In hierdie artikel word aangevoer dat ubuntu in bepaalde kontekste in die
staatsreg van besondere waarde kan wees, maar dat die toepaslikheid
daarvan op ander gebiede onder verdenking is. Wat die toepaslikheid
daarvan betref, word geredeneer dat daar ’n korpus van reg, genaamd die
reg van inter-gemeenskapsbetrekkinge aan die ontwikkel is. Die grondslag
hiervan is in die wesensaard van die staat self. Op die keper beskou is die
staat die beliggaming van, en waarborg vir die openbare vrede (of behoort
dit ten minste so te wees). Die openbare vrede is op sy beurt afhanklik van
die instandhouding van gesonde betrekkinge tussen gemeenskappe, by
gebreke waarvan die veiligheid van die gemeenskappe in die gedrang kom
en die stabiliteit, en trouens die voortbestaan van die staat self, in die
gedrang kom. In die bespreking word met verwysing na die beskouing in
Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor ubuntu aangevoer dat ubuntu saam met die
verbod op haatspraak en dergelike verbiedinge wat die openbare vrede
kan ontwrig, sowel as die internasionale reg rakende volksmoord en
verwante internasionale misdade, die ontluikende reg van intergemeenskapsbetrekkinge,
beliggaam. Daarenteen kan ubuntu egter
treffend ontoepaslik wees naamlik op die gebied van openbare
ampsbekleding. Die kernvraag by openbare ampsbekleding is of die
ampsbekleër vir die openbare amp waarin sy/haar aangestel is, geskik is
en die pligte wat met die amp vereenselwig word, soos dit in die
toepaslike reg beskryf word, getrou (kan) uitvoer. Openbare
ampsbekleding hang juis nie primêr van die persoonlike verhoudings van
die ampsbekleër met die publiek of met die hoofde of ondersgeskiktes van
die ampsbekleër af nie. Inteendeel, warm verhoudings kan juis
verkeerdelik voortspruit uit oorwegings wat allermins met die betrokke
amp vereenselwigbaar is. Dit kan voorkom omdat die kunsmatige
identiteit van openbare ampsbekleding met vermeende ubuntugeïnspireerde
knusse betrekkinge wat niks met die nakoming van
openbare ampspligte te doen het nie, verwar word. Om hierdie rede is die
aanwending van ubuntu-geïnspireerde goeie verhoudings in die konteks
van openbare ampsbekding bevraagtekenbaar.
The value of ubuntu, among other things encapsulating the notions of
humaneness, human dignity, reconciliation, group solidarity,
compassion, the establishment and the maintenance of warm relations
and restorative justice is autochthonous to South African law, more in particular South African constitutional law. Lately it has come to play an
increasingly important part in South African constitutional jurisprudence.
It is not possible to measure exactly how prominent the place is that
ubuntu occupies in the public order and in the public service. However,
judging by the Constitutional Court, who observed that the spirit of
ubuntu is part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the
population,1 ubuntu might be far more important than one might
generally tend to assume. This article assesses the relevance or otherwise
of ubuntu in constitutional law. The discussion proceeds from the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on ubuntu, thus beginning in
section 2 with an overview of the judicial pronouncements on ubuntu.
This discussion casts light on the definition and the field of application of
ubuntu as viewed by the courts. There is a corpus of South African
academic literature on ubuntu.2 In this corpus ubuntu is generally very
favourably viewed. However, there is also stinging critique against
ubuntu as for example in the thoroughly researched article by Ilze Keevy,
who argues that ubuntu is fundamentally at odds with the values of
equality and tolerance as endorsed by the South African constitution.3
Moreover, even those who generally praised ubuntu as a lofty ethicallegal
value complex, encounter serious difficulties in their attempts to
offer a workable core-definition of ubuntu.4 Moreover, some attempts to
define ubuntu were to my mind so airy-fairy that they fail to
communicate anything of value about ubuntu.5 For that reason, but for a
few exceptions such as the discussion by Bilchitz, the academic
commentary is mainly left aside in this article. The focus instead is on
ubuntu as assessed by the courts. In the next two sections of the article
the rightful place that ubuntu should occupy in constitutional law is
considered. Hence, if there is a place for ubuntu, as the affirming dicta of
the courts clearly suggest, the question is how to delineate the boundaries of its applicability, and how to clarify where ubuntu should
have a place and a role and where not.
It is argued in section 3, and this leads to the first conclusion, that
ubuntu could be relevant and even of crucial importance in the sphere of
inter-communal relations and for the maintenance of inter-communal
peace, which is an essential condition for the very existence and survival
of the state. In this context ubuntu may be playing an important part in
what is here termed (an emerging) law of inter-communal relations,
which is in fact a core issue of constitutional law and for the well-being
of the state. However, in section 4 it is argued that there is a field of
constitutional law where it would be inappropriate to allow ubuntu to play
any part. This is in the context of certain aspects of public office-bearing,
which is an essential aspect of constitutional law and on which the
existence and well-being of the state depends. To allow ubuntu to play
any part in this context could arguably be to the detriment of the state.
