Nuclear energy security : a critical analysis of the North-South diplomatic discourse on the nuclear fuel cycle, 2004-2011

Abstract

The diplomatic discourse on nuclear energy security has intensified since former United States (US) President GW Bush on 11 February 2004 announced a number of initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including a proposed ban on new enrichment and re-processing facilities in countries that do not already possess such facilities. Although there is a high level of diplomatic activity characterised by various proposals on the nuclear fuel cycle at different international fora, the debate seems to have stagnated. Firstly, this study examines the North-South diplomatic discourse on the future of the nuclear fuel cycle and, in particular, the extent to which the choice of diplomatic modes by the major actors has contributed to a stagnated debate. For this purpose, North- South perspectives on nuclear energy security are explored to determine the degree to which the dominant state-centric, national security approach as opposed to the wider conception of security found in the more recent and evolving human security paradigm has prevented consensus. While the global South prefers to pursue its interests predominantly through the multilateral mode, the North prefers a more selective approach or what is sometimes referred to as “à la carte diplomacy”. These approaches, in both form and substance, have curtailed North-South dialogue, thereby limiting the search for solutions to address the continuing dilemma and recurring tension posed by nuclear energy with negative consequences for both security and development. Secondly, an assessment is made of the diplomatic institutional arrangements and norms governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to determine whether they remain able to respond to the risks associated with the expected “nuclear renaissance”. These institutions and norms reflect the global power configurations of the immediate post- WWII era and have been discredited due to their inability to deliver on the promise of increased participation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a world free of nuclear weapons. This study argues that the prevailing state-centred approach to nuclear energy security and the choice of diplomatic modes have rendered the existing diplomatic institutions and norms governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ineffective in responding to the challenges posed by the predicted increase in the development and use of nuclear energy in the twenty-first century. I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the Master of Diplomatic Studies degree at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.