The rules of the game: business elite behaviour in limited access orders

Abstract

Academic interest in the impact that business (or economic) elites have on national institutions has risen alongside global inequality. The question is more compelling within emerging markets which vary significantly in their institutional complexity. On the one hand economic elites may choose to buttress autocrats, on the other they have precipitated democratisation in authoritarian states. What remains unclear, is the impact a country’s institutional context has on business elites choices. Using Social Order Theory’s limited access orders (LAO) construct, which differentiates states by how much access to political and economic institutions is restricted, this qualitative case study interviewed 40 business and 8 other elites across the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Kingdom of Eswatini, Côte d’Ivoire, and South Africa. Each country represents a different LAO typology, namely: Fragile, Basic Authoritarian, Basic Competitive-Clientelist, and Mature. The research reveals how institutional context does constrain business elite behaviours in LAOs. The structural power of economic elites, a determinant of their choices, is enhanced by consolidation mechanisms. Where elites had institutionalised means of developing consensus, their states were more ready for a transition to a more open order. In a virtuous cycle, economic elite influences rises as LAOs fulfil the doorstep conditions required for such a transition. These findings advance the understanding of how transitions between social orders could be operationalised and the roles of business elites within elite coalitions, which were little defined before in the literature. It is axiomatic that the work also contributes to elite theory. Future research should examine how the orientation of economic elites motivates them to pursue elite consensus.