dc.contributor.author |
Spiers, Edward M.
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2010-11-04T06:18:06Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2010-11-04T06:18:06Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2010-05 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
The British military performance in the South African War not only confounded prewar
expectations but also aroused controversy about what had caused the
underestimation of a well-armed, mobile enemy and the failure to anticipate the
tactical challenges posed by fire zones, swept by smokeless magazine rifles. Although
the sweeping criticisms of Leo Amery, which held sway for over 70 years, have been
modified by more recent historiography, this essay uses the correspondence of British
soldiers to argue that the British victory was not simply a product of numerical
superiority and an ability to deny any foreign intervention on behalf of the Boers. It
claims that the British army, and its much-maligned soldiery, proved resilient and
adaptable in South Africa, capable of learning in the field, and of conducting counterguerrilla
operations across a vast terrain in a way that would ultimately undermine the
enemy’s will to resist. While the more perceptive Boers recognised that the British
had improved in their field craft and tactical skills neither the British press,
disenchanted with a protracted war, nor the military themselves, valued this learning
process inasmuch as the war seemed to be largely anomalous with only limited
lessons for the future. |
en_US |
dc.description.abstract |
Die Britse militêre vertoning in die Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog het nie alleen
vooroorlogse verwagtinge beskaam nie, maar ook dispuut ontlok oor wat gelei het tot
die onderskatting van ’n goed bewapende, mobiele vyand en die versuim om die
taktiese uitdagings te voorsien wat gestel is deur vuursones, bestryk deur rooklose
magasyngewere. Ofskoon die felle kritiek van Leo Amery wat vir meer as 70 jaar
oorheers het deur meer onlangse historiografie versag is, benut hierdie artikel die
korrespondensie van Britse soldate om te argumenteer dat die Britse oorwinning nie
bloot die gevolg was van ’n getalle-oorwig en die vermoë om enige buitelandse
tussenkoms namens die Boere te verhoed nie. Dit voer aan dat die Britse leër en sy
veel beswadderde krygsvolk ‘n veerkragtigheid en aanpasbaarheid in Suid-Afrika
getoon het, en dat hulle daartoe in staat was om in die veld te leer, en om teenguerrilla
operasies uit te voer oor ’n wye terrein en op ’n manier wat uiteindelik die
vyand se wil om weerstand te bied sou ondergrawe. Terwyl die meer opmerksame
Boere besef het dat die Britte in hul vermoë in die veld en met hul taktiese
vaardighede verbeter het, het nóg die Britse pers – ontnugter deur ’n uitgerekte oorlog
– nóg die militêre self hierdie leerkurwe na waarde geskat, in so verre die oorlog as
grootliks anomaal met slegs beperkte lesse vir die toekoms beskou is. |
en_US |
dc.identifier.citation |
Spiers, EM 2010, 'The learning curve in the South African War : soldiers’ perspectives', Historia, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 1-17. [http://www.journals.co.za/ej/ejour_hist.html] |
en_US |
dc.identifier.issn |
0018-229X |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2263/15155 |
|
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
Historical Association of South Africa |
en_US |
dc.rights |
Historical Association of South Africa |
en_US |
dc.subject |
British army |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Learning curve |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Army reform |
en_US |
dc.subject |
South African War |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Counter-guerrilla operations |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Britse lëer |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Leerkurwe |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Militêre hervorming |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Teen-guerrilla operasies |
en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh |
South African War, 1899-1902 |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Military campaigns |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Great Britain -- Armed forces |
en |
dc.subject.lcsh |
Learning curve (Psychometrics) |
en |
dc.title |
The learning curve in the South African War : soldiers’ perspectives |
en_US |
dc.title.alternative |
Leerkurwe in die Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog : die soldate se perspektiewe |
en_US |
dc.type |
Article |
en_US |