'Superstition' as a contemplative term : a Wittgensteinian perspective
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Date
Authors
Kroesbergen, Hermen
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Abstract
Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as
superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in
which theWittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as
a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition
is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating
‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate
the meaning that religious beliefs have in the lives of both the faithful and their critics.
I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using
examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply
this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular
Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be
called superstitious.
Description
Keywords
Superstition, Genuine religion, Prosperity gospel, Contemplative conception of philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, D.Z. Phillips
Sustainable Development Goals
Citation
Kroesbergen, H 2015, 'Superstition' as a contemplative term : a Wittgensteinian perspective', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 105-122.