The political (in) dependence of the judiciary in Cameroon : fact or fiction?

Abstract

My main concern in this paper is to critically examine judicial deference to the executive within the context of Cameroon. I portray how authorities in the country purposely fail to invest the judiciary with substantial levels of independence. In so doing, I look at the nexus between the domineering executive entity and the prevailing Hobbesian conception of separation of powers according to which powers mutually divided destroy each other. My investigation revolves around the idea as to know whether it is possible to mitigate political intrusion and interference to judicial independence when such intrusion and interference have become inherent and consubstantial to the modus operandi of the political system itself. Various studies on judicial independence are available but the peculiarity of the current one is not about the extent or limitation to judicial independence but it questions whether this independence exists in the first place. The study further innovates by providing a theory based approach which is an attempt to capture judicial motivations as well as the rationale behind the erosion of the liberal political theory within the context of Cameroon.