa's Present and Future Foreign Policy*.
- Falaye, O. A. (2014). AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: ACQUIESCENCE AND RESPONSES. *Journal of Globalisation Studies*, 5(2), 81–90. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304821475>
- Farkas, A. (1996). Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 343–361. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2600715>
- Farrokhyar, F., Farrugia, P., Petrisor, B., & Bhandari, M. (2010). Practical tips for surgical research: Research questions, Hypothesis and Objectives. *Canadian Journal of Surgery*, 53(4). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45277520\\_Practical\\_tips\\_for\\_surgical\\_research\\_Research\\_questions\\_hypotheses\\_and\\_objectives](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45277520_Practical_tips_for_surgical_research_Research_questions_hypotheses_and_objectives)
- Fink, A. (2014). *Conducting Research Literature Reviews : from the internet to paper* (Fourth Edi). Sage Publications.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism. *International Organisation*, 50(325–347). <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028587>
- Gabrielsson, A. (2010). *A Study of Pan-African Ideas of a Collective Identity in Africa* [Univeristy of Halmstad]. <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:386814/fulltext01.pdf>
- Geldenhuys, D. (2006). South Africa's Role as International Nomr Entrepreneur. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Aparthied* (pp. 93–107). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- George, A. L. (1967). *The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision*.
- Gerner, D. J. (1995). Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy. In L. Neack, J. A. K. Hey, & P. J. Haney (Eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and in its Second Generation*. (pp. 17–32). Prentice Hall.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith (eds.); First Edit). International Publishers. <https://ia800503.us.archive.org/17/items/AntonioGramsciSelectionsFromThePrisonNotebooks/Antonio-Gramsci-Selections-from-the-Prison-Notebooks.pdf>
- Gregory, C. (1986). *Zimbabwe: The One Party State Issue* (No. 27). [https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Zimbabwe\\_-\\_The\\_One\\_Party\\_State\\_Issue.pdf](https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Zimbabwe_-_The_One_Party_State_Issue.pdf)
- Groom, A. J. R., & Light. (1994). *Contemporary international relations : a guide to theory*. Pinter Publications.
- Haas, E. (1953). The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?' World Politics. In A. Baldwin (Ed.), *Theories of International Relations* (First Edit, p. 36). Routledge. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315236339>
- Habib, A., & Selinyane, N. (2006). *Constraining the Unconstrained: Civil Society and South*

- Africa's Hegemonic Obligations in Africa. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* (p. 13). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Habib, Adam. (2009). South Africa's foreign policy: Hegemonic aspirations, neoliberal orientations and global transformation. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16(2), 143–159. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460903265857>
- Hamauswa, S., & Chinyere, P. (2015). *Unpacking the Complexities of Mediation in Africa: Some lessons from SADC's Mediation Role in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2013*. <http://www.up.ac.za/media>
- Hamill, J., & Hoffman, J. (2009). "Quiet Diplomacy" or Appeasement? South African Policy towards Zimbabwe. *The Round Table*, 98(402), 373–384. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080.00358530902895584>
- Haney, P. J. (1995). Structure and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises. In L. Neack, J. A. K. Hey, & P. J. Haney (Eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and in its Second Generation*. (p. 16). Prentice Hall.
- Hengari, T. (2014). *South Africa 's Diplomacy 20 Years On : Implementing the African Agenda around Core Values , Principles*. [https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia\\_spb\\_107\\_hengari\\_20141008.pdf](https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_spb_107_hengari_20141008.pdf)
- Henwwood, R. (1996). South African Foreign Policy and International Practice 1995/96: An Analysis. *South African Yearbook of International Law*, 21, 243–292.
- Hermann, C. F. (1990). Hermann-Changing Course When Governments Choose to Redirect.pdf. *International Studies Quarterly*, 34, 3–21. <http://links.jstor.org/sici>
- Hill, C. (2003). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hofstee, Erik. (2006). The Literature Review. In E. Hofstee (Ed.), *Constructing a Good Dissertation: A Practical Guide to Finishing a Master's, MBA or PhD on Schedule* (pp. 91–106). EPE.
- Holsti, K. J. (1998). Scholarship in an era of Anxiety: The Study of International Politics During the Cold War. *Review of International Studies*, 24(4), 17–45. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210598000175>
- Holsti, O. R. (2012). Theories of International Relations\*. In M. J. Hogan & T. G. Paterson (Eds.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Second Edi, pp. 51–90). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511806445.005>
- Hopf, T. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 23(1), 171–200.
- Hudson, V. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1(1), 1–30. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2005.00001.x>
- Hughes, T. (2004). *Composers, conductors and players : Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making* (Issue September).

- Human Rights Watch. (2002). *Zimbabwe: Fast Track Land Reform*.  
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/03/08/fast-track-land-reform-zimbabwe>
- International Crisis Group. (2002). *ZIMBABWE AT THE CROSSROADS: TRANSITION OR CONFLICT?*
- IOL. (2003, December 25). SA rebuffs cleric's criticism of Zim stance. *IOL*, 1.  
<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sa-rebuffs-clerics-criticism-of-zim-stance-119843>
- Iroulo, L. (2017). *PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE THROUGH THE APRM* (Issue July).  
[https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia\\_spb\\_162\\_\\_Iroulo\\_20170728.pdf](https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_spb_162__Iroulo_20170728.pdf)
- Jili, P. (2000). *AFRICAN IDENTITY AND AN AFRICAN RENAISSANCE*. University of Natal.
- Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. *Politikon*, 30(2), 165–181.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282>
- Kabir, M., S. (2018). Methods of Data Collection. In S. Kabir, M. (Ed.), *Basic Guidelines for Research: An Introductory Approach for All Disciplines* (First Edit, Issue June, pp. 201–275). Book Zon Publication.
- Kasambala, T., & Gagnon, G. (2008). “Bullets for each of you” : *State-sponsored Violence Since Zimbabwe's March 29 Elections*. Human Rights Watch.  
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections>
- Kent, V., & Malan, M. (2003). Decisions, Decisions. South Africa's foray into regional peace operations. In *Institute for Security Studies Papers* (Issue 72).  
[http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic\\_journals/ispaper/ispaper\\_n72.pdf](http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ispaper/ispaper_n72.pdf)
- Keto, C. T. (1994). *The Africa-Centered Perspective of History*. Research Associates/Karnak House.
- Kumah-Abiwu, F. (2016). Beyond Intellectual Construct to Policy Ideas: The Case of the Afrocentric Paradigm. *Africology: The Journal of Pan-African Studies*, 9(2), 7–27.
- Kumalo, R. S. (2015). Pixley ka Isaka Seme, the African Renaissance and the Empire in Contemporary South Africa. *Alternation Special Edition*, 14, 190–211.
- Landberg, C. (2007). South Africa and the Making of the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki's “progressive African agenda.” In A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (pp. 195–212). University of KwaZulu Natal Press.
- Landsberg, C. (1994). Selling South Africa New foreign Policy. *Indicator SA*, 12(1), 69–73.  
[https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA0259188X\\_1528](https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA0259188X_1528)
- Landsberg, C. (2002). The Impossible Neutrality? In J. F. Clark (Ed.), *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. Palgrave Macmillan.  
[https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982445\\_10](https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982445_10)

- Landsberg, C. (2006). Foreign Policy-making and Implementation in Postsettlement South Africa. In C. Landsberg & A. Venter (Eds.), *Government and Politics in the New South Africa* (3rd Editio, pp. 250–257). Van Schaik Publishers.
- Landsberg, C. (2010). *The Diplomacy of Transformation: South African Foreign Policy and Statecraft*. Pan Macmillan.
- Landsberg, C. (2012). Towards a Post-apartheid South African Foreign Policy. In C. Landsberg & J. van Wyk (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. Volume 1* (pp. 1–17). Africa Institute South Africa , Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Landsberg, C. (2014). The concentric circles of South Africa’s foreign policy under Jacob Zuma. *India Quarterly*, 70(2), 153–172. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928414524652>
- Landsberg, C. (2015). Sub-cintinental Entente: Twenty Years of South Africa’s SADC. In L. Masters, S. Zondi, J. van Wyk, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. Volume 2* (pp. 119–138). Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Landsberg, C., & Hlophe, D. (1999). *THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AS A MODERN SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY* (Vol. 11, Issue 1). [https://www.academia.edu/7358165/Artcl\\_African\\_Renaissance](https://www.academia.edu/7358165/Artcl_African_Renaissance)
- Landsberg, Chris. (2000). Promoting democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki doctrine. *Journal of Democracy*, 11(3), 120–121. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0061>
- Landsberg, Chris. (2012). Reflections on the African Union after Decade One Looking Back in Order to Look Forward. *Africa Institute of South Africa AFRICA INSIGHT*, 42(3).
- Landsberg, Chris. (2016). Caught between Afro-Southern Solidarism and Liberal Cosmopolitan values: Four Turning points in South Africa’s Human Rights Foreign policy. In *Review of African Political Economy* (No. 1; 1, Vol. 30, Issue 97). Informa UK Limited. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10>
- le Pere, G. (2014). CRITICAL THEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 36(2), 31–56.
- Leedy, P. D., & Omrod, J. E. (2014). *Practicl Research: Planning and Design* (10th editi). Pearson Education.
- Lefkowitz, M. (1996). The Afrocentric Interpretation of Western History: Lefkowitz Replies to Bernal. *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education*, 12, 88–91. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2962996>
- Legum, C. (1962). *PAN-AFRICANISM: A SHORT POLITICAL GUIDE REVISED EDITION* (Second edi). Frederick A. Praeger Publishers.
- Lipton, M. (2009). Understanding South Africa’s foreign policy: The perplexing case of Zimbabwe. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16(3), 331–346. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460903495181>
- Magure, B. (2014). LAND, INDIGENISATION AND EMPOWERMENT: Narratives that Made a Difference in Zimbabwe’s 2013 Elections. *Journal of African Elections*, 13(2), 17–47.

- Maier-rigaud, R. (2008). International Organizations as Corporate Actors : Agency and Emergence in Theories of International Relations. In *SSRN Electronic Journal* (Issue March 2008). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1127188>
- Makalela, L., & Sistrunk, W. (2002). Review: C. A. Diop. Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946-1960. *Proud Flesh: A New Afrikan Journal of Culture, Politics & Consciousness*, 1(1). <http://www.proudfleshjournal.com/vol1.1/makalela-sistrunk.html>
- Makokera, C. G. (2015). *Zimbabwe and South Africa: Security Takes Precedence Over Economy*.
- Malaquias A. (2001). Reformulating International Relations Theory: African Insights and Challenges. In *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory. International Political Economy Series* (Dunn, K.C.).
- Maloka, E. T. (2001). THE SOUTH AFRICAN “AFRICAN RENAISSANCE” DEBATE : A CRITIQUE. *Polis: Revue Camerunaise de Science Politque*, 8, 1–10.
- Mandela, N. (1993). South Africa's Future Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), 86–97.
- Marthoz, J.-P. (2012). *The challenges and ambiguities of South Africa's foreign policy NOREF Report*.
- Masters, L., Zondi, S., van Wyk, J., & Landsberg, C. (2015). Principles and Practices. In *South African Foreign Policy Review* (pp. 1–15). Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Masunungare. (2006). Nation-building, State-building and Power Configuration in Zimbabwe. *Conflict Trends*, 1, 3–8.
- Mathebula, S. (2016). *South African Foreign Policy's Conflict Mediation Outcomes are Significantly Shaped by the Democratic Deficit which Charecterises the African Continent*. <https://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/02/conflict-and-violence-in-africa-causes-sources-and-types/>
- Matlosa, K. (2007). South Africa and Regional Security in Southern Africa. In A. Adebajo, A. Adadeji, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post Aortheid Era* (pp. 105–127). University of KwaZulu Natal Press.
- Matondi, P. B. (2012). *Fast Track Land reform Zimbabwe* (Vol. 1). Zed Book.
- Mayanja, E. (2013). Strengthening ethical political leadership for sustainable peace and social justice in Africa: Uganda as a case study. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 13(2), 113–146. [https://journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/EJC145358?\\_\\_cf\\_chl\\_tk=CJ\\_IvxIAaTkd6IQofUiyzjhzs4tZbvq2pyh3fQ1r1i4-1647252510-0-gaNycGzNCv0](https://journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/EJC145358?__cf_chl_tk=CJ_IvxIAaTkd6IQofUiyzjhzs4tZbvq2pyh3fQ1r1i4-1647252510-0-gaNycGzNCv0)
- Mazama, A. (2001). The Afrocentric Paradigm. *Journal of Black Studies*, 31(4), 387–405. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002193470103100401>
- Mbeki, M. (2000). Issues in the South African Foreign Policy: African renaissance. *Souls*, 2(2), 76–81. <https://doi.org/DOI:10.1080/1099999>
- Mbeki, T. (1996). *I am an African*. Sowetan. [https://soweto.co.za/html/i\\_iamafrikan.htm](https://soweto.co.za/html/i_iamafrikan.htm)

- Mbeki, T. (1997). *“Attracting Capital to Africa.”* Department of International Relations and Cooperations. <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1997/mbek0419.htm>
- Mbeki, T. (1998). *African Renaissance: South Africa and the World.* Department of International Relations and Cooperations. <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0409.htm>
- Mbeki, T. (1999). *Speech at the Launch of the African Renaissance Institute.* Department of International Relations and Cooperations. <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1999/mbek1011.htm>
- Mbeki, T. (2002). *Speech at the Launch of the African Union.* Department of International Relations and Cooperations. <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2002/mbek0709.htm>
- Mbeki, Thabo. (2016). *SOUTH AFRICA’S POLICY TOWARDS ZIMBABWE-A SYNOPSIS.*
- Mbete, S. N. (2018). *The Middle Power Debate Revisited: South Africa in the United Nations Security Council, 2007-2008 and 2011-2012* [University of Pretoria]. [https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/65823/Mbete\\_Middle\\_2018.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y](https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/65823/Mbete_Middle_2018.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y)
- Mckinley, D. . (2004). South African Foreign Policy towards Zimibabwe under Mbeki. *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(100), 357–364. <https://about.jstor.org/terms>
- Merriam, S. B. (1998). *Qualitative Research and Case Study Application in Education.* Jossey- Bass Publishers.
- Mhandara, L., & Pooe, A. (2013a). *Mediating a convoluted conflict: South Africa’s approach to the inter-party negotiations in Zimbabwe* (Vol. 2). <http://www>.
- Mhandara, L., & Pooe, A. (2013b). *Mediating a convoluted conflict: South Africa’s approach to the inter-party negotiations in Zimbabwe* (1, Vol. 2). <http://www>.
- Mhango, G. A. (2012). Is Quiet Diplomacy in Consonance with Meaningful Peacemaking in SADC? Lessons from Zimbabwe. *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, 1(1), 14–25.
- Mills, G., Callahan, T. J., Geldenhuys, D., & Fabricius, P. (1997). *US-South Africa Relations and the “Pariah” States.* [https://www.africaportal.org/documents/958/SAIIA\\_Reports\\_no\\_2.pdf](https://www.africaportal.org/documents/958/SAIIA_Reports_no_2.pdf)
- Miti, K. (2012). South Africa and Conflict Resolution in Africa: From Mandela to Zuma. *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, 1(1), 1–17. <http://www.crisisgroup.org>.
- Mkabela, Q. (2015). Using the Afrocentric Method in Researching Indigenous African Culture. *The Qualitative Report*, 10(1), 178–189. <https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2005.1864>
- Monyae. (2012). The Evolving “Doctrine” of Multilateralism in South Africa’s Africa policy. In C. Landsberg & J. van Wyk (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. Volume 1* (pp. 139–151). Africa Institute of South Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue.

- Monyae, D. (2014). *Learning to Lead: South Africa's Role in Africa-Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)*. University of Witswatersrand.
- Moravcsik. (2002). Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment. In C. Elman & F. M. Elman (Eds.), *Progress in International Relations Theory* (p. 47). MIT Press.
- Moyo, F. (2012). The struggle within the struggle: an examination of the political power wrangle between the African National Council and other nationalist parties, especially ZANU and ZAPU, in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. *Studia Historica Ecclesiastica*, 15–36.
- Moyo, Simbarashe. (2014). *Regime Survival Strategies in Zimbabwe after Independence* (Vol. 2, Issue 1). Online.
- Mpungose, L. (2018). *South Africa's foreign policy under Zuma: towards greater strategic partnerships*. <https://saiaa.org.za/research/south-africa-s-foreign-policy-under-zuma-towards-greater-strategic-partnerships/>
- Murithi, T. (2007). *Institutionalising Pan-Africanism • page Paper 43 • Institutionalising Pan-Africanism Transforming African Union values and principles into policy and practice* (No. 143).
- Mutisi, M. (2011). *Beyond the signature: Appraisal of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement and Implications for Intervention*. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128389/policy\\_practice4.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128389/policy_practice4.pdf)
- Mutua, M. (2001). Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights. *Harvard International Law*, 42(1), 201–245. <https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/articles/570>
- Mvulane Moloji, T. (2016). Afrikan Contribution to International Relations Theory : An Afrocentric Philosophical Enquiry. *Africology: The Journal of Pan-African Studies*, 9(1), 241–269. <http://www.jpanafrican.org/docs/vol9no1/9.1-15-T-new-Moloji.pdf>
- Nabudere, D. W. (2001). The African Renaissance in the Age of Globalisation. *African Journal of Political Sciences*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.4314/ajps.v6i2.27321>
- Naidu, S. (2015). Understanding South Africa's global governance Identity. In *South African Foreign Policy: Vol. Volume 2* (pp. 59–71). Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Nathan, L. (2008). *ANTI-IMPERIALISM TRUMPS HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO THE DARFUR CONFLICT* Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2 *Anti-imperialism Trumps Human Rights: South Africa's Approach to the Darfur Conflict 1*. [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org)
- Nathan, L. (2011). Interests, ideas and ideology: South Africa's policy on Darfur. *African Affairs*, 110(438), 55–74. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq058>
- Nathan, L. (2013). *African Solutions to African Problems. South Africa's Foreign Policy*. <http://www.southafrica.info>
- National Academy of Science. (1999). Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, Second Edition. In National Academy of Science (Ed.), *Science*

- and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, Second Edition* (Second Edi, p. 48). National Academies Press. <https://doi.org/10.17226/6024>
- Ndlovu-gatsheni, S. (2003). Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21 st Century. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 3(1), 1980–2002. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/136419>
- Ndubisi, F. O. (2013). The Philosophical Paradigm of African Identity and Development. *Open Journal of Philosophy*, 03(01), 222–230. <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.31a037>
- Neack, L., Hey, J. A. K., & Haney, P. J. (1995). Generational Change in Foreign Policy Analysis. In L. Neack, J. A. K. Hey, & P. J. Haney (Eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and in its Second Generation*. (pp. 1–15). Prentice Hall.
- Nel, P. (2006). The Power of Ideas: 'Ambiguous globalism' and South Africa's foreign policy. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* (p. 13). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Nel, P., & Carlsnaes, W. (2006). Introduction. In P. Nel & W. Carlsnaes (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* (pp. 17–24). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Newmann, B. (2005). *A Brief Introduction to Theories on International Relations and Foreign Policy*. People.Vcu.Edu. <http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/468theory.htm>
- Nganje, F. (2015). *Governance and APRM Programme Moving Beyond Africa 's Crisis of Institutions*. [https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia\\_sop\\_222\\_nganje\\_20151012.pdf](https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_sop_222_nganje_20151012.pdf)
- Nhlapo, W. (2016). Welile Nhlapo. In S. . Ndlovu & M. Strydom (Eds.), *The Thabo Mbeki I Know* (pp. 269–288). Picador Africa.
- Nkrumah, N. (1963). *Africa Must Unite KWAME NKRUMAH New York*. Frederick A. Praeger Publisher.
- Norwich University Online. (2017, October 16). *Key Theories of International Relations*. Norwich University Online.
- Nyere, C. (2016). The Continuum of Political Violence in Zimbabwe 1. In *J Soc Sci* (Vol. 48, Issue 1).
- Oguonu, C. N., & Ezeibe, C. C. (2014). African Union and conflict resolution in Africa. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(27), 325–332. <https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p325>
- Olivier, G. (2012). South African Foreign Policy Towards the Global North. In C. Landsberg & J. van Wyk (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. Volume 1* (pp. 173–195). Africa Institute of South Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Olivier, Gerrit. (2003). Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's saviour? *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 79(4), 815–828. <https://about.jstor.org/terms>

- Omoruyi, I., Idahosa, S. O., Mugadam, M. M., & Sidibe, O. (2020). Nigeria - South Africa Rivalry in Quest for Regional Power Status: from Material Potential to UN Security Council Membership. *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 20(1), 147–157. <https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2020-20-1-147-157>
- Öniş, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2017). The Dynamics of Emerging Middle-power Influence in Regional and Global Governance: The Paradoxical Case of Turkey. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71(2), 164–183. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1183586>
- Onslow, S. (2011). *ZIMBABWE AND POLITICAL TRANSITION STRATEGIC UPDATE*.
- Organisation of African Union, Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, Organisation of African Union, Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (1963). <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36024.html>
- Pahad, A. (2016). Aziz Pahad. In S. M. Ndlovu & M. Strydom (Eds.), *The Thabo Mbeki* (pp. 120–137). Picador Africa.
- Pal, M. (2018). *Introducing Marxism in International Relations Theory*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/25/introducing-marxism-in-international-relations-theory/>
- Parry, A. W. (2021). Liberalism and Foreign Policy: An Analysis of the Liberal Foreign Policy in International Relations. *INSAMER*, 1–4. [https://insamer.com/en/liberalism-and-foreign-policy-an-analysis-of-the-liberal-foreign-policy-in-international-relations\\_3712.html](https://insamer.com/en/liberalism-and-foreign-policy-an-analysis-of-the-liberal-foreign-policy-in-international-relations_3712.html)
- Paterson, M., & Virk, K. (2014a). *POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER TWO DECADES*.
- Paterson, M., & Virk, K. (2014b). *South Africa's Multilateral Relations in Africa Report Title: POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER TWO DECADES*.
- Pfister, R. (2006). Studies on South African Foreign Policy After Isolation. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid* (pp. 23–33). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Pfister, Roger. (2001). South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Towards Africa. *Electronic Journal of Africana Bibliography*, 6(1). <https://doi.org/10.17077/1092-9576.1003>
- Prys, M. (2008). *Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and "Quiet Diplomacy"* (No. 77; Working Paper Series). [www.giga-hamburg.de](http://www.giga-hamburg.de)
- Prys, M. (2009). *South Africa's dual role as regional power and global player: Running with the hare, hunting with the hounds*. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259863990\\_South\\_Africa's\\_dual\\_role\\_as\\_regional\\_power\\_and\\_global\\_player\\_Running\\_with\\_the\\_hare\\_hunting\\_with\\_the\\_hounds](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259863990_South_Africa's_dual_role_as_regional_power_and_global_player_Running_with_the_hare_hunting_with_the_hounds)
- Qobo, M. (2017). South Africa's Foreign Policy and Nation Branding: Regional Leadership and its Discontents. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39(1).

- [https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/strategic review](https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/strategic%20review)
- Qobo, M., & Dube, M. (2015). *South Africa's foreign economic strategies in a changing global system*.
- Quigley, J. (1992). Perestroika African Style : One-Party Government and Human Rights in Tanzania. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 13(3), 611–625.  
<https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1623&context=mjil>
- Raftopoulos, B. (2013). The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39(4), 971–988.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2013.862101>
- Rapport, A. (2016). Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford University Press.  
[https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.6796](https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264294.013.6796)
- Richardson, J. L. (2002). *Critical Liberalism in International Relations* (No. 7). Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University. <https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41669/3/02-7.pdf>
- Rosati, J. A. (1995). A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy. In L. Neack, J. A. K. Hey, & P. J. Haney (Eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and in its Second Generation*. (p. 20). Prentice Hall.
- Rothgeb Jr, J. . (1995). The Changing International Context for Foreign Policy. In L. Neack, J. A. . Hey, & P. J. Haney (Eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and in its Second Generation*. (pp. 33–48). Prentice Hall.
- Rusell, A. (2008, April 17). Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' meets an ever louder response. *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/ca920680-0ca9-11dd-86df-0000779fd2ac>
- Rwodzi, A. (2020). Reconciliation: A false start in Zimbabwe? (1980-1990). *Cogent Arts and Humanities*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2020.1745555>
- Sachikonye, L. (2004). *Constitutionalism, the Electoral System and Challenges for Governance and Stability in Zimbabwe*. ACCORD. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/001-constitutionalism-the-electoral-system-and-challenges-for-governance-and-stability-in-zimbabwe/>
- Sachikonye, L. (2013). Continuity or Reform in Zimbabwean Politics? An overview of the 2013 referendum. *Journal of African Elections*, 12(1), 178–185.  
<https://eisa.org/pdf/JAE12.1Sachikonye.pdf>
- Sachikonye, L. M. (2005). *Political parties and the democratisation process in Zimbabwe*. EISA. <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/political-parties-and-the-democratisation-process-in-zimbabwe/>
- SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, Pub. L. No. South African Institute for International Relations, 9 (2004). [https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SADC\\_-\\_Principles-and-Guidelines-Governing-Democratic-Elections.pdf](https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SADC_-_Principles-and-Guidelines-Governing-Democratic-Elections.pdf)
- SADC. (2010). *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics , Defence and Security*

- Cooperation* (p. 72). SADC.  
[https://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514\\_SADC\\_SIPO\\_English.pdf](https://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_English.pdf)
- SADC. (2017). Summary of the SADC Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015-2020. In *Summary of the SADC Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015-2020* (pp. 1–20). www.sadc.int. www.sadc.int
- Sadomba, Z. W. (2013). A Decade of Zimbabwe’s Land Revolution: The Politics of the War Veteran Vanguard. In Sam Moyo & W. Chambati (Eds.), *Land and Agrarian Reform in Former Colonial Zimbabwe* (pp. 80–122). CODESRIA.
- Sako, S. (2004). The NEPAD Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative: Building Institutions for Sustainable Development SOUMANA SAKO. In International Monetary Fund (Ed.), *New Partnership for Africa’s Development* (pp. 126–141). International Monetary Fund.
- Schoeman. (2007). South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Parther or “Just another Kid on the Block”? In A. Adebajo, A. Adadeji, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post Apartheid Era*. KwaZulu Natal University Press.
- Schoeman, M. (2015). South Africa as an emerging power: from label to “status consistency”? *South African Journal of International Relations*, 22(4), 429–445.
- Shai, K. B. (2016a). *An Afrocentric Critique of the United States of America’s foreign policy towards Africa: The case studies of Ghana and Tanzania, 1990-2014* [University of Limpopo]. <http://hdl.handle.net/10386/2610>
- Shai, K. B. (2016b). US Foreign Policy towards Ghana and Tanzania: An Afrocentric Review. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 40(2), 52–66.
- Shai, K. B. (2018). US Foreign Policy towards Ghana and Tanzania: An Afrocentric Review. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 40(2).
- Shillington, K. (2012). *History of Africa* (Third Edit). Palgrave Macmilan.  
<https://archive.org/details/historyofafrica00shil/page/n3/mode/2up>
- Sidiropoulos, E. (2007). *South Africa’s regional engagement for peace and security*.
- Singh, P. (2020). *South African Peacebuilding Needs New Purpose*.  
<https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/south-african-peacebuilding-needs-new-purpose>
- Slaughter, A.-M. (1995). Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law. *American University International Law Review*, 10(2), 717–743.  
<http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr>
- Smith, K. (2012). Soft Power: The Essence of South Africa’s foreign policy. In C. Landsberg & J. van Wyk (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. Volume 1* (pp. 68–81). Africa Institute of South Africa and Institute.
- Smith, S., Hadfield, A., & Dunne, T. (2012). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors and Cases* (S. Smith, A. Hadfield, & T. Dunne (eds.); Second Edi). Oxford University Press.
- Spies, Y. K. (2010). South Africa’s Multilateral Challenges in a “polypolar” world.

- International Spectator*, 45(4), 73–91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2010.527103>
- Swart, G., & Tonheim, M. (2015). *Africa 's pre-eminent peacemaker ? An appraisal of South Africa 's peacemaking role in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Issue March).
- Ta'a, T. (2014). Pan-Africanism: A Historiographical Analysis. *EJSSLS*, 1(1), 63–77. <https://fliphtml5.com/ihys/hnps/basic>
- Tayfur, M., F. (1994). Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign. *METU Studies in Development*, 21(1), 113–114. [https://www.academia.edu/37429391/Main\\_approaches\\_to\\_the\\_study\\_of\\_foreign\\_policy\\_Tayfur](https://www.academia.edu/37429391/Main_approaches_to_the_study_of_foreign_policy_Tayfur)
- Taylor, I. (2002). Zimbabwe's Debacle, Africa's Response and the Implications for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In H. Melber (Ed.), *Zimbabwe's Presidential Elections 2002 Evidence, Lessons and Implications* (No. 14; pp. 68–75). Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241803/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- Taylor, I., & Williams, P. (2017). Introduction: understanding Africa's place in world politics. In I. Taylor & P. William (Eds.), *Africa in International Politics: External involvement on the continent* (Second, pp. 1–22). Routledge.
- Taylor, Ian, & Williams, P. (2001a). The Royal African Society South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Meets Vagabondage Politique? *Source: African Affairs*, 100(399), 265–286. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents)
- Taylor, Ian, & Williams, P. (2001). The Royal African Society South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance Meets Vengabondage Politique. *Source: African Affairs*, 100(399), 265–286. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents)
- Tembo, J. (2016). *African Identity: A Question of Conceptual and Theoretical Purchase* [University of Pretoria]. [https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/60425/Tembo\\_African\\_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/60425/Tembo_African_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)
- Theys, S. (2018). *Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/>
- Thomas, David R, & Hodges, I. (2010). Developing Research Aims and Objectives. In D.R Thomas & I. Hodges (Eds.), *Designing and Planning your Research Project: Core Skills for Social and Health Researchers*. Sage Publications.
- Tondi, P. T. (1991). Pan-African Thought and Practice. *Alternation Special Edition 2*, 2(2005), 301–308. [https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA10231757\\_820](https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA10231757_820)
- Umezurike, S. A., & Lucky, A. (2015). *Exploring Diplomatic Crisis of Nigeria and South Africa between 1994 and 2013*. 4(1), 65–73. <https://doi.org/10.5901/ajis.2015.v4n1p65>

- Vale, P., & Maseko, S. (1998). South Africa and the African Renaissance. *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 74(2), 271–287.
- Van Kessel, I. (2002). An agenda for modernisation, neo-traditionalism or Africanisation? *Quest*, 15(1–2), 43–52.
- van Nieuwkerk, A. (2006). Foreign Policy Making in South Africa: Context, Actors and Process. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* (pp. 37–49). Institute for Global Dialogue.
- van Nieuwkerk, A. (2011). The regional roots of the African peace and security architecture: exploring centre–periphery relations. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 18(2), 169–189. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2011.588824>
- van Nieuwkerk, A. (2012a). A Review of South Africa’s Peace Diplomacy Since 1994. In C. Landsberg & J. van Wyk (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review: Vol. Volume 1* (pp. 84–107). African Institute of South Africa and Institute of Global Dialogue.
- van Nieuwkerk, A. (2012b). *Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa* (6). <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/08868.pdf>
- van Nieuwkerk, A., & Lalbahabur, A. (2020). South Africa’s Security Interests in Africa: Recommendations for the 2020s. In D. Bradlow & E. Sidiropoulos (Eds.), *Values, Interest and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times* (p. 24). Pretoria University Law Press. <https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/component/edocman/values-interests-and-power-south-african-foreign-policy-in-uncertain-times>
- Vickers, B. (2002). Pulpit Morality or Penny-pinching Diplomacy? The Discursive Debate on Mandela’s Foreign Policy. *Politeia: Journal for Political Science and Public Administration*, 21(2), 80–100. <http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/publications/docs/polit212.pdf>
- Wagner, C., Garner, M., & Kawulich, B. (2012). *Doing Social Research: A global context*. McGraw-Hill Education. Berkshire.
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc. [https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod\\_resource/content/0/Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics Addison-Wesley series in political science 1979.pdf](https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20Addison-Wesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%201979.pdf)
- Wang, H., & Li, S. (2018). Traditional literature review and research synthesis. In A. Phakithi, P. De Costa, L. Plonksy, & S. Starfield (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Linguistics Research Methodology* (Issue January, pp. 123–144). <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59900-1>
- Wasike, S., & Odhiambo, E. O. . (2016). A critique of the usefulness of theories in explaining socio-political phenomenon. *Asian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences*, 3(1), 29–23. [https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod\\_resource/content/0/Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics Addison-Wesley series in political science 1979.pdf](https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20Addison-Wesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%201979.pdf)
- Webber, M., & Smith, M. (2002). *Foreign Policy in a Transformed World* (First Edit). Routledge. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315847269>
- Wei, W. X. (2013). Special Issue: Chinese Trade and Investment in Africa. *Journal of African Business*, 14(2), 72–74. doi:10.1080/15228916.2013.812012

- Wendt, Alexander. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organisation*, 46(2), 391–425.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858>
- Wendt, Alexander. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* (A. Wendt (ed.); First). Cambridge University Press. <http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Wendt-Social-Theory-of-International-Politics.pdf>
- Willett, T. D. (2002). *Towards a Broader Public Choice Analysis of the International Monetary Fund Claremont* (No. 2002–25).  
<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/31443/1/366361244.pdf>
- Wintour, P., & Elliott, L. (2008, July 7). G8 Condemns Mbeki's Quiet Diplomacy over Zimbabwe. *The Guardian*, 1.  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/07/zimbabwe.southafrica1>
- Yin, R. K. (1993). *Applications of Case Study Research*. Sage Publications.
- Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (5th Editio). Sage Publications.
- Youla, C. (2009). *THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF MANDELA AND MBEKI: A CLEAR CASE OF IDEALISM VS REALISM ?* Stellenbosch University.
- Zembe, W., & Masunda, O. (2015). The Global Political Agreement (GPA) Constitution in Zimbabwe: A New People-Driven Constitution or a Misnomer? Wurayayi Zembe and Octavious Chido Masunda. In J. De Visser, N. Steytler, D. Powell, & E. Durojaye (Eds.), *Constitution-Building in Africa* (Issue January 2015, pp. 19–47). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845254609-19>
- Zondi, S. (2011). ZANU-PF and MDC Power-Sharing: Zimbabwe Still at a Crossroads? In H. Besada (Ed.), *Zimbabwe: Picking Up The Pieces* (pp. 13–35). Palgrave Macmillan US. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230116436\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230116436_2)
- Zondi, S. (2015). Africanity, pan-Africanism and African Renaissance: South Africa's Africa agenda under Mbeki and Zuma. In L. Masters, S. Zondi, J. van Wyk, & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review* (Vol. 2, pp. 97–114). Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Zondi, Siphamandla. (2012). *South Africa in Southern Africa: A Perspective*. Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung.
- Zuma, J. G. (2009). *State of the Nation Address His Excellency President Jacob Zuma*. Department of International Relations and Cooperations.  
<http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/jzum0603.html>

---

<sup>i</sup> This section shall deal with African Renaissance as a policy, how it came about and its objectives. Later on we will discuss the African Renaissance as a concept.

---

<sup>ii</sup> SADC was initially called SADCC before it was transformed in 1992. See <https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty>