Abstract:
This article reviews the theoretical question pertaining to state-societal relations in developing political economies, with reference to South Africa. Three theoretical dispositions are critically evaluated for its explanatory reach, and the suggestion is made that these theories represent contending regime preferences operative on the interface between state, society and the economy. The compromise between two of the three regimes – liberalism and systemic patronage–originated in the need for a stable constitutional compromise between political elites in the aftermath of apartheid. The third regime preference, which manifests in a ‘captured state’- regime evolved as a consequence of inconsistencies and contradictions within the compromise between liberalism and systemic patronage. Whereas the first two regime preferences are embedded in sufficient levels of legitimacy, the latter is tolerated by the actors and constituents of systemic patronage, but actively opposed by liberal actors within the political economy. Theoretically, a clear distinction is made between the conceptual confines and operational features of the patrimonial state and the architecture of a political economy in which varying regime preferences either compete for control of the (re)distributive means of the state or coexist in an uneasy quest for political stability.
