Cross-cultural and applied ethics in the light of a relational moral theory

Abstract

This article is a reply to six contributions to a special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice that is devoted to critically discussing A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and Beyond the Continent. In this book I articulate a comprehensive principle of rightness that is substantially informed by relational values salient in the African philosophical tradition (and some others in the Global South) and defend it as preferable to some major moral-theoretic rivals, including standard versions of utilitarianism and Kantianism. Some contributions argue for a method of undertaking cross-cultural ethics different from mine , while others consider to what extent my general ethic can entail and powerfully explain particular duties or at times aspects of morality beyond duties. The latter topics include: when biotechnological enhancements are permissible, how to respond emotionally to injustice, how solitude is morally significant, what we owe the environment, and what the obligations of a private business are. I work to clarify and motivate my approach within the constraints of a brief reply.