Abstract:
In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the
evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation
for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised
realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures
and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued
that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by
showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions
among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and
full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism
redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the
debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-
based anti-realist arguments.
