A framework for bank resolution in Namibia.

Abstract

Banks are regarded as special financial institutions because, apart from the various critical intermediary and other functions they fulfil in a financial system, the hallmark of their business models is receiving deposits from the public and using such deposits for extending loans against interest from which they make profit.

Unlike other companies, banks are however vulnerable to loss of public confidence and remain exposed to various risks and failure.

Banks are thus critically important actors in domestic and global financial systems, - thus their safety is critical to the maintenance of financial stability. As a result, banks are subject to stringent regulation and supervision to ensure their safety. Despite prudential regulation, the failure of banks remains a reality. If the risk of bank failure is not adequately addressed through appropriate regulation and supervision, , it may result in a financial crisis like the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (2008 GFC).

Because banks play a special role in an economy and their failure may have an adverse impact on financial stability and depositors, this thesis aligns with the view expressed by academics and international organisations that there is a need for a special regime (lex specialis) to deal with the failure of banks since normal insolvency procedures are not suitable for this purpose. f. This is because bank failures require swift, timely intervention by a supervisor to resolve failing banks in an orderly and optimal manner to ensure the maintenance of financial stability, depositor protection and relegating bailouts with taxpayers’ money as a last resort.

A very notable lesson that emanated from the 2008 GFC is the criticality of special resolution frameworks for banks; the need to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors, and depositors, while promoting financial stability objectives. As a result, the need for special resolution frameworks for banks which empowers Resolution Authorities with adequate resolution tools and powers to resolve a failing bank timeous and orderly , has become a legislative imperative in contemporary financial systems.

To deal with bank failures in Namibia, the Banking Institutions Act, 2 of 1998 (the BIA 1998) contained provisions that allowed for the assumption of control and liquidation of a failed bank. However, the newly enacted Banking Institution Act 13 of 2023 (the BIA 2023 which repealed the BIA 1998) has changed that position and introduced a single provision in section 70 that provides for bank resolution. Until now, prior to the introduction of this very new statutory provision, all bank failures in Namibia were dealt with under the limited supervisory tools of the BIA 1998.

This study seeks to determine whether section 70 of the BIA 2023, is sufficiently aligned with international best practice as captured in the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (FSB KAs), issued in 2011, as updated in 2014 and 2024. Alternatively, if the regime introduced by the BIA 2023 does not adequately align with the FSB KAs it is then considered whether the new Namibian bank resolution framework requires to be strengthened further to better align it with the FSB KAs. To consider possible further reforms to the new Namibian bank resolution regime, this thesis considers the resolution frameworks in Germany and Nigeria by way of comparative studies to observe best practices.