Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford

Show simple item record Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma 2013-10-28T06:01:45Z 2013-10-28T06:01:45Z 2013-07
dc.description.abstract In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination- based anti-realist arguments. en_US
dc.description.librarian hb2013 en_US
dc.description.librarian cp2013 en
dc.description.uri en_US
dc.identifier.citation Ruttkamp-Bloem, E 2013, 'Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford', Journal for General Philosophy of Science, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 201-224. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0925-4560 (print)
dc.identifier.issn 1572-8587 (online)
dc.identifier.other 10.1007/s10838-013-9220-x
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Springer en_US
dc.rights © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013.The original publication is available at en_US
dc.subject Realism en_US
dc.subject Evolutionary progressiveness en_US
dc.subject Continuity en_US
dc.subject Reference en_US
dc.subject Truth en_US
dc.subject Unconceived alternatives en_US
dc.title Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford en_US
dc.type Postprint Article en_US

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