Democracy, populism and hyperinflation : some evidence from Latin America

Show simple item record Bittencourt, Manoel 2013-05-20T06:52:21Z 2013-05-20T06:52:21Z 2012
dc.description.abstract We test for the populist view of inflation in Latin America between 1970 and 2007. The empirical results -based on the relatively novel panel time-series data and analysis confirm the theoretical prediction that recently elected governments coming into power after periods of political dictatorship, and which are faced with high economic inequality, end up generating high inflation and macroeconomic instability. All in all, we suggest that the implementation of democracy as such requires not only the right political context or an appropriately con- strained executive to work well, but it also must come with certain economic institutions (e.g. central bank independence and a credible and responsible fiscal authority), institutions which would raise the costs of pursuing populist policies in the first place. en_US
dc.description.librarian hb2013 en_US
dc.description.sponsorship I thank ERSA for financial support. en_US
dc.description.uri en_US
dc.identifier.citation Bittencourt, M 2012, 'Democracy, populism and hyperinflation : some evidence from Latin America', Economics of Governance, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 311-332. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 1435-6104 (print)
dc.identifier.issn 1435-8131 (online)
dc.identifier.other 10.1007/s10101-012-0117-7
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Springer en_US
dc.rights © Springer-Verlag 2012. The original publication is available at en_US
dc.subject Democracy en_US
dc.subject Populism en_US
dc.subject Hyperinflation en_US
dc.subject Latin America en_US
dc.title Democracy, populism and hyperinflation : some evidence from Latin America en_US
dc.type Postprint Article en_US

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