The effect of reframing relative to intuition on decision quality in complex and unfamiliar tasks

Abstract

This study responds to a call for research that recognised the role of reframing, as a third cognitive strategy in managerial decision-making, along with the often studied Type 1 and Type 2 decision processes in dual processing theory. Reframing as a cognitive strategy utilises both Type 1 non-conscious processing and Type 2 conscious processing. As a relatively new construct within behavioural decision-making the effectiveness of reframing as a cognitive strategy required further testing. This research therefore fulfilled the purpose, through an experimental research methodology to test the effectiveness of reframing, relative to intuition, within decision-making contexts of low familiarity and high complexity. Moreover, the study examined whether the type of intuition used by individuals interacts with the effectiveness of reframing relative to intuition. Although the theorised effect of reframing in decision quality of unfamiliar and complex decision tasks was well-motivated, the experiment did not find statistically significant support that reframing as a cognitive strategy is more effective that intuition in these contexts. Furthermore, the study did not find support that the different types of intuition used by individuals interacts with the effectiveness of reframing relative to intuition. The study, however, found that reframing has a positive coefficient relative to intuition as a baseline group. These findings offer behavioural decision-making researchers several new questions regarding the relative value of reframing as a cognitive strategy. Organisations are encouraged to develop a broad range of cognitive strategies to support effective decision-making, not limited to reframing or intuitive processes.