dc.contributor.author |
Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-28T06:01:45Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2013-10-28T06:01:45Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2013-07 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the
evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation
for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised
realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures
and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued
that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by
showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions
among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and
full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism
redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the
debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-
based anti-realist arguments. |
en_US |
dc.description.librarian |
hb2013 |
en_US |
dc.description.librarian |
cp2013 |
en |
dc.description.uri |
http://link.springer.com/journal/10838 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.citation |
Ruttkamp-Bloem, E 2013, 'Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford', Journal for General Philosophy of Science, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 201-224. |
en_US |
dc.identifier.issn |
0925-4560 (print) |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
1572-8587 (online) |
|
dc.identifier.other |
10.1007/s10838-013-9220-x |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2263/32158 |
|
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
Springer |
en_US |
dc.rights |
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013.The original publication is available at http://link.springer.com/journal/10838 |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Realism |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Evolutionary progressiveness |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Continuity |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Reference |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Truth |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Unconceived alternatives |
en_US |
dc.title |
Re-enchanting realism in debate with Kyle Stanford |
en_US |
dc.type |
Postprint Article |
en_US |