Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Entities Involved in Core Crimes

Abstract

War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression (hereinafter, ‘core crimes’) could not be perpetrated without those who finance them. This dissertation examines the basis for criminal liability in international criminal law (‘ICL’) for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. Despite the need for clear rules, neither international courts nor scholars agree upon (i) whether liability exist for individuals who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes; and (ii) if so, the circumstances under which such liability exists. To determine the minimum standard of liability of these individuals, this work analyses the legal rules relating to complicity in twenty selected common law and civil law jurisdictions in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania. The aim of this assessment is to determine whether general principles of law exist that are recognized by the community of nations with respect to the minimum standard of liability for aiders and abettors. Therefore, this work proposes a comparative framework for assessing legal rules relating to complicity, and it advances a normative claim as to how legal rules should be structured concerning the criminal responsibility of individuals who finance entities that commit core crimes. The comparative study concludes for aiding and abetting that, at this time, the minimum standard of knowledge is active knowledge. However, this work argues that a revision of this standard is in order to include wilful blindness. Regarding the intent requirement, the comparative analysis found that dolus eventualis is included in the definition of intent.