Abstract:
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was initially established as a coordination conference in 1980 and was transformed into a treaty organisation in 1992. Challenges of lack of coordination, inefficiency and lack of policy harmonisation led to the amendment of the Treaty in 2001. While the amendment of the Treaty served to address some of the challenges of the organisation, it failed to address the core challenge of the democratic deficit inherent in SADC s governance framework. While the SADC Treaty has as part of its principles and objectives the observance and promotion of democracy and the rule of law, both in its own processes and in its Member States, the design of the SADC institutions does not reflect these normative values. Governance of SADC is characterised by excessive executivism under the overarching powers of the Summit of Heads of State or Government. This democratic deficit is most prominently evidenced by the suspension and eventual disbandment of the SADC Tribunal, the only judicial organ of the organisation. The suspension and disbandment of the Tribunal, in addition to the obvious issue of legality that it raises since it was done in the absence of Treaty amendment, also raises the fundamental question of decision making in SADC in general, as the current treaty framework does not provide for meaningful conversation between and among the key institutions of SADC in matters involving policy formulation and implementation. There is also no institution with a strong oversight role in SADC. There is need for constitutional change in SADC if the organisation is serious in its commitment to achieve its objectives, which it has defined as its Common Agenda. This study proposes a treaty based reform process that is informed by the institutional model of shared governance. One of the several core tenets of this model is that in an organisation, there should be meaningful conversation among the internal stakeholders before a decision is made. For such conversation to be meaningful, there should be the broadest possible exchange of information among the components of an organisation. The proposals made by this study include transforming the Secretariat into an effective institution that formulates SADC laws and policies as well as their implementation frameworks; creation of a SADC parliament that would play a meaningful role on the amendment of the SADC Treaty and in the adoption of the budget; and an independent and accessible judicial body with significant powers of review. Shared governance as conceptualised in this study is not a substitute for, nor does it compete with related concepts like constitutionalism, separation of powers, the rule of law and participatory democracy, but in fact complements them. In addition to these proposals, there is a recommendation for the adoption of a robust access to information regime in which the shared governance institutional model would be anchored. There is also a recommendation for a new regime of law making through community legal instruments that would be directly applicable in Member States as opposed to the largely ineffective protocols.
