'Superstition' as a contemplative term : a Wittgensteinian perspective

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Authors

Kroesbergen, Hermen

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Springer

Abstract

Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in which theWittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating ‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate the meaning that religious beliefs have in the lives of both the faithful and their critics. I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be called superstitious.

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Keywords

Superstition, Genuine religion, Prosperity gospel, Contemplative conception of philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, D.Z. Phillips

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Citation

Kroesbergen, H 2015, 'Superstition' as a contemplative term : a Wittgensteinian perspective', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 105-122.