Abstract:
South African rhinoceros (e.g. Diceros bicornis) and abalone (Haliotis midae) have in common that they
both are harvested under open-access conditions, are high-value commodities and are traded illegally. The
difference is that a legal market for abalone already exists. An open-access deterrence model was developed
for South African abalone, using Table Mountain National Park as a case study. It was found that illegal
poaching spiked following the closure of the recreational fishery. The resource custodian’s objective is to
maximise returns from confiscations. This study showed that a legal trade results in a ‘trading on extinction’
resource trap, with a race for profits, an increase in the probability of detection after a poaching event and the
depletion of populations. In contrast with HS Gordon’s seminal article (J Polit Econ 1954;62:124–142), profit
maximisation does not automatically improve the sustainability of the resource. Under certain conditions
(e.g. a legal trade with costly enforcement), profit maximisation may actually deplete abalone populations.
The article also has implications for rhino populations, as a legal trade is currently proposed.
