Regeringsvorming kragtens die grondwet sonder ’n volstrekte partypolitieke wenner

Abstract

AFRIKAANS : Ofskoon die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet deeglik voorsiening maak vir ’n veelpartydemokrasie, het sterk politieke kragte meegebring dat die land vir die afgelope 30 jaar ’n tipiese eenparty-oorheerste stelsel onder aanvoering van die regerende African National Congress (ANC) was. In die lig hiervan was verkiesingsuitslae voorspelbaar en was regeringsvorming na afloop van verkiesings telkens ’n maklike en voorspelbare oefening. Die politieke klimaat het egter nou so verander dat eenparty-oorheersing waarskynlik verby is. Dit beteken dat die vorming van ’n regering na ’n verkiesing in die toekoms (na die verkiesing van 29 Mei vanjaar inderdaad ook ten dele was) ’n baie komplekse oefening kan wees. (Dit was inderdaad ook ten dele so toe ’n veelparty-regering gevorm is nadat die ANC nie daarin kon slaag om ’n volstrekte meerderheid in die verkiesing te behaal nie.) Gevolglik het die grondwetlike en tersaaklike wetlike bepalings oor die bepaling en aankondiging van die verkiesingsuitslag asook die bepalings wat regeringsvorming daarna reguleer, besonder aktueel geraak. Die vorming van ’n regering na afloop van ’n verkiesing begin met die verkiesing van die president ten tyde van die eerste sitting van die Nasionale Vergadering na die verkiesing. Indien geen party ’n volstrekte meerderheid behaal het nie, sal meer as een party op ’n presidentskandidaat moet ooreenkom. Watter soort meerderheid word vereis vir die verkiesing van die president? Wat gebeur egter as die onderskeie partye nie oor die presidentskandidaat kan ooreenstem nie? Is dit voorts moontlik dat ’n president verkies kan word sonder die ondersteuning van die meerderheid van die lede van die Nasionale Vergadering? Indien wel, wat gebeur daarna? Sal ’n werkbare regering gevorm kan word? Hierdie vrae word bespreek aan die hand van ’n ontledende oorsig van grondwetlike en tersaaklike wetlike bepalings. Dit word verduidelik met behulp van ’n aantal moontlike scenario’s wat ten tyde van die verkiesing van die president sou kon geld.ENGLISH : Judged by its Constitution the South African state squares with all the essentials of a multiparty democracy. Thus, section 1(d) of the Constitution, part of the founding provision, proclaims the Republic of South Africa a sovereign, democratic state founded on universal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. This value is fleshed out by a multitude of operational constitutional provisions and supporting legislation. Nonetheless the South African constitutional order morphed into a system in which a single party, the African National Congress (ANC), distinctively dominates the party-political scene, consistently vanquishing its opposition in successive elections, and dominating the ideological scene with its ideology of transformationism. Arguably the primary reason for the ANC’s enduring dominance is the strength of the factor of racial and cultural identity. Accordingly, South African voters are showing a strong propensity for voting in accordance with their racial and cultural identity, while the ideological and political merits and the quality of governance of the ruling party fail to be the prominent considerations one would expect in a rationally based democratic order. On close analyses these political forces – the identity factor – have changed the multi-party nature of the constitutional order contemplated by the Constitution, into a one-party dominated system, thus constituting a glaring instance of lapsed or substituted constitutional law resulting in a change of the constitutional order, without the text of the Constitution having been amended – a phenomenon discussed in Malan (2019: ch. 4 and 5). Since the municipal elections of 2016, and more so the 2021 municipal elections one-party domination in South Africa shows signs of subsiding. The ANC is losing support – a trend stimulated by successive splits in its ranks, the latest the uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party under the leadership of former President Zuma. In consequence, the formation of a new government following a national election that fails to produce an outright victor might henceforth necessitate coalition governments with all its accompanying political and constitutional complexities. This is the main focus of the present discussion. However, the Constitution is silent on the formation of a (multiparty) government in the event of a single party failing to secure an outright majority. Hence, conducting coalition negotiations and concluding coalition agreements are purely political matters. Under section 57(2) of the Electoral Act the Electoral Commission – commonly known as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) must declare the result of the national election. In the normal course of events that will be within seven days of the election. The newly elected National Assembly (NA) convenes at a time and place determined and presided over by the Chief Justice. During its first siting the new NA must, amongst other things, elect a president in accordance with a process governed by the Constitution. If negotiations prior to the first sitting of the NA have been successful and the partners to a multiparty government have also agreed to a presidential candidate enjoying the support of the partners that account for an outright majority of members of the NA, that is, at least 201 of its 400 members, the election of the president would most probably be running smoothly, the (majority of the) NA simply formally rubberstamping the agreement of the coalition partners. If only one candidate is nominated, the nominee is declared the elected president. If more than one candidate is nominated, Item 6 of Part A of Schedule 3 of the Constitution provides that the candidate who receives a majority of the votes is declared the elected president. From reading the phrase in italics above, together with Item 7 of Part A of Schedule 3, it is clear that to be elected the successful candidate is required to receive more votes than his/her opponent (if there is a single opponent), or more than the total of votes of his/her opponents (if more than one opponent have been nominated). However, the successful candidate need not receive the support of the majority of members of the NA. Reasons for this interpretation is explained in detail in the discussion. If three or more candidates are nominated and none secures an outright majority, the candidate who receives the least votes, is eliminated and another vote taken. Votes are then repeated until one of the candidates receives a majority of the votes and declared the elected president. The discussion proceeds with reference to seven scenarios, repeatedly also accounting for the interplay between the negotiations (and possible agreements) for the formation of a multiparty government on the one hand, and the result of the consecutive votes for the presidential candidates on the other. The scenarios show, amongst other things, that the voting behaviour of members of minority parties in the NA might materially impact the outcome of the election for the president. This may result from strategic abstentions, or from either in the first or later votes, favouring a presidential candidate of a smaller party against the candidate put up by the ANC. This could even have the effect that such a candidate be elected as president, thus keeping the majority party out of office. Negotiations for a multiparty government might already be underway and concluded before the first vote in the NA. However, a person not enjoying the support of the majority of members of the NA, might even be elected president without the conclusion of a multiparty agreement. That would precipitate a minority government with all its accompanying vicissitudes and potential governmental instability, including vulnerability to motions of no confidence. A (majority) coalition agreement may, however, also be reached at any later stage, that is, after a minority government has been in office for some time.

The dynamics of the formation of coalition governments applies mutatis mutandis to provincial governments – once again a realistic prospect for contemporary South Africa.