A study of consciousness as an ethically significant property and its value and significance in human-animal conflict

Abstract

In this thesis I argue that current approaches to animal ethics, while valuable for solving cases of indirect conflict between humans and animals, are not equipped to deal with cases where humans and animals are in direct, unavoidable conflict with each other. Those approaches that focus on consciousness as ethically relevant factor however, are superior since they can make distinctions between individuals even with many other factors (level of interest in the conflict, sentience etc.) being equal. I also argue that it is reasonable to attribute consciousness to animals, and that consciousness is ethically relevant and identifiable in the behaviour of animals, even if not directly reportable though language for example. Building on this, I further argue that we can more accurately ascribe consciousness to animals through their intentional behaviour, rather than more traditional indicators such as tool use or language, both to those animals closely related to us and those that are very different to us. This consciousness has ethical relevance, and if we can determine the level of, or type of consciousness that each species in a direct conflict possesses, we can more effectively solve direct, unavoidable conflicts between humans and other animals.