This dissertation aims to revitalise and revalue a currently disregarded conceptual field of tolerance, and explores the prospect of it - and its respective practice (toleration) - satisfying Nietzsche"s criteria of life-affirmation and flourishing. The project of revaluation undertaken within this dissertation entails an evaluative re-appraisal and a critically selective incorporation of the particular concepts of tolerance and toleration once highly esteemed during the Hellenistic period. This inquiry centres on the axiological, ethical and psychological perspectives on tolerance and toleration, whilst investigating their compatibility within a Nietzschean valuation. Considerations of a few overlapping epistemological perspectives which are apposite to the aforesaid are articulated. Including the effects on the affective and cognitive accompaniments to toleration, possible formulations of tolerance that undermine life-affirmation and flourishing are also considered from a meta-ethical perspective. In order to do so, a critical analysis of the incorporated aspects of tolerance and toleration is conducted in relation to resentment and ressentiment. The primary questions I address are: „what is it to tolerate?", „how would tolerance and toleration read within a Nietzschean valuation?‟, „what are the psychological - i.e. affective and cognitive - intricacies of tolerating and how do they feature in its procedure?", „what kinds of psychological attachment does one qua human being create in connection with the entities one tolerates?" and „are there possible psychological dangers regarding tolerance and toleration that a Nietzschean valuation can help identify?"