The impact of political interference on corporate strategy execution by the board of directors in Namibian state-owned enterprises

Abstract

This study investigated the impact of political interference on corporate strategy execution within Namibian state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Despite governance frameworks such as the Public Enterprises Governance Act, NamCode, and King IV, SOEs continue to underperform, largely due to systemic political influence. Using a qualitative, interpretivist multiple-case study design, data was collected through semi-structured interviews with board members, executives, government officials, and governance experts, complemented by documentary analysis. Thematic analysis revealed that political interference is pervasive, primarily through loyalty-based board appointments, informal directives, and blurred boundaries between policy-making and oversight. These practices undermine board autonomy, foster anticipatory compliance, and disrupt strategic execution through project reversals, short-term priorities, and leadership instability. Institutional weaknesses such as weak enforcement of governance codes and absence of consequence management enable persistent interference. The study contributes to governance scholarship by integrating agency and institutional theories to explain how informal norms override formal governance structures. It identifies a causal chain linking political appointments to governance paralysis and execution failure. Practical recommendations include merit-based independent board appointments, mandatory written shareholder directives, structural separation of ownership, oversight and operational roles, and enforceable performance contracts. These findings offer actionable insights for policymakers and regulators in their efforts to strengthen SOE governance in Namibia and similar emerging economies.