The reformation atonement theory of penal substitution : a systematic-theological study of its coherence with divine justice

Abstract

Penal substitution has been explored in detail both within the areas of theology and philosophy. Its understanding and application of justice has been a focal point of objection for many. While often understood in purely retributive terms, there is scope to analyse its coherence with divine justice in a more comprehensive biblical manner. This systematic-theological study explores whether the Reformation atonement theory of penal substitution is coherent with divine justice. There are three objections to consider that challenge this coherence: the Reformers understanding and application of divine justice was influenced by their cultural legal context instead of being directed by scripture; penal substitution is self-contradictory as it both attempts to uphold positive retributivism (through its focus on punishing the guilty) while also contradicting negative retributivism (Jesus was innocent yet punished); penal substitution reduces divine justice to purely retributive terms. Firstly, a threefold approach is utilised to identify a broad overview of divine justice: four theories of justice within contemporary philosophy are identified and four OT narratives are analysed to determine their use/application; an exploration of OT and NT justice terms; divine justice and its wider structure within the kingdom of God motif. Secondly, an analysis of selected Reformers to determine their understanding of penal substitution as well as the place and application of divine justice within their atonement thinking. Lastly, an evaluative discussion assesses whether the Reformation atonement theory of penal substitution is coherent with divine justice in light of the findings of the previous two sections. Three observations are made: firstly, the Reformers had a clear scriptural basis for understanding retributive justice to be an essential element of divine justice. Secondly, implicit within their thinking and available within their environment are the necessary concepts to address the supposed self-contradiction within penal substitution. Thirdly, clarifying methodology such as “doctrine”, “metaphor”, “theory”, and “motif”, the kaleidoscopic view, and the epistemological presuppositions, can prevent penal substitution from being reductive in its understanding and application of divine justice. It is therefore possible to conclude that penal substitution is coherent with divine justice.