Applying Zartman's theory of ripeness to the Zimbabwean conflict : 2000-2009

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dc.contributor.advisor Miti, Katabaro en
dc.contributor.postgraduate Thusi, Enoch en
dc.date.accessioned 2015-11-25T09:53:42Z
dc.date.available 2015-11-25T09:53:42Z
dc.date.created 2015/09/01 en
dc.date.issued 2015 en
dc.description Mini-dissertation (MDPS)--University of Pretoria, 2015. en
dc.description.abstract This study applies Zartman's theory of ripeness to the Zimbabwean conflict over the period 2000-2009. According to this theory conflicts can only be resolved when the parties have reached a stalemate and perceived mediation as an alternative way out. As long as the two main protagonists in the Zimbabwean conflict, Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) had not reached a stalemate, it was not possible to resolve the conflict by means of an assisted negotiation. It is this that explains why it was very difficult for the Southern African Development Community {SADC) to resolve the conflict in Zimbabwe that started more or less in 2000 and turned more violent as time went on. Several efforts made by President Mbeki both on his behalf and on behalf of SADC made no lead way precisely because the conflict was not yet ripe for resolution. It was after only the 2008 elections saw the MDC - Tsvangirai gaining huge electoral support that challenged the ZANU - PF's hold on power that things began to change for ZANU-PF which up to this point it had hoped to destroy MDC through violence against its leaders, members and supporters. The electoral outcome demonstrated large support for the MDC that could no longer be ignored. Accommodation with MDC was the only way out. The violence that followed the parliamentary elections threatened to destroy the country and forced Tsvangirai to abandon the re-run of the presidential elections clearly demonstrated to the MDC that ZANU-PF and Mugabe could not be defeated through the ballot box as they controlled the security forces. The only way to share power was to negotiate with the ZANU-PF. At this point both parties were ready to enter into meaningful negotiations and resolve their differences. It was beyond dispute that a stalemate had been reached and some form of accommodation and compromise was necessary. Hence the acceptance of mediation which resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2009 and the creation of the government of national unity. en
dc.description.availability Unrestricted en
dc.description.degree MDPS en
dc.description.department Political Sciences en
dc.description.librarian tm2015 en
dc.identifier.citation Thusi, E 2015, Applying Zartman's theory of ripeness to the Zimbabwean conflict : 2000-2009, MDPS Mini-dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, viewed yymmdd <http://hdl.handle.net/2263/50806> en
dc.identifier.other S2015 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2263/50806
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher University of Pretoria en_ZA
dc.rights © 2015 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. en
dc.subject UCTD en
dc.title Applying Zartman's theory of ripeness to the Zimbabwean conflict : 2000-2009 en
dc.type Mini Dissertation en


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