Is a notion of transcendence still possible, after (a certain) metaphysics, which enables a
sense of politics that does not reduce difference? This study seeks to address the question by
first suggesting that in Edmund Husserl s redefinition of the distinction between immanence
(the subject s cognition) and transcendence (the world/ the other) one finds a starting point
for the endeavor.
Additionally, three criteria for guiding the set-out task of thinking after metaphysics are
proposed. The first criterion concerns the modus operandi for thinking after metaphysics that
I call a thinking the same different taken from Martin Heidegger s way of engaging with the
history of thought. The second criterion is also provided by Heidegger in his critique of
ontotheology and accordingly concerns avoiding ontotheology, which is synonymous with
thinking after (a certain) metaphysics, i.e. the metaphysics of ontotheology. Furthermore, in
appropriating Heidegger, account is also taken of his involvement with the Nazi regime, as
demythologizing Heidegger with the help of John Caputo. The third and final criterion
concerns thinking the other (not the Other) sprouting from Emmanuel Levinas critique of
Heidegger sublating alterity.
In turn, these criteria are argued to be met in the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy, who also
redefines the distinction between immanence (subject) and transcendence (the world/ the
other), allowing me to make a case for Nancy providing an alternative sense of politics that
allows for difference. This alternative sense of politics is found in Nancy s re-appropriation
of Heidegger s notion of Mitsein, as thinking the with of being-with, which concerns the
plurality of singularities. Moreover, it is argued that Nancy s notion of transcendence as
transimmanence enables his alternative sense of politics.
Furthermore, Nancy s thought is brought into a debate with that of Levinas, who might also
be considered to provide a way to answer the question above. The debate hinges on Levinas
rejection, and Nancy re-appropriation of Heidegger and includes Critchley s Levinasian
critique of Nancy, as well as a Nancian reply and critique of Levinas in a discussion on love.
Following the debate, the concluding remarks propose why Nancy is preferred above Levinas
in answering the question, and the implications of Nancy s thought for the South African