How fundamental is the right to free movement of persons within the European Union?

Abstract

The free movement of persons is a key pillar of European integration. However, whether it constitutes a fundamental right remains contentious. This article argues that the fundamental status of free movement has been interpreted inconsistently, and highlights the need to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality by clearly affirming it as a fundamental right. The claim is that a legal redesign of this right is required. The article uses Rawls’ theory of justice to formulate a clearer normative standard for evaluating and redesigning European law on free movement of persons. The proposed shift towards a human‑rights‑based, residence‑anchored conception of free movement can thus be framed as an effort to align the European Union’s basic structure more closely with Rawlsian principles: securing free movement as an equal basic liberty for all legally resident persons and restructuring mobility‑related rules to promote, rather than undermine, fair equality of opportunity across the Union.