Abstract:
Corporate Governance and in particular, the role of the board of directors, have been placed at the centre of attention due to the recent well-publicized corporate scandals (Adams, Hermalin,&Weisbach, 2009). In South Africa, both the King II and recently published King III reports emphasise the importance of the board of directors, as being the crucial aspect of the South African corporate governance system (Institute of Directors, Southern Africa, 2002, 2009).The aim of this study was to determine the relationship between corporate governance and company performance. This was achieved by defining six specific characteristics of the board of directors in relation to corporate governance (independent variables of board independence, CEO-Chairman duality, staggered boards, board size and the presence and composition of the board remuneration committee), as well as identifying five company performance measures (dependent variables of net profit margin, return on equity, return on assets, share price and dividend payout).In reviewing the available literature, it was found that there is a lack of an appropriate and publicly available corporate governance measurement tool in South Africa. The Delphi technique was used to garner the views of four experts in the corporate governance field, in order to obtain their views as to what constitutes the research selected independent variables. The emergent themes from these interviews guided the measurement of these board variables and empirical testing against the selected company performance measures using the 21 Consumer Goods Companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange with published financial statements over the time period commencing on 01 January 2006 and ending on 31 December 2010.The overall results of this study indicate that the vast majority of board selected variables relating to corporate governance had a positive relationship with company performance. Of the six independent variables selected for testing, board independence, board size and composition of the board remuneration committee were found to have statistically significant relationships with the dependent variables of company performance, while the presence of a board remuneration committee indicated a moderate relationship (with only return on assets and net profit margin indicating a significant relationship) and staggered boards revealed no statistical significant difference.The relationship between CEO-Chairman duality and company performance could not be assessed, due to the sector data set revealing only one instance in which this duality existed.
