The role of asymmetric information on investments in emerging markets

Show simple item record De Wet, W.A. (Walter Albert) 2007-10-03T06:39:10Z 2007-10-03T06:39:10Z 2004-07
dc.description.abstract This paper argues that, because of asymmetric information and adverse selection, forces other than fundamentals may play an immense role in investment flows to emerging markets. When information is distributed asymmetrically between those who make decisions (the government) and the theoretical beneficiaries (investors), optimal investment behaviour is distorted. Information, which is hidden from investors, affects a country adversely, even though it may not be negative in nature. As a consequence of asymmetric information, other more serious problems, which in the long run can prove to be very costly, could appear. The paper applies a model developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment (1990)) to test for the presence of credit rationing in these markets. en
dc.format.extent 189260 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.identifier.citation De Wet, WA 2004, 'The role of asymmetric information on investments in emerging markets', Economic Modelling, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 621-630. [] en
dc.identifier.issn 0264-9993
dc.identifier.other 10.1016/j.econmod.2003.09.002
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Elsevier en
dc.rights Elsevier en
dc.subject Imperfect information en
dc.subject Rationing en
dc.subject Adverse selection en
dc.subject Contagion en
dc.subject.lcsh Investments
dc.title The role of asymmetric information on investments in emerging markets en
dc.type Postprint Article en

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