A benevolent or malevolent hiding hand? Retrospection on the outcomes of the public transport strategy and action plan

Abstract

The Department of Transport initiated a Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan (PTSAP) in 2007 to install high-quality Integrated Public Transport Networks (IPTN) in up to 12 cities and six district municipalities by 2020. This paper reflects upon the outcomes of the PTSAP. The evaluation extends beyond simply measuring whether or not the stated objectives of the strategy were attained. It draws from Hirschman’s ‘principle of the hiding hand’, to explore whether the PTSAP may have had unintended consequences. A ‘benevolent hiding hand’ refers to unexpected outcomes that are positive, while a ‘malevolent hiding hand’ refers to unexpected outcomes that are negative. Cape Town (MyCiTi), Tshwane (A Re Yeng) and Rustenburg (Ya Rona) were selected as case studies of IPTN projects. Case study data were assembled from government records and in-depth interviews with key stakeholders (including project consultants, project management personnel, and government officials). The case study analysis found that the PTSAP was too ambitious, and that its implementation was slow and encountered multiple challenges. The case cities only partially achieved intended outcomes, to varying degrees. However, it is argued that the establishment of treasury grants accessible to municipal governments for public transport systems improvements, and the staffing of municipal transport departments with officials capable of planning public transport networks and contracting companies to operate services and manage fare collection, amongst other capabilities, represents a ‘benevolent hiding hand’ that has enhanced the capacity of at least some local governments to confront subsequent public transport improvement challenges.