Abstract:
In this article I contend that the Constitution-making process in postapartheid
South Africa provides a suitable paradigm that could enable
post-independence Cameroon to break away from the past neo-colonialist
and authoritarian ideologies in its future Constitution-making processes.
Cameroon’s Constitution-making deficit can be traced back to the
independence Constitution-making process which implicitly facilitated
neo-colonialism. Conversely, the Constitution-making process in postapartheid
South Africa espoused a break from apartheid, oppression, and
authoritarianism. The nature and structures of the resultant Constitutions
of the two countries attest to this view. Using the Constitution-making
process in post-apartheid South Africa as an appropriate paradigm, I argue
for a new trajectory as a response to post-independence Cameroonian
Constitutions’ subjection to neo-colonialism and authoritarianism.
Inspiration from the South African paradigm of introducing the
judiciary into the Constitution-making process is a novelty worthy of
emulation by post-independence Cameroon. This paradigm promises
greater legitimacy in the Constitution-making process and renders the
final Constitution more ‘self-binding’ (binding on Cameroonians). The
suitability of the South African paradigm is informed by the imperative to
realign post-independence Cameroonian Constitutions with conventional
and democratic principles of Constitution-making as exemplified by the
post-apartheid South African model. In this way the Constitution-making
process in post-independence Cameroon would systematically eradicate
the ‘chicanery-approach’ of neo-colonialists and their neo-colonial
acolytes, so that the resulting constitution is a manifestation of the will
of the people.
