The roles of risk and of a perceived sense of injustice in union members’ decision to participate in unprotected strikes

Abstract

Kelly’s mobilization theory does not provide for the role of any cost/risk analysis as part of the process of deciding to embark upon collective action. On the other hand the theories advanced by the like of McAdam, Wiltfang and Simmons considering the incorporation of a cost/benefit analyses as part of the decision to embark upon collective action, do not have regard to the development of a sense of injustice. This study harmonizes the two approaches in seeking to answer the question why employees engage in unprotected strikes considering the significant risk involved. In doing so the study identifies the kind of triggers that would induce such a sense of injustice to trigger participation in unprotected strikes, whilst also investigating whether participants in unprotected strikes actually moderate their conduct to decrease the risks of such participation. This study considered all 98 reported judgements of the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court that were reported by LexisNexis. The methodology used in this study was content analysis of a quantitative nature. Descriptive statistics were used to identify patterns, relationships and trends. The analysis of the reported judgements shows that procedural disputes involving single issues at single employers, arising from time-sensitive unilateral changes to workplace practices, are likely to trigger unprotected strikes. The study further demonstrated that employees participating in unprotected strikes and their trade unions actually moderate their conduct to decrease the risk of dismissal. A close relationship between the profound sense of injustice that triggers unprotected strikes and the decisions to moderate the risks were established.