In this article the author reflects on the relationship between the law and the humanities in the
context of the aftermath of apartheid. She raises some concerns with regard to the general sentiment
that emanates from the ASSAf report and the Charter on the Humanities and Social Sciences
which would appear to limit the contribution of these disciplines to a narrow functionalism devoid
of any intrinsic value. She refers to two articles published recently by South African scholars on
the state of both the university and the humanities. The first article laments the university’s
uncritical embrace of corporatisation, resulting in the concomitant loss of collegiality. The other
focuses on how even critical responses to the state’s approach towards the humanities fall into
the trap of again delimiting the humanities; advocating, instead, a third space, within which the
humanities would be enabled to develop a selfconscious critical stance. The author underwrites
Ulrike Kistner’s support of this third space that is linked to Hannah Arendt’s definition of freedom
(distinguished from liberation).
Traditional approaches to law which regard the law as an autonomous discipline are not
open to the possible influence and value of the humanities for legal scholarship and legal education.
The author, however, is also critical of the extent to which some legal scholars rely on multidisciplinary
approaches, since these perspectives also follow a narrow functionalist approach to
the humanities. By way of conclusion she discusses shortly a few examples of a respectful engagement with
the humanities as part of a reflection on justice. She highlights the contemplations on law, justice
and the humanities of James Boyd White, Marianne Constable and Ari Hirvonen. Law and
literature scholar James Boyd White rejects the view of the law as a system of rules and policy
as well as the view of the law as an abstract mechanical bureaucratic system. To him law is “an
inherently unstable structure of thought and expression”... “not a set of rules at all, but a form
of life” (2012:1). Marianne Constable’s take on justice is to focus on the exploration of speech
and the silences from which speech emanates. She focuses on the imperfect nature of language
and translates this into law – as language, law is imperfect, incomplete and unknowable. Ari
Hirvonen, through the work of Sarah Kofman, considers the possibility of a new humanism that
does not comply with a set of universal morals, but rather imagines and creates communities
based on irreducible difference.
The author argues that these examples are valuable for the depth of engagement with justice
from a humanities perspective, showing that they could also give direction to critical legal
scholarship and critical legal education within the present South African context.
In die artikel besin die outeur oor die verhouding tussen die reg en die geesteswetenskappe in die
konteks van die nasleep van apartheid. Sy spreek kommer uit oor die algemene sentiment wat
voortspruit uit die ASSAf-verslag en Handves vir die Geestes- en Sosiale wetenskappe, wat ’n
eng funksionalistiese, nie-intrinsieke waarde aan hierdie dissiplines toedig. Ulrike Kistner se steun
vir ʼn derde ruimte vir die kritiese geesteswetenskappe wat in die teken staan van Hannah Arendt
se omskrywing van vryheid (te onderskei van bevryding) word ondersteun. Tradisionele
benaderings tot die reg wat die reg as ʼn outonome dissipline beskou, is nie oop vir die moontlike
invloed en waarde van die geeswetenskappe vir regstudie en regsopvoeding nie. Die outeur staan
egter self krities teenoor die mate waarin sommige regsgeleerdes steun op multidissiplinêre
perspektiewe, aangesien hierdie perspektiewe ook ʼn eng funksionalistiese benadering tot die
geesteswetenskappe volg. Ter afsluiting bespreek sy kortliks voorbeelde van ʼn respekvolle omgang
met die geesteswetenskappe as deel van ʼn besinning oor geregtigheid.
