Trading on extinction : an open-access deterrence model for the South African abalone fishery
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Date
Authors
Crookes, Douglas
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
AOSIS Open Journals
Abstract
South African rhinoceros (e.g. Diceros bicornis) and abalone (Haliotis midae) have in common that they
both are harvested under open-access conditions, are high-value commodities and are traded illegally. The
difference is that a legal market for abalone already exists. An open-access deterrence model was developed
for South African abalone, using Table Mountain National Park as a case study. It was found that illegal
poaching spiked following the closure of the recreational fishery. The resource custodian’s objective is to
maximise returns from confiscations. This study showed that a legal trade results in a ‘trading on extinction’
resource trap, with a race for profits, an increase in the probability of detection after a poaching event and the
depletion of populations. In contrast with HS Gordon’s seminal article (J Polit Econ 1954;62:124–142), profit
maximisation does not automatically improve the sustainability of the resource. Under certain conditions
(e.g. a legal trade with costly enforcement), profit maximisation may actually deplete abalone populations.
The article also has implications for rhino populations, as a legal trade is currently proposed.
Description
This article forms part of a 3-year project studying new approaches to
model the economics of scarce resources.
Keywords
Rhino, System dynamics, Illegal harvesting, Predator–prey, Table Mountain National Park, South African abalone, South African rhinoceros
Sustainable Development Goals
Citation
Crookes DJ. Trading on
extinction: An open-access
deterrence model for the
South African abalone fishery.
South African Journal of Science. 2016 ; 112(3/4), Art. #2015-0237, 9 pages.
http://dx.DOI.org/ 10.17159/sajs.2016/20150237.