The Role of State Institutions in Preventing Violent Conflict in Angola

Abstract

The majority of the literature within the study of Political Sciences suggests and tries to paint a picture of how to manage societies and prevent conflict, and in doing so how State structures (institutions) can better manage and mediate social relations in curbing conflict. International Law - and the later establishment of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) - builds on the foundations of Political Sciences by creating a framework for which States must not only adhere to minimum standards of behaviour on how they interact with other States but also and, more importantly - how they treat their citizens.

Despite such a seemingly simple relationship (systems and rules) and the normative standards at the international level for the protection of human rights, this thesis argues that overly-centralised states have a hand in contributing towards the emergence of conflict. The design of the State, through its institutions, is paramount in safeguarding individual rights and in doing so, preventing the occurrence and or resurgence of violence. Furthermore, the thesis contends that while there are both global and regional mechanisms for the protection of human rights which promote values of peace, inclusiveness and democratic governance, States are still the main actors in international politics. As such it is their responsibility to structure institutions which would reflect such values based on their local contexts and realities.

Angola, the case study for this inquiry, confirms that the very nature of its institutions has created conditions under which individual rights and liberties are undermined, enhanced by its overly-centralised State with a strong command culture. Since independence, Angola has experienced a situation of social and political instability through (1) an attempted coup almost immediately after independence, and (2) a civil war which would continue for nearly thirty years. Due to these factors, Angola has never had the opportunity to develop democratic institutions which would work towards safeguarding individual rights while promoting democratic governance.

Such undemocratic trend has been a feature of Angola’s post-war political landscape. Paraphrasing Davis (1962) - dissatisfaction breeds dissent, and dissent leads to revolt. In an article entitled ‘Watch out Angola – repression only generates more dissent’ Marissa Moorman (2015) argued that the Angolan government has for the better part of a decade since the end of the Civil War mostly ‘resorted to force to stay in power’. In such regard, a recurring theme of this inquiry is that dissatisfaction breeds dissent and dissent breeds revolt. This dissatisfaction has then been seen in the form of the denial of rights, high levels of unemployment, corruption, and the centralisation of State power within the executive and the undermining of State institutions such as Parliament and the judiciary has created high levels of discontent, and though conflict is a natural part of human nature it can nevertheless be controlled, managed and prevented through institutional re-engineering. The reform of Angola’s State institutions is thus vital towards preventing a recurrence of violence.

The research for this thesis found that though the end of the civil war resulted in ‘peace’ and the adoption of a new constitution which specifies a wide range of rights, the overly-centralised State, high levels of corruption and institutional inefficiency has created bottlenecks towards the realisation of individual rights and freedoms. Several issues were identified which led to the civil war, in addition, and within the post-war context such issues are those which have yet to be addressed both socially and within the Constitution.

In addressing such hindrances, the author of the thesis identified that reforming the State and its institutions are vital not only for the prevention of violence but for the establishment of democratic governance. In doing so, the author found that there is an urgent need to decentralise State power by limiting executive power while at the same time further emphasising the role of provinces. Such emphasis is then also based on a more prominent role of the Angolan Parliament which should not only regain its full legislative and oversight functions of government (executive) but should assume a bicameral structure.

The conclusion is that for the achievement of such objectives, the onus not only falls on government but also civil society to begin designing a State which is inclusive and safeguards individual participation within the process of governance.