The defence and limits of consensual democracy

Abstract

In this article, I draw on the neglected tradition of African political and legal philosophy to address the sort of representative democracy suitable for twenty-first-century urban societies. In particular, I present and evaluate for a global audience consensualism about democracy, the view that some kind of unanimous agreement amongst elected legislators should normally be a necessary condition for a statute to count as valid law. After expounding this view, which is more or less the default in the African philosophical tradition, I present a new argument for it by drawing on a plausible communal ethic, contend that this argument is a better explanation of why consensualism might be justified than extant moral rationales, draw on the ethic to explain why consensualism might not be unconditionally justified and might be unjust in certain circumstances, and finally defend consensualism from major objections that have recently been made and remain as yet unaswered.